Violence In Iraq, Jan 2016

January 2016 ended as the most violent month in Iraq in five months. That was due to the loss of Ramadi, which led to a frantic number of counter attacks by the Islamic State. The result was the highest number of attacks and casualties since August 2015.

There were 598 incidents reported in the press in January. That was up from December’s 553, and the most since 620 recorded in August. Every province in central Iraq saw an increase in attacks except for Ninewa and Kirkuk. That was IS’s response to the loss of Ramadi. Anbar has been the main focus of the organization for the last year. Taking Ramadi in May was the group’s last major victory in the country, and made up for its defeat in Tikrit. Having the government re-take Ramadi therefore was a big setback. In comparison, some have argued that Baiji was just as bad for the group, but after that area was freed in October incidents actually went down from 585 to 530 in November.

The number of dead and wounded went up with the increase in attacks. There were 1,992 dead and 1,721 wounded in January. That broke down to 30 Peshmerga, 33 Hashd al-Shaabi, 110 Sahwa, 379 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and 1,440 civilians killed, and 10 Peshmerga, 44 Hashd, 111 Sahwa, 276 ISF, and 1,280 civilians injured. Those were the highest figures since August’s 2,239 fatalities and 1,757 wounded.

Anbar obviously saw the heaviest fighting of the month. There were 96 incidents there leading to 457 deaths and 534 wounded. Those were across the length of the province from the Fallujah area in the east to the Ramadi area in the center, and the Haditha district in the west. That was up from December’s 76 attacks, 235 killed and 88 wounded. Two mass graves were discovered in Ramadi with 80 civilians killed by the Islamic State, and another 120 were estimated to have died in the battle to retake the city. IS attacks upon the security forces also left 2 Hashd, 107 Sahwa, and 134 ISF dead and 9 Hashd, 106 Sahwa, and 171 ISF wounded. Many of those were the result of the 26 car bombs that broke through defenses and were able to hit targets. Another 72 suicide bombers, 141 car bombs and 1 motorcycle bomb were reportedly destroyed during the month.

Violence was relatively unchanged in Babil. There were 25 incidents in December and 30 in January. There were 33 dead and 107 wounded in January. As usual, all of the attacks were concentrated in the north in places like Yusifiya and Mahmudiya. IS has been carrying out sporadic attacks in the province, but has mostly been using it as a launch pad for its operations in Anbar and Baghdad.

Baghdad has been the other main focus of the insurgents. There were 266 incidents there, up from December’s 240. That was the most attacks in the province since June’s 276. The result was 306 dead and 842 wounded. IS has mostly been hitting the south section of the province with 100 incidents there. It also set off 3 car bombs and 3 suicide bombers in eastern Baghdad, and another 12 attacks in the center of the city. There was only one other car bomb attempt during the month, which was discovered and dismantled in the south. That’s surprising because this new campaign in the capital has really been made up of IEDs, 121 for the month, and sticky bombs, 21, with only a few big headline grabbing car bombings. Not all of the violence was due to IS however. There has been a growing tide of lawlessness in the capital and other major cities in Iraq. For example, there were 23 robberies reported in the press and 13 kidnappings. Another 38 bodies were found in the governorate, which were probably the work of criminals, vigilantes or elements of the Hashd.

Violence In Baghdad, Jan 2016

Center: 19 – 1 Motorcycle Bomb Dismantled, 1 Stabbing, 1 Sticky Bomb, 2 Kidnappings, 2 Robberies,

2 Robbery/Shootings, 10 IEDs

East: 54 – 1 Strangling, 1 Grenade, 3 Car Bombs, 3 Suicide Bombers, 4 Kidnappings, 4 Robberies,

5 Sticky Bombs, 14 IEDs, 24 Shootings

Outer East: 6 – 1 Shooting, 2 Sticky Bombs, 3 IEDs

North: 28 – 1 Robbery, 1 Grenade, 2 Robbery/Shootings, 5 Sticky Bombs, 7 Shootings, 12 IEDs

Outer North: 14 – 1 Beheading, 1 Sticky Bomb, 2 Kidnappings, 3 Shootings, 7 IEDs

South: 68 – 1 Kidnapping Americans, 1 Car Bomb Dismantled, 1 Strangling, 1 Robbery/Shooting,

2 Kidnappings, 2 Sticky Bombs, 2 Stabbings, 2 Robberies, 22 Shootings, 34 IEDs

Outer South: 32 – 1 Robbery, 1 Stabbing, 2 Mortars, 7 Shootings, 21 IEDs

West: 37 – 1 Kidnapping, 3 Robbery/Shootings, 5 Robberies, 5 Sticky Bombs, 6 Shootings, 15 IEDs

Outer West: 5 – 1 Mortar, 1 Shooting, 3 IED           s

Unknown: 1 – 1 Kidnapping

In the middle of the month there was a large surge in violence in Diyala topped off by a double bombing by IS in Muqtadiya that led to the Hashd to carry out a series of revenge attacks. Security incidents overall went up from 23 in December to 42 in January. During the second week of the month there were 22 incidents alone including a car bombing in Khalis, another one dismantled in Mandali, and an IED and car bombing of a café in Muqtadiya. After that last attack, the Hashd went on a rampage in the city destroying 7 mosques, 7 houses, and 36 shops. 2 reporters were also killed after they went to Muqtadiya, and their deaths were blamed on the Hashd. Ayatollah Sistani’s spokesman talked about the sectarian violence in the city afterward, and Prime Minister Haidar Abadi promised to take the perpetrators of the mosque attacks to justice, but none of the Hashd were arrested. Instead anonymous gangs were blamed for the post-bombing violence, while the Hashd said IS was behind it all. By the end of the month 101 were dead in the province and 95 wounded.

On the surface it would appear that Kirkuk was relatively stable with 23 incidents in December and 23 in January, but a new violent phenomenon emerged in the latter. What was different between the two months was the new occurrence of bodies being dumped. During the first week, 8 bodies were found, one the second week, 8 the week after, and 5 in the fourth for a total of 22. There was only one other reported death during the month. There was no evidence of who was behind these incidents, but it was something new.

Ninewa was one of the few provinces that saw a decrease in attacks, which was ironic since IS launched a winter offensive against the Kurds. The number of incidents went from 93 in December to 56 in January. The reported dead however went up from 518 to 965. That was due to 288 Yazidis discovered in a mass grave in the Sinjar district, and another 626 people reportedly executed by the Islamic State. There were also 22 attacks upon Peshmerga positions as part of the new IS campaign that killed 30 and wounded 10 Kurdish fighters.

IS also went on the counter attack in Salahaddin where incidents went from 65 in December to 79 in January. There was heavy fighting in the Makhoul Mountains in the northeast and the Samarra and Tikrit districts in the center. The last was notable, because there were very few reported incidents around the capital for several months after it was freed, but it appears that IS is trying to make minor comeback there. IS still carries out probing attacks in Samarra, sometimes quite large with car bombs, while the joint forces have been trying to clear the Makhoul Mountains since Baiji was retaken in October. In total, there were 107 dead and 113 wounded.

The number of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) went up as well. There were a total of 144 used in December and then 203 in January. This didn’t look like the beginning of a new campaign, but rather another sign of IS’s counter attacks after Ramadi. That’s shown by the fact that 167 of the car bombs, 82% of the total, were launched in Anbar. There were another 3 in Diyala, 4 in Baghdad, and 29 in Salahaddin. Overall, 36 were successful and cost the lives of 253 people and wounded another 317.

Violence In Iraq By Week 2015-16

Date	Incidents	Dead	Wounded
Jan 1-7	226	540	525
Jan 8-14	187	776	514
Jan 15-21	197	438	528
Jan 22-28	207	573	898 + 150
Jan 29-31	94	329	567
JAN	911	2,656	3,032 + 150
Feb 1-7	168	572	689
Feb 8-14	183	462	572
Feb 15-21	177	697	383
Feb 22-28	202	614	722
FEB	730	2,345	2,366
Mar 1-7	196	408	595
Mar 8-14	164	419	655
Mar 15-21	178	1,312	505
Mar 22-28	201	310	406
Mar 29-31	81	212 + 4	218 + 150
MAR	820	2,665	2,529
Apr 1-7	153	276	422
Apr 8-14	165	864	525
Apr 15-21	190	880	714
Apr 22-28	187	564	479
Apr 29-30	56	169	182 + 299
APR	751	2,753	2,621
May 1-7	176	651	448
May 8-14	167	450	542
May 15-21	149	996	390
May 22-28	131	362 + 1,499	344
May 29-31	49	87	164 + 646
MAY	672	2,546 + 1,499	1,888 + 646
Jun 1-7	155	534	475
Jun 8-14	146	649 + 405	389
Jun 15-21	153	403	373
Jun 22-28	186	407	474
Jun 29-30	66	126 + 22	189 + 106
JUN	706	2,141 + 405	2,006
Jul 1-7	161	436	718
Jul 8-14	141	385	570
Jul 15-21	109	359	597 + 4,024
Jul 22-28	148	559	590
Jul 29-31	53	193 + 260	203 + 400
JUL	612	2,192	3,078 + 4,024
Aug 1-7	154	650 + 760	298
Aug 8-14	133	756	640
Aug 15-21	136	348	354
Aug 22-28	138	366	296
Aug 29-31	59	112	169
AUG	620	2,239 + 760	1,757
Sep 1-7	141	293	355
Sep 8-14	146	387	394
Sep 15-21	123	323	488
Sep 22-28	128	190	258
Sep 29-30	40	110 + 19	147 + 8
SEP	578	1,303 + 314	1,650 + 3,003
Oct 1-7	120	340	398
Oct 8-14	144	254	389
Oct 15-21	142	208	285
Oct 22-28	129	216	366
Oct 29-31	49	110	116
OCT	585	1,127	1,554
Nov 1-7	125	186	316
Nov 8-14	121	265	354
Nov 15-21	140	358	420
Nov 22-28	107	289	261 + 124 + 1,322
Nov 29-30	37	52 + 24	103 + 1
NOV	530	1,174	1,455 + 124 + 1,322
Dec 1-7	118	158	249
Dec 8-14	128	246	248
Dec 15-21	140	242	326 + 5,920
Dec 22-28	127	292	346
Dec 29-31	40	203 + 14	83
DEC	553	1,155	1,252 + 5,920
Jan 1-7	150	808	421
Jan 8-14	140	436	417
Jan 15-21	135	275	227
Jan 22-28	132	392	322
Jan 29-31	41	81	334
JAN	598	1,992	1,721

Security By Province Jan, 2016

Province	Jan
Anbar	96 Incidents 457 Killed: 2 Hashd, 107 Sahwa, 134 ISF, 214 Civilians 534 Wounded: 9 Hashd, 106 Sahwa, 171 ISF, 248 Civilians 58 Shootings 8 IEDs 24 Suicide Car Bombs 2 Car Bombs 2 Rockets 3 Mortars 1 Motorcycle Bomb Destroyed 72 Suicide Bombers Killed 97 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 44 Car Bombs Destroyed
Babil	30 Incidents 33 Killed: 1 Hashd, 5 ISF, 27 Civilians 107 Wounded: 3 Hashd, 13 ISF, 91 Civilians 8 Shootings 21 IEDs 1 Sticky Bomb
Baghdad	266 Incidents 306 Killed: 3 Hashd, 3 Sahwa, 14 ISF, 286 Civilians 842 Wounded: 4 Hashd, 5 Sahwa, 28 ISF, 805 Civilians 79 Shootings 121 IEDs 21 Sticky Bombs 3 Suicide Bombers 3 Car Bombs 2 Grenades 3 Mortars 1 Motorcycle Bomb Dismantled 1 Car Bomb Dismantled
Basra	3 Incidents 2 Wounded: 2 ISF 2 IEDs 1 Grenade
Dhi Qar	1 Incident 1 Grenade
Diyala	42 Incidents 101 Killed: 5 ISF, 8 Hashd, 88 Civilians 95 Wounded: 7 Hashd, 14 ISF, 74 Civilians 17 Shootings 18 IEDs 3 Sticky Bombs 1 Suicide Car Bomb 1 Car Bomb 4 Mortars 1 Car Bomb Dismantled
Irbil	1 Incident 1 Rocket
Kirkuk	23 Incidents 23 Killed: 23 Civilians 3 Wounded: 1 ISF, 2 Civilians 11 Shootings 1 Grenade
Ninewa	56 Incidents 965 Killed: 30 Peshmerga, 187 ISF, 748 Civilians 24 Wounded: 9 Civilians, 15 Peshmerga 25 Shootings 17 IEDs 2 Rockets 4 Mortars 10 Suicide Bombers Killed
Salahaddin	79 Incidents 107 Killed: 19 Hashd, 34 ISF, 54 Civilians 113 Wounded: 21 Hashd, 45 Civilians, 47 ISF 42 Shootings 14 IEDs 7 Suicide Bombers 5 Suicide Car Bombs 4 Rockets 1 Grenade 18 Suicide Bombers Killed 11 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 13 Car Bombs Destroyed
Sulaymaniya	1 Incident 1 Wounded: 1 Civilian 1 Shooting

Car Bombs In Iraq, January 2016

Date	Location	Dead	Wounded
Jan 1	North of Ramadi x4, Anbar 35 Kilo, Haditha & North of Ramadi, Anbar – 11 destroyed	60	70
Jan 2	Albu Faraj, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Jan 3	Camp Speicher x2,  Salahaddin Barwana, Garma, Haditha Nazim & Ramadi, Anbar – 46 destroyed	20	17
Jan 4	Outside Haditha, Anbar Wadi Horan, Anbar - 3 destroyed Baya, Baghdad – 1 destroyed	11	30
Jan 5	Nikhaib x2 & Ramadi, Anbar Barwana, Niamiya & Ramadi, Anbar – 13 destroyed	8
Jan 6	Ramadi, Anbar – 2 destroyed
Jan 7
Totals	10 – 77 destroyed	99	117
Jan 8	Barwana, Anbar – 5 destroyed
Jan 9
Jan 10
Jan 11	Nahrawan & New Baghdad x2, Baghdad Muqtadiya, Diyala	69	118
Jan 12	Khalis, Diyala Jazeera, Salahaddin – 8 destroyed	3	10
Jan 13	East of Ramadi & Jubba, Anbar – 9 destroyed Mandali, Diyala – 1 destroyed
Jan 14	East & Tal Kasiba x2, Salahaddin Ajeel, Makhoul Mountains, Tal Kasiba, Salahaddin – 5 destroyed	7	6
Totals	8 – 28 Destroyed	79	134
Jan 15	Tal Kasiba, Salahaddin – 4 destroyed
Jan 16	Thar Thar, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Jan 17
Jan 18	Leine & Samarra Island, Salahaddin – 3 destroyed
Jan 19
Jan 20	Leine & Samarra Island, Salahaddin – 4 destroyed
Jan 21
Totals	0 – 14 Destroyed	-	-
Jan 22	Sjar, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Jan 23	70 Kilo x3 & Tal Meshahda, Anbar	48	11
Jan 24	Husaiba, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Jan 25
Jan 26	Sufiya, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Jan 27	Baghdadi x12, Anbar Albu Hayes, Saqlawiya, Sarsar, Thar Thar, Anbar – 27 Destroyed	10	9
Jan 28	Nadheim x2, Anbar Nadheim, Anbar – 17 Destroyed	17	46
Totals	18 – 47 Destroyed	75	66
Jan 29
Jan 30
Jan 31	Abu Shajal, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Totals	0 – 1 Destroyed	-	-
TOTALS	36 – 167 Destroyed	253	317

Iraq’s Oil Revenue Drops 45%

Iraq’s oil exports reached new highs in the last few months, but that contributed to the international oil glut. The result was that prices for Iraq’s crude have continued to plummet over the last six months crippling Baghdad’s revenues, and threatened the government’s ability to sustain itself.

In January 2015, Iraq exported an average of 3.285 million barrels a day. That was the second highest amount in the post-2003 era with only November recording more at 3.365 million. In fact the last three months have all seen very good numbers. This has been due to the opening of single point mooring facilities over the last year or so that have increased capacity in the southern Basra ports, and the marketing of the new Basra Heavy crude that has opened up new sales opportunities. This has made up for Kurdistan ceasing its foreign sales for the central government in September 2015.

The problem Iraq faces is that these new export figures have contributed to the high supply of oil on the international market leading to a collapse in prices. On January 25 for example, oil prices dropped 5% based upon Iraq’s December export figures. By the end of the month a barrel of Iraqi crude sold for only $22.21. That was half the price the nation’s oil was going for last year. The result was that the country only earned $2.26 billion for the month, 45% below its 2015 monthly average of $4.079 billion. All of the world’s major oil producers are dealing with the drop in prices the same way, maintaining or increasing production to try to earn as much as possible. That situation will only get worse when Iran re-enters the market when its sanctions are fully lifted.

Iraq is facing a huge dilemma. Over 90% of its revenues come from oil. It has a bloated public sector that has only grown over the years when it was flush with cash. It is also facing the war with the Islamic State and a huge internal refugee crisis. It is only surviving by going through its reserves, which can’t sustain the heavy spending for long. Rather than taking this opportunity to develop the private sector and cut the fat from the government, Baghdad is likely to go into debt borrowing from investors and banks, and might eventually follow the lead of the Kurdistan Regional Government and stop paying its civil workers and cutting services when its cash runs low. Like many oil dependent countries, Iraq can’t shake its addiction even during a crisis.

Iraq Oil Exports & Revenues 2015-16

Month	Avg. Exports	Avg. Price Per Barrel	Earnings (Bil)
Jan	2.535	$41.45	$3.258
Feb	2.597	$47.43	$3.449
Mar	2.98	$48.24	$4.457
Apr	3.077	$51.70	$4.8
May	3.145	$55.87	$5.447
Jun	3.187	$55.32	$5.289
Jul	3.104	$50.99	$4.908
Aug	3.079	$40.59	$3.874
Sep	3.052	$40.32	$3.692
Oct	2.7	$39.56	$3.320
Nov	3.365	$36.42	$3.67
Dec	3.215	$29.84	$2.793
2015 Avg.	3.003	$44.81	$4.079
Jan	3.285	$22.21	$2.26

 

2015-16 Oil Exports From Basra

Jan 2.39 mil/bar/day

Feb 2.29 mil/bar/day

Mar 2.71 mil/bar/day

Apr 2.62 mil/bar/day

May 2.69 mil/bar/day

Jun 3.022 mil/bar/day

Jul 3.064 mil/bar/day

Aug 3.021 mil/bar/day

Sep 3.03 mil/bar/day

Oct 2.7 mil/bar/day

Nov 3.37 mil/bar/day

Dec 3.215 mil/bar/day

Jan 3.285 mil/bar/day

2015-16 Oil Exports By Kurds For Baghdad

Jan 153,000 bar/day

Feb 306,000 bar/day

Mar 268,000 bar/day

Apr 450,000 bar/day

May 451,000 bar/day

Jun 164,733 bar/day

Jul 41,000 bar/day

Aug 50,900 bar/day

Sep 21,500 bar/day

Oct 0.0

Nov 0.0

Dec 0.0

Jan 0.0

SOURCES

Kumar, Devika Krishna, “Oil hit again after Iraq supply adds to glut,” Reuters, 1/25/16

Reuters, “Iraq’s January oil exports rise slightly,” 2/1/16

Van Heuvelen, Ben, “Iraq exports rebound but oil price does not,” Iraq Oil Report, 2/2/16

Iran’s Ties With Al Qaeda In Iraq’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

The history of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq has largely been written. He grew up as a petty criminal in Jordan, travelled to Afghanistan twice after the war with the Soviets was over and set up his own camp with the help of Al Qaeda, was imprisoned in Jordan, and eventually went to Iraq to fight the Americans. The one part of his life that has not been written about much was his two stints in Iran in 2001 and 2003 and his ties with the government there. Zarqawi originally began running his supply lines through Iran to his camp in Afghanistan, and later received direct support from Tehran when he was building up his terrorist network in Germany and Iraq.

When Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was organizing his jihadist organization in Afghanistan called Jund al-Sham it included cells and routes through Iran. In 1999, Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan for the second time after he was amnestied from prison in Jordan. When he arrived in the country he stayed in an area under the control of the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Zarqawi then met with Osama bin Laden in Kandahar. The two did not get along as they had different views on jihad, but prominent Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel thought that the group should maintain contacts with Zarqawi That led Al Qaeda to provide Zarqawi with $200,000 to help him set up his own camp in Herat along the Afghanistan-Iranian border in 2000. There he went about creating his own network that stretched to Europe and Iran. The Iranian city of Mashhad for example, became an important way station for men and material to enter Zarqawi’s camp. His top operative in Iran was a man named Abu Ali who ran and coordinated a cell in Germany. Afghanistan had become a failed state controlled by various factions and warlords after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Zarqawi had missed out on the war against the communists in the country, but like many other jihadists felt it provided a perfect setting to start his own organization. This was probably where Tehran first became aware of his activities as it supported both Hekmatyar and Al Qaeda. It also did nothing about him establishing his supply lines through Iran.

Zarqawi would become more involved with Iran after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In October 2001 the Americans began their campaign to overthrow the Taliban. Zarqawi and his men fought alongside Al Qaeda in Herat and Kandahar, during which time he was wounded by a U.S. airstrike. The war drove Zarqawi and 300 of his men to flee to Iran in December. He then went to Tehran for medical treatment on his injury. Zarqawi ended up staying in Iran until April 2002, and was initially hosted by a follower of Hekmatyar who he’d met from his time in Afghanistan. Zarqawi then set about rebuilding his organization, setting up camps and safe houses in Zahedan, Isfahan, and Tehran. He also established ties with Ansar al-Islam in Iraq’s Kurdistan, and travelled to Lebanon, Syria and the rest of Iraq to recruit. Germany’s Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) in an investigation that ended in the arrest of a Zarqawi cell found evidence that Iran was actively supporting him at this time. According to the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Iranian Revolutionary Guard provided Zarqawi with phone numbers he could use. Jordanian intelligence seconded the Germans, and claimed that Iran provided weapons, uniforms, and equipment to the terrorist. When Zarqawi was based in Afghanistan, the Iranian authorities turned a blind eye to his activities in their country. When he relocated there in 2001, they became more actively involved in his operations. As long as he was focused upon striking the west and Arab governments Tehran didn’t appear to have any problems with him being in the country.

During this time Zarqawi met back up with Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel in Iran, and the two decided that Iraq should be their next focus due to the impending U.S. invasion. Adel would later write that Iraq would be the perfect opportunity to create an Islamic State. The American intervention could be used as a rallying cry for the Islamic masses to be radicalized and turned towards jihad. Zarqawi then decided upon a two-part plan. First, most of his men would move to Kurdistan and work with Ansar al-Islam in preparation for the American arrival. Other would go to Germany where they were to carry out terrorist attacks upon Jewish targets. Zarqawi and Adel were right, Iraq did provide a turning point for jihadists, and turned the former into an international terrorist that would rival even bin Laden. His activities in Germany would also hasten his move into Iraq.

In April 2002 Zarqawi’s cell in Germany was arrested leading to the West to put pressure on Iran to crackdown on his group. The detention of Zarqawi’s men in Germany alerted the western authorities to his presence in Iran and how his network was working. Both Germany and the United States complained to Tehran about it harboring the terrorist. The Iranians responded by arresting Zarqawi and almost all of his operatives in the country. They were released after a few weeks. That led Zarqawi to leave the country for Syria, and then Iraqi Kurdistan. By May 2002 Zarqawi was in Baghdad organizing for the U.S. invasion. Zarqawi was still a rather minor jihadist leader at the time. While Tehran had supported him to keep tabs on the radical Islamist community, he was not important enough to be protected. Zarqawi could see that and he was already planning on moving to Iraq, so these events simply moved forward his timetable.

The Iraq war actually made Zarqawi turn to Iran one more time. Zarqawi and his allies in Ansar al-Islam had their camps wiped out in Kurdistan during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Both ended up going to Iran as a result as both had ties with Tehran. There, Zarqawi met up with Saif al-Adel once again who asked for help getting Al Qaeda operatives into Iraq. Zarqawi agreed to funnel them via his networks in Syria, and many of them joined his organization Tawhid wal Jihad, which would later become known as Al Qaeda in Iraq.

The major question that comes to mind when reading these reports of ties between Iran and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was why would they work together when Zarqawi was so vehemently anti-Shiite? There are many possible answers. First, many governments in the Middle East maintained ties to jihadist organizations even ones they didn’t agree with to surveil them. Second, Tehran saw that Zarqawi could further its foreign policy goals. This started in Afghanistan as Zarqawi was setting up his first camp. The Iranian government might have thought they could use him later on if he made anything out of himself. That happened when Zarqawi decided to move to Iraq as both he and Iran were interested in fighting the Americans and undermining their plans for a post-Saddam nation. For Zarqawi he apparently found Tehran a marriage of convenience. He could use Iran as a way station for his men that did not rely upon routes through Pakistan, which were dominated by the established jihadist groups in Afghanistan. After Zarqawi returned to Iraq for good after the U.S. invasion there was little on his ties with Tehran. What is clear is that he established relations with the Iranian government that lasted from 2000 to at least 2003. They both benefited as Zarqawi found a base and safe haven to work out of, while Iran ended up backing the deadliest insurgent faction against the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Tawhid wal Jihad’s bombings in Baghdad in 2003 drove off many foreign countries, companies, and international organizations that might have helped the Americans, thus immediately undermining reconstruction. Today, Iran is fighting Zarqawi’s successor the Islamic State, but at one time the two worked together. Such is the Byzantine nature of Middle Eastern politics.

SOURCES

Brisard, Jean-Charles Martinez, Damien, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005

Bunzel, Cole, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, March 2015

Darling, Dan, “The Cicero Articles,” Long War Journal, 10/30/05

Debat, Alexis, “Vivisecting the Jihad,” National Interest, 6/23/04

Gambill, Gary, “Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” Jamestown Foundation, 12/15/04

Isikoff, Michael, “Distorted Intelligence?” Newsweek, 6/25/03

Kirdar, M.J., “Al Qaeda In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011

Leiken, Robert and Brooke, Steven, “Who Is Abu Zarqawi?” Weekly Standard, 5/18/04

Napoleoni, Loretta, Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005

New York Times, “Militants linked to al Qaeda rallying in Iraq, Bremer says,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/10/03

Roggio, Bill, “Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi, al Qaeda and Iran,” Long War Journal, 6/16/05

Schanzer, Jonathan, “Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004

Symon, Fiona, “The devil America knows,” Financial Times, 9/24/04

Weaver, Mary Anne, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, July/August 2006

Weiss, Michael Hassan, Hassan, ISIS, Inside the Army of Terror, New York: Regan Arts, 2015