Iraq’s Security Situation Looking Bleaker By The Day

 

August 2013 was the worst month of the year for Iraq’s fragile security situation. Insurgents carried out a huge number of mass casualty bombings, as the public seemed to teeter on the edge of losing faith in the government to protect them. There were increasing stories of sectarian retaliation up and down the length of the state. That begs the question of which direction Iraq is heading. Is this the new norm or are can things get any worse?

The four organizations that track deaths in Iraq were in rare unanimity in September. Agence France Presse had 880 killed, up from 693 in August. The United Nations reported 979 deaths, an increase from August’s 804, while Iraq Body Count had 1,220 fatalities in September compared to 915 in August. Even the Iraqi government couldn’t deny the carnage with 971 deaths. That was only the third time this year that Baghdad offered realistic numbers for the level of violence in the country. Usually their figures are a fraction of what the other three record. For the year, both Iraq Body Count and the United Nations have over 6,000 people dying so far with 6,293 and 6,551 respectively. Those are the highest numbers since 2008. On average that’s over 20 people killed per day in 2013. To make things worse this came during the latest government crackdown Revenge of the Martyrs, which began in August. The government has bragged about hundreds being arrested, but this has not affected security at all as the casualty figures show. In fact, it is likely making matters worse by turning the very public the security forces should be protecting and relying upon for information against them.

Deaths In Iraq 2003-2013

Month/Year	Iraq Body Count	Avg. Daily Deaths	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Daily Deaths	United Nations	Avg. Daily Deaths	Agence France Presse	Avg. Daily Deaths
2003	4,675	19.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	11,608	31.8l	11,313	30.99	-	-	-	-
2005	16,186	44.2	15,817	43.3	-	-	-	-
2006	29,144	79.8	32,622	89.3	34,452	94.3	-	-
2007	25,519	69.9	19,155	52.4	-	-	-	-
2008	9,839	26.9	9,046	24.7	11,536	31.6	-	-
2009	5,132	14.0	3,682	10.0	4,611	12.6	-	-
2010	4,109	11.2	3,949	10.8	4,855	13.3	-	-
2011	4,147	11.3	2,781	7.6	4,150	11.3	-	-
2012	4,573	12.5	2,174	5.9	3,878	10.6	1,531 (7 mo.)	7.1
Jan. 2013	357	11.5	177	5.7	319	10.2	246	7.9
Feb.	358	12.7	136	4.8	418	14.9	220	7.8
Mar.	395	12.7	163	5.2	456	14.7	271	8.7
Apr.	545	18.1	208	6.9	712	23.7	461	15.3
May	887	28.6	681	21.9	1,045	33.7	614	19.8
Jun.	648	21.6	240	8.0	761	25.3	452	15.0
Jul.	968	31.2	989	31.9	1,057	34.0	848	27.3
Aug.	915	29.5	365	11.7	804	25.9	693	22.3
Sep.	1,220	40.6	971	32.3	979	32.6	880	29.3
2013 Totals	6,293	22.9	3,930	14.2	6,551	23.8	4,685	17.0

Days With 30 Or More Fatalities Per Month In 2013, Iraq Body Count

January 2013 – 5 Total

1/3/13 – 34 killed

1/16/13 – 46 killed

1/17/13 – 31 killed

1/22/13 – 34 killed

1/23/13 – 46 killed

February 2013 – 3 Total

2/3/13 – 40 killed

2/8/13 – 38 killed

2/17/13 – 59 killed

March 2013 – 3 Total

3/14/13 – 34 killed

3/19/13 – 73 killed

3/29/13 – 30 killed

April 2013 – 7 Total

4/1/13 – 55 killed

4/6/13 – 34 killed

4/15/13 – 62 killed

4/18/13 – 30 killed

4/23/13 – 71 killed

4/24/13 – 32 killed

4/29/13 – 34 killed

May 2013 – 10 Total

5/1/13 – 31 killed

5/15/13 – 40 killed

5/17/13 – 93 killed

5/18/13 – 33 killed

5/20/13 – 134 killed

5/21/13 – 46 killed

5/27/13 – 81 killed

5/28/13 – 45 killed

5/29/13 – 35 killed

5/30/13 – 34 killed

June 2013 – 7 Total

6/10/13 61 killed

6/16/13 49 killed

6/18/13 39 killed

6/23/13 36 killed

6/24/13 46 killed

6/25/13 45 killed

6/27/13 34 killed

July 2013 – 14 Total

7/1/13 43 killed

7/2/13 59 killed

7/11/13 59 killed

7/12/13 49 killed

7/13/13 37 killed

7/14/13 66 killed

7/19/13 36 killed

7/20/13 80 killed

7/21/13 41 killed

7/23/13 38 killed

7/24/13 37 killed

7/25/13 48 killed

7/29/13 60 killed

7/30/13 50 killed

August 2013 – 11 Total

8/6/13 – 50 killed

8/7/13 – 34 killed

8/10/13 – 94 killed

8/12/13 – 37 killed

8/15/13 – 42 killed

8/20/13 – 34 killed

8/23/13 – 46 killed

8/25/13 – 55 killed

8/28/13 – 98 killed

8/29/13 – 41 killed

8/31/13 – 30 killed

September 2013 – 18 Total

9/1/13 73 killed

9/2/13 33 killed

9/3/13 87 killed

9/10/13 34 killed

9/11/13 57 killed

9/13/13 50 killed

9/14/13 54 killed

9/16/13 67 killed

9/17/13 50 killed

9/19/13 33 killed

9/20/13 33 killed

9/21/13 116 killed

9/22/13 39 killed

9/23/13 46 killed

9/25/13 47 killed

9/26/13 49 killed

9/29/13 85 killed

9/30/13 62 killed

Aftermath of the bombing of a funeral in Sadr City 9/21/13 (AP)

The high death counts were due to the large number of bombings launched by the insurgency, which in turn have led to Iraqis turning on each other. In September there were 18 days with 30 or more fatalities each, the most for the year. That was topped off by September 21 when Iraq Body Count recorded 116 killed, the highest one day figure in 2013. 107 of those died in Baghdad mostly from a suicide bomber who set off his explosive device at a funeral in Sadr City. That was matched by nine other days with 50 or more deaths. Al Qaeda in Iraq is also continuing with its bombing campaign in the south, which began in December 2012. On September 15, the organization was able to carry out simultaneous attacks in five cities, Hillah, Karbala, Kut, Basra, and Nasiriyah killing a total of 40 people. The high level of violence has put the population on edge. After the attack on the 21st for example local citizens in the area blocked off the streets, armed men were seen walking the area, while the security forces withdrew and government offices closed. There were calls for public executions of several people who were captured in the neighborhood who were believed to be behind the bombing. Five days later when there was a funeral procession for the victims people again expressed their frustrations by attacking the district council building, and once again called for the suspected insurgents to be turned over to them. This came on top of stories of members of the Sadoun tribe in Dhi Qar being forced out of their homes in retaliation for attacks upon Shiites in the rest of the country, Sunnis being killed in Basra, and bound men being found shot in the head in various parts of Baghdad. Those types of incidents have not been seen in Iraq since the civil war years of 2005-2007. If the public feels like the government is no longer effective in ensuring their safety there may be more of these stories. That could point to the breakdown of society and the return of another large-scale sectarian conflict.

Iraq is facing a resurgent insurgency. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been able to rebuild since the U.S. military withdrawal, and expand due to the Syrian conflict. The overall insurgency has also found new supporters after the government raid upon the Hawija protest site. The number of attacks and deaths each month has skyrocketed since then. Society is fraying as a result. Daily life continues but people are becoming afraid to go to certain areas like large markets in Baghdad out of fear of bombings. More importantly, there are increasing stories of sectarian retaliatory attacks against Sunnis for the bombings of Shiites. This may become the new norm in Iraq with large explosions every couple days and deepening divisions as a result. At worse, the situation could continue to escalate and the Islamists may succeed in rekindling the civil war, which will bring the whole country down.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Gunmen attack Sunni town in Iraq,” Associated Press, 9/24/13

Agence France Presse, “Iraq casualties from violence (2013),” 10/1/13

Arango, Tim, “Rise in Deadly Attacks on Shiites in Iraq Stirs Anger at Government,” New York Times, 9/27/13

Associated Press, “Attacks Kill Scores in Iraq as Violence Surges,” 9/21/13

Edwards, Kelly, “Prison break and violence levels demand Maliki security response: 2013 Iraq Update #32,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/13/13

Iraq Body Count, “Recent Events”

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Dozens Killed In Baghdad Attacks,” 10/1/13

Al Rafidayn, “Dozens of families of victims of bombings in Sadr City attack stones at the building of Municipal Council,” 9/26/13

Salaheddin, Sinan and Gamel, Kim, “Nearly 1,000 Iraqis killed in September, UN says,” Associated Press, 10/1/13

Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Commander General Suleimani And His Role In Iraq, An Interview With The New Yorker’s Dexter Filkins

 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force Commander General Qasim Suleimani is a rather infamous figure in Iraq and the Middle East. The general has been blamed for organizing attacks upon American forces when they were in Iraq, helping to put together new governments in Baghdad, and now he’s running Iraqi fighters into Syria. The man is a jack of all trades involved in espionage, covert operations, and power politics. He’s rarely talked about in public however, which was why Dexter Filkins’ recent article for the New Yorker profiling the general was quite revealing. Here now is an interview with Filkins about General Suleimani’s role in Iraq.

Recent image made by the Badr's militia showing Gen. Suleimani and American coffins in the background (via Phillip Smyth)

1. General Qasim Suleimani was an early supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini, which led him to join the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1979. The next year he was fighting in the Iran-Iraq War where he eventually rose to be a division commander. He witnessed hundreds of his friends and comrades die in that conflict. Do you think that gave him a life long interest in Iraq, and a desire to not see that country become a threat again?

I think that’s right. Suleimani, but Iran more broadly, were deeply traumatized by the Iran-Iraq war, and they vowed never to allow anything like that to repeat itself.

2. Suleimani seemed to follow a two-track policy in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Overall, what did he want to do to the American occupation, and what were his goals with the new Iraqi government?

I think Suliemani—after concluding the Americans were not going to invade Iran—decide to bleed the Americans as much as he could. At the same time, he worked to ensure that the Shiites succeeded in Iraq. I think this made for a sort of yin-yang policy that was sometimes at war with itself. But I think it’s safe to say that Suleimani helped kill a lot of Americans.

3. One example of his political strategy was his involvement in the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). After the Coalition Provisional Authority took over responsibility for Iraq in 2003 it created the IGC. You discovered that it was actually put together through negotiations between the State Department’s Ryan Cocker and Suleimani. How did the two work out the Council members, and what was each hoping to achieve?

It’s pretty amazing; the IGC was essentially the product of a joint American-Iranian negotiation. Ryan Crocker was at the center of it; he told me never gave the Suliemani veto power; for instance, the Iranians didn’t want Ayad Alawi. But he sometimes agreed to Iranian requests if their objections involved someone the Americans regarded as non-essential. 

4. On the military front, the Qods Force began supporting a number of Shiite militias against the Americans. Many in the U.S. believed that Moqtada al-Sadr was Iran’s main proxy, but Suleimani actually didn’t like working with him. Can you explain his dislike for Sadr and what alternatives that led the Qods Force Commander to search out to confront the Americans?

This one’s pretty easy, I think. Muqtada is a very independent leader, and I think this frustrated Suleimani. The result were what the Americans called “Special Groups,” i.e., militias that were under more direct Iranian control.

5. One tactic that Suleimani unsuccessfully employed to undermine the U.S. occupation was to encourage the flow of Islamist militants into Iraq via Syria. This seemed to blowback upon the general in two ways. First, what did the Islamists end up doing in Iraq, and what are they doing in Syria now?

Well, I think the real crazies started blowing up Shiite mosques and the like—the very people the Iranians were supporting. They made a sectarian war in Iraq. They are now doing the same in Syria.

6. Washington knew about all of the general’s machinations in Iraq, and finally decided to retaliate starting in December 2006. What kind of operations did the U.S. forces launch against the Qods Force, and how did Suleimani retaliate?

U.S. Special Forces captured five Quds Force officers in Erbil. I think the evidence suggests pretty conclusively that Suleimani retaliated by ordering an Iraqi militia (a Special Group) to kidnap and kill five Americans in Karbala less than a week later.

7. That was quite an escalation form arresting Qods Force membersto them killing U.S. soldiers. Did the Americans consider raising the stakes after that, perhaps a cross border raid into Iran or anything like that?

Yes, they did. But they figured in the end that it would be too easy for the Iranians to escalate the war, which they didn’t need.

8. General Suleimani seemed to like the overt and covert battle with the U.S. in Iraq, and there was some indirect communication between the two via intermediaries and text messages. What were some of the more notorious comments the general made to the Americans?

Well, I think the most colorful one came in 2006, when Sulimani appears to have sent a note to the American command, following the war between Israel and Hezbollah: He said: “I hope you have been enjoying the peace and quiet in Baghdad. I’ve been busy in Beirut!” A sense of humor, you might say.

9. Many Iraqis believe that Suleimani is involved in all the major negotiations between the ruling parties in the country. That actually seemed to be true after the 2010 parliamentary elections. The winning lists were deadlocked for months in talks over whether Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki would return for a second term. What role did the general play in breaking this stalemate?

Suleimani himself broke the stalemate between the Iraqis, by persuading Muqtada al-Sadr’s coalition to join Maliki’s government. That clinched it.

Suleimani helped convince Sadr to support Maliki after the 2010 elections assuring him of a 2nd term (AP)

10. Now that the American military has withdrawn from Iraq many in the West believe that Iraq has fallen in with Tehran. That’s not quite true as shown in the relationship between Premier Maliki and Suleimani. What do the two think of each other?

I think they do not like each other, but at the same time I think Maliki feels compelled to do many things the Iranians tell him to do.

11. Today the general’s main concern is Syria. You wrote that he has a command post set up in Damascus where he orchestrates part of the war. He has drawn on his ties in Iraq to varying degrees of success to help with this. One major project is ferrying weapons and supplies from Iran to Syria through Iraq. Who did Suleimani contact in Iraq to help him, and who answered his call?

Good question. I am not sure. Essentially, the Maliki government allows the Iranian planes to fly over Iraqi airspace unimpeded. One crucial figure in all this is the Transportation Minister, Hadi Al-Ameri. For years, Ameri was the head of the Badr Brigade, a Shiite militia with very close ties to Iran—so close that Badr fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq war.

12. Just as important is that Iran is bringing in its allies to support the Assad regime, which includes Iraqis. What kind of command and control does Suleimani exercise over them, and what are they doing in the war?

The exact command relationship is not clear, but it is quite clear that Iran is instrumental in the recruiting, training and moving of the militias into Syria. So I think the Iranian role is substantial.

SOURCES

Filkins, Dexter, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, 9/30/13

PRESS TV VIDEO: Fake bomb detectors still being used in Iraq

BRITISH INSTITUTE FOR IRAQ VIDEO: Britain and the Occupations Of Iraq

Can Iraq Solve Its Housing Crisis?

 

Due to wars and international sanctions Iraq is in need of many essential services. One of those is housing. With an increasing population and migration from rural areas to urban ones there is a severe housing crunch. The government has promised to solve this problem, but due to an archaic land ownership system, Baghdad’s infamous bureaucracy, and a failure to fund programs little progress has been made.

Housing unit being built by a foreign company in Najaf (Copperchase)

In the last two years the Iraqi government has pledge to solve the country’s housing crisis. In 2012, the Housing Ministry said that it would start spending $4 billion on building new housing units across the country. That same year the authorities stated that they would raise the budget of the two main state-run banks, Rafidain and Rasheed, so that they could provide a new series of housing loans. In September 2013, it was announced that the two would increase their capital holdings from $23 million to $360 million by 2014 to assist with this program. As a result, by next year the two are supposed to offer 75 million dinar loans to public employees and 40 million dinar loans to regular citizens. The problem as ever with the Iraqi government is fulfilling these promises. First, Housing Minister Mohammed Sahib Darraji recently remarked that his office would only be able to complete around 130,000 houses by 2016. That would be around 5% of the 2.5 million units the country needs. The government would build approximately 30,000 of those with the remaining 100,000 by private businesses. That’s because the Ministry’s budget was cut in 2013. It was supposed to be giving out 0% interest loans to contractors to build houses, but it now doesn’t have the money to continue that program. Second, the cabinet did not include increasing the Rafidain and Rasheed banks’ reserves this year either. That means those two institutions will not be able to follow through with the new loan program. Like too many things the Iraqi government has been talking about providing housing to the public with little to show for it. Not only has the Housing Ministry brought it up, which is controlled by the Sadrists, but so has Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. That may be because parliamentary elections are just around the corner in 2014. That’s usually when politicians start talking about solving the country’s pressing needs.

Iraq’s housing situation has been a long time problem. One major cause is the fast growing population. That has led to rents doubling in some places, and real estate prices to go up as well. Many houses are overcrowded too. According to one survey, 13% of urban households have 10 or more occupants, while 37% have 3 or more persons per room. Second, there is a large and on-going migration from Iraq’s rural areas to cities, which is making the housing crisis worse. That’s driven by the high poverty rates out in the countryside, which are more than double the urban areas, 39% compared to 16%, and the hope for opportunity. Finally, the last time the nation saw a large increase in housing stock was from 2000-2004 when around 200,000 units were added, hardly enough to meet demand. Those together are the causes. The growing and moving population is putting increasing pressure upon the almost stagnant housing stock. Iraq has one of the highest birth rates and youngest populations in the region as well, and that’s not going to end any time soon.

To add to that the government’s notorious red tape is holding up development plans. Many investment projects are stalled due to land use issues. Iraq’s land titles and registry system follows the Ottoman one, and most of them are held by the state. There are a huge amount of lost, destroyed, or forged land titles to complicate things. The state has promised to reform the system several times, but failed. In 2006 for example, the Investment Law No. 13 was passed, which allowed investors to acquire state land for private home development. Unfortunately, the government has not followed through with the act, and getting land remains one of the main complaints of homebuilders. In 2010, the investment law was amended allowing foreigners to own land. That has not changed the situation much either. Many construction deals that have been announced are stalled, because they cannot get the proper approval to begin work. That’s due to the byzantine bureaucracy. A business has to go to the provincial investment commission for a project under $250 million to work out a deal for a piece of land. The commission then has to get the land title, but that’s difficult, because the commissions lack real power, and the ministries that own the land often don’t agree to private businesses developing them. Companies then have to go through various government offices such as the Finance Ministry, the General Commission of Taxes, the provincial government, the Land Registry, and sometimes the secretariat of the cabinet, before they can even start on the financing. That doesn’t even include the payoffs and bribes that are usually required to make it through all these steps. All together that’s the reason why the pace of issuing licenses to build houses has been so slow. In Kurdistan, the hurdles are not as high, and the regional government has been more successful at attracting foreign investment as a result. That hasn’t alleviated the problem there however, as most of the development has been upper income leading to a huge need for lower and middle income housing units. That means that even if the Housing Ministry was given its required budget, and state-run banks had the money to hand out all the loans that are needed, the supply of houses would still drag far behind demand since there are so many barriers to building anything in Iraq. This is a classic example of the difficult business environment that is not only holding up the delivery of essential services, but handicapping the entire economy.

For the last several years various Iraqi officials have talked about addressing the country’s pressing housing needs with little to show for it. Each year a new plan is rolled out whether that’s government housing projects, public loans or attracting foreign investment. That leads to a lot of announcements, but very little actual work. As the Housing Minister admitted recently only a small fraction of demand is going to be met in the next few years. The government doesn’t support many of the policies it comes up with. More importantly the bureaucracy is not set up to facilitate these types of projects, and many get put on hold as a result. The structural problems with the government is the real issue, and there is no real effort to resolve it. That means there will be no resolution to the housing issue any time soon.

SOURCES

Ministry of Housing, Iraq Directory, “A Home For Every Citizen In Five Years,” Iraq Business News, 12/28/11

Al Rafidayn, “The launch of housing loans,” 9/25/13

Reuters, “Iraq faces chronic housing shortage, needs foreign investment – minister,” 9/16/13

Al-Shaher, Omar, “Iraq to Raise Bank Capital To Address Housing Crisis,” Al-Monitor, 9/18/13

- “Iraq’s Housing Crisis Worsens Amid High Population Growth,” Al-Monitor, 5/5/13

- “Iraqi Housing Initiatives Fails to Deliver,” Al-Monitor, 2/1/13

- “New Iraqi Budget Deepens Housing Crisis,” Al-Monitor, 3/20/13

Walid, Tamra, “Iraq Plans to Spend $9.8 Billion on Roads, Housing by 2016,” Bloomberg, 5/21/12