Background To The Fall Of Mosul, Insurgents’ Relentless Attacks Upon Security Forces Set Stage For The Taking Of City

 

On June 10, 2014 Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul fell to insurgents led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). While there have been some conspiracy theories circulating there is solid evidence to back up the theory that a collapse at the top of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) leadership led to the route that spread to other units throughout northern and central Iraq. The capture of Mosul furthered ISIS’s long term goal of reclaiming territory that it lost during the Surge, which it outlined in its July 2013 Soldiers’ Harvest campaign. The first part of that strategy was to relentlessly target the ISF to loosen up their control so that militants could eventually move in. In Mosul the police and army were targeted more than just about any other city in the country, which helps explain why they fell apart so quickly in June.

For several years now Ninewa has been one of the most violent provinces in all of Iraq, and most of the security incidents there occur in Mosul. From January to May 2014 the press reported 481 attacks in the city. That led to 508 deaths and 746 wounded. Of those 274 of the killed and 412 of the injured were members of the ISF. That averaged out to 53% of the fatalities and 55% of the wounded. Not only that but the number of attacks and casualties were ramping up during that time period foreshadowing the June raid on the city. For instance, the number of incidents went from 79 and 85 in January and February respectively to 109, 101, and 107 from March to May. Conversely the number of dead and wounded started off at 71 and 81 in January, then 76 and 188 in February, before jumping to 109 and 161 in March, 135 and 176 in April, and then 117 and 210 in May. In its Soldiers’ Harvest campaign the Islamic State laid out its plan to seize territory by weakening the security forces. That was what they achieved in Mosul. The relentless attacks upon the army and police gave rise to a siege mentality. Niqash for example reported that the security forces would withdraw from some areas of the city at night because they were afraid for their safety. The situation was so bad that the Ninewa Operations Command had to set up special air flights from Mosul to Baghdad for its members to commute from their homes to work because the highway between those two cities was too unsafe. The targeting of the ISF obviously took a toll on the morale of the forces in Mosul, which helped lead to them breaking when the insurgents attacked in June.

Violence In Mosul 2014

Month	Attacks	Dead	Wounded	ISF Dead	ISF Wounded	ISF % Of Dead	ISF % Of Wounded
Jan	79	71	81	37	63	52%	77%
Feb	85	76	118	43	74	56%	62%
Mar	109	109	161	60	71	55%	44%
Apr	101	135	176	77	111	57%	63%
May	107	117	210	57	93	48%	44%
Total	481	508	746	274	412	53%	55%

Attacks upon the Iraqi forces help explain why the army and police barely put up a fight when the Islamic State and other insurgent groups laid siege to Mosul. There were other factors as well like reports that the leadership of the Ninewa Operations Command was extorting money from people or that insurgents were stealing most of the salaries of the ISF in the province. These claims of corruption at the top, being unpaid for months, and the constant targeting by insurgents pointed to a weakened force in Mosul who were in no state to put up determined resistance to protect the city.    

SOURCES

Bas News, “Mosul operations commander takes money from citizens,” 4/19/14

Habib, Mustafa, “did they or didn’t they? Iraqi army did not desert mosul, they were ordered to leave,” Niqash, 6/15/14

New Sabah, “Armed groups earn money from imported food..and “royalties” on hot spots up to 8 million dollars a month,” 3/15/14

Al Rafidayn, “Maliki’s office agrees to conduct flights to transport security personnel in Mosul,” 3/25/14

Sabah, Mohammad, “Mosul deputies: Nineveh become under control of insurgents and gunmen moving openly,” Al-Mada, 11/2/13