Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government Prevents Return Of Protests

Sulaymaniya in Iraq’s Kurdistan saw the largest and most consistent protests at the beginning of the year. Thousands of young people turned out every day in the city’s central square beginning in February 2011. In April, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had enough, and sent out the security forces to break them up. Since then things have been relatively quiet, until July 15 when organizers called for a new round of demonstrations. The regional government acted quickly to suppress it before it even happened.
(United Nations)
On July 14, a youth group in Sulaymaniya called for new protests in the city. It used Facebook to promote its plan for an assembly on Friday, July 15. Other activists had differing opinions on the idea. Some warned that the government would repress any new activity. The Livin Press, which has been critical of the government, added to this by reporting that large numbers of security forces were deployed throughout the city. The KRG used force back in April to break up protests in Sulaymaniya, so this threat had to be taken seriously.

The security forces were out in large numbers to deter any protests
When July 15 came around, the security forces were ready. There were checkpoints in and around the city, and a large number of officers were deployed in Saray Square where the previous protests were held. As soon as people approached downtown they were swept up or deterred from continuing. Ten organizers were arrested, (1) along with two reporters. Later, one of the protest organizations claimed that their followers were abused and beaten. They claimed the director of the Metro Center to Defend Journalism was picked up, and whipped, and that people who were trying to film the arrests with their cell phones were also detained. The government was obviously not going to tolerate a new round of demonstrations starting in Sulaymaniya. They had just broken up the last ones two months before, and were not willing to have more people out in the street questioning their authority. They thus wanted to nip these activists in the bud by a strong show of force meant to scare and intimidate them.

Demonstrations originally began in Sulaymaniya on February 17, when thousands of young people came out to Saray Square calling for a number of reforms such as a new government, and an end to corruption. Things quickly got out of hand when they headed for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) headquarters, one of the two ruling parties, and started throwing stones. That led guards to fire into the crowd, killing two people and wounding 47 others. That did not deter activists who came out to the square again the next day, and started a sit-in that lasted two months. In May, the government decided to end them, by sending in the security forces to beat and arrest the protesters, and push them out of the square. Since then, there had not been any activity in any part of Kurdistan until July 15.

After May, the demands of the protesters were taken up by the Kurdish opposition parties, but nothing came of it. In fact, the three opposing parties recently walked out of talks. Some of the activists objected to the negotiations to begin with, claiming that only they spoke for the Kurdish people. Because the two months of protests and the discussions with the ruling parties have not brought about any concrete change, a new wave of protests could’ve been predicted. The KRG’s response with the security forces was also something that could have been foreseen. Whether the organizers can break through the security forces is the question now, because without outside pressure, the regional government is unlikely to make anything but cosmetic reforms, while they hold onto power.

FOOTNOTES

1. Alsumaria News, “Kurdish security forces arrested ten people who were preparing to break a demonstration in Sulaimaniya,” 7/15/11

SOURCES

Alsumaria News, “Kurdish security forces arrested ten people who were preparing to break a demonstration in Sulaimaniya,” 7/15/11

Asaad, Dana, “unrest in kurdistan,” Niqash, 2/21/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “Strict security measures in Sulaimaniya to face new demonstration,” 7/16/11

Hennessy-Fiske, Molly, “IRAQ: At least two protesters dead,” Babylon & Beyond, Los Angeles Times, 2/17/11

MESOP, “Stop the Whipping in Sulaimaniah / The Federation of Civil Society Organizations,” 7/16/11

Saifaddin, Dilshad, “Kurdistan’s ruling parties to voice stance on opposition’s suspension of talks,” AK News, 7/14/11
- “Sulaimaniya: Youth group calls for revival of protests,” AK News, 7/14/11

Monday, July 18, 2011

A False Offensive In Iraq Against Special Groups, May Have Served A Political Purpose

At the end of June 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that a military offensive would be launched in southern Iraq against Special Groups. In the last couple months, the number of attacks upon U.S. forces throughout Iraq had dramatically increased, and the number of casualties along with it. The Americans were constantly pressuring Baghdad to do something about it. The Premier finally agreed to conduct an operation, but it appeared to be more for show than anything else, and might have been a warning to Moqtada al-Sadr who Maliki is increasingly having problems with.

Maysan province (Wikipedia)
On June 30, the Iraqi government said that it would begin a crackdown on Iranian-supported Special Groups in southern Iraq. 2,000 soldiers and police would be deployed to Maysan province, wanted persons would be rounded up, weapons caches would be searched for, and patrols around U.S. bases would be stepped up to prevent attacks by militants. Maysan has historically been a center for arms smuggling and infiltration by Shiites-supported by Tehran. In 2008, Maliki conducted the last of his military operations of the year there to break up the Sadrists who controlled the provincial government. 

By mid-July, the U.S. military complained to the New York Times that nothing had come of Baghdad’s effort. The top U.S. army spokesman in Iraq said that nothing substantive came of the campaign, with only a few low-level fighters detained. He told the Times that the Iraqi government could be doing more.

Since nothing of military value came of the campaign, its real purpose might have been a warning to Moqtada al-Sadr from Maliki. Sadr’s bloc in parliament was the main reason why Maliki was able to return to the premiership. As part of that deal, the Sadrists regained controlled of Maysan where the operation was announced. Since then, the Sadr movement has begun to be a thorn in the side of the prime minister. They have increased their attacks upon American forces, and are constantly bragging about it. On July 14 for example, they claimed that have carried out nine attacks upon U.S. military bases in a week in Baghdad, Maysan, Qadisiyah, and Diyala governorates. The stepped up violence, while aimed at foreigners, damages Maliki’s claim to have improved security in the country. Sadrists in parliament are also the main opponents of American troops staying in the country. They’ve called for Americans to be banned from entering parliament, condemned the opening of a U.S. consulate in Basra, and have pushed provincial councils to bar American forces from operating there. None of these actions are legal or binding, but they show how the Trend is attempting to win over public opinion to its side. That appears to be partially working as more and more parliamentarians from a variety of parties have recently said they would oppose any extended stay for the Americans. This too annoys Maliki as he appears to want to give them an extension. Finally, Sadrists on the integrity committee in parliament are constantly threatening to expose corrupt officials including members of the premier’s Dawa party, (1) which of course Maliki would not like either. While the two parties are part of the National Coalition, that is an alliance in name only. Both agreed to work together so that they could take power, but now the cracks are becoming more and more apparent. Sadr, especially needs to be wary of any threats from Maliki as he has used military force against him before.

Maliki’s move appeared to have had its intended affect. Sadr recently announced that he would not mobilize his Mahdi Army militia again, even if the U.S. army stayed in the country. This was a major reversal for Sadr who had been threatening to bring his men back on the street for months. His followers told the press that Moqtada made the decision partially because he angered political parties, meaning the prime minister’s State of Law. That still leaves differences over a troop extension and in parliament, but for now the prime minister looks like he has gotten the upper hand.

FOOTNOTES

1. Alsumaria News, “The issuance of arrest warrants for two of the leaders of the Dawa Party, on charges of corruption,” 6/30/11

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Sadr Front launches campaign to prevent Americans from entering Parliament,” 7/14/11

Alsumaria News, “The issuance of arrest warrants for two of the leaders of the Dawa Party, on charges of corruption,” 6/30/11

Arango, Tim, “In Shadow of Death, Iraq and U.S. tiptoe Around a Deadline,” New York Times, 7/14/11

Mohammed, Muhanad, “Iraq military cracks down on militias and arms smuggling,” Reuters, 7/3/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Muqtada Al Sadr denounces the opening of U.S. Consulate in Basra,” 7/6/11

Al-Rayy, “Islamic Resistance confirms implementation 9 operations against U.S. occupation forces in a week,” 7/14/11

Reuters, “Iraq cleric pursues U.S. troop ban in strongholds,” 6/30/11

Schmidt, Michael, “Iraq Begins Cracks Down on Shiite Militias,” New York Times, 7/1/11

Friday, July 15, 2011

Iraq Thinks Its Politicians And Parties Are Failing Them According To New Opinion Poll

In early June 2011, the Greenberg Quinland Rosner Research company in conjunction with the National Democratic Institute released their latest public opinion poll of Iraqis. The survey was conducted from February to March, and consisted of 2,400 in-person interviews of people 18 years or older. 1,436 of them were weighted to reflect the populations of each region. They were asked eleven questions total, and there was +/- 2.0% margin of error. This poll was a follow up to a much larger one held in November 2010. The new survey showed that Iraqis are losing confidence in the direction the country is going in and in their leaders.

The first question asked was whether the participants felt that Iraq was going in the right or wrong direction. 49% said that Iraq was heading in the wrong direction, while 42% said that it was doing fine. That was a slight reversal from November when 45% thought the country was going in the right direction, and 44% thought it was going the wrong way. That change was due to a reversal in mood in southern Iraq. There, 37% said that Iraq was on the right track, and 52% said the opposite. In November, 57% said it was going in the right direction. Baghdad and northern Iraq had the most positive views with 54% and 66% respectively stating that the nation was doing good. Western Iraq was the opposite with 67% saying that things were going wrong. Not only that, but those that felt strongly that Iraq was on the wrong track in that part of the country went from 17% in November to 43% in March. The situation in the country has slightly changed from the last poll. Attacks have inched up, and the political parties are still deadlocked over forming the government. Those could be the reasons why respondents turned slightly more pessimistic in the latest survey.
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When broken down by ethnosectarian identity, Sunnis had overwhelmingly negative views about the country, 71% saying that Iraq was doing badly, while Kurds were the most positive, 67% said the nation was on the right track. Turkmen were like Sunnis with 53% telling surveyors that Iraq was going down the wrong path. Shiites were almost evenly divided with 43% telling the company that Iraq was doing fine, and 48% saying the opposite. The poll showed that Sunnis still felt the most marginalized in the country. The Kurds are relatively safe and prosperous by Iraqi standards in their own region, which is why they had positive views. Finally, the Shiites were split, because despite being the majority, many of them live in the poorest parts of the country.
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Young people and the poor were the most pessimistic, while the elderly and wealthy were evenly split. 49% of young women said that Iraq was on the wrong track, and 54% of young men stated the same thing. That compared to 43% of older women and 45% of older men who had positive views. In the survey, people under 35 were designated as young. In terms of class, 60% of the poor, and 52% of the middle class claimed that the country was on the wrong path. 46% of the rich said Iraq was doing fine. The young probably have higher aspirations of the new Iraq, and the poor are obviously suffering, which is why those two appear to be disappointed.

The next question was what issue had improved the most. Security and education were at the top, while corruption and the electrical supply were at the bottom. 62% felt that security was better, up 4% from November. 61% also thought education was improving. Conversely, only 38% said that the power was doing better, and 32% said that of corruption. Elements of the economy were seen to be positive, with 52% saying jobs and 50% stating the cost of living had gotten better. When asked about the economy specifically, 56% thought it was weak, however 38% believed their personal finances were strong. Attacks continue in Iraq, but the civil war is over. Violence has become more impersonal for many Iraqis, and they are able to go out more, which is why the improvement in security is perceived to be the greatest achievement. More and more children are also attending schools. Despite having an oil dependent economy during a period when the industry is booming, little of this wealth is seen to have trickled down however. That’s probably why the economy was at the bottom in the survey. Corruption is also endemic, and is reported on almost every day in the media, yet there is no perceived change in the situation.
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As a follow up question, participants were asked what two issues were the most important for the government to address. Jobs were number one at 63%, followed by services at 47%. Security was the third most important in November at 36%, but it dropped 20% to fourth by March. Education, 8%, sectarianism, 6%, and housing 1% were considered the least pressing. In western Iraq, 73%, and southern Iraq, 65%, jobs were the most important, while services were even more important to the south at 76%. Iraq suffers from high unemployment and even higher underemployment, and services like electricity have never met demand. With security greatly improved, these quality of life issues have now come to the fore in the public’s mind.
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Iraqis from all regions felt that democracy was the best form of government for the country, but were a little divided over whether it really was one or not. 71% said that democracy would make life better, and only 16% thought it would make it worse. Baghdad, 58%, western Iraq, 67%, northern Iraq, 76%, and southern Iraq, 80%, all felt the same. On whether Iraq was a real democracy, the responses were much closer with 42% saying yes, and 39% saying no. Baghdad, 40%, and western Iraq, 51%, said no, while northern Iraq, 45%, and southern Iraq, 56%, said yes. After living for decades under a dictatorship, it’s no surprise that people have a positive view of democracy. Whether it’s working appears to be much more mixed with the country almost evenly split on the matter.

One problem with Iraq’s democracy is its political parties, not one of which had a 50% approval rating. 43% had a warm or favorable opinion of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List, 37% said that about the Sadr Trend, 32% felt that way about Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, followed by 31% for the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), 30% for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party, 26% for the Iraqi Islamic Party, 14% for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Renewal List, 14% for President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and 13% for the Fadhila Party and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party. All the Arab parties, except for Dawa, improved their standing from November 2010, while the Kurdish parties both went down. Only Allawi’s Iraqi National List had a more favorable rating, 43%, than negative, 40%. The Dawa for example had a 30% favorable opinion, and 52% unfavorable, and two-thirds had bad views of the Kurdish parties.
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Those feelings carried over to people’s views of individual politicians. Iyad Allawi, 48%, and Moqtada al-Sadr, 45% finished at the top of the poll, and were the only two with more favorable than unfavorable responses. They were followed by Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi, 39%, Premier Maliki, 35%, SIIC head Ammar al-Hakim, 35%, Vice President Hashemi, 33%, head of the National Coalition Ibrahim al-Jaafari, 30%, Deputy Premier Mutlaq, 29%, President Talabani, 17%, and Kurdish President Barzani, 16%. All of those had more negative than positive opinions. One base of support for Sadr and Allawi appeared to be the lower-middle class and poor, 52% of which had a favorable opinion of Sadr, and 45% had one of Allawi. After that, all the other politicians had a more unfavorable view than positive. The same thing was expressed amongst young men with 54% supporting Sadr and 48% supporting Allawi. In comparison, 44% of the lower class and 48% of young men had an unfavorable opinion of Maliki. Also, while Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani were seen negatively in the country in general, they still held strong support in Kurdistan with 66% having a good view of Talabani and 62% saying that about Barzani. This was despite large protests that occurred in Sulaymaniya that started in February against the Kurdish regional government.
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Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was right in the middle of the pack. The poll showed that he had his strongest support in Baghdad and the South, but that his numbers were slipping in the latter. Overall, 35% said they felt positive about Maliki, while 45% were cool to him. In Baghdad the premier had a 50% approval rating, and 42% in the south, although that dropped 23% from November. In Western Iraq only 15% had a favorable view of him, and in the North 30% did, but that was a 17% increase from the last survey. When asked directly about his performance 39% said they approved, and 54% said the opposite. Again, 52% in Baghdad and 47% in the south said they thought Maliki was doing well, while in the West, 24%, and north, 27%, that opinion was not shared. Oddly enough the prime minister’s approval rating went up 22% in the South, which contradicted the first question about him personally. Maliki has strenuously held onto power, and outmaneuvered his main rival Iyad Allawi after the 2010 elections. He has not improved the government’s performance however, which could account for the negative views people have of him. The opposing views of Maliki himself on the one hand, and his job on the other in the south is an oddity.
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On the local level the provincial councils were seen negatively, while there was still strong support for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). When asked about the job performance of the councils, 34% approved, down 13% from November, while 62% disapproved, up 15%. Western Iraq had the most favorable opinion with 40% approving, and 59% disapproving. Baghdad was in the middle with 38% approving, and 58% disapproving, while the South had the lowest rating at 27% approving and 67% disapproving. In Kurdistan 69% approved and 30% disapproved. That was down from November when the KRG had an 85% favorability rating. The south is the poorest part of the country. The provincial councils have been in power since 2009, but have not been able to improve services or the quality of life, which accounts for their poor showing in the poll. Western Iraq also has its problems, but perhaps the closer connection between the tribes and political parties there has kept some of the discontent in check. Baghdad contains all of the contradictions in the country with some of the poorest and richest districts of the country. It also has the most daily attacks and casualties, and a huge internally displaced population. Kurdistan on the other hand, is the most stable part of the nation, and the ruling parties have a vast array of tribal ties and a large patronage system to maintain support.

The main thing to take away from this new poll is that Iraqis felt that their country was heading in the wrong direction. Sunnis, the poor, and the young were the most pessimistic about the future. Based upon the questions asked, Iraq’s political class was the main culprit behind the negative views. All of the major parties and leaders, with the exception of Allawi and Sadr, were seen badly. Politicians are increasingly thought to be more involved with their own personal squabbles than running the country. In the sixteen months since parliamentary elections, very little has been accomplished as Maliki and Allawi are still arguing over finishing off the cabinet. The provincial councils have been in power even longer, and people’s opinions of them are just as negative with the exception of the Kurdish region. The question is the next time a survey is conducted, will the negative views increase even more or will they remain relatively stable? If the numbers continue to decline it will show that the public has lost even more faith in the government to improve its lot. The sad thing is that the elite do not show any concern for this. In Iraq, the parties insist upon national unity governments where everyone gets a seat at the table instead of being punished for their poor performance.

SOURCES

Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, “Relative Stability in Iraq Despite Unrest,” National Democratic Institute, 6/2/11

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Protests In Iraq Continue Into July

July 2011 saw continued protests in Iraq. There was a sit-in in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar, and a march in Basra over the lack of services. The weekly demonstration on Friday in Baghdad also occurred. While local officials made themselves available in Dhi Qar and Basra, the same was not true in the capital. At the end of Friday’s event there was a scuffle with pro-government forces, plus a few arrests by the security forces that subsequently beat their detainees. The first week of July was one of the few where there were assemblies outside of Baghdad. It also showed that while provincial councils have tried to be accommodating towards activists, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is intent on intimidating them, and breaking them up.

On July 3, 2011, protesters gathered in Dhi Qar’s provincial capital Nasiriyah. They started with a march to the city center where they then held a rally outside the provincial council building. People chanted for the release of prisoners, to not allow Baathists in the government, (1) for better security, economic development, to end corruption, for jobs and services, and for the governor, the head of the council, and Dhi Qar’s police chief to all resign. The protesters also called for Dhi Qar to become its own region as the best way to achieve these goals. They said that they would stay until their demands were met. They then set up tents and shanties outside the council headquarters for a sit-in. (2) A member of the council said that they had meetings with protesters before, and that they planned on consulting with this new group, but organizers refused, claiming that the politicians had made plenty of promises before, but never followed through with them. That led the governor to come out and talk with the demonstrators. He promised to pass on their list of demands to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad. Dhi Qar has been one of the most active provinces in the country outside of Baghdad. Most recently, assemblies were held there on July 2 and June 24, but there were also protests over the lack of electricity back in June 2010.
Protesters in Nasiriyah making their demands (Al-Sharqiya TV)
March in Nasiriyah (Al-Sharqiya TV)
Setting up tents in Nasiriyah (News Network Nasiriyah)
Sit-in, Nasiriyah (News Network Nasiriyah)
Two days later, people came out onto the streets of Um Qasr in Basra against the lack of services. They complained that they did not get an adequate supply of electricity and drinking water. Some local politicians also joined in. The city council even issued a statement in support of the event saying that Basra was rich with oil, but that it lacked the basic necessities and infrastructure to be wealthy. The governor of the province sent a delegation to meet with the organizers, while the deputy governor said that the people had legitimate complaints. Basra province has also seen its spate of demonstrations this year as part of Iraq’s Arab Spring, and was also the catalyst for the protests last year about electricity. The governorate is the home to most of the country’s oil fields, and its only major ports, yet services are still poor, and there is widespread poverty. Those have been major points of contention for years, and have finally boiled over.

Finally, July 8 was the day for the weekly gathering at Tahrir Square, Baghdad. Hundreds turned out voicing a variety of issues as usual, but one of the main ones was the visit of Iran’s Vice President Mohammad Rahimi. The protesters demanded that the government stop Iranian interference in the country such as their support for Special Groups. They also criticized Baghdad for doing nothing about Iranian shelling of Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, and sending polluted water into Basra and Maysan. Others complained about corruption, demanded that early elections be held, and that the U.S. withdraw its forces immediately. Some workers from the Election Commission showed up again, asking for full time contracts. The crowd also burned U.S., British, and Israeli flags, and tried to torch an Iranian one as well. Some of the chants heard were “Friday after Friday until we rid of al-Maliki,” “We haven’t seen oil, but only poverty,” and “They’re all thieves.” This eclectic mix of demands has been the normal fare at the Tahrir protests. Several hundred also showed up this week, which was more than pervious weeks. That might show that activists in the capital at least, may be growing bolder after the government’s steps to repress them.
Banners seen at Tahrir Square, Bahgdad (Al-Sharqiya TV)
Protesters at Tahrir Square (National Iraqi News Network)
Chanting at Tahrir Square
Everything was going peacefully until the end of the protest. Some supporters of the prime minister showed up, and began harassing some of the demonstrators. Then when the people were leaving the square, security forces arrested several participants. First, several plainclothes officers began beating one activist, before throwing him a truck of a car and driving off. A woman who was taking picture of the assault had another group of plainclothes men drag her out of a bus, and take her away. A worker for the Al-Mada newspaper was also arrested and beaten, and a protester had his house raided. In total, the Popular Coordination Movement claimed that seven of its members were arrested that day. Five of them were later released, and claimed that they were beaten and abused by the security forces. July 8 turned out to be like many other Friday’s, with Maliki trying to intimidate and break-up the demonstration. He has organized members of his Dawa and the tribal support councils as counter demonstrators, and has carried out a wave of arrests of activists. That has shut down most of the protests in the country, but organizers have still been able to bring people out every Friday in Baghdad despite the premier’s best efforts.

Maliki’s attitude towards the protest movement was shown in two recent meetings. First, on July 7, the Dawa Party held a conference with tribal support councils in Karbala. They thanked those that went to Tahrir Square, and helped suppress demonstrators on June 10, while threatening those that hadn’t been cooperative. Then on July 8, Maliki gave a speech to sheikhs in Baghdad saying that the changes occurring in the rest of the Arab world would not occur in Iraq. He claimed that the country was “immune” from the Arab Spring, and that the nation had to stand together to maintain stability. Rather than answer the people’s demands or simply use the riot police to break up demonstrations, the premier has increasingly turned to extra-legal means. Maliki originally created the tribal support councils to counter Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia, but now they are simply becoming a group of vigilantes to be used by the prime minister against his opponents. Maliki’s remarks about Iraq not being like other countries in the region also showed that he is completely unwilling to accept the legitimacy of the demonstrators.

July has started off much like previous months. On the one hand, the prime minister is attempting to use force to end the protests, while on the other provincial officials have either done nothing since the demonstrations started, or lack the capabilities to meet any of their demands. That represents one major dilemma for activists. Neither the local nor central authorities have the will or means to bring about any meaningful reforms in the country. At the same time, the protest movement has been largely repressed by the prime minister’s tactics meaning that outside pressure on the government is diminishing, and so are the hopes for any real change to come out of the nation’s demonstrations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hamid, Murtaza, “The governor of Dhi Qar met with a  number of demonstrators in Nasiriyah, looking to meet their demands,” Voice of Iraq, 7/4/11

2. Al Aalem, “Demonstration for the Mujahideen for federalism in the south turned to the military barracks in Nasiriyah,” 7/3/11

SOURCES

Al Aalem, “Demonstration for the Mujahideen for federalism in the south turned to the military barracks in Nasiriyah,” 7/3/11

Alsumaria, “Hundreds of protests in Baghdad Tahrir Square,” 7/9/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 demonstrators arrested – Activist,” 7/8/11
- “Burning flags, 4 detained in today’s demonstration,” 7/8/11
- “Civilian Organization charges government with arresting 7 of its activists in Baghdad demonstration,” 7/9/11
- “February gathering sit-in in Nassiriya,” 6/24/11
- “Nassiriya demonstration demands Federalism in South Iraq,” 7/3/11

Hamid, Murtaza, “The governor of Dhi Qar met with a  number of demonstrators in Nasiriyah, looking to meet their demands,” Voice of Iraq, 7/4/11

Al-Kadhimi, Bahaa, “Umm Qasr protesters decry lack of basic services,” AK News, 7/6/11

Al-Mada, “Head of government: Iraq is immune from the Arab spring,” 7/8/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Demonstrators denounce Iran’s Vice President visit, demanding Iran stop violations of Iraqi sovereignty,” 7/8/11

Saadi, Ahmed, “Threatening some tribal support councils in the chapter to not participate in the repression of demonstrations in Tahrir Square,” Shatt al-Arab, 7/7/11

Sharqiya Television,” Dozens of people from the city of Nasiriyah, begin a sit-in,” 7/3/11
- “Tribal elders in Dhi Qar: the deterioration of services and lack of the most basic requirements of the Simple Life,” 7/2/11

Shatt al-Arab, “Liberation Square: government forces glaciation young demonstrators,” 7/9/11

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Activists: Protesters beaten in Baghdad,” CNN, 7/8/11

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Inside Story - US Points Finger At Iran For Iraq Violence

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Iraq’s Oil Exports Hit A New High, While Prices Drop

Partial figures have just been released for Iraq’s June 2011 oil production. They show that the country has reached another post-2003 high in exports, but that dropping oil prices are decreasing its profits.

Last month, Iraq’s exports rose for the third straight month. In June, Iraq exported an average of 2.27 million barrels of oil per day. That was the most since 2003. In April, it exported 2.14 million barrels, and then 2.22 million in May. For all of this year Iraq has been able to ship out more than 2 million barrels a day to foreign markets, another post-invasion first. That doesn’t mean they have constantly grown each month however. In February, Iraq exported 2.20 million barrels for example, before dropping to 2.15 million in March. The reason for the up and down pattern is that exports are shaped by a number of factors such as weather in the port of Basra that can limit boats dockings, maintenance on pipelines that can temporarily shut them down, and attacks, which are still common along the northern pipeline. Most importantly, the nation’s infrastructure is extremely limited due to years of wars and sanctions. That means it is unlikely to see any large increase in production until new pipelines, ports, etc. are built, the first of which isn’t due until the end of the year

As usual, the south was the mainstay of the country’s petroleum industry. Basra exported an average of 1.727 million barrels, slightly up from the 1.725 million in May. The northern pipeline to Turkey shipped an average of 537,000 barrels, far above the 490,000 from the previous month. 10,000 barrels was also trucked to Jordan per day.

Unfortunately for Iraq, the increased production did not pay off as much as it could. After hitting $114.26 a barrel in April, prices for Iraqi crude have dropped to $108 in May, and $105 in June. In May, that didn’t have an affect when Iraq earned $7.4 million. In June however, profits went down to $7.1 billion. After consistently rising due to the unrest in the Arab world, the international oil market is finally cooling off. Prices are still over $100 a barrel, which means Iraq will still make large profits, but the record money they’ve been bringing in will eventually end even if production stays high.

Overall, three factors have benefited Iraq’s Oil Ministry this year. First, foreign oil companies are ramping up production at over a dozen oil fields they won contracts for in 2009. Second, Baghdad has reached an agreement with Kurdistan to allow it to export once again, bringing on line two more fields for foreign sales. Third, world prices for petroleum have dramatically gone up due to the Arab Spring. Each of these also pose possible challenges for the country. As stated before, exports can only grow so much due to the lack of infrastructure. Iraq is currently working on new ports and pipelines, but there are questions about how much capacity it can actually add. The problems with Kurdistan are not completely worked out as the Finance Ministry is only paying companies there for their costs, not profits, and they will not accept that indefinitely. Finally, international prices for a barrel of crude are already declining, which means that once Iraq’s new infrastructure is ready to operate, it may miss out on this boom. Iraq therefore needs to produce as much as it can right now to bring in as much money as possible, because the market may not be as favorable in the future.

Iraq Oil Production And Profits Jan. 2010-June 2011 

Month
Total Production
(Mil/Bar)
Avg. Exports
(Mil/
Bar/
Day)
Avg. Price Per Barrel
Revenue
(Mil)
Jan. 10
59.7
1.92
$73.97
$4.441
Feb.
57.9
2.05
$73.04
$4.229
Mar.
57.1
1.84
$76.20
$4.351
Apr.
53.0
1.80
$79.66
$4.222
May
58.7
1.88
$73.85
$4.335
Jun.
54.7
1.86
$71.10
$3.889
Jul.
56.3
1.82
$71.21
$4.009
Aug.
55.4
1.82
$71.43
$3.957
Sep.
60.6
2.02
$73.07
$4.428
Oct.
58.7
1.91
$77.10
$4.526
Nov.
57.3
1.92
$80.59
$4.618
Dec.
60.5
1.95
$86.31
$5.222
Jan. 11
67.0
2.16
$90.78
$6.082
Feb.
61
2.20
$98.44
$6+
Mar.
66.9
2.15
$107.13
$7.167
Apr.
64.2
2.14
$114.26
$7.342
May
N/A
2.22
$108
$7.4
Jun.
N/A
2.27
$105
$7.1



SOURCES

Ajrash, Kadhim and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq June Oil Exports Rise to Post-2003 Record, Somo Chief Says,” Bloomberg, 7/5/11

Bloomberg, “Iraq Exports Hit 2.23 Million bpd in May,” Iraq Business News, 6/1/11

El Gamal, Rania, “UPDATE 2-Iraq sees oil output at 3 mln bpd by year-end,” Reuters, 6/4/11

Al-Wannan, Jaafar, “Parliamentary committee: Oil exports will not exceed 5m bpd by 2013,” AK News, 6/25/11

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