Monday, June 23, 2014

Moqtada al-Sadr And Iraq's Militia Mobilization

 
As security continues to deteriorate in Iraq all of the major Shiite parties have said that they are mobilizing their militias. This process started with the Iranian backed groups such as the League of the Righteous, the Hezbollah Brigades, and the Badr Organization back in January 2014. After the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIS) charge through Mosul and into Salahaddin in June the mainstream Shiite parties made the call for men as well. Moqtada al-Sadr said that he was creating a new organization called the Peace Brigades that would defend Iraq’s shrines. Recently they marched through several cities, and were engaged in fighting before that. The rise of militias shows the failure of the state to protect the country.

Sadr's Peace Brigades practicing before the June 21 march (Alsumaria)

Moqtada al-Sadr was one of the last Shiite leaders to publicly call on his followers to arm themselves to face the insurgent threat. On June 11, 2014 he said that he was forming Peace Brigades to protect Iraq’s shrines. Three days later he stated that these new units would hold marches throughout the provinces to show their strength. Offices were then set up across Iraq to take in volunteers, and then on June 21 the Sadrists paraded through Baghdad, Amarah, Basra City, and other locations in the south. Unofficially, Sadr’s forces had been organizing as early as January 2014 when Fallujah and much of Anbar fell to insurgents. They have been integrated into the security forces, received training from the army, and been deployed to Salahaddin, Ninewa and Diyala provinces. Sadr was one of the last Shiite leaders to publicly come out for remobilizing his militia. That was for three reasons. First, he is an opponent of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and did not want to be seen supporting him. Second, most of the militias are beholden to Iran, which Sadr also has problems with, so he did not want to follow Tehran’s lead. Third, Sadr has struggled to portray himself as a statesman since 2003 instead of a militia leader. He was therefore loath to openly call out his men again. As Phillip Smyth noted by the time Mosul fell in June and the Islamic State of Iraq and other insurgent groups made a charge towards Baghdad Sadr and others were forced into action to save face if nothing else since the whole country appeared to be threatened.
(AP)
(Reuters)
(AFP)
(AP)
Images from the June 21 march in Baghdad

Sadr’s militia and others are now fighting the insurgency across Iraq, which is a step back for the country. The state does not have a monopoly over violence and that is why it is turning to the militias once again. 60 of Iraq’s 243 army battalions disintegrated in just a few days after the fall of Mosul, and there have been other militant gains in Ninewa and Anbar since then. A sense of desperation has slowly grown across the country, which has led to this mobilization of gunmen. This may seem like a new development, but in fact the militias have never disappeared. They carried out attacks against the U.S. right up to the last day of the withdrawal in 2011, and then the Iranian connected ones went to fight in Syria. In the end this will strengthen the hand of these armed groups, political parties, and Tehran in Baghdad. It will also cause more tensions as Sunnis have complained about militias carrying out extra judicial killings. Even worse, there is the threat that this could all escalate to another wave of sectarian cleansing. History has a funny way of repeating itself in Iraq. The attacks upon Mosul, Salahaddin, Kirkuk and Diyala are very similar to the 2004 uprising. The militias now mobilizing in response is like 2005. If the country were to descend into sectarian fighting once again it would be a repeat of the civil war from 2005-2008. That would be a tragic turn of events.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed and Kagan, Kimberly, “The Iraqi Shi’a Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offensive,” Institute for the Study of War, 6/14/14

Buratha News, “Muqtada al-Sadr calls on his supporters to organize parade” next Saturday “to show their equipment and numbers,”” 6/14/14

Chivers, C.J., “Answering a Cleric’s Call, Iraqi Shiites Take Up Arms,” New York Times, 6/21/14

Fox News, “Shiite cleric issues threat to US military advisers as Iraq militants take border post,” 6/21/14

Al Mada, “Sadr’s office in Maysan opens the door to volunteers from “Peace Brigades” and the willingness to continue the review of the military,” 6/19/14

Morris, Loveday, “Iraqi army increasingly bolstered by Shiite militias as ISIS advances,” Washington Post, 6/20/14
- “Shiite ‘peace brigades’ send signal of aggression with major rally in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 6/21/14

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Iraq’s Dire Situation,” 6/16/14

Sunday, June 22, 2014

Musings On Iraq In The News


My interview with Alexandre Massimo on Iraq’s deteriorating security situation was mentioned in “Examining the Causes of the Islamic State’s Resurgence in Iraq” on the Syrian site Tahrir Souri, while my talk with Aaron Zelin "The Islamic State of Iraq Attempts To Create A State in Syria and Iraq" was posted on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's website. I was quoted in "Maliki's most solemn hour" by Paul Mutter in the Arabist.

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY VIDEO: Iraq's Dire Situation


Friday, June 20, 2014

Replacing Maliki No Panacea For Iraq

 
As the Obama administration is about to send military advisers to assist Iraq’s government there are growing reports that Washington wants Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to be replaced. The argument is that the premier is a divisive figure and that by getting rid of him the country’s politics can move forward, which will in turn help counter the insurgency. Finding a new prime minister could definitely improve the atmosphere in Baghdad in the short term, but it is no panacea for the deep structural problems facing Iraq.
Pres Obama wants PM Maliki to carry out reforms, which some Iraqi parties are taking for a call for his replacement (Defenselink)

President Barak Obama has called for a more inclusive government in Iraq as a caveat of receiving American military aid. The New York Times reported that some Iraqi politicians are taking this to mean that Washington is opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki returning for a third term. The Guardian wrote that even Iran might be tiring of Maliki’s rule, although that is contradicted by other stories. The argument is that the premier has caused so much distrust within the country’s establishment that he must go if Iraq is to create a new government that includes the three major ethnosectarian groups the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. Together this new ruling coalition is supposed to reach out to Sunnis so that they will not give at least passive support to the insurgency and help unite the country overall in the face of the growing violence.
A new premier from Ammar Hakim's ISCI (left) could lead to better relations with Kurdish Premier Nechirvan Barzani (right) and the KRG (KRG)

A new premier could help Iraq with some of its short-term problems. For instance a new premier from say the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraqi (ISCI) would have a much better relationship with the Kurds who have lost complete trust in Maliki. ISCI and the ruling Kurdish parties have had a good relationship dating back to the 1980s when both were supported by Iran and fought on Tehran’s side in the Iran-Iraq War. Those lists could work together and come to an oil export agreement that would actually be followed through with rather than the last two where Maliki refused to pay the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) all the money that it was owed. There also would not such heated rhetoric between Baghdad and Irbil the capital of Kurdistan. Parties like Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun might be more willing to join a coalition as well since it currently opposes Maliki returning to office. A new national unity government could therefore be put together based upon the shared animosity towards the premier and make some deals between the lists.  

Those short-term gains however would not overcome Iraq’s deep-seated institutional problems. For instance, any new coalition would still be based upon ethnosectarian quotas where ministers and other officials are named not by their competence, but rather by their party being Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish. The endemic corruption would not end as this has become a means of governance where every winning party gets to steal part of the government pie to enrich itself and maintain its patronage networks. The economy would still be the most oil dependent in the world, and the parliament would be no closer to passing an oil law as the Sadrists and ISCI both want central control over the industry, while the Kurds want autonomy. Other reforms that have been called on for years such as ending deBaathification are unlikely to come about since parties like the Sadrists are ardent supporters of it. The competence of the Iraqi Security Forces would not suddenly improve, and neither would its counter productive tactics either. The new premier would likely follow the same types of coup proofing tactics that Maliki and every other leader in the Middle East has done, which is to put loyalists in top positions and maintain Maliki's separate chain of command over the army and police. Finally, every government since 2005 has been a national unity one. The simple inclusion of parties from each group did not stop the insurgency back then and will not deter it now. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the Baathist Naqshibandi, and others are not interested in being included the government, but rather want to overthrow it. Sunni votes were spread across several different parties as well who do not agree with each other showing that at least those who voted would not suddenly unite either, because there is no agreement upon which party or individual should be the leader. Without solving these long-term issues Iraq’s future would still appear dim.

The talk of replacing Maliki is a popular one, but it provides no real solutions to Iraq’s deep seated problems and divisions. The greater cooperation amongst the major lists that might emerge in the aftermath of Maliki not be re-elected premier would likely fade with time, and all the internal political divisions over centralism versus federalism, the oil industry, etc. would re-emerge. Not only that, but the appearance of a new united front amongst the elite is not going to suddenly lead to a Sunni consensus to try politics again or more importantly end the insurgency. Therefore any short-term gains from Maliki being replaced will not pan out over time leaving Iraq still a very divided and violent country.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Obama says Iraq’s government cannot resolve the country’s crisis unless it is more inclusive,” 6/19/14

Chulov, Martin and Ackerman, Spencer, “How Nouri al-Maliki fell out of favour with the US,” Guardian, 6/19/14

Habib, Mustafa, “let the post election horse trading begin: iraqi politicians playing the long game,” Niqash, 5/22/14

Al Mada, “Eight blocks, most notably united and the nationalists form union and endorse any candidate from the Shiite alliance,” 5/29/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “An informed source reveals Iran’s agreement on Maliki’s nomination for third term,” 6/4/14

New Sabah, “”Citizens” and “Liberals” talking about “strong government” and Erbil raise the ceiling demands: annexation of Kirkuk and Khanaqin,” 5/22/14

Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Iraqi Factions Jockey to Oust Maliki, Citing U.S. Support,” New York Times, 6/19/14

Shafaq News, “Nujaifi , Allawi and al-Mutlaq agree to work as a unified team,” 5/26/14

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Background To The Fall Of Mosul, Insurgents’ Relentless Attacks Upon Security Forces Set Stage For The Taking Of City

 
On June 10, 2014 Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul fell to insurgents led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). While there have been some conspiracy theories circulating there is solid evidence to back up the theory that a collapse at the top of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) leadership led to the route that spread to other units throughout northern and central Iraq. The capture of Mosul furthered ISIS’s long term goal of reclaiming territory that it lost during the Surge, which it outlined in its July 2013 Soldiers’ Harvest campaign. The first part of that strategy was to relentlessly target the ISF to loosen up their control so that militants could eventually move in. In Mosul the police and army were targeted more than just about any other city in the country, which helps explain why they fell apart so quickly in June.

For several years now Ninewa has been one of the most violent provinces in all of Iraq, and most of the security incidents there occur in Mosul. From January to May 2014 the press reported 481 attacks in the city. That led to 508 deaths and 746 wounded. Of those 274 of the killed and 412 of the injured were members of the ISF. That averaged out to 53% of the fatalities and 55% of the wounded. Not only that but the number of attacks and casualties were ramping up during that time period foreshadowing the June raid on the city. For instance, the number of incidents went from 79 and 85 in January and February respectively to 109, 101, and 107 from March to May. Conversely the number of dead and wounded started off at 71 and 81 in January, then 76 and 188 in February, before jumping to 109 and 161 in March, 135 and 176 in April, and then 117 and 210 in May. In its Soldiers’ Harvest campaign the Islamic State laid out its plan to seize territory by weakening the security forces. That was what they achieved in Mosul. The relentless attacks upon the army and police gave rise to a siege mentality. Niqash for example reported that the security forces would withdraw from some areas of the city at night because they were afraid for their safety. The situation was so bad that the Ninewa Operations Command had to set up special air flights from Mosul to Baghdad for its members to commute from their homes to work because the highway between those two cities was too unsafe. The targeting of the ISF obviously took a toll on the morale of the forces in Mosul, which helped lead to them breaking when the insurgents attacked in June.


Violence In Mosul 2014
Month
Attacks
Dead
Wounded
ISF
Dead
ISF
Wounded
ISF %
Of Dead
ISF % Of
Wounded
Jan
79
71
81
37
63
52%
77%
Feb
85
76
118
43
74
56%
62%
Mar
109
109
161
60
71
55%
44%
Apr
101
135
176
77
111
57%
63%
May
107
117
210
57
93
48%
44%
Total
481
508
746
274
412
53%
55%


Attacks upon the Iraqi forces help explain why the army and police barely put up a fight when the Islamic State and other insurgent groups laid siege to Mosul. There were other factors as well like reports that the leadership of the Ninewa Operations Command was extorting money from people or that insurgents were stealing most of the salaries of the ISF in the province. These claims of corruption at the top, being unpaid for months, and the constant targeting by insurgents pointed to a weakened force in Mosul who were in no state to put up determined resistance to protect the city.    

SOURCES

Bas News, “Mosul operations commander takes money from citizens,” 4/19/14

Habib, Mustafa, “did they or didn’t they? Iraqi army did not desert mosul, they were ordered to leave,” Niqash, 6/15/14

New Sabah, “Armed groups earn money from imported food..and “royalties” on hot spots up to 8 million dollars a month,” 3/15/14

Al Rafidayn, “Maliki’s office agrees to conduct flights to transport security personnel in Mosul,” 3/25/14

Sabah, Mohammad, “Mosul deputies: Nineveh become under control of insurgents and gunmen moving openly,” Al-Mada, 11/2/13

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

The Need To Reform Iraq’s Educations System Interview With Christine Van Den Toorn

 
The current security crisis has increased the ethnosectarian tensions within Iraq. Public discourse and news reports are full of remarks about the “war” between Sunnis and Shiites and the tensions between Arabs and Kurds. One possible way to overcome these divisions is through Iraq’s education system. Many both inside and out of Iraq have talked about the need to reform Iraqs schools. The textbooks and curriculum are out of date, there are questions about the skills that are taught, etc. Not only that but a reformed curriculum can show the shared experiences of all Iraqis, and provide a basis for national reconciliation. To discuss how the countrys schools should be changed is Christine van den Toorn who taught at the American University of Iraq, Sulaymaniya (AUIS) 2009-2013. She now runs The Primary Source (www.theprimarysourceiraq.com), a research services and consulting company, with her former students. She can be followed on Twitter @vandentoorn.
Reforming Iraq's school could not only provide a better education but a sense of shared identity and struggle amongst Iraqis argues Christine Van Den Toorn (Al Shorfa)

1. The Iraqi government and international organizations have pointed out that Iraq’s curriculum needs to be overhauled. What do many Iraqi children learn today, what is missing, and what needs to be done about it?

In terms of curriculum, the "what" students are learning, I can speak mainly about the Iraqi history textbooks now being used in schools. There are two main issues: one is that there is a great deal missing, and the other is how texts present the history that is included.

The modern history textbook is framed as a story of repression and victimhood, moving from the "Turkish occupation" to the "British occupation." While most historians can agree that outside powers played a role in the fate of Iraq and the greater Middle East, local agency should not be ignored, especially in teaching history locally. Neither period is evaluated comprehensively, and important parts of Iraq's history – social and political movements of the monarchy, and an analysis of various economic and agricultural “reform” projects, for example – are left out.

Most problematic is that history stops in 1963 in Iraqi textbooks with the first, albeit unsuccessful in the long term, Baathist coup that ousted the first leader of the Iraqi republic, Abd al Karim Qassim. Missing is the rule of the 'Arif brothers from 1963 to 1968, the second, and this time successful, Baathist coup which installed Hassan al Bakr as leader of Iraq until 1979 when Saddam Hussein officially took over as head of the Revolutionary Command Council. There is nothing on the Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 invasion of Kuwait and subsequent sanctions in the 1990s.

This means that students do not learn about shared suffering of all Iraqis – Sunni, Shi'i, Arab, Kurd, Yezidi, Christian – under Saddam's regime. Suspicions, hatred and mistrust based on misinformation, stereotypes and assumptions go uncorrected.

For example, during Saddam's regime, students in Iraq proper were told that the Kurds were trying to destroy the state and were a backward people inferior to Arabs. They were shielded from much of the realities of Arabization, the Anfal campaign and the continuous violent repression against the Kurdish people. A historically accurate treatment of these atrocities remains missing from Iraqi public school textbooks.

Likewise, some Kurds are left to think that there was general support for the Saddam Hussein regime and the Baath party outside of the Kurdish areas. "He couldn't have stayed in power without their support" claim many Kurds, "their" referring to Arabs, as they don't know or will not acknowledge that "support" was, while still condemnable, in some cases nothing more than signing a sheet of paper to save the lives of family members. Nor was "support" for Saddam's regime limited to the "Arabs." In addition, some Kurdish youth are not aware of the brutal suppression of the 1991 uprising in the south, events that mirror their own history. They do not learn of the fear, paranoia, and torture pervasive in Iraq, again, consistent with their own experience.

Last, Iraqi Arabs themselves do not learn about important issues like the brutality of Saddam's regime; the time when Sunni and Shi'i was not a defining, antagonistic identity; or the suffering under sanctions and the Iran Iraq War. Considering the current political environment, many assume that all Sunnis were pro-Saddam Baathists and that they were Saddam's only loyalists, which supports the current sectarian narrative of Iraq and Iraqi history, denying that reality that there were many Shi'i in power and that power was based on blind loyalty and submission not just sect.

It is important that various ethno-sectarian groups of Iraqis understand and acknowledge each other's history to improve relations, to understand they have something in common in the past other than enmity.

The Baath Party and Saddam Hussein's regime need to be carefully examined, so youth understand how they were able to stay in power, and exactly how destructive the regimes were to Iraq's economy, society and politics.

The humanities curriculum in Iraqi high schools and universities should be overhauled to include more comprehensive courses in Iraqi, Middle East and World history as well as in political science, international relations, government and philosophy.

2. What kinds of skills do Iraqis learn in primary and high school, and does that prepare them for going on to college?

Just like important lessons in history, also missing from the curriculum is development of academic skills. Most students enter (and even leave) university without having read multiple texts, written original essays or conducted research. So it’s not just what is being taught in Iraq that is a problem, but how it is taught. Here are a few examples:

When I ask my students whether they had to write anything, or turn in essays in high-school, most say no. Those who respond yes say they just found a piece on the internet on the subject at hand – usually on Wikipedia – "copy pasted" it onto a word document, printed it out and handed it in. "All you have to do is find it and sometimes read it," they say.

Nor are they required to read different books, academic articles, and primary sources – which are always a source of much wonder and amazement (and pain) in history classes at AUIS. Readings in classes are limited to the assigned textbook, and a few questions at the end of each chapter that rarely get to the heart of the historical matter – the causes and effects.

On tests, instead of having short answers and essays requiring students to understand the how and why, students are required to simply memorize and regurgitate as accurately as possible handouts from the teacher or professor. To prepare, they simply copy the text over and over, saying it out loud and in their heads.

Another huge gap is with research. None of my students had ever conducted actual research and really understood what "research" meant. They would use random online sites including Wikipedia for citations, hearsay and generalities. Most did not understand what constituted "evidence" for an "argument" or "thesis."  For example, a student might write that the Ottoman Empire was unjust because "the people were treated unfairly" and "there was discrimination." These lines would be quoted from texts and presented as evidence, when they needed examples of that discrimination from academic texts. A bigger issue was providing analysis to link that evidence to the thesis statement.

Research assignments teach students that different people, like academics, have different perspectives. They also teach important history lessons. One of the most popular research topics over the years was "How did the Baath party stay in power?" This required students to read texts and primary sources on the party and its strategies, learning that it wasn't because of love and blind support the Baath stayed in power but usually fear, intimidation, violence, propaganda and indoctrination. The second most selected topic was "What were the main causes of the Iran Iraq War?" Students would all say at the start, "that's easy it was between the Sunni and Shi'i." I would ask, OK what is your evidence and the would say, "Because Sunni and Shi'i have always hated each other and are always fighting." While sectarian identity plays a role here, only after research did students realize that there is more to the story, like the regional power struggle between Iran and Iraq (Saddam and Khomenei after the ‘79 revolution) and access to, control of the Shatt al Arab.

Last, pedagogy is outdated, and teachers and professors hold lecture-based classes with little room for discussion, debate and analysis – for students to share opinions (to analyze texts) and learn to respond to perspectives different than their own.

I want to emphasize here that my point here is not that Iraqi students do not have the ability do these things, it’s that they haven’t been taught. These skills do not come naturally, rather they must be taught starting at the elementary and secondary level. At AUIS students learn pick them up – analysis in reading and discussions, writing and research – after a year or two of courses that emphasize them. But they really need to start earlier, and these skills are not used in any sort of widespread manner in public schools and universities.

I also want to note that there are of course exceptions to the above statements – no doubt there are wonderful instructors, researchers, professors around Iraq that are teaching their subjects and academic skills. My guess though is that they are the exception rather than the rule at this point.

Fixing this will take nothing less than a total overhaul of curriculum and pedagogy, involving rewriting textbooks and intensive teacher and administrator training in academic skill building to ensure implementation. There must be oversight, accountability and benchmarks.

3. When do you think these problems with Iraq’s school started?

[It is] important to keep in mind is that the decline of the education system did not start in 2003, rather it began over thirty years ago during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and then took a serious dip during sanctions in the 1990s when little to no academic research and texts were coming into Iraq. Harith Hassan, a DC based Iraqi academic who taught political science at Baghdad University in the late 90s and early 2000s, mentioned to me once that textbooks he was using were from the 70s. So while during the 1970s, despite the politicization under the Baath, and earlier there was major educational reform, by 2003 most of those initiatives were outdated to say the least.

On top of the out of date materials, there is also a huge lack of human resources. Hundreds of teachers and professors were killed, have quit their work or have left Iraq over the past eleven years due to threats, attacks and assassinations. This was not the first exodus though, before 2003 intellectuals who did not bow to or join the Baath Party were targeted and sent into "early retirement" or to prison. Many escaped and still live in exile.

4. Has the Education and Higher Education Ministries done anything to fix the textbooks, etc. in the country?

As far as I know, there was a curriculum committee in the early years after the invasion, and due to an inability to agree on how to teach about the Baathist era and Saddam, they left it out of books. This seems fairly reasonable considering the inability of Iraqi politicians to agree on just about anything today.

There have been initiatives over the years to reform curriculum but here implementation is a real problem. For example Dr. Alaa Maaki, an advocate for education reform in Iraq who has been both chair and vice-chair of the education committee in the Iraqi Parliament (he was a member of the Iraq Islamic Party and is now a close ally of Ayad Allawi's party, and was number 2 on the Wataniya list in recent elections) partnered with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to design a civic and human rights curriculum for public schools. They also trained teachers and administrators around Iraq. However the curriculum – which took over a year to design – has yet to be implemented in the Iraqi education system.

So it's not only agreeing on a curriculum, but also the actual implementation that is a serious issues facing education reform.

The Kurdistan Regional Government has in fact overhauled education. But the reports of the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education do not reflect the reality of the situation. It is true that education reform takes time so we cannot expect things to be perfect now. Education was severely lacking in the Kurdistan Region in the 1980s and 90s, many Kurds did not attend school due to war and displacement. That said the way the Kurds are reforming the education should be improved and revised. A new European style curriculum is used, and thousands of teachers have been hired. But it is near to impossible to think that there has been time to properly train these teachers in progressive pedagogy and basics of instruction. The rule seems to be quantity over quality. For example, they have new English lesson books, like in Iraq proper, but very few teachers here are actually know English well enough to teach the subject. While many schools have been built and renovated, hundreds of others lie in a total state of disrepair.

5. What is the overall state of Iraq’s higher education? Are the universities any better than the primary and high schools and are there enough of them to meet Iraq’s needs?

I'd say the higher education is worse off than the secondary and primary schools due to a the exodus of professors over the decades, and lack of research. Evidence for this is also that the Iraqi scholarship programs sending students to the U.S. are only for graduate school, and with the explicit purpose of filling the gap in university professors.

University students prepare for exams by memorizing their professors’ handouts or texts, copying them over time after time and repeating them over and over in their heads. I have rarely, if ever, heard of students writing research papers even at the university level.

Another issue now is corruption in the system regarding awarding degrees. Ministry of Higher Education officials and students report that degrees - BA, MA and PhD - can be bought or awarded through fear and intimidation. These degrees are in high demand because Iraqi law requires that ministers and high-level officials hold them, and the men and women seeking these positions do not have. The government has also created a remedial test for those who did not graduate high-school, or do not pass their exams to take, essentially further dumbing down the system. There is widespread cheating at all levels of education, which is seen as "helping friends."

6. You’ve written that Iraq’s universities represent both Iraq’s divisions and a hope for a better future. At the American University of Iraq, Sulaymaniya (AUIS) what kinds of splits did you see within the student body?

The ethno-sectarian divisions that exist in Iraq exist at AUIS. In general Kurds hang out with Kurds and Arabs with Arabs. Sunni students hang out in the same groups, as do Shi'i.

Among Arabs and Kurds there is a "we don't like because they don't like us" attitude. Students from Baghdad and other areas in Iraq proper say that the Kurds do not welcome them, exclude them and don't want them there. To an extent they are right - some, though not all, Kurds still associate Arabs with Saddam and the Baath Party and would rather if Arabs were not living the Kurdistan Region or at the very least do not want to befriend them. Kurds, on the other hand, say the Arab students think they are better than them, and look down on Kurdish students. What is at the root of this is hard to determine; it's like figuring out which came first, the chicken or the egg.

The Iraqi Arab students are also mostly divided between Sunni and Shi'i. Not only have they grown up in an Iraq of heightened sectarian identity, but most of them hail from elite families. The division between them reflects the animosity and divides between Iraq's political parties, not really pure sectarianism.

This plays out in ways on campus - on the anniversary of the day Baghdad fell, for example, Sunni students dressed in black and Shi'i students from Najaf handed out candy. Kurdish students were also upset because they claimed the black outfits were for mourning Saddam's fall, and therefore showing respect for the past dictator. There were words exchanged in person and on Facebook, but no fighting. The various reactions to this day show the competing narratives of Baath Party rule and Iraq since its fall. Students must have an opportunity to study and discuss the past, including the years since to invasion, to try to reconcile some of the massive divide and differences of their experiences.

Some of these divisions are understandable considering the violent history Kurds under the Saddam regime, and the past ten years of conflict between sectarian groups in Iraq. And one can argue that with time things will improve - but it's not just time but also education and stable spaces and shared experiences.

There are also practical divisions like language. After 1991, Arabic instruction stopped in the Kurdistan Region, and Kurdish is not taught in Iraqi schools. Even though at AUIS both Kurds and Arabs speak English, they prefer to speak in their own language outside of class. Some Kurds still associate Arabic with the Saddam regime, though most young people are starting to see it as a tool for advancement as many companies require some Arabic language skills. Similarly, many students from Baghdad learn Kurdish, to get by in town, to show respect for the local culture and because many international oil companies in the KRG require Kurdish.

Then there divides that you might find everywhere in the world: rural vs. urban (grew up in a village vs. in Sulaimani), liberal vs. conservative, and wealthy vs. poor. I always called the students from Ranya a “posse” because they were rarely apart, and there are Sulaimani cliques.

7. On the positive side in what ways do you think a rigorous and challenging college education can transform Iraqi society?

Education is key to rebuilding Iraqi society in many different ways.

First, in terms of reconciliation, at AUIS there are many exceptions to the ethno-sectarian divides mentioned in the last question. This is because the University provides a stable environment where students share a language (English) and engage not only in academics but also extracurricular activities. 

In Middle East History classes, for example looking at the shared suffering and struggle against Saddam’s regime can bridge gaps between Iraqi Kurdish and Arab students. In Debate Society, students learn to use evidence and form convincing arguments and refutations. The pain and suffering of the engineering major has bridged ethnic divides, “we don’t care about that stuff anymore...we are too busy” said one Kurdish student who “didn’t want to be friends with Arabs” only a couple of years ago.

While in the dorms students usually share rooms with people from their hometown or ethno-sectarian group, there are exceptions. A Kurdish, Turkmen girl from Erbil lives with her best friend, an Arab from Baghdad. A Yezidi student from Sinjar has become good friends with his roommates from Diyala and Anbar. A student from Bashiqa, near Mosul, also Yezidi, went to visit his close friend in Najaf who hails from one of the most prominent religious families there a couple years back. Students from Baghdad go on weekend trips with the friends and classmates in Ranya, and vice versa.  There are also several students from Baghdad whose friends cross all the divides – Sunni, Shi’i and Kurdish. Students with Sunni and Shi'i parents, and Kurds who grew up in Baghdad also hang out in mixed groups. One student from Ranya who considers Arabs the same as Kurds, and calls them his brothers, and wrote a letter of tolerance and compassion during one period of ethnic tension at the school when it was proposed to remove the "S" – for Sulaimani, the Kurdish city where the University is located – from the name, leaving on “Iraq.” The women’s basketball and soccer teams have players from all over the Kurdistan Region and Iraq, and Kurds, Arabs (Sunni and Shi’i) and Christians form friendships through their experiences as teammates.

While not all become close friends, important is that they can study and work together after a couple years, and that most at the very least move beyond past suspicions, mistrust, and hatred.

There are also lessons to be learned beyond ethno-sectarian reconciliation. We all hear people talking about the importance of justice, institutions and power sharing to rebuild Iraq. But I’d say you need people, educated Iraqis, to implement and build these programs and institutions.

For example, in the post invasion years, many say that a main problem is that political personalities and parties are unable to power share (though this has really been a problem of Iraqi politics for decades). Parties in power and the opposition won’t compromise – it is all or nothing, right or wrong – nor do they negotiate, look for moderate reforms.

While some of this discord has to do with the personal political history of these particular players, some might at the very least be prevented in future generations by teaching history and politics as well as the academic skills mentioned above which enable them to negotiate, compromise and debate. In conversations I’ve had with students at AUIS, all will mention that AUIS not only taught them things about history and politics they did not know, but also how to think, analyze and consider different perspectives.

One example regarding current perception of Saddam and dictatorship I think shows why history and political science courses and academic skill-building are so important: It is all too common to hear – especially from those who have grown up in extremely violent, sectarian areas – express support or nostalgia for Saddam Hussein era or the security of pre-2003 Iraq. They see dictatorship as stable and secure, and democracy as ineffective, unstable and violent. So they think the chaos they see today is democracy. A lack of knowledge about the realities of the Saddam regime and a lack of courses in government and political science deny them the ability to fully understand and evaluate different types of government and political transitions. While there was no Al Qaeda under Saddam, one could argue that he terrorized his own people, and that no one was really "safe" under his regime, loyal family and friends were also executed. The more years that pass, the fewer young people will have memory of his rule.

8. Can foreign exchange programs for Iraqi college students help with the process of reform and do many such opportunities exist today?

Graduates of exchange programs also can make important contributions to education and political, societal reform in Iraq. While there are several Iraqi and U.S. government exchange program, we need to be more to make a real impact.

The Iraqi government and the KRG have three scholarship programs that send students to the U.S. for graduate school, with the goal of filling the major gap among university professors: one from each Ministry of Higher Education (Erbil and Baghdad) and then the third run out of Prime Minister Nouri al Malikis office, the Higher Committee for Educational Development or HCED, also known as Malikis scholarship. However it was founded and is actually run by Iraqi-American academic Zuhair al Jezairy. There are no programs currently for undergraduates.
 
The HCED is by far the most legitimate and successful of all three, because of its merit based application system and strong academic and English preparation program. The ministry programs, on the other hand, are in need of serious reform and oversight as they are unfortunately plagued with corruption, selecting students based on wasta rather than on merit, which means that many students who are sent abroad do not succeed in their studies.

There have not been enough graduates of these MA and PhD programs in the US to yet evaluate their impact but these students will, like AUIS grads, be exceptions to the rule in their universities and might not be enough to change the tides of the Iraqi education system.

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad offers advice studying in the States through its global Education USA program, and holds annual graduate school fairs around Iraq. There are also several scholarship and exchange programs run by the State Department: Fulbright (which is for both undergraduate and graduate students, as well as teachers and professors) and then three summer exchanges, the Iraq Youth Leadership Program (IYLEP), Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the Study of U.S. Institutes (SUSI). From student feedback, MEPI is by far the superior, substantive program with students taking classes at Georgetown University and visiting Capitol Hill. There are several other State Department funded programs run by groups like IREX, such as the Iraqi University linkages program that trains administrators and builds much needed career services centers.

These exchanges produce visible changes in students outlook and also provide them opportunities to advance. For example, when they return, while they could be stronger, some alumni networks promote academic and professional exchange two graduates last year organized a debate about Is oil a blessing or a curse between their two universities. One of those same graduates has used his connections from AUIS and MEPI to plan a business that plans and implements corporate social responsibility projects for oil companies operating in the country. In addition, among the community youth groups that have popped up in Baghdad over the past few years encouraging people to read or pick up trash are graduates of such exchanges.

SOURCES

Van Den Toorn, Christine, “Reconciliation through Education in Iraq,” The New Middle East, 5/23/14

This Day In Iraqi History - Sep 10 1st Iraqi cabinet formed under new King Faisal govt

  1921 1 st Iraqi cabinet formed under newly coronated King Faisal Abd al-Rahman al-Gaylani became Iraq’s 1 st PM ( Musings On Ir...