Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Cracks Appear In New Oil Deal Between Baghdad and The Kurdistan Regional Government


In September 2012, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad came to their third agreement over the former exporting its oil. The previous two times, the deals broke down over disputes over paying the energy companies operating in northern Iraq. The problem stems from the fact that the central government wants control over oil policy and contracts, which comes into conflict with the KRG’s wish to have their own strategy. That unresolved issue is coming to the fore again as the Kurds dramatically cut their exports at the end of November. This could eventually lead to the breakdown of the latest agreement between the two sides.

In November, the Kurdish regional government decided to reduce its oil exports. According to the state-run North Oil Company, the KRG was only pumping 70,000-80,000 barrels a day by the end of the month through the northern pipeline to Turkey. Before that, Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi told the press on October 4 that the Kurds had reached 170,000 barrels a day. For the month, the region averaged 146,000. That was below its 200,000 barrel a day quota that it was supposed to reach that month. Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani, who is in charge of Baghdad’s energy policy, said that payments to the oil companies working in northern Iraq would be stopped, because the KRG was not meeting its mark. The recent drop in exports then, was likely due to fears that Baghdad will follow through with Shahristani’s threats. At the same time, it appears that the KRG lacks the capacity currently to maintain its export levels, and meet its quota. Officials such as Shahristani, who has been at the forefront of opposition to the Kurds’ independent energy policy, have used this fact against them. Kurdistan may be stuck in a Catch 22 in this situation as a result. It could continue to pump oil at its current rate, but it would know that would be below its mark. Baghdad would constantly hang that over its head, and use it as an excuse not to make any payments.

Baghdad and Irbil are currently in the midst of their third oil deal. On April 1, the KRG halted its exports claiming that Baghdad owed $1.5 billion to oil businesses there. Then on August 7, Kurdistan restarted sending oil through the northern pipeline in hopes that it would renew talks with the central government. That eventually happened with a verbal agreement between the two on September 15. The KRG would export 140,000 barrels a day for September, then 200,000 barrels for the rest of the year. At the time, it was pumping 120,000 barrels. In return, the central government agreed to pay companies in Kurdistan $858.3 million. Each one of the previous agreements have started and ended the same way. There is great fanfare that this is a breakthrough for the two sides, but then Baghdad fails to deliver. On the one hand, the central government welcomes Kurdish exports, because they help it towards achieving its production goals and raises money. The deals also reinforce Baghdad’s position that it should be in charge of oil policy, and that the Kurds have to go through it. At the same time, the government of Nouri al-Maliki is opposed to the KRG’s independent oil contracts. It therefore regularly withholds payments to punish Kurdistan for following its own path.

This series of short-term deals is frustrating for the companies operating in the KRG. Genel Enerji and DNO for example, which operate the Taq Taq and Tawke fields threatened to stop foreign sales through the northern pipeline in early October, because they had not been paid yet. Together, the two firms were responsible for 110,000 barrels of Kurdistan’s 146,000 barrels of exports in October. The Finance Ministry eventually sent just over $500 million to the KRG later that month, which was distributed to DNO at the beginning of December. Kurdish authorities promised that the second installment was to arrive soon afterward, but then later press reports said that it wasn’t going to be until early 2013. Now there are questions about whether it would happen at all due to Deputy Premier Shahristani’s threat. In total, DNO has only been paid $104 million in June 2011 and $60 million in September 2011, and will receive $116 million this month for all of its exports since 2008. Oil companies in Kurdistan are waiting for a national hydrocarbon law to be passed, so that there are no more conflicts over their operations. That would allow them to legally export, and be able to monetize their investments. Until then, the firms have to rely upon these unreliable short-term export contracts where they only get paid for a fraction of their work.

The third export deal between Iraq’s central and regional governments is still in effect, but it is fraying at the edges. The Kurds are sending oil through the northern pipeline again, and they have received half a million dollars to pay the companies that are operating there. At the same time, it is not meeting its quota, and Baghdad has once again threatened to cut off payments. The two sides are still far apart on oil policy, and that will continue to lead to tension and breakdowns in these agreements. If the current one ends, and there are plenty of signs that it eventually will, it will be followed by another. The Kurds need these deals with Baghdad to show the energy companies that they will eventually be able to get a full return on their investments. The central government welcomes the Kurdish contributions, because it brings in more money and boosts its monthly export numbers. The problems rise from the fact that Baghdad holds the purse, and will continuously hold this over the head of the Kurds until their differences over oil are resolved. Their positions are so far apart however, that this will not come anytime soon, so for the foreseeable future official Kurdish exports will be at the mercy of these volatile agreements.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq’s Kurds pledge to raise oil exports in 2013,” 10/22/12

Ersoy, Ercan and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq to Pay Kurdistan Oil Producers Next Week, Hawrami Says,” Bloomberg, 9/24/12

Kami, Aseel, “UPDATE 1-Oil exports from Iraq’s Kurdish region rise to 170,000 bpd,” Reuters, 10/4/12

Al-Khayat, Faleh, “Iraq’s oil output slumps by 200,000 b/d in October,” Platts, 11/28/12

Lee, John, “Tawke Export Payment Received by DNO,” Iraq Oil Report, 12/3/21

Mackey, Peg, “KRG gets oil payment from Baghdad, exports to flow,” Reuters, 10/8/12

Osgood, Patrick, “Kurdistan slashes oil exports over payment feud,” Iraq Oil Report, 11/29/12

Rahman, Mohammed Abdul, “Erbil and Baghdad agree on reimbursing oil companies,” AK News, 9/15/12

Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq’s Kurds Say Crude Exports Rise to 140,000 Barrels a Day,” Bloomberg, 9/20/12

Reuters, “Genel could halt Kurdish oil exports over pay delay,” 10/5/12
- “UPDATE 1-Iraqi Kurdish oil exports down ‘significantly’-sources,” 11/27/12

Sabri, Abdullah, “Kurdistan may increase its oil exports to more than 250,000 bpd,” AK News, 9/19/12

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/12

Monday, December 3, 2012

Iraq’s Insurgency Tries To End November 2012 With A Bang


November 2012, looked like it was going to end well in terms of security. The Shiite religious ceremony of Ashura went off relatively peacefully with only one small bombing. Then at the end of the month there were two days of bombings and shootings across twelve cities in northern, central, and southern Iraq that broke the calm. That last flurry of violence seemed to boost the government’s numbers for the month above the previous one. The far more accurate and reliable Iraq Body Count however, recorded a five-month decline in casualties.

There were three different death counts for November, which showed different trends. The Iraqi ministries reported 166 killed for the month, up from 144 in October. Iraq Body Count’s early figure was 244 casualties, down from October’s 253. The Agence France Presse (AFP) wire service has also started its own count, and recorded 160 fatalities in November, up from the previous month’s 136. The cause for the jump in the government and AFP numbers was the string of attacks that occurred at the end of the month. On November 27, Iraq Body Count had four bombings and three shootings across Baghdad, Ramadi in Anbar province, Kirkuk and Hawija in Tamim, Mosul in Ninewa, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, and Buhriz in Diyala that cost 38 lives. Two days later, 49 were killed in Hilla in Babil, Karbala, Mosul, Taji in Salahaddin, and Abu Ghraib and Besmaya in Baghdad. Overall, all three organizations have been going in different directions. The government’s numbers have consistently gone up and down with 325 in July, 164 in August, 365 in September, 144 in October, and then 166 in November. AFP was showing a downward trend with 278 in August, 253 in September, 136 in October, before hitting November’s 160. Iraq Body Count on the other hand had a five-month decline from 523 in June to 461 in July to 403 in August, 363 in September, 253 in October, and 244 in November. Since AFP’s numbers are so close to the government’s, and low compared to Iraq Body Count’s it appears that they are both missing many of the smaller incidents that regularly occur throughout Iraq that might only kill 1-2 people each. 

Deaths In Iraq 2011-2012
Month
Iraq Body Count
Iraqi Ministries
Avg. Monthly Deaths
Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan. 2011
388
259
323
10.4
Feb.
251
167
209
7.4
Mar.
307
247
277
8.9
Apr.
287
211
249
8.3
May
378
177
277
8.9
Jun.
386
271
328
10.9
Jul.
305
259
282
9.0
Aug.
399
239
319
10.2
Sep.
396
185
290
9.6
Oct.
357
258
307
9.9
Nov.
273
187
230
7.6
Dec.
388
155
271
8.7
2011 Mo. Avg.
342
217
279
9.1
Jan. 2012
522
151
336
10.8
Feb.
355
150
252
8.7
Mar.
375
112
243
7.8
Apr.
370
126
248
8.2
May
293
132
212
6.8
Jun.
523
131
327
10.9
Jul.
461
325
393
12.6
Aug.
403
164
283
9.1
Sep.
363
365
364
12.1
Oct.
253
144
198
6.4
Nov.
244
166
205
6.8
2012 Mo. Avg.
378
178
278
9.1

Since Iraq Body Count captures more of the violence in the country than the other two, its numbers showed that the insurgent’s summer offensive is over. For the last several years militants have picked up their operations during the summer. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader Abu Bakr al-Bahgdadi dubbed this year’s campaign Breaking Walls in July. The results were immediately seen. The average number of daily deaths based upon Iraq Body Count and the government’s ministries went from 6.8 in May to 10.9 in June, 12.6 in July, 9.1 in August, and 12.1 in September before dropping to 6.4 in October and 6.8 in November. Next month will likely have low figures as well until January when the Shiite’s celebrate Arbayeen. Al Qaeda in Iraq has hit that pilgrimage the last several years. Then things will repeat again with a dip until the summer arrives. This has become the annual pattern in Iraq, and is unlikely to change without a dramatic re-alignment in the country’s politics that would offer Sunni insurgents a means to participate openly in society.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq Unrest AFP Count”
- “Iraq violence rose in November,” 12/1/12

Iraq Body Count

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi security officers killed in clashes,” 7/26/12

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Iraq Attacks Leave Dozens Dead


Review Charles River Editors, The Mandate for Mesopotamia: The History and Legacy of British Occupation and Iraq’s Independence after World War I, Charles Rivers Editors, 2021

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