Violence In Iraq, March 2016

Government offensives in Anbar and Ninewa along with some large bombings led to an increase in violence and casualties in Iraq in March 2016. In Anbar the Iraqi forces continued to make gains in clearing out the Ramadi area and launched several new operations in the province as well. In Ninewa an effort was made to clear the Makhmour area. Faced with these campaigns, IS has turned to car bombings against the Iraqi forces to try to stall their advances and terrorist attacks against civilian targets, especially in Baghdad.

Attacks had been going down in Iraq in 2016, but March reversed that trend. There were 598 incidents in January when the Islamic State launched a series of counter attacks and terrorist bombings in response to its loss of Ramadi. Then there were 549 in February, before going up to 665 in March, the highest amount since August’s 684. The question is whether March was a blip like January or is IS going to increase its operations during the summer like it historically has. Since incidents have been going down overall since 2015 it is likely that even if IS tries to pick up its operations in the coming months it may not be sustainable.

Casualties increased in March as well. There were 1,463 dead and 1,843 wounded. That was up from 1,281 killed and 1,566 injured in February. Those figures compared to the United Nations’ 1,119 dead and 1,561 wounded, and Iraq Body Count’s 1,073,which does not include soldiers, but does cover the police, Hashd, and Sahwa in its count.

So far this year there has been an average of 66.1 fatalities per day in January, 44.1 in February, and 47.1 in March.

The Iraqi forces were operating throughout Anbar. They continued to clear the Ramadi suburbs. They were also active in Thar Thar, Garma, Amiriya Fallujah, Hit, Saqlawiya, and Kubaisa. The Islamic State’s main response was counter attacking with car bombs and suicide bombers. Seven car bombs and 12 suicide bombers found their targets. The government also claimed to have destroyed 36 car bombs, 45 suicide car bombs, and killed 58 suicide bombers. Because of official exaggeration the real numbers are likely half that. In total, there were 98 incidents, 343 killed and 161 wounded in the province during the month. The Islamic State executed 111 people, and 150 ISF and Sahwa were killed and wounded attempting to disarm IEDs in Ramadi.

For most of March Babil was witnessing its usual low level of IEDs and shootings, but then there were two mass casualty bombings. First, a suicide truck bomb left 61 dead and 95 wounded in Hillah. Then towards the end of the month a suicide bomber detonated his device at a soccer match in Iskandiriya, which killed 41 and wounded 105. In March there were 33 incidents, 136 fatalities, and 306 injured. 75% of the deaths and 65% of the wounded were due to those two explosions.

As IS has lost territory it has increasingly turned to attacking the capital. At the end of 2014 there was a huge spike in incidents, and then they have fluctuated up and down from 2015-2016. Since October they have been going up from an average of 7.0 per day to 7.6 in November, 7.7 in December, 8.5 in January, 8.4 in February, and then 9.9 in March, the highest in three years. In that month there were 307 incidents leading to 363 killed and 995 wounded. Since 2014 incidents have gone up from an average of 6.2 per day, to 7.4 per day in 2015 to 8.9 so far in 2016. Southern Baghdad has been the main target of IS with 111 attacks in March, including a motorcycle bomb, 2 mortar attacks, 5 sticky bombs and 70 IEDs. As security has deteriorated, so has crime and vigilantism. Major robberies, kidnappings, and bodies being dumped are commonplace each week.

Violence In Baghdad, March 2016

Center: 17 – 1 Kidnapping foiled, 1 Stabbing/Robbery, 1 Suicide Bomber, 1 Sticky Bomb, 3 Robberies, 3 Shootings, 7 IEDs

East: 44 – 1 Attempted Robbery, 1 Robbery, 1 Decapitation, 1 Grenade, 2 Shootings/Robberies, 3 Kidnappings, 6 Sticky Bombs, 13 IEDs, 17 Shootings

Outer East: 8 – 1 Kidnapping, 1 Shooting, 3 Sticky Bombs, 3 IEDs

North: 34 – 1 Grenade, 1 Kidnapping, 1 Sticky Bomb Dismantled, 2 Robberies, 4 Sticky Bombs, 12 Shootings, 13 IEDs

Outer North: 30 – 1 Kidnapping/Shooting/Robbery, 2 Kidnappings, 4 Sticky Bombs, 5 Shootings, 17 IEDs

South: 66 – 1 Stabbing, 1 Strangling, 1 Robbery, 1 Grenade, 3 Kidnapping, 5 Sticky Bombs, 15 Shootings, 38 IEDs

Outer South: 45 – 1 Motorcycle Bomb, 1 Stabbing, 1 Kidnapping, 2 Mortars, 7 Shootings, 32 IEDs

West: 40 – 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested, 1 Kidnapping Foiled, 1 Mortar, 1 Car Bomb Destroyed, 1 Grenade, 1 Robbery/Shooting, 2 Kidnappings, 2 Robberies, 2 Robberies/Shootings, 3 Sticky Bombs, 6 Shootings, 17 IEDs

Outer West: 14 – 1 Mortar, 1 Shooting, 3 Sticky Bombs, 9 IEDs

Unknown: 1 – 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested

Basra has also been unstable. There are constant tribal clashes and rampant crime. Political violence between the ruling parties is also on going with an education director being killed and an attempt made on a judge.

Violence has been creeping up in Diyala as well. In November and December there were only 0.7 incidents per day. Then they went up to 1.3 in January, 1.1 in February, and 1.4 in March. For the month there were 46 attacks, 29 dead, and 18 wounded. The security forces were able to prevent three bombings when they disarmed a car bomb, and arrested two suicide bombers. IS was able to fire mortars on several towns and cities.

IS also picked up its operations in Kirkuk, although they dipped a bit. Like Diyala, there was an average of 0.7 attacks per day in December and January, but then jumped to 1.7 in February, and 1.4 in March. In those last two months IS started regular attacks upon the Peshmerga lines as well as carried out a wave of mass executions in Hawija, the last district in the province still under its control. In March, IS began firing rockets with chemical agents at Taza. At the end of the month however, attacks dramatically tailed off. There were 45 incidents total that killed 50 and wounded 106.

There has been a wave of terrorist attacks in Turkey in recent months. In response, Ankara has begun regular air raids upon northern Kurdistan bombing areas under the control of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey claimed it killed 112 PKK fighters in two air strikes.

Ninewa became a new focus of both Baghdad and IS. The insurgents were carrying out regular attacks upon the Peshmerga lines, and fired chemical rockets upon civilian towns. It also executed 272 people, mostly in Mosul. At the end of the month the ISF and tribal fighters began an offensive in Makhmour to clear the area of IS cells that were firing upon the bases there, including a Marine one that was just built in March. As that operation got under way, IS counter attacked with its usual mix of infantry assaults, suicide bombers, and car bombs. 7 car bombs and 10 suicide bombers were able to hit the security forces. They in turn claimed they destroyed 9 car bombs and killed 36 suicide bombers. As usual those figures are inflated. These clashes led to 84 incidents, 387 killed, and 199 wounded. The dead included 1 U.S. Marine, 1 Hashd, 3 Turkish Soldiers, 40 Peshmerga, and 41 ISF.

Salahaddin, which was a major battlefield for months has been quieting down. There were an average of 2.0 attacks per day in December, going up to 2.5 in January as IS carried out attacks in the province in response to the loss of Ramadi, and then went down to 1.9 in February and 1.5 in March. Almost all of the fighting in the governorate was concentrated in the northeast in places like the Ajeel and Alas oil fields in the Hamrin Mountains, the Makhoul Mountains, and the Baiji district. Baiji was freed back in October, but in recent weeks there were constant reports of clashes going on there. At the end of 2015 the Hashd that have dominated security operations in the province were talking about clearing out the last IS pockets, but then they were called away by Iran for the Tehran-Moscow Aleppo offensive. Since then violence has leveled off, the frontline has stalemated, and IS has been able to re-infiltrate into places like Baiji.

The number of car bombs has tapered off in Iraq in recent months. In December there were 26 successful bombings, and then 36 in January because of the fight for Ramadi. After that though there were only 9 in February and 18 in March. Almost all of those were targeting the government’s forces with a few terrorist bombings. There was 1 terrorist car bombing in Babil, 3 in Salahaddin against the ISF and Hashd, and 7 each in Anbar and Ninewa against the ISF and Peshmerga.

Violence In Iraq 2015-16

Date	Incidents	Dead	Wounded
JAN	911	2,656	3,032 + 150
FEB	730	2,345	2,366
MAR	820	2,665	2,529
APR	751	2,753	2,621
MAY	674	2,565 + 1,499	1,952 + 646
JUN	708	2,153 + 405	2,174
JUL	688	2,716	3,198 + 4,024
AUG	684	2,440 + 760	1,777
SEP	649	1,731	1,668 + 3,003
OCT	589	1,144	1,555
NOV	530	1,174	1,455 + 124 + 1,322
DEC	553	1,155	1,252 + 5,920
Jan 1-7	150	808	421
Jan 8-14	140	436	417
Jan 15-21	135	275	227
Jan 22-28	132	392	322
Jan 29-31	41	81	334
JAN	598	2,052	1,721
Feb 1-7	146	575	313
Feb 8-14	119	146	323
Feb 15-21	130	225	239
Feb 22-29	153	371	690
FEB	549	1,281	1,566
Mar 1-7	183	321	478
Mar 8-14	168	408	415
Mar 15-21	130	349	409
Mar 22-28	135	213	420
Mar 29-31	49	172	121
MAR	665	1,463	1,843

Security By Province March, 2016

Province	Incidents
Anbar	98 Incidents 343 Killed: 8 Hashd, 85 Sahwa, 106 ISF, 144 Civilians 161 Wounded: 1 Civilian, 13 Hashd, 55 Sahwa, 92 ISF 45 Shootings 9 IEDs 12 Suicide Bombers 6 Suicide Car Bombs 1 Car Bomb 5 Mortar 58 Suicide Bombers Killed 45 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 36 Car Bombs Destroyed
Babil	33 Incidents 136 Killed: 13 ISF, 123 Civilians 306 Wounded: 4 Hashd, 8 ISF, 294 Civilians 7 Shootings 21 IEDs 1 Sticky Bomb 1 Suicide Bombers 1 Suicide Truck Bomb 1 Suicide Bomber Killed
Baghdad	307 Incidents 363 Killed: 9 Hashd, 13 Sahwa, 26 ISF, 315 Civilians 995 Wounded: 12 Sahwa, 26 Hashd, 52 ISF, 905 Civilians 77 Shootings 155 IEDs 31 Sticky Bombs 1 Suicide Bomber 1 Motorcycle Bomb 4 Grenades 4 Mortars 2 Suicide Bombers Arrested 1 Car Bomb Destroyed
Diyala	46 Incidents 29 Killed: 6 ISF, 6 Hashd, 6 Peshmerga, 11 Civilians 18 Wounded: 1 Hashd, 3 Peshmerga, 3 ISF, 11 Civilians 8 Shootings 13 IEDs 1 Sticky Bomb 11 Mortars 2 Suicide Bombers Arrested 1 Car Bomb Dismantled
Kirkuk	45 Incidents 50 Killed: 2 Hashd, 2 Asayesh, 3 Peshmerga, 9 ISF, 34 Civilians 106 Wounded: 2 Asayesh, 6 Hashd, 20 Peshmerga 78 Civilians 20 Shootings 4 IEDs 8 Rockets 1 Suicide Bomber Arrested 17 Suicide Bombers Killed 1 Suicide Car Bomb Destroyed 3 Car Bombs Destroyed
KRG	2 Incidents 112 Killed: 112 PKK 2 Turkish Air Strikes
Ninewa	84 Incidents 387 Killed: 1 Marine, 1 Hashd, 3 Turkish Soldiers, 16 Najafi Hashd, 40 Peshmerga, 41 ISF, 285 Civilians 199 Wounded: 1 Turkish Soldier, 4 Hashd, 8 Marines, 8 Najafi Hashd, 22 Peshmerga & PKK, 25 Civilians, 52 Peshmerga, 79 ISF 33 Shootings 297 IEDs 10 Suicide Bombers 7 Suicide Car Bombs 2 Chemical Rockets 5 Rockets 1 Artillery 6 Mortars 36 Suicide Bombers Killed 6 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 3 Car Bombs Destroyed
Salahaddin	48 Incidents 41 Killed: 5 Hashd, 8 ISF, 28 Civilians 57 Wounded: 6 Civilians, 20 ISF, 31 Hashd 26 Shootings 4 IEDs 3 Suicide Car Bombs 2 Mortars 11 Suicide Bombers Killed 14 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed 25 Car Bombs Destroyed

Car Bombs In Iraq March, 2016

Date	Car Bombs	Dead	Wounded
Mar 1	Leine, Tikrit & West of Samarra, Salahaddin Samarra Island & Shirqat, Salahaddin – 8 destroyed	4	29
Mar 2	Baghdadi & Lake Qadisiyah, Anbar – 5 destroyed Bashir, Kirkuk – 1 destroyed Samarra & Samarra Island, Salahaddin – 18 destroyed
Mar 3	Samarra Island, Salahaddin – 3 destroyed
Mar 4	Albu Abdul, Anbar – 4 destroyed Mansour, Baghdad – 1 destroyed
Mar 5
Mar 6	Hillah, Babil Albu Abad, Anbar – 1 destroyed	61	95
Mar 7	East of Ramadi, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Totals	4 – 42 Destroyed	65	124
Mar 8
Mar 9	Kirkuk-Sulaymaniya Road, Kirkuk – 1 destroyed	2	2
Mar 10	Khalis, Diyala – 1 destroyed
Mar 11	Khashim, Anbar – 1 destroyed Baiji, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed
Mar 12	Safiriya, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Mar 13	Makhoul & ?, Salahaddin – 2 destroyed
Mar 14	Albu Aasi, Albu Taiban & Safiriya, Anbar Albu Aasi, Aqba, Keserat & Masri, Anbar – 4 destroyed	25	20
Totals	3 – 13 Destroyed	27	22
Mar 15
Mar 16	Shuhada, Anbar – 1 destroyed
Mar 17	Fallujah, Anbar – 5 destroyed
Mar 18
Mar 19	Albu Sayah & Husseiniya, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Mar 20	Hamadiya x2, Anbar Albu Obeid, Haqlaniya, Kubaisa, south of Hit, Anbar – 8 destroyed Makhoul, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed
Mar 21	Albu Obeid, Anbar Albu Obeid & Baghdadi, Anbar – 11 destroyed Bashir & Taza, Kirkuk – 2 destroyed Ain Tallawi, Ninewa – 2 destroyed Baiji & Siniya, Salahaddin – 4 destroyed	8	13
Totals	3 – 37 Destroyed	8	13
Mar 22	Albu Abad, Kubaisa, Thar Thar, Anbar – 8 destroyed Siniya, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed
Mar 23	Zkhaikha, Anbar Albu Daaj, Zkhaikha, Anbar – 7 destroyed Makhoul, Salahaddin – 1 destroyed	6	13
Mar 24	Baghdadi, Anbar – 1 destroyed Kudilah, Ninewa – 2 destroyed
Mar 25	Karmardi, Ninewa Kubaisa, Saqlawiya, Anbar – 6 destroyed
Mar 26	Karmardi, Ninewa Thar Thar, Anbar – 3 destroyed Khattab, Ninewa – 4 destroyed	7
Mar 27
Mar 28	Thar Thar, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Totals	3 – 36 Destroyed	15	13
Mar 29	Thar Thar, Anbar – 3 destroyed
Mar 30	Nasir, Ninewa – 1 destroyed
Mar 31	Makhmour – 5	14	4
MAR	18 – 132 Destroyed	129	176

Car Bombs In Iraq Nov 2015-Mar 2016

Date	Successful – Destroyed Car Bombs	Dead	Wounded
NOV	9 – 155 Destroyed	55	144
DEC	26 – 117 Destroyed	128	76
JAN	36 – 167 Destroyed	253	317
FEB	9 – 135 Destroyed	96	69
MAR	18 – 132 Destroyed	129	176

Complaints About Iraq PM Abadi Undermine His Cabinet Reshuffle

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi finally presented his new cabinet of technocrats to parliament. It now has a little over a week to discuss the nominees. The whole process to come up with the ministers has been fraught with problems with the majority of the ruling parties opposing Abadi’s plans. The main problem is that Abadi’s cabinet threatens the ruling parties hold on the government. What has made the situation worse is Abadi’s unwillingness to consult with others and to present a clear plan. The premier is already facing a difficult situation, and his alienating the other lists is only making the situation worse.

On March 31, 2016 a list was presented of Premier Abadi’s nominees for his new cabinet. That led Moqtada al-Sadr to call off his protests at Baghdad’s Green Zone, which had annoyed the prime minister, but it created more problems in the process. First, the nominee for Oil Minister Nizar Salim withdrew his candidacy claiming there was no agreement amongst the ruling blocs over the new cabinet. Salim was correct. Sadr is the only national leader who seemed to agree with Abadi’s move. It was reported that the Sadrists, the Supreme Council and Dawa Iraq Organization were the only ones to submit candidates to Abadi. All the others refused to go along with the move. First, the Kurdish Alliance complained that Abadi never explained how their ministers had failed, why they should be replaced, that the nominees don’t represent the political parties, and that the prime minister was ignoring the right of the Kurd to choose their own representatives. In turn, they claimed they would not vote on the new minister in parliament. The Solution List, which is part of the Sunni alliance, said that the cabinet was a way to exclude some parties from power. Beforehand, Iyad Allawi and Mutahidun stated that they would not give up their ministries. The Supreme Council countered Abadi’s reforms by saying that if the government were to be technocratic and non-partisan than Abadi should resign as well. Needless to say, Abadi’s program has angered almost everyone. The ministries are how the ruling parties control the government. Each one is run like a private fiefdom, and allows the parties to hand out patronage via jobs and steal via corrupt contracts. It would be expected that if the technocrats were to be approved they would move to get rid of all the political hacks that occupy the director generals, the managers, etc. That is a major threat, which none of the parties are willing to agree to as of now.

What has made the whole process worse for the prime minister is his apparent inability or unwillingness to consult with others. Since Abadi first started talking about reforms last year, he has never offered a clear or coherent program. It was a surprise to all when he first came out with his proposals. Since then the complaints have mounted into a chorus. Members from within his own Dawa and State of Law wanted him to talk to them before making major decisions, but he didn’t. Abadi’s two main allies, the Supreme Council’s Ammar Hakim and Moqtada al-Sadr have repeatedly made similar statements. The National Alliance, which all those parties belong to said that it would not follow Abadi’s program if they didn’t know about the details. Members of the Kurdish Alliance have told the press that Abadi’s plan has never been made clear to them. Finally, Allawi’s bloc complained about the lack of transparency in Abadi’s decisions. There is no way the premier can be successful unless he builds consensus. None exists right now. A major reason why so many parties turned on Maliki was that he only talked with his small core of advisers when making policy. Abadi, who was supposed to be the anti-Maliki, and came in talking about repairing relations with the other parties, has instead followed in his predecessor’s footsteps. That makes a successful transition with the cabinet all the more difficult.

SOURCES

AIN, “Solution: afraid new technocratic government is an attempt exclude,” 4/1/16

International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Conflict Alert,” 8/24/15

Kazimi, Nibras, “What is happening in Iraq?” Talisman Gate, Again, 10/29/15

Al Mada, “Abadi staggering to present his cabinet to parliament for fear of his government being overthrown,” 3/26/16

- “Citizen and Kurdish MPs criticize ambiguity of Ministerial Committee,” 3/27/16

- “”Commander of necessity” and not cooperating with the quartet raise the wrath of State of Law against the Prime Minister,” 10/28/15

- “Kurds and Sunnis are waiting for clarification of the Prime Minister: We reject the removal of our ministers without justification,” 3/30/16

- “Large blocs reluctant..and small ones send their candidates to the ministerial committee,” 3/24/16

- “The new government is in a closed envelop until next week pending parliamentary vote,” 4/1/16

- “Sayadi: 45 deputies from the State of Law withdraw authority from Abadi,” 10/28/15

- “Shiite parties leave presidencies commission … the Kurds and Sunnis hold the balance,” 3/24/16

Mamouri, Ali, “Will Abadi put his money where his mouth is?” Al Monitor, 3/1/16

Mardini, Ramzy, “No Authority: Shiite Minimization in a Fragmented Iraq,” World Politics Review, 12/8/15

Martin, Patrick with Anagnostos, Emily, Bessette, Rachel and Werman, Hannah, “Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/25/16

New Sabah, “Abadi identifies two paths of reform and choice of ministers reached an advanced stage,” 2/29/16

- “Kurdistan objects to Abadi’s list and calls on the government to obtain its representation,” 4/1/16

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Premier To Elevate Technocrats, Demote Politicos In Cabinet,” 2/10/16

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s coalition members press PM to consult before ordering reforms,” Reuters, 10/28/15

Rudaw, “Kurdish ministerial nominee withdraws from new Iraqi cabinet,” 4/1/16

Sotaliraq, “Kurds threaten to withdraw from the government, will not vote on any candidate in the new cabinet,” 4/2/16

Xinhua, “Iraqi parliament says Abadi’s reforms should comply with constitution,” 11/2/15

Musings On Iraq In The News

I’m mentioned in the in the revised version of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan.

BOSTON UNIV VIDEO: William McCants ISIS & The Absent Mahdi

RUMI FORUM VIDEO: Ethno-Religious Dynamics In Iraq With Amb Faily and Amb Khalilzad

Syria Still Had Ties To Iraq’s Insurgency In 2011

When the Syrian civil war broke out at the start of 2011 Iraqi officials were still complaining about its support for the insurgency. In June, the head of the Anbar council’s security committee said that President Assad was a threat to Iraq. (1) He went on to say that in January militants were caught crossing over from Syria with help from Damascus. As early as 2002 Assad began allowing its nationals and other Arabs to go to Iraq to prepare to fight the impending American invasion. That process continued afterward. By 2008, Damascus was trying to repair relations with Baghdad as it saw the Americans preparing to draw down in the country. Syria began cracking down on some of the militants, and provided intelligence to Iraq and sometimes the U.S. Still, Assad didn’t stop all of the insurgents within his territory, so that he could monitor and maintain ties with them. Ironically, the Syrian war would reverse the flow of men and material as Iraqi militias, militants, and tribes all joined in on the conflict.

FOOTNOTES

1. Alsumaria, “Anbar: Syria still poses a risk on Iraq if regime is not changed,” 6/17/11

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Anbar: Syria still poses a risk on Iraq if regime is not changed,” 6/17/11

Kane, Sean, Abouaoun, Dr. Elie, “Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo,” United States Institute of Peace, 10/18/11

Nance, Malcolm, The Terrorists Of Iraq, Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014, Boca Raton, CRC Press, 2015