Anbar Objects To Iraq’s October Natural Gas Auction

Map of the 3 natural gas fields to be auctioned off Oct. 20, 2010
Source: Energy-Pedia News

On October 20, 2010 Iraq’s Oil Ministry will hold an auction for three natural gas fields. One of them is Akkas in Anbar province. There the governor and provincial council are demanding that they, and not Baghdad be in charge of developing the field.

Anbar’s governor and the head of the provincial council both talked with Reuters recently to voice their objections to the Oil Ministry’s plans. Governor Qasim Abdi Muhammad Hammadi al Fahadawi said he was against any government deal for Akkas. He claimed the field should be under local control instead. He warned that the province would not provide any security for Akkas if it was auctioned off. The head of the provincial council also said that Baghdad had ignored Anbar’s natural resources, and that the Oil Ministry should start exploring for gas and oil there.

Akkas has an estimated 5.6 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. It, along with Mansuriya in Diyala, and Siba in Basra, are going to be bid on by thirteen international companies tomorrow. Originally, the auction was supposed to occur on September 1, but was then delayed until October 1 to try to draw up more interest. It was set back again until October 24 because the Ministry claimed several companies had asked for additional information on the process. Some of the businesses that have paid fees to participate are Italy’s Edison, France’s Total, South Korea’s KOGAS, and Russia’s TNK-BP.

Anbar’s objections are just the latest example of a province calling for greater control over its resources. The Oil Ministry however, clams that it has the ultimate authority over developing the country’s petroleum and gas, and has done little to appease local concerns. That could lead to problems between the central and provincial governments if Akkas is successfully bid on. At the same time, the Oil Ministry doesn’t rely upon the governorates to manage and export resources so Anbar is limited in what it can do about the gas auction.

SOURCES

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraqi province wants more say over energy riches,” Reuters, 10/18/10

Are The Sons Of Iraq Returning To The Insurgency?

Sons of Iraq In Diyala province
Source: Agence France Presse

On October 16, 2010 the New York Times ran a story claiming that hundreds of Sons of Iraq (SOI) members had left their jobs, with most of them rejoining the insurgency, specifically Al Qaeda in Iraq. The article was largely based upon sources from Diyala province. That governorate has had the most contentious relationship between the SOI and the government for the last three years as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has tried to break and co-opt the SOI there. The Times’ piece failed to mention this background, and that could’ve probably provided a better explanation for what has gone on in Diyala.

The New York Times talked with government officials, SOI members, and an insurgent commander who told it that hundreds of SOI had rejoined Al Qaeda in Iraq. It also claimed that perhaps thousands of SOI still on the job were aiding the insurgency. An SOI leader in Diyala said that two dozen of his fighters had recently rejoined Al Qaeda in the last few weeks. An Al Qaeda commander was interviewed saying that they had a successful intimidation and recruiting campaign amongst the SOI there as well. Police officials accused SOI members of helping insurgents, and claimed that they had arrested 90 since January 2010, although half of them were later released for lack of evidence. Finally, the head of Diyala’s security committee told the Times that the SOI were working with militants.

Several causes were cited for this turn of events. One was Al Qaeda’s carrot and stick approach towards the Sons. They have targeted the SOI, resulting in hundreds killed and wounded, while at the same time offering them safety and more money than the government is paying them to switch sides. The political instability after the March 2010 parliamentary elections was also cited because Sunnis are not sure about their political future. The last was a government crackdown on the SOI in the province that has resulted in arrests, and an attempt to disarm them.

The problem with the story was that it was mostly based upon reports from Diyala, but had little context for what has been going on there. The province’s SOI have had the most difficulties with the government of any in the country. Those problems began in 2007 when insurgents first began turning on Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the U.S. turned them into the first Sons of Iraq units. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) attempted to co-opt them to build up its popular base ahead of the provincial elections, which were originally scheduled for 2008. Prime Minister Maliki immediately attempted to break this alliance. First, he offered the SOI government jobs in 2007, while refusing to integrate those who were connected to the IIP. Then in 2008, the premier launched Omens of Prosperity that was nominally meant to fight insurgents, but turned into an operation against the SOI and Islamic Party. Hundreds of SOI fighters were rounded up, along with IIP members. The U.S. even complained that Maliki was destabilizing the province at the time through his actions. The ties between the SOI and the Islamic Party were not broken and the IIP still came in first place in the 2009 elections.

Since then little has changed. Baghdad continues to offer rewards and punishments to the SOI in Diyala. In January 2009 the government took control of the SOI in the province from the U.S. promising to integrate a larger percentage into the security forces than in the rest of the country. Instead, many weren’t paid until March. One SOI leader claimed that half of his fighters were fired after the take over. Islamic Party and SOI members continued to be arrested, and Maliki launched another security operation that targeted them in mid-2009. Again, the Americans complained about these operations, with the Provincial Reconstruction Team in the province saying that they were likely political moves at the behest of Maliki. In June 2010, the government told the SOI that they could no longer carry guns because they were civilians. Finally, Baghdad announced that it would stop integrating all of the SOI in the country because they needed them for security before and after the 2010 elections, and because of a hiring freeze imposed by the 2009 budget. Payment problems continue to this day as well in Diyala.

The day after the New York Times story ran, two SOI leaders rejected the paper’s claims as well. CNN talked with two sheikhs, one in Diyala and one in Salahaddin, who stated that their men were still at their jobs. The two had 24,000 fighters under their command. They blamed politicians who were opposed to the SOI for the Times article. The Diyala sheikh said that 150 of his men had walked off their posts in the past two months, but that was because they no longer felt safe from insurgent attacks, while others went looking for other work.

So what is the truth of the matter? Some SOI have undoubtedly been tempted by Al Qaeda’s offers and rejoined the militants. How many is unknown as reports of former SOI members taking part in attacks are very rare. The fact that the New York Times didn’t provide any background to its article robbed the story of the context necessary to understand what’s happening in Diyala however. The bigger problem with the SOI seems to be the government’s unwillingness to integrate all of them, and Maliki’s continued attempt to punish and co-opt them in the province. That along with insurgent attacks upon checkpoints has probably led many more SOI to abandon their posts for safety, to escape harassment by the government, and to search out jobs that actually pay than to rejoin Al Qaeda. Either way, both trends are worrisome, and have had a deleterious affect upon security, giving insurgents more opportunities to carry out attacks.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “disarming awakening councils threatens security,” Niqash, 6/9/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF head’s detention is meant for political liquidation – IIP,” 5/19/09

Haynes, Deborah, “A mutiny among militia threatens peace in Iraq after US airstrike,” Times of London, 4/4/09

Reid, Robert, “Without pay, Iraqi Sunni fighters threaten to quit,” Associated Press, 3/28/09

Santora, Marc, “Iraq Arrests 2 Sunni Leaders, Raising Fears of Violence,” New York Times, 5/19/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/10
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/10

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Leaders deny Iraqi Awakening Council members defecting to al Qaeda,” CNN, 10/17/10

Williams, Timothy and Adnan, Duraid, “Sunnis in Iraq Allied With U.S. Quitting to Rejoin Rebels,” New York Times, 10/16/10

Al Qaeda’s Ideology Betrayed Itself In Iraq

Many theories have been given for why Iraqis turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq. Much has been written about the Islamists use of violence against the tribes in Anbar and other insurgent groups across the country as a deciding factor. Others have pointed to Al Qaeda’s attempt to take over friendly tribes’ illegal businesses. Dr. Andrew Phillips, a lecturer at the University of Queensland, Australia presented a paper in 2008 arguing that Al Qaeda’s ideology was the major factor.

According to Phillips, the root of the problem for Al Qaeda was its world revolutionary outlook, and exclusionary vision of Islam. Al Qaeda mixes two popular jihadist beliefs. One is an idea that the Muslim world has become corrupt, and they are the only true believers, who need to renew the roots of the religion. Another is that the West is responsible for this decline. Some Islamists decided to respond to this perceived threat by struggling against their own governments that they saw as godless and pro-Western. Others felt that the United States was the root of the problem, and therefore needed to be confronted. Al Qaeda took the latter route, arguing the need to fight the U.S. in order to start the regeneration of their faith.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Source: AP

Al Qaeda in Iraq was created by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadhil Nazal al-Khalaylah in Zarqa, Jordan in 1966. He was exposed to Islamist ideas early on in life, and that led to his departure to fight the Russians in Afghanistan in 1989. At the time, many jihadists believed that the Soviet Union’s secular communist ideas were as bad as the West’s, and their invasion of a Muslim country had to be opposed. After the Afghan war Zarqawi met Muhammad al-Maqdisi, aka Issam al-Barqawi, a well-known radical Islamist and Jordanian. Together the two decided to go back to their homeland and start an Islamic revolution. They were arrested in the 1990s for their activities, but Zarqawi was later released under an amnesty program, and ended up back in Afghanistan. There he met Osama bin Laden, and asked for and received assistance to create his own camp where he would train fighters to overthrow the Jordanian government. While there Zarqawi expanded his ideas to a worldwide Islamist fight against Israel, Jews, and the West. This came together in his new group, Tawhid wal Jihad, Unity and Holy War that eventually built up a network throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Europe, and launched plots to bomb Israel, and attack Jews in Germany. Zarqawi’s activities showed the mixing of various jihadist ideas. At first, he was caught up in expelling the Soviets from a Muslim country, Afghanistan, which was an early radicalizing event for Islamists. He then decided to focus upon his home country, Jordan, to start an Islamic revolution. When he went back to Afghanistan in the 1990s he came into contact with Al Qaeda and other radicals that made him expand his ideas to the need for a worldwide struggle against Israel and the West. It was this ideology that led him to travel to Iraq next.

When it became apparent that the United States would overthrow Saddam Hussein, Zarqawi began focusing upon Iraq. He went there in March 2002, and set up networks in Syria, Iran, Baghdad, the Sunni triangle, and allied with the Kurdish group, Ansar al-Islam. In March 2003 he also met with Al Qaeda’s military head, Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi, aka Saif al-Adel, in Iran. The two agreed to facilitate the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq to attack the Americans. When the insurgency started Zarqawi played a crucial role in providing money, men, and logistics, as well as carrying out the first mass casualty attacks such as the bombings of the United Nations headquarters and Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, and the headquarters of the Italian carabineri in Nasiriyah. His group also attracted the support of Iraqi jihadists, who had been growing in number since the Gulf War in 1991. Zarqawi thus established himself as a leader in the insurgency quickly. He later renamed his group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia in 2004, and pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden. The U.S. invasion of Iraq thus turned out to be a boon for Zarqawi. He was able to become a world famous jihadist, expand the power and influence of his organization, and finally take the fight to the West. His name began to rival that of bin Laden, and the later alignment with him was another way to increase Zarqawi’s standing and tap into the foreign funding that Al Qaeda had available.

Al Qaeda 2nd in Command Ayman Zawahiri
Source: Long War Journal

Zarqawi and Al Qaeda would prove to have a rocky relationship. The two sides disagreed about tactics and strategy. Bin Laden’s number two, Ayman Zawahiri argued that jihadists should first kick the Americans out of Iraq, and then establish a Caliphate there. Zarqawi believed that the way to achieve that was by starting a sectarian civil war that would pull the country into chaos and make the U.S. leave. He thought that this civil war would spread to the rest of the Middle East, weakening other governments, and opening up the way for a global jihad. Al Qaeda in Iraq then began focusing upon attacking Shiites to provoke their retaliation. Al Qaeda central never believed in this strategy, and Zawahiri would later unsuccessfully call on Zarqawi to stop his campaign against the Shiites. The dispute between the two groups showed that Islamism was not a monolithic movement, and that Al Qaeda in Iraq was its own group at the time, following its own vision of jihad. At the same time, the two did have ties, which neither was willing to give up because both benefited from being seen as fighting against the Americans in Iraq. Zarqawi’s rift with Al Qaeda was the harbinger of a larger problem he would have with Iraq’s militants.

From 2004-2007 Al Qaeda in Iraq and the country’s Sunnis split. Zarqawi wanted leadership of the insurgency, and used a variety of methods to achieve it. He killed tribal sheikhs and other militants to impose his will. He attempted to marry Al Qaeda fighters with Iraqi women to connect his organization with local communities. He tried to appropriate businesses, like the smuggling tribes in Anbar carried out, to monopolize the funding of the insurgency. Zarqawi tried to impose his form of Islam upon Iraqis. In 2005, many tribes and insurgents also decided to participate in the December vote for parliament to gain some kind of Sunni representation. Al Qaeda rejected any role in the new Iraq. Finally, in October 2006 Al Qaeda declared the Islamic State of Iraq in Anbar as an umbrella organization that was supposed to unite all the militant groups under its leadership. All of these tactics, along with Al Qaeda’s inability to protect Sunnis during the civil war, caused resentment amongst Iraqis, which eventually led them to break from the group. First the tribes in Anbar began fighting against Zarqawi in 2005. In 2006 they gained American support, and then in 2007 the U.S. began playing on the differences between Iraqis and Al Qaeda across northern and central Iraq, which led to the formation of the Sons of Iraq. Eventually, the majority of Sunnis rejected Al Qaeda’s ideas, and this has led to its current isolation and loss of support within the country.

By 2007 the U.S. exploited the divisions between Al Qaeda and insurgents to create the Sons of Iraq
Source: Al Jazeera

At the heart of the matter was the fact that Al Qaeda’s ideology ended up alienating Iraqis. Zarqawi overestimated the appeal of jihadist ideas in Iraq, ignored local concerns, and believed that he could impose his will. He was fooled at first, by his initial success. Al Qaeda was able to humiliate the U.S. in Iraq, energized international support for the fight there, and did start a sectarian civil war. That was the apex of his vision however. There was no way he could create a caliphate in Iraq because the Baathists and nationalists within the insurgency always outnumbered the Islamists and foreign fighters. The latter were more concerned about bringing back Sunni or Baathist rule rather than putting Zarqawi in power. Attacking tribes and other insurgents, marrying into families, taking over local businesses, and starting a sectarian war all backfired, and pushed Iraqis away from Al Qaeda. This happened before in other situations, such as in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir. There, foreign jihadists were eventually rejected as well because they acted superior, ignored indigenous concerns, and used violence against those that refused to follow their lead. That points to the Islamist ideology as a root problem for their failures rather than local circumstances.

Al Qaeda was never going to succeed in Iraq. It was always a small group within the insurgency, but its spectacular attacks gave it a larger profile and more media attention than other militants. Its ideology failed to win over many converts, as few were willing to follow Zarqawi as an Islamist revolutionary vanguard. In fact its ideas led to tactics and strategies that ended up alienating many Sunnis, and that allowed the U.S. to exploit the differences in a divide and conquer strategy. Even after Zarqawi was killed in 2006, and replaced with Abu Ayub al-Masri who was more in line with Al Qaeda in Pakistan, the group failed to improve its situation. Masri was later killed in April 2010, and Al Qaeda in Iraq is now led by a third wave of leaders who are still committed to targeting Shiites, the government, and the Awakening/Sons of Iraq. That shows despite the change in leadership, the organization’s core ideas remain. On the other hand, Al Qaeda in Iraq is still operating, and will probably continue to do so for several more years. In fact, it may have gained more breathing space with the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the on-going political deadlock over forming a new government, and Baghdad’s unwillingness to fully integrate the Sons of Iraq. Al Qaeda can’t win in Iraq, but it also can only be defeated through a combined military and political strategy by the Iraqi government. Unfortunately Baghdad is so divided it doesn’t appear capable of doing that right now, which is giving the Islamists extra life.

SOURCES

Ashour, Omar, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Eliminating Leaders Will Not Necessarily Cut Lifelines,” Arab Reform Bulletin, 6/30/10

Eisenstadt, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, “Iraq Tribal engagement Lessons Learned,” Military Review, September-October 2007

Gambill, Gary, “Abu Musaib Al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 12/16/04

Hendawi, Hamza, “Al-Qaida in Iraq offers cash to lure former allies,” Associated Press, 8/6/10

Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07

Kilcullen, Dave, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07

Kukis, Mark, “Turning Iraq’s Tribes Against Al-Qaeda,” Time, 12/26/06

McEvers, Kelly, “Analysts Speculate Al-Qaida In Iraq Has Regrouped,” Morning Edition, NPR, 10/6/10

Phillips, Dr. Andrew, “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associated, 8/28-31/08

Ridolfo, Kathleen, “Iraq: Al-Qaeda Tactics Lead To Splits Among Insurgents,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4/17/07

Roggio, Bill, “Dear Zarqawi: A Letter from Zawahiri, and a Constitutional Compromise,” Long War Journal.org, 10/12/05

Symon, Fiona, “The devil America knows,” Financial Times, 9/24/04

Whitlock, Craig, “Al-Zarqawi’s Biography,” Washington Post, 6/8/06

Iraqi Accordance Front And Unity Of Iraq Lists Try To Remain Relevant

In the 2010 parliamentary elections, the Iraqi Accordance Front and the Unity of Iraq lists only won six and four seats respectively. That was a huge disappointment for both. The Accordance Front, led by the Iraqi Islamic Party, ran in the 2005 balloting, and came away with 44 seats. The Unity of Iraq list, made up of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani’s Constitution Party, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening movement, former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashadani, and the Sunni Endowment, were hoping to win over the Sunni and nationalist vote with their claims of securing the country. Neither was successful. From December 2009 to January 2010 the Accordance Front fractured with members like Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Council departing over charges that the Islamic Party was attempting to monopolize power. Before the 2010 vote, more members left, with many of them joining Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement such as Vice President Tariq Hashemi. The Unity of Iraq’s platform turned out to be indistinguishable from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law’s, and lacked its standing with the public. That resulted in both having poor showings at the ballot box.

Since the March election not much has been heard from either list until recently. On October 10, it was announced that the two would join together in the new Iraqi Centrist Alliance. Then it appeared to be playing Allawi off of Maliki in an attempt to gain as much influence as it possible could for such a minor list with only ten seats. On October 11, a member of the new alliance said that ten other parliamentarians were willing to join, and that it would then back the National Coalition made up of State of Law and the Sadrist-Supreme Council led Iraqi National Alliance. Then on October 13, the Iraqi National Movement claimed that it had 130 parliamentarians on its side to support current Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, a Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) member, for the premiership. The Iraqi Centrist Alliance was supposedly a member of this new group, but then the next day it denied any such alignment. 

Iraqi politics has taken one gradual step with Moqtada al-Sadr’s recent about face on supporting Maliki. Now State of Law and the National Movement are focusing upon gaining the backing of the remaining parties, such as the Kurdish Coalition and the Centrist Alliance to reach 163 seats, which is the necessary majority in parliament to begin naming a premier. This turn of events, has led the rather minor Accordance Front and Unity of Iraq lists to try to maximize their positions with Allawi and Maliki by offering their support to the highest bidder. This explains the apparent flip-flop by the Centrist Alliance that at one time said they would join the National Coalition, and then the National Movement, and then announced it would explore its options instead. If it can work out a deal before the Kurds, who are the largest unaligned bloc, make up their mind it can probably get more positions in a new government than ten seats might otherwise be able to. If not, it faces the possibility of being an after thought, a coalition left out, or added at the end, just to maintain the image of a national unity government, which means it will get less. In the end, when all the personal rivalries are sorted out amongst Iraq’s major parties, all of them will be jockeying for key posts and ministries in a new ruling coalition, which will allow them to dole out patronage to maintain and build upon their supporters. No list wants to be left out of the spoils, which is why the Centrist Alliance is now making its move.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09

Alsumaria, “Accordance Front willing to engage in new government,” 5/6/10
- “Al Iraqiya forms a new axis,” 10/13/10
- “Mashadani supports Al Maliki in 2nd term,” 4/10/10
- “Wasat Alliance denies axis with Iraqiya Bloc,” 10/14/10

Ashour, Muhammad, “no more sunni parties … other than the lame duck,” Niqash, 3/4/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi Accordance, Iraq Unity blocs form new alliance,” 10/10/10

Ibrahim, Haider, “Dozens of Iraqi MPs to join National Coalition List,” AK News, 10/11/10

Inside Iraq, “Iraq’s Election results,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/26/10

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections And Beyond,” 2/25/10

Al-Jasim, Huda, “Iraq: Major Disputes within the National Alliance,” Asharq Alawsat, 6/16/10

Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraqi election results: What do they mean for the biggest winners, Allawi and Maliki?” Long War Journal, 3/27/10

Mashkour, Salem, “Iraqi Elections and Prospective Government Scenarios,” Arab Reform Bulletin, 3/3/10

Niqash, “the biggest loser,” 4/7/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/10

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Parliamentary Election,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/21/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Unity of Iraq Alliance: Another Second-Generation Coalition,” Historiae.org, 10/21/09

Iraq’s Oil Infrastructure Expansion Plans May Run Into A Hitch

Iraq is about to embark upon a massive building and rehabilitation effort on its oil industry. The Oil Ministry wants to boost oil production from around 2.4 million barrels a day currently, to 12 million barrels in six years. In order to achieve that goal, the country must rebuild and repair it existing infrastructure, while quadrupling its pipelines and terminals at the same time. Basra will be at the center of this work as the largest petroleum fields are in the south, and the Basra port currently handles around 80% of the country’s oil exports.

Basra Oil Terminal
Source: Agence France Presse

The oil facilities in Basra are in a sorry state. JJ Sutherland of National Public Radio recently relayed how he went to the Basra oil terminal in 2009. The engineers there said that they could not run the pipeline at full capacity because they were afraid it would burst, and they could not shut it down either for repairs because of trepidation that the underwater section would collapse under pressure from the sea. Back in October 2008, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the state-run South Oil Company completed a study that found that the pipes in Basra could fail due to a lack of maintenance. (1) They estimated that it would take $5 billion to fix the problem.

In 2009 that the Oil Ministry came up with plans to expand and rehabilitate Basra’s infrastructure. First was the Iraqi Crude Oil Export Expansion project that will replace the current Basra oil terminal and pipelines, and increase capacity to 4.5 million barrels a day. Then there are plans to add four new floating terminals, three underwater pipelines, new oil and gas pipelines, reconstruct the Fao port, and rehabilitate the terminals at Khor Amaya. If completed these new facilities would boost Basra’s capacity from 1.6 million barrels a day currently to 8 million barrels. The expansion is to be completed in 15 months after work begins.

A major problem with this timeline is that oil production in southern Iraq is expected to expand dramatically very soon under the new contracts given to foreign companies in 2009 and 2010. The South Oil Company expects production to reach 1.925 million barrels a day by the first quarter of 2010, then 2.030 million by the second quarter, 2.149 million by the third, and 2.285 million barrels by the end of the year. There’s no way those numbers can be reached with the current infrastructure handling less than 1.6 million barrels, and the expansion plan not expected to be finished until early 2012. Some of this work needs to be fast tracked, but Iraq has a horrible record at doing anything major on time. That could mean an increase in bottlenecks, slow downs, and closures that already plague Basra for up to a year. That would put a major damper on the Oil Ministry’s ambitious goals to more than quadruple output.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dombey, Daniel, “US warns on aging Iraqi oil pipelines,” Financial Times, 10/14/08

SOURCES

Al-Chalabi, Issam, “Iraq’s Oil Export Outlets,” Middle East Economic Survey, 11/30/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq June 2010,” 9/7/10

Dombey, Daniel, “US warns on aging Iraqi oil pipelines,” Financial Times, 10/14/08

Dow Jones, Business Week, Reuters, Leighton International, “$733m Contract Awarded for Basra Oil Terminal,” Iraq Business News,9/28/10

Ebel, Robert, “Geopolitics and Energy in Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2010

Reuters, “New Quarterly Production Targets for Basra’s Oilfields,” Iraq Business News, 9/7/10

Sutherland, JJ, “Iraq Raises Oil Reserves Estimates 25 Percent,” NPR, 10/4/10

The Knot And The Saw - Forming A New Iraqi Government

Source: Al-Sabah, 10/10/10

Trying To Reach The Chair

Source: Al-Sabah, 10/11/10