Arab-Kurdish Divide Over New Ninewa Provincial Council

On April 12 the new Ninewa provincial council met and elected its leadership. The head of the Al-Hadbaa List Atheel al-Nujafi was elected governor, followed by Jabr Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir as the first deputy governor, al-Adrabbo as the head of the council, and Wild-dar Zebary as the deputy head of council. The second deputy governor, Judge Hassan Mahmoud Ali, an independent Turkmen, was the only official named not from Al-Hadbaa. The List gained these positions after they came away with 19 of the 37 seats in the January 2009 provincial elections. The Kurdish Ninewa Brotherhood List finished second with 12 seats, followed by the Iraqi Islamic Party with three. The religious minority groups the Shabaks, Christians, and Yazidis received one seat each under a quota. The ascendancy of the Arab al-Hadbaa List however has only increased the divisions in the province.

As reported before, the al-Hadbaa party ran on an explicitly anti-Kurdish platform. While campaigning for example, they declared that Mosul was an Arab city, and said that the Kurds need to give up all plans of annexing any areas in Ninewa. After the election, List leader Nujafi demanded that the Kurds get rid of all of their standing politicians and replace them with ones that would only work for Ninewa’s needs. He also wanted all the Kurdish peshmerga militiamen to leave the province.

In response the Kurdish Fraternal List is boycotting the new provincial council. The Kurds want Al-Hadbaa to share power, and say they won’t return until two of the top three posts in Ninewa are given to them. The mayor of Sinjar district in western Ninewa has also declared that he will not cooperate with the new Hadbaa run council. The mayor later said that he would prefer Sinjar be annexed by Kurdistan rather than work with the Hadbaa List. There were also two days of protests in the district against the council as well. Governor Nujafi has rejected these calls, hoping that the Kurds will eventually accept the new status quo and rejoin the council.

American officials said that the 2009 January provincial elections were an important benchmark for progress in Iraq. Some analysts declared it a tidal change in Iraqi politics. With more Sunnis voting after they boycotted in 2005, Ninewa was held up as one example of this. The dispute over the provincial council however shows that the voting could actually make things worse in places, and that political bickering and infighting will continue. That has wide ranging affects across the province, including the security situation as Ninewa remains one of the most unstable areas in the country. In Mosul for example, the provincial capital, attacks and casualties have gone right back up to where they were after a short dip during January. Much of that violence is due to the Arab-Kurdish divide, which is still the major issue in Ninewa before and after the balloting.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

Alsumaria, “Yazidis call to join Sinjar to Kurdistan,” 4/15/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Sinjar to boycott new local government in Ninewa,” 4/13/09

Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09

Flintoff, Corey, “Shift In Power Heightens Tensions In Iraqi City,” All Things Considered, NPR, 2/27/09

Gamel, Kim, “Sunni party likely big winner in northern Iraq,” Associated Press, 2/1/09

Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09

Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Thu: Corruption and Reconstruction,” IraqSlogger.com, 3/4/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Sands, Phil, “Kurd-Arab battle for power unlikely to end,” The National, 1/30/09

Sly, Liz and Ahmed, Caesar, “Establishment of Iraq provincial councils drags,” Los Angeles Times, 4/15/09

Zelikow, Philip, “The new strategic situation in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Online, 2/9/09

Kirkuk Remains In Political Limbo

Every deadline set for Kirkuk in Tamim has come and gone with no resolution. The Kurds of the province want it either annexed by Kurdistan or given special status for a period of time to work out its future, while the resident Arabs and Turkmen think it should be under the control of the central government or have some sort of autonomy. The Christians there are caught in the middle. On March 31, 2009, a special committee was suppose to come up with a power sharing agreement amongst those major groups that would allow for provincial elections. That date has passed with nothing happening. That follows the failure to carry out a census and referendum called for by the Iraqi constitution at the end of 2007. That date was extended to June 2009, but that too expired with no action. The task of determining the future of Kirkuk is now up to the United Nations, which is in the process of coming up with a series of options. It the past is a prelude to the future, then the U.N.’s plans are likely to be frustrated as well.

The Provincial Election law postponed voting in Tamim until a special committee could come up with plans for how to conduct them there. The law said that a committee had to create a power sharing agreement between the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians, before balloting could occur. The committee was to consist of two Kurds, two Turkmen, two Arabs, and one Christian. They were to finish their work by March 31, 2009. In early February 2009 a parliamentarian from the Kurdistan Islamic Union criticized the group saying that it would miss its March deadline because it had done nothing, which would jeopardizing the election in Tamim. He proved to be right. The end of March has come and gone, and there has been no word on the committee’s progress.

A major sticking point is that there are no up to date numbers on the population of Tamim. The Kurds want to use a 1957 census that says they are the largest group, while the Arabs insist on a 1987 census that favors them. The problem arises from Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy that forced thousands of Kurds out of Kirkuk. Since the U.S. invasion thousands of Kurds have moved to the province, while many Arabs have either been forced out or been encouraged to leave with the promise of cash payments by the Kurds if they do so. According to the law, the fate of Tamim is now supposed to pass to the cabinet, but they are unlikely to make much progress either.

That leaves the issue to the United Nations. At the end of March several officials talked to the Associated Press about a draft U.N. plan that includes five possible options to deal with Kirkuk. One official said three of those would be rejected outright by one or the other of the major groups in area, leaving the last two, a special status for Tamim or making it an autonomous region as the only viable ones. If the province is given special status that would mean that it would be under the joint rule of both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The final decisions on how to carry out the day-to-day governance of Tamim would be left to the provincial council. Tamim would be under this specification for three to ten years until the government and the U.N. could find a resolution. This plan is favored by the Kurds because it would mean their continued control of Tamim, as they are the majority on the provincial council. The other plan is to make the province autonomous. It would still rely upon Baghdad for funding, but could possibly collect revenues from the North Oil Corporation as well, which exports its petroleum through a Kirkuk-Turkish pipeline. The Arabs and Turkmen support this idea.

In the meantime tensions are building in the province. In July 2008 the newly formed 12th Iraqi Army Division was moved into Tamim. The commander of the unit General Abdul Amir Zaidi served in that area under Saddam from 1996-1998. The commander of the Kurdish peshmerga militia claims that General Zaidi operated against the Kurds during that period, although he denies it. The general said that his orders from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, are to remove all of the Kurdish peshmerga militiamen from the province. The peshmerga have been there since the U.S. invasion. This plan was postponed after an Iraqi Army unit almost got into a shoot out with Kurds in January 2009. The U.S. had to intervene to defuse the situation. As a result, the Kurds have called for 10,000 U.S. troops to stay in the province until its future is determined. Leading Kurdish officials such as the President of Kurdistan Massoud Barzani, and his son Masrour Barzani, have called for the implementation of Article 140 of the constitution that requires a census and then referendum on the status of Kirkuk.

The U.S. is fully aware of the potential danger in Tamim, but now has a set deadline to leave the country that complicates its role. A U.S. Army officer said in March 2009 that if there was a flare up around Kirkuk that threatened violence, the U.S. would send in troops to stop it. Despite the plan to drawdown forces in much of the country, the Americans have actually increased their presence around Kirkuk. At the beginning of the year, the U.S. Army battalion that was stationed there was replaced with a full brigade. In that same month then Vice President-elect Joe Biden traveled to Iraq and stopped in Kirkuk where he told the sides that they had to have reconciliation to resolve the future of the area. The Americans are supposed to be out of Iraq’s cities by the end of June 2009 however, and completely withdraw from the country by the end of 2011, so the Kurds especially are apprehensive about what lays ahead after they leave.

In March 2009 Kurdish President Barzani said that the problems between the Kurds and Baghdad will remain unresolved until the future of Kirkuk is determined. The Kurds lay claim to a large swath of northern Iraq, but Kirkuk is the prize. It has both symbolic importance as well as help rallies the population behind the ruling parties in Kurdistan. While the central government was weak, the Kurds moved to legally annex the area. They sent their forces into Tamim after the U.S. invasion, they took control of the local administration, they won in the provincial elections, and then added Article 140 to the Constitution to hold a referendum on the issue. In 2007 Prime Minister Maliki began asserting his authority as the American Surge and other factors began to decrease the violence. After dealing with the Sadrists and insurgents, he began confronting the Kurds. This began in places like the Khanaqin district of Diyala and Mosul in Ninewa, and eventually came to Tamim. The attempt by the 12th Iraqi Army Division to move the peshmerga out is part of Maliki’s plan to limit the Kurds to Kurdistan, and end their expansionist plans. President Barzani’s claim is probably correct then, Kirkuk will be a defining issue between Baghdad and Kurdistan. It will probably take some kind of bargain between those two to resolve it. Until then tensions will increase, elections will be postponed, and Tamim will remain in political limbo.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “arab leader expects Kurdish consensus in kirkuk,” Niqash, 3/3/09

Ali, Ahmed and Knights, Michael, “Kirkuk: A Test for the International Community,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/14/09

Alsumaria, “Peshmerga Forces along borders with Kirkuk,” 8/7/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Investigation committee in Kirkuk ‘late’ – MP,” 2/2/09
- “Kirkuk behind all Kurds’ problems with Iraqi governments – Barzani,” 3/12/09
- “Political powers split over Kirkuk Asayesh,” 12/14/08

Daniel, Trenton, “Ethnic tensions in Kirkuk turn U.S. military into mediator,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/9/09

Frayer, Lauren, “Kirkuk: Edging out its Arab migrants,” Associated Press, 12/8/07

Howard, Michael, “Arabs face evictions as Kurds take revenge,” Guardian, 4/18/03

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Jakes, Lara, “Key UN report to suggest power-sharing plan in Iraq’s divided Kirkuk,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Al-Khalidi, Diaa, “kirkuk awaits election law,” Niqash, 3/11/09

Mardini, Ramzy, “Rising Arab-Kurdish Tensions over Kirkuk Will Complicate U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 2/25/09

Parker, Ned, “Iraqi general’s presence in Kirkuk stirs dark memories,” Los Angeles Times, 3/26/09
- “Kurd sees ‘very bad signals’ from Baghdad,” Los Angeles Times, 3/28/09

Rafaat, Aram, “U.S.-Kurdish Relations In Post-Invasion Iraq,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, December 2007

Ziezulewicz, Geoff, “’The best solution will be an Iraqi solution,’” Stars and Stripes, 4/3/09
- “Kirkuk power-sharing agreements in limbo,” Stars and Stripes, 4/12/09

Anbar Sheikhs Reach Out To Shiites

The dispute over naming the Anbar governor reported here before has ended. Muhammad Qassem, the candidate nominated by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening of Iraq and Independents List was finally elected governor. After being criticized by other tribes, Qassem was reportedly elected by all the major blocs in the province. Now that that dispute has been resolved, the two main Awakening leaders from Anbar Sheikh Abu Risha and Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes are apparently positioning themselves for the parliamentary elections planned for the end of 2009 by reaching to Shiite parties.

On April 9, followers of Moqtada al-Sadr led a protest to mark the fall of Baghdad and to call for the U.S. to withdraw. While Sadr wanted one million to show up, only about 30,000 actually participated. One of those was Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes. Hayes told McClatchy Newspapers that Sadr had a clear vision for Iraq, and that the government should release his followers. Hayes went on to say that he agreed with Sadr that the U.S. should leave the country, and blamed them for creating sectarianism. This was a clear move by Hayes to reach out to the Sadr Trend.

At the same time Sheikh Abu Risha said that he was open to an alliance with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list before the parliamentary elections. Abu Risha said that he and Maliki had the same vision of a unified Iraq of both Shiites and Sunnis working together.

Both Hayes and Abu Risha appear to be angling to become the leading voice of Iraq’s Sunnis. In 2005 the Sunnis largely boycotted the provincial elections, allowing the Iraqi Islamic Party to get most of the votes from Sunnis that did participate. Later in the parliamentary elections, the Islamic Party led Accordance Front won the most votes of the Sunni parties, and went on to become part of Maliki’s ruling coalition. Since then, the Accordance Front has broken apart. The Prime Minister has been working to get Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front to join him as a new Sunni partner. This fragmentation of the Sunnis, who have never really had strong leadership since the fall of Saddam, allows room for the Anbar sheikhs to maneuver. Both Hayes and Abu Risha are willing to do just about anything to gain power. Hayes has been known for threatening violence to get his way, while Abu Risha has formed alliances and then broken them to further his cause. That should make Sadr and Maliki weary of joining alliances with either one of them, but with Iraqi politics now in flux after the January 2009 provincial elections, anything seems possible.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Sunni anti-Qaeda leader eyes Shi’ite alliance,” Reuters, 4/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Al-Hafoth, Wail, “Thousands march in Baghdad against US presence,” Times of London, 4/9/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Lawrence, Quil, “Political Rift In Iraq's Anbar Province,” Morning Edition, NPR, 4/8/09

Reilly, Corinne and Issa, Sahar, “Celebrating freedom: Thousands of Iraqis rally against U.S.,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/9/09

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Refugees International Report On Iraq’s Refugees and Displaced

In early April 2009, Refugees International released its latest position paper on Iraq’s refugees and internally displaced entitled, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return.” There are still several million Iraqis that have lost their homes. Many do not want to go back yet because they have concerns about security, and the lack of services provided by the government. Most will have to return at some point so the government, the U.S., and the U.N. need to work together to ensure that they can, and will want to come back. That means Baghdad needs to improve health care, education, and jobs. The U.S., U.N., and international community also need to step up their assistance and funding for humanitarian programs to help out this population. Overall, Refugees International does not believe that the time is right for Iraqis to return since there is little aid to accommodate them, and that Baghdad is doing a disservice by asking them to come back.

Since late 2007, Baghdad has been encouraging refugees to return. This came in two waves. First, in November 2007 the government set up special buses from Syria for Iraqis to come back, and offered each family $800 if they did. Then in the summer of 2008 Iraq began offering plane rides to refugees in Egypt. Baghdad didn’t consider the conditions in Iraq when they began asking Iraqis to come back. It even went as far as to ask Syria to close its borders to Iraqis in late 2007. Instead, Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki’s government felt that large numbers of returns would make Baghdad look better and increase international and domestic support. Refugees International believes that this policy was a political move meant to improve the image of the government, rather than actually help people.

In fact, Baghdad has shown little sympathy for Iraq’s refugees. Syria and Jordan claim that they are home to almost 2 million Iraqis, but Baghdad says there are only 400,000 there. A U.N. diplomat told Refugees International that Maliki thinks the refugees are traitors, filled with Baathists, who don’t want to help Iraq. Refugee International believes that this bias is largely due to the fact that most of the refugees are Sunnis.

The government has also been offering cash rewards to internally displaced families that return. Refugees International found fault with this program as well. First the payment was only offered to those that lost their homes between January 2006 and December 2007. That favors Shiites who were mostly displaced during the sectarian war. According to the International Organization for Migration’s April 2009 report, 56.8% of Iraq’s displaced are Shiites, compared to 30.8% who are Sunnis. Refugees International ignores the fact that more than 50% of Iraq’s displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, which set off the civil war.

Refugees International also talked with Iraqi officials who say they want the whole issue of refugees and the displaced to be over with by the end of 2009. The government officers claimed that there are no more reasons for Iraqis to be displaced. The February 2009 U.N. Humanitarian Report even said that some officials claimed that most of the displaced had gone home. Because of this, the government has stopped registering internal refugees, which is a prerequisite to receive assistance. Refugees International believes that the combination of encouraging refugees and the displaced to come back without providing adequate support for them will only lead to more problems. In fact, the government is making things worse because they are more concerned about making themselves look better than actually dealing with the causes and consequences of the country’s refugee crisis.

The fact that the majority of Iraq’s displaced have not gone back puts the lie to the officials’ claims. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), only around 50,000 families, approximately 250,000 individuals, have gone back. Most are internal refugees. Only 8% have been refugees from other countries. According to IOM surveys, 61% of Iraq’s displaced want to return, but don’t think they can yet. 39% said they want to stay where they are or be resettled somewhere else. Refugees International is concerned that if these families don’t return, it will solidify the ethnic cleansing that occurred from 2006-2007.

Baghdad needs to improve services, aid, and rule of law before there is a safe and stable environment for Iraq’s refugees and displaced to come back according to Refugees International. The improved security situation has not led to better services. The government needs to provide health care, education, and jobs, as well as offer more aid to those that are coming back. Right now Baghdad doesn’t have this capacity, nor any laws or regulations to deal with property disputes, which could take years to resolve. There is still the issue of sectarian biases within the administration. The government has set up assistance centers in the capital, and Maliki has ordered the security forces to deal with squatters, but the amount of money offered isn’t large enough, and the expulsion of squatters has just added more displaced. Iraq’s budget problems probably mean that these aid programs are in jeopardy. There are also stories of returnees being attacked and intimidated, and many have not been able to go back to their original homes. Refugees International warns that the potential for renewed violence still exists.

Refugees International has four recommendations on how to move forward on Iraq’s refugee crisis. First the U.N. should provide more aid to Iraq to help the displaced and its causes. The U.N. has had a limited presence in Iraq since its compound was bombed in 2003. Refugees International believes that improved security should allow the U.N. to create offices in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Right now few displaced in Iraq receive any aid from the government or non-governmental organizations. Second, the U.S. should pay for 50% of the U.N.’s programs. Third, the government, with the assistance of the U.S. and U.N., needs to improve services and provide jobs. That is something that may prove impossible however as American and international reconstruction aid is coming to an end. Iraq has already received $125 billion, and services are still largely below pre-invasion levels. Fourth the U.S. should work with countries where Iraqi refugees are residing. That includes providing money, and helping those Iraqis that don’t wish to return.

This report by Refugee International is an important advocacy paper for Iraq’s refugees. They provide a good overview of some of the problems facing the country’s displaced, and why it’s still not the right time for them to return. The major issue now is that international assistance to Iraq is winding down, and Baghdad is facing a budget crisis so there is little hope that more money will be spent on Iraq’s refugees. That will probably mean that Iraq’s displaced will have to exist off of the meager help provided by non-government organizations and the U.N., and act on their own. Ironically, that may mean that Baghdad’s wish to put the refugee crisis behind them may come true as no new effort on their behalf can be expected in the immediate future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, “There’s No Place Like … Iraq?” Newsweek, 11/24/07

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

Falling Oil Revenues, and Uneven Production

Iraq is facing the worst of two worlds. The price for Iraqi oil has dropped dramatically, while it has not become a steady producer. The Oil Ministry recently announced that oil revenues were down over 50% in the first three months of 2009 compared to the same time period in 2008. At the same time petroleum production and exports have continued to fluctuate up and down.

At the beginning of April 2009 the Oil Ministry announced a dramatic drop in oil profits. In the first three months of 2009 it made $6.57 billion. That was a 57.6% decrease from the same period in 2008 when the country earned $15.49 billion. Iraq did make more in March than it did the previous months. In January 2009 Iraq made $2.15 billion, followed by $1.7 billion in February, and $2.5 billion in March. The average price of Iraqi crude has also inched up from $34.57 in December 2008 to $38.06 in February. That's still far from the highest price of $113.81 reached in July 2008, and not even up to the November 2008 price of $43.54.

Iraq Oil Revenues

March 09	$2.5 bil
Feb. 09	$1.7 bil
Jan. 09	$2.15
Dec. 08	$1.9 bil
Nov. 08	$2.2 bil
Oct. 08	$3.11 bil

An additional problem is that Iraq is still not a consistent oil producer or exporter. While yearly averages of production and exports have grown since 2005, the monthly numbers are still up and down. In January 2009 for example, Iraq produced an average of 2.15 million barrels per day (mbd) and exported 1.89 mbd. The next month production went up to 2.32 mbd, but exports dropped to 1.69 mpd. In March production, 2.38 mbd, and exports, 1.93 mbd, increased. In comparison, Iraq exported 1.93 mbd for the first three months of 2008, and went as high as 1.96 mpd in May and June of that year. The other months' exports were lower. Production and exports have stayed within the same range since the fall of 2007. These fluctuations have contributed to the changing revenues.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Jan.		2.44/1.537	2.1/1.367	1.73/1.05	1.66/1.3	2.24/1.93	2.15/1.89
Feb.		2.276/1.382	2.1/1.431	1.83/1.47	2.08/1.5	2.39/1.93	2.32/1.69
March		2.435/1.825	2.09/1.394	2.1/1.32	2.08/1.58	2.38/1.93	2.38/1.93
April		2.384/1.804	2.14/1.398	2.14/1.6	2.14/1.5	2.4/1.88
May	0.3/0.0	1.887/1.38	2.1/1.308	2.13/1.51	2.03/1.64	2.6/1.96
June	0.675/0.2	2.295/1.1488	2.17/1.377	2.3/1.67	2.0/1.47	2.52/1.96
July	0.925/0.322	2.2/1.406	2.17/1.55	2.22/1.68	2.07/1.71	2.54/1.85
Aug.	1.445/0.646	2.122/1.114	2.16/1.504	2.24/1.68	1.91/1.69	2.5/1.7
Sep.	1.722/0.983	2.514/1.703	2.11/1.6	2.234/1.65	2.3/1.9	2.37/1.65
Oct.	2.055/1.149	2.45/1.542	1.91/1.239	2.26/1.55	2.34/1.91	2.37/1.69
Nov.	2.1/1.524	1.95/1.32	1.98/1.168	2.1/1.44	2.38/1.88	2.4/1.88
Dec.	2.3/1.541	2.16/1.52	1.92/1.071	2.15/1.45	2.42/1.93	2.35/1.73
Yr. Avg.	1.44/0.795	2.25/1.47	2.079/1.36	2.11/1.5	2.11/1.66	2.42/1.84	2.28/1.83

As reported before, the Oil Ministry is desperately trying to boost production to keep money flowing. This includes issuing tenders for 100 new wells and installations. Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani is hoping those will increase output by 300,000-500,000 barrels per day by the end of the year. At the same time, the Ministry is moving ahead with its long-term contracts as well. That still would not bring Iraq up to pre-invasion levels. In 2001 Iraq was producing 2.6 million barrels a day. Production at the North Oil Company is about 600,000 barrels per day, 2/3 of the production before 2003, while the South Oil Company's output has declined by around 200,000 barrels per day over the last several months.

Iraq's budget and ministries are feeling the immediate effects of both declining oil prices and inconsistent production. The Electricity Ministry asked for $1 billion in the 2009 budget, but only got $400 million. As a result its had to cut $600 million in contracts with General Electric, France's Alstom, Germany's MAN AG, and South Korea's Hyndai. It had plans to boost power production by 2,000 megawatts this year, but that has been drawn back to only 600 megawatts. Iraq's cities were due to get $5 billion for development, but that has been cut 60%. Baghdad was going to get $600 million for that, but now will only get $340 million. It had planned two sewage projects in 2009 and two in 2010, but now is only going to go through with one this year, and two next. The Water Ministry is also canceling work to dredge canals. All government ministries are having a hiring freeze. The Interior Ministry stopped adding new police in December 2008. That's put a halt to integrating the Sons of Iraq. The Defense Ministry will also not be able to buy new weapons systems and other equipment.

From 2007-2008 Iraq was flowing in oil money. Those huge profits have now largely disappeared. The country's growing, but still inconsistent exports is now a larger issue, as every barrel is needed to keep up revenues. The Oil Ministry wants to boost exports to 2 million barrels a day this year, but has not been able to achieve that since 2005. With better security that might now be a possibility, but that still won't bring in enough to meet the government's needs with crude prices still low. That puts Baghdad in a precarious situation as it has rising expectations, especially after the January 2009 provincial elections, but will have to now cut some services.

SOURCES

Associated Press, "Iraq Reports Increase in Oil Exports in December, but Revenues Drop," 1/26/09

- "Iraq's oil revenues fall 25%," 12/23/08

Ali Fathi, Saadallah, "Major bottlenecks in Iraq's oil refinery sector," Gulf News, 4/5/09

Gamel, Kim, "Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze," Associated Press, 3/20/09

Kamal, Fatima, "Nine foreign firms win service contracts to develop 11 oil fields in Iraq," Azzaman, 4/7/09

Lando, Ben, "Iraq oil exports drop in February," Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O'Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, "Iraq Index," Brookings Institution, 4/2/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Iraqi Water Projects Affected By Budget Cuts," 4/2/09

Reuters, "Iraq's Faltering Oil Revenues Hurt Public Services," 3/31/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, "OIl Ministry: Iraq's oil revenues drop," Associated Press, 4/5/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09

Are Iraqi Forces Ready?

The Obama administration has committed itself to a timetable for withdrawal. Following the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the Bush White House and Baghdad, American combat troops are to be out of the country's cities by June 2009, and then be completely withdrawn by the end of 2011. The question then is whether the Iraqi forces are up to the job of taking over security. There is little reporting on specific operations by Iraqi units, but the anecdotal stories that are available show a mixed bag.

In November 2008 the U.S. signed the SOFA with the government of Iraq. Under this agreement U.S. combat troops are to withdraw from major cities and towns to their bases by June 30, 2009. U.S. soldiers responsible for training Iraqis would remain, and American troops will still carry out operations within Iraq. There is some talk about Iraqis asking U.S. forces to stay in certain unstable areas such as Baquba in Diyala province and Mosul in Ninewa, in addition to Basra beyond the June deadline. American troop levels are also expected to drop from around 140,000 in March 2009 to approximately 128,000 by September. They would stay at that level until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for December. After the balloting is over and confirmed troops levels are supposed to drop to around 35,000-50,000 by August 2010, and then be completely out by December 31, 2011.

If this arrangement is followed through with, Iraqi forces will have primary responsibility for most of Iraq by this summer. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has repeatedly said that his forces are up to the challenge. The size of the Iraqi security forces has almost doubled from around 320,000 in January 2007 to 637,495 by December 31, 2008.

According to the Pentagon's quarterly reports to Congress the number of National Police battalions operating went from 27 to 34 from January 2007 to October 2008. The National Police are a paramilitary force that supports the military in counterinsurgency operations. In January 2007 23 battalions were partially capable of conducting operations in coordination with Coalition forces, and four could plan and carry out operations with U.S. support. None were considered independent yet. By October 2008 that had grown to 1 battalion being formed, 15 that were partially ready to operate with U.S. forces, 16 that could operate with U.S. support, and two that could work independently. That showed that during the process of expansion the National Police had been able to keep up with its training and readiness with the percentage of units capable of operating with some support going from 14.8% in January 2007 to 47% in October 2008, and the number of independent battalions going from zero to two.

From the beginning of 2007 to late 2008 the number of Army battalions went from 112 to 175. In January 2007 five were being formed and couldn't operate yet, 17 were dependent upon U.S. forces, 78 could operate but with Coalition support, and 12 were considered independent. By October 2008 five battalions were being formed, 54 were incapable of working without U.S. forces, 99 were semi-dependent, and 17 were considered independent. By December the Pentagon reported that 165 of 185 Iraqi battalions were in the lead or independent. The Army has gone through the most growth so its capabilities have been harder to keep up with. In October 2008 15.1% of the force were partially capable and in January 2009 that had increased to 30.8%. The number of battalions capable of operating with some Coalition support went down from 69.6% to 56.5%, while those considered independent dropped from 10.7% to 9.7%. What these numbers actually mean is still up to debate as Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has often pointed out.

Status Of Iraqi Forces

	Incapable of Operating	Partially Capable	Capable With Coalition Support	Independent	Totals
National Police Battalions
Jan 2007	0/0%	23/85.1%	4/14.8%	0/0%	27/100%
Oct 2008	1/2.9%	15/44.1%	16/47%	2/5.8%	34/100%
Iraqi Army Battalions
Jan 2007	5/4.4%	17/15.1%	78/69.6%	12/10.7%	112/100%
Oct 2008	5/2.8%	54/30.8%	99/56.5%	17/9.7%	175/100%

The Iraqi Army is considered farther along than the police. U.S. officers often say that their Iraqi counterparts are more capable of carrying out operations, however their quality still varies. An American commander told the Stars and Stripes in February 2009 that they still don't trust Iraqis with advance information on operations. The U.S. believes many Iraqi units are infiltrated with insurgents and militiamen. A U.S. commander found an Iraqi officer in southern Baghdad who was tipping off Shiite militias before raids for example. Rather than being fired or punished he was simply transferred to a Sunni area. U.S. soldiers and contractors are supposed to be partnered with all new Iraqi Army units. A U.S. officer that ran one of these Military Transition Teams meant to train Iraqis said there weren't enough Americans to advise all the Iraqi units so most of them have been okayed to operate whether they are ready or not. Another issue is the motivation of Iraqi troops. After the SOFA was passed all U.S. operations are supposed to be carried out jointly with Iraqi forces, although this does not always happen. There have been several stories that in practice, it is usually the Americans that initiate and lead patrols. The same Stars and Stripes article followed one patrol in Diyala that had the Americans doing all the work. A U.S. unit showed up and told the Iraqis that they were going on a mission. The Americans ended up arresting a suspected insurgent. The event was recorded as an Iraqi led patrol and nabbing. It's also still common for large numbers of Iraqi soldiers to be on leave at any given time.

The Iraqi police still have far more problems. Iraqi soldiers are drawn from across the country and are usually rotated. Police on the other hand, are locally recruited and serve in those same areas. That means they are more open to influence by political parties, militias, and others. There is also the issue of infiltration. On February 24, 2009 an Iraqi policeman shot and killed a U.S. soldier, an interpreter and two Iraqi policemen in Mosul. Three American soldiers and another interpreter were also wounded in the attack. In another incident in that city, a U.S. patrol was attacked with two grenades with Iraqi police looking on who did nothing. Abuse is often common in Iraqi jails as the judicial system relies upon confessions rather than evidence. A review of the Interior Ministry by the William and Mary College however said that the leadership is developing, and progress is being made fighting corruption and sectarianism. The Interior Minister claimed in March 2009 that he had fired 62,000 members of the Ministry since he took office in 2006 in an attempt to clean it up. The major problem the William and Mary researchers found was that the police and Interior were not institutions yet that followed rules and regulations, but were mainly driven by individuals. The National Police are the elite of the Interior Ministry, and have been largely cleaned up of militias, and are doing much better.

Does this mixed bag of reports make for a competent security force that is ready to protect the country? A phrase "Iraqi good enough" has often been mentioned as a response. Iraqi forces are not up to the quality or standards of American forces, but Iraq is not the United States. There will still be problems with outside influences, corruption, and abuses, but Iraq's police and army for the most part are probably competent enough to hold areas and fight insurgents or militiamen when confronted. They also have until 2011 to develop with American assistance. That may be good enough for Iraq.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “US general: American forces may not leave key Iraqi cities,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/27/09

Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09
- “U.S. troops to remain active in Iraq after pullback,” 3/15/09

Cordesman Anthony, “The Changing Situation In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
- “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development And ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals, Final Pre-Publication Draft,” 2/17/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama to Announce U.S. Troop Withdrawal in Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/27/09

Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09
- “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
- “Shooting of four U.S. troops highlights trust issues between two forces,” Stars and Stripes, 2/27/09

Engle, Richard, “The sixth war in Iraq,” NBC News, 3/20/09

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Kaplow, Larry, “The Last Day of the Iraq War,” Newsweek, 1/12/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi security leader wants ‘war of intelligence,’” Associated Press, 3/14/09

Sherman, Matt and Carstens, Roger, “Cooling the Streets: Institutional Reforms in Iraq’s Ministry of Interior,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at The College of William and Mary, 11/14/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009

Iraq’s GDP

Iraq has the third largest oil reserves in the world. It has an estimated 115 billion barrels, placing it only behind Saudi Arabia and Iran. Petroleum accounts for 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Iraq has also been the recipient of $125 billion in reconstruction aid, along with reducing half of its debt. With all this potential wealth the country should be well off. Instead, it finds itself near the median point when comparing GDPs to other countries in the region, and almost at the bottom in per capita GDP in the Middle East.

In the 1980s Iraq was a growing middle class country, but fell into disrepair in the proceeding decades. After the 1991 Gulf War the economy collapsed under international sanctions. It became poor and underdeveloped on par with countries in Africa. 60% of the population for example was dependent upon the state-run food ration system, and there was widespread malnutrition. In 2002 the GDP was at $20.5 billion, and per capita GDP stood at $802. That was a 7.8% decrease from the previous year. The 2003 U.S. invasion was another setback, dropping GDP to $13.6 billion, and per capita GDP to $518. Since then Iraq has had steady growth, largely due to the increase in the price of oil, which accounts for 90% of revenues and 65% of the GDP. By 2008 GDP was at an estimated $84.7 billion, and per capita GDP at $3,100. That was a $29.3 billion increase from the previous year.

Iraq’s GDP/Per Capita GDP
2002 $20.5 billion/$802
2003 $13.6 billion/$518
2004 $25.7 billion/$949
2005 $34.5 billion/$1,237
2006 $48.5 billion/$1,687
2007 $55.4 billion/$1,978
2008 $84.7 billion/$3,100

Breakdown of Iraq’s GDP – est. 2008
65% Oil
13% Services
7% Transportation/Communication
6% Wholesale, Retail, Hotels
5% Farming
2% Manufacturing
1% Finance/Banking
1% Construction

In early 2009 Iraq’s Planning Ministry expected the GDP to continue to grow by 10.9%, but that’s hard to believe with the collapse of the petroleum market. The Pentagon predicts that there could still be positive growth in 2009 due to government spending, but even that is going to be constrained with the budget cuts.

Despite the expansion of the economy after the U.S. invasion, Iraq has not regained the standard of living that it had in the 1980s. When comparing GDPs in the region Iraq ranked 9th out of seventeen countries in 2008. Saudi Arabia at $468.1 billion, Iran at $319 billion, and the United Arab Emirates with $240.3 billion were at the top, while Bahrain at $18.6 billion, Jordan at $20.1 billion, and Yemen at $22.3 billion were the bottom three. When broken down by per capita the comparison was even more stark. Iraq was second to last with only Yemen below it. Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates were the richest in the region.

Comparison Of Iraq’s GDP With Other Countries In The Region
Saudi Arabia $468.1 billion
Iran $319 billion
United Arab Emirates $240.3 billion
Egypt $159.2 billion
Algeria $152.3 billion
Kuwait $148.4 billion
Qatar $95.8 billion
Morocco $87 billion
Iraq $84.7 billion
Libya $67.9 billion
Syria $50 billion
Oman $46.4 billion
Tunisia $38.9 billion
Lebanon $28.02 billion
Yemen $22.3 billion
Jordan $20.1 billion
Bahrain $18.6 billion

Comparison Of Iraq’s Per Capita GDP With Other Countries In The Region
Qatar $58,004
Kuwait $40,826
United Arab Emirates $29,063
Saudi Arabia $23,928
Bahrain $23,702
Oman $23,654
Libya $16,431
Iran $11,748
Lebanon $10,742
Algeria $8,344
Tunisia $7,894
Egypt $5,689
Jordan $5,051
Syria $4,763
Morocco $4,405
Iraq $3,880
Yemen $2,290

Iraq has had steady economic growth and a huge increase in its GDP since the 2003 invasion. Those aggregate numbers however don’t reveal the myriad problems that the country is facing. Almost all of that expansion was due to oil. In February 2009 a barrel of Iraqi crude sold at $38, down from its peak of $113.81 in July 2008. (NOTE: Iraqi oil sells below the world average, which went from $147 per barrel in July 2008 to around $50 currently.) The government dominates the economy, which is corrupt and inefficient. Investment is up, but it is caught in a bureaucratic maze that slows its impact. U.S. reconstruction funding is also coming to an end, and Baghdad has been unable to spend most of its capital budget that goes towards infrastructure. More importantly, the benefits of the development of Iraq have not trickled down much as there is still high unemployment, especially amongst the young, and high rates of poverty.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Asia Companies The New Players In Iraq’s Oil Industry,” 4/9/09

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq investors bemoan red tape and lack of credit,” Reuters, 3/29/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
- “Oil ministry says Iraq’s exports hit $1.9b in Feb.,” 3/28/09

Baker, Luke, “Investors ready for Iraq invasion as troops pull out,” Reuters, 12/22/08

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Glanz, James, “In Report to Congress, Oversight Officials Say Iraqi Rebuilding Falls Short of Goals,” New York Times, 10/31/07

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports drop in February,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 2/26/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

UPI, “Iraqi Red Crescent predicts continued need,” 10/30/08

World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008