Monday, June 11, 2012

Mass Graves, Saddam Hussein’s Legacy In Iraq


Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq through a carrot and stick approach. With various groups within the country he would offer positions within the government, development funds, and conduct personal visits to their communities. On the other hand, he had a vast array of security agencies that would detain, interrogate, torture, and kill anyone that was considered a rival or threat to his regime. In the 1980s and 1990s, Kurdish parties in the north and young Shiites in the south challenged Saddam’s authority and were met with his fist. Tens of thousands were killed, many having “disappeared” after being picked up by Saddam’s forces. Many of the regime’s victims were dumped in dozens of mass graves spread throughout Iraq. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, both the Americans and the Iraqis made a concerted effort to find these sites, and detail the crimes contained within them. This history has left a lasting legacy. Many of today’s politicians had to flee in the face of threats by Saddam or lost friends and family members. It has also created a sense of victimization and mistrust, which makes it hard for Iraq’s parties to agree upon many things. Iraq’s mass graves are Saddam’s living legacy within the country.

The Kurds were a prime target of Saddam’s repression. During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, the two leading Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of current Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by today’s president of Iraq Jalal Talabani fought on the Iranian side. At the beginning of the war, the KDP had closer relations with Tehran, and immediately aligned with them in the conflict. The PUK was threatened by the benefits Barzani was gaining from this relationship, and decided to open talks with Baghdad. This provided a perfect chance for Saddam to play his divide and conquer strategies. At the same time, he decided to retaliate against the KDP. In early 1983, the KDP and Iranian forces led an offensive in northern Iraq. In response, Saddam ordered the round up of the Barzani clan in August. Around 8,000 men and boys, some as young as eight years old, were arrested by the security forces in Irbil. Massoud Barzani lost 37 families members as a result. They were then sent to Nugra Salman prison in Muthanna province, southern Iraq where some died of hunger or torture. The survivors were relocated to more remote locations further south where special execution squads killed them in the desert. After 2003, 512 Barzani men were found in a mass grave by the Kuwait and Saudi border. When talks went nowhere with Baghdad, the PUK joined the Iranian side as well. As the war was winding down in 1988, Saddam decided to destroy all the KDP and PUK cadre in northern Iraq with the Anfal campaign. The offensive was broken up into six parts lasting from February to September, and included artillery, bombing, and troop assaults, supported by the use of chemical weapons. The survivors were rounded up and sent to special prison camps created for them. These were spread out between Dohuk, Sulaymaniya, Ninewa, Tamim, Salahaddin, Diyala, and Muthanna governorates. There, hundreds were executed. By the end of it, the Anfal campaign had broken the back of the Kurdish resistance. The PUK and KDP bases had been rolled up, and thousands were forced into Iran and Turkey as refugees. The regime had shown its ruthlessness, and the length it was willing to go to destroy its opponents.

In the next decade, after the 1991 Gulf War came to an end, returning soldiers and young men took up the gun against Saddam. The precursors were a radio station set up by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Saudi Arabia that called for Iraqis to revolt against the government, and a message by President George Bush broadcast in February saying that Saddam should be overthrown. In March, soldiers straggling back from the frontlines decided to start an uprising in Basra. That quickly spread to other southern cities such as Najaf, Kufa, Karbala, Diwaniya, Hillah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Kut, Samawa, Zubayr, Kumait, and Qalat Saleh. This became known as the 1991 Shiite Uprising. The leading Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Sayid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei even gave his approval. Within a few days, Saddam responded by sending in the Republican Guards, which had largely escaped the Gulf War. In Basra, the security forces shelled the city, and went from house to house taking away any young men they found. The revolt didn’t have a chance, because it was unorganized, had no outside support, and did not have the arms to counter the government. Within a few days the whole thing was over. Some stragglers fled into the southern marshes, where Saddam would later carry out a campaign of destroying the echo system there to root out the rebels. The uprising put a scare into the regime, but it had weathered through, and exacted its revenge upon all those that had opposed it. Like in Kurdistan during the Anfal campaign, thousands of young Iraqis went missing after 1991, taken to various locations throughout southern Iraq where they were executed.

No one knew or was willing to talk about where all the victims of the Anfal campaign and the 1991 Uprising were until after the fall of Saddam in 2003. As soon as he was overthrown, reports began to emerge of mass graves. By 2004, 270 sites were allegedly found, and out of those, 53 were confirmed. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set up a special investigative team to find, categorize, and document each place. There were estimates that 50,000-180,000 Kurds died in the Anfal campaign, and 100,000-180,000 Shiites were killed in the 1991 Uprising. By 2005, graves were found in Mahawil in Babil, Hatra in Ninewa, and one near Samawa in Muthanna with around 10,000-15,000 bodies in them. In Mahawil, 200-300 people were discovered, thought to be from the Shiite Uprising. It appeared that groups of men were shot in the back of the head. At the site near Samawa, almost all the victims were Kurdish women and children who were gunned down by AK-47s. The work of the CPA team went on to help convict Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity. There are so many of these killing fields that they are still turning up to this day. In March 2011, Kurdish peshmerga found trenches south of Kirkuk with around 2,300 people in them. In July, another 1,100 bodies turned up in a mass grave near Shanafiya, Qadisiya. In June 2012, a ceremony was held for 730 of them in Chamchamal, Sulaymaniya that was attended by President Barzani. Each of these sites attests to the brutality of the former regime. Saddam used an iron first to maintain his hold upon the country. His actions left a deep scar, which is still felt today. There are thousands of people in Iraq that lost their family members and friends in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of them were never seen after the security forces took them away, and they ended up in these mass graves. The process of identifying all the bodies has been slow, and will probably never be complete. That means the hole in the lives of the survivors will never be filled as they do not know what ultimately became of their loved ones.

The history of Saddam Hussein created widespread mistrust amongst the public. Today’s politicians share many of those feelings, and have also exploited them for their own personal gains. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for instance, fled Iraq in 1979 fearing assassination by the government. Kurdish President Barzani lost thousands of members of his clan, and immediate family. Moqtada al-Sadr’s father and brothers were murdered by the regime. It’s those fears of Saddam’s legacy that allows the government to round up suspected Baathists and use the deBaathification laws to ban people from politics or public sector jobs. It’s the reason why the leading Shiite and Kurdish parties would never allow a Sunni to become prime minister again out of the suspicion that they could bring back the Baath Party. It’s the reason why politicians like Iyad Allawi and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq are held into question by others such as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, because both were former Baathists, and the latter has even praised the message of the party, while condemning its excesses. The mass graves themselves have even been hurled about in disputes to condemn political rivals. Iraq is unlikely to overcome these fissures and move on until this generation of leaders passes. Their past still lives deep within them, and shapes how their interact with other elites to this day. This often times hampers compromises, and moving ahead with important issues. Instead of addressing them, they are being pushed down the road. This is what happens in many post-conflict countries, especially ones like Iraq that suffered through decades of brutal dictatorship. 
Bones of a Kurdish victim of the Anfal campaign unearthed in 2003 in Hatra, Ninewa (Science Photo Library)

American forensic specialists going through remains at the Samawa site in Muthanna province 2005 (AP

Part of the U.S. team examining bodies outside of Samawa (Ministry of Human Rights)
A woman holding a picture of some of the missing Barzani men (PBS' Frontline)
Iraqi and American officials looking at one of the trenches at the Mahawil, Babil site 2006 (New York Times)
Some of the skeletons at Mahawil (New York Times)
Identification papers of a baby Kurdish girl found at a mass grave site (Evidence Technology Magazine)
Faded ID papers of a Kurdish man killed in the Anfal campaign (Evidence Technology Magazine)

A woman holds up two pictures of missing family members lost during the Anfal campaign at ceremony in Chamchamal July 2012 (Rudaw)
Coffins draped with Kurdish flags at the Chamchamal ceremony (Al Jazeera)

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq unearths mass grave of 900 bodies,” 7/6/11

Associated Press, “Expert: 300,000 in Iraq’s Mass Graves,” 11/8/03

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and Bureau of Public Affairs, “Mass Graves of Iraq: Uncovering Atrocities,” U.S. State Department, 12/19/03

Burns, John, “Uncovering Iraq’s Horrors in Desert Graves,” New York Times, 6/5/06

Johns, Dave, “1983 The Missing Barzanis,” PBS Frontline, 1/24/06

Knickmeyer, Ellen, “113 Kurds Are Found In Mass Grave,” Washington Post, 4/30/05

McEvers, Kelly, “Mass Grave Discovery In Iraq Could Fuel Divisions,” NPR, 4/20/11

Moon, Ban Ki, “Second report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1936 (2010),” United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 3/31/11

Sackur, Stephen, “In Saddam’s killing fields,” BBC, 5/14/03

Satkunanandan, Shyamali, “Tears, Grief and Waiting at Chamchamal Burial Ceremony,” Rudaw, 6/1/12

Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, 2008

U.S. Agency for International Development, “Iraq’s Legacy of Terror Mass Graves,” 2004

UNAMI Human Rights Office and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report on Human Rights in Iraq: 2011,” May 2012

Friday, June 8, 2012

Iraq's Sadrists Protest Outside Baghdad TV Station


On June 6, 2012, followers of Moqtada al-Sadr protested outside of a TV station in Baghdad after it aired a story claiming that the movement took orders from Tehran. While Sadr built up his base standing up for Iraq’s poor Shiites, and likes to portray himself as an Iraqi nationalist, he increasingly came under the influence of Iran as the U.S. began targeting him in the mid-2000s. He eventually fled to Qom where he claimed he was going for religious studies, but the real reason was he was afraid that the U.S. might target him during the Surge. At the same time, Tehran found Sadr to be too independent and erratic in his actions, and worked to lure away many of his militiamen to join Special Groups, trained, armed and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. Sadr is no puppet, but he definitely feels Iran’s pressure when they apply it.

Riot police waiting for a crowd of Sadrists to approach a TV station in Baghdad that claimed their movement took orders from Iran, June 6, 2012 (AP)
Sadrist crowd protesting TV station (AP)
Followers of Moqtada al-Sadr chanting during demonstration against TV station (AP)
SOURCES

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Bennett, Brian, “Underestimating al-Sadr – Again,” Time, 2/12/08


Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

McGeary, Johanna, “New Thugs On The Block,” Time, 4/19/04


Rahimi, Babak, “Moqtada al-Sadr’s New Alliance with Tehran,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 3/1/07

CSPAN VIDEO: Patrick Cockburn: Who Is Muqtada al-Sadr





REAL NEWS VIDEO: Understanding Muqtada al-Sadr

VIDEO: Mahdi Army Punishes Alcohol Sellers in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar, Iraq

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Iraqi Shiite Forces Clash In Basra March 2008

Thursday, June 7, 2012

Iran Tries To Mediate Iraq’s Political Crisis, But Can They Overcome The Deep Divisions In The Country?


As Iraq’s political crisis has dragged on, more and more countries have been dragged into the fray. One such nation is neighboring Iran, which has close ties to all of Iraq’s major parties. Tehran is currently worried that the opponents of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are gaining more power, and creating more uncertainty in the country. As a result, Iran has been holding talks with Iraqi leaders both within and without the country. Iran would rather have a stable, sectarian government, led by Shiites than the current situation where the major lists are increasingly turning upon Maliki.

Iran has been trying to play the role of mediator in Iraq’s current dispute. Iranian officials have been travelling to Baghdad and Irbil, and hosting Iraqis in Iran. Iranian leaders have consulted with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as in January 2012 when he met with the speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danafar has also talked with Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the head of the National Alliance (NA), and Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council, and NA member. In April, Maliki travelled to Iran, nominally to prepare for the 5 + 1 conference over Iran’s nuclear program that was to be held in Baghdad, but it was also to discuss with Iranian leaders, Shiite clerics, and Sadr the Iraqi political scene. While there, the premier had meetings with Moqtada al-Sadr, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, Iran’s Vice President Mohammed Reza Rahimi, President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Iranians were able to get Maliki and Sadr to sign a letter of understanding, but it didn’t last. As Sadr increased his rhetoric against Maliki, Iran upped the ante. Ayatollah Kadhem al-Hussein al-Haeri, the spiritual leader of the Sadr movement who is based in Iran, issued a fatwa forbidding his followers from voting for secular candidates with an explicit mention of Iraq. Sadr rejected that decree saying that Iraqi parties were a mix of secular and Islamist politicians, and accused Haeri of working for foreign powers. Iran then allegedly closed down Sadr’s offices in Tehran at the beginning of June, and requested that he come to Iran for talks. There were conflicting reports about what the outcome of that trip was. Members of the Sadr Trend stated that Iran wanted them to drop their push for a no confidence vote against Maliki, but that they would not budge. A member of State of Law then claimed that a deal had been worked out between the two, which was quickly denied by the Sadrists. Besides trying to squash the no confidence move against Maliki, Tehran has focused upon several other issues according to press reports. Those include trying to get the Kurdish Coalition and the prime minister to make concessions to each other, and convincing Maliki that he should follow through with more parts of the Irbil Agreement, which helped put together the current government in 2010. All along, Iran’s goal has been to return Iraq to the status quo. That means a government in Baghdad based upon sectarian quotas, where all the major lists had their share of top offices, while being led by Shiites. Surprisingly, this is the goal of the United States as well. The problem is that parties such as the National Movement, the Kurdish Coalition, and now the Sadrists believe that the premier is taking too much power for his own State of Law list, disrupting the delicate balance within the ruling coalition. With the American military now out of Iraq, Tehran does not want chaos on its doorstep, especially when it is facing the possible fall of its longtime ally in Syria. Iran has therefore been doubling down in recent weeks to get Iraq’s parties to come to some type of agreement so that they stop their constant bickering.

Many believe that Iran has attempted to dominate Iraq since the 2003 fall of Saddam and turn it into a puppet state. Serious analysis of Tehran’s strategy has shown it to be much more nuanced. Their main goal appears to be aimed at building up various forms of soft and hard levers within the country so that whenever a major issue arises, Iran will be able to influence events to their liking. That is exactly what they are trying to do now by having talks with all of Iraq’s factions. Their power will be severely tested in this situation, because many of these disputes date back decades, and are deeply personal. With U.S. troops out of Iraq, its politicians are also highly sensitive to claims that they are giving in to foreign influences, and want to assert their nationalist credentials. That’s why figures like Sadr who are deeply connected to Tehran are able to go against its will in his confrontation with Maliki. Despite Iran’s best efforts than, however the current crisis plays out it will ultimately be Iraqis who decide their fate.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi president rebuffs move to unseat premier,” Associated Press, 5/30/12

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Maliki Given Ultimatum at Leaders Meeting in Erbil,” Rudaw, 4/29/12

AIN, “Iran pressurizes to prevent withdrawing confidence from Maliki, says Naji,” 6/6/12
- “Kinani denies reaching agreement between Sadr Trend, SLC in Iran,” 6/6/12
- “Musawi: Sadr Trend, SLC about to reach agreement to settle crisis,” 6/6/12
- “SLC not part of political negotiations conducted in Iran, says Allaq,” 6/6/12

Alsabawi, Jasim, “Sadr Movement Claims No Ulterior Motive to Leader’s Erbil Visit,” Rudaw, 5/9/12

Al Estiqama, “Iran shut down Sadr’s office in Tehran because of its demand to withdraw confidence from the Maliki,” 6/1/12

Habib, Mustafa, “getting rid of nouri: PM’s critics consider options to remove ‘dictator,’” Niqash, 5/3/12

Hatem, Oudai, “Muqtada al-Sadr Ignores Fatwa Against Secularist Candidates,” Dar al-Hayat, 6/4/12

Najm, Hayder, “enemies in common: diplomacy from iran and west heals political rift in iraq,” Niqash, 2/15/12

Seibert, Thomas, “Erdogan’s bid to end Iraq power struggle,” The National, 1/11/12

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 38,” 5/16/12

UPI, “Iran steps in to prop up to Iraq’s Maliki,” 6/5/12

Visser, Reidar, “Endgame for the Prime Minister?” Sada, 5/29/12

Review Charles River Editors, The Mandate for Mesopotamia: The History and Legacy of British Occupation and Iraq’s Independence after World War I, Charles Rivers Editors, 2021

   The Mandate for Mesopotamia is a short overview of British rule and influence in Iraq after World War I. It covers Europe...