Baghdad Can’t Get Its Story Straight On Aug. 18 Bombings

On August 18, 2009 two truck bombs struck the Finance and Foreign Ministries in central Baghdad. The blasts killed at least 101 and wounded 1203. In the aftermath, Iraqi officials and newspapers blamed any and everyone. Azzaman newspaper reported that Iranian backed Special Groups were responsible. A source in the Iraqi National Intelligence Service told columnist David Ignatius of the Washington Post that the explosives used were similar to those made in Iran. The mayor of Baghdad said that the government had photos and evidence implicating Sunni members of parliament, and that Baathists and Al Qaeda in Iraq, funded by Saudi Arabia, had carried it out. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said the Iraqi security forces must have collaborated for such an attack to be so successful, and 11 officers were arrested immediately afterward.

Beginning on August 22, the Iraqi government began announcing the arrests of suspects connected to the Baath Party. On that day, the Baghdad Operations Command reported that it had arrested a man involved in the bombings who admitted that he was a Baathist. Later that day Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that more suspects had been picked up as well. On August 23 the Baghdad Operations Command aired a taped confession of one of the arrestees who said that he was a former policeman from the Muqdadiya district of Diyala and a Baathist. He claimed that the truck bomb on the Finance Ministry was put together in Muqdadiya, and that he paid $10,000 in bribes to get it through security checkpoints. Two Baathist officials in Syria were said to have ordered the attack. Other confessions were supposed to be coming, and a military spokesman said guards at three checkpoints in Diyala had been arrested. On August 25 the Iraqi cabinet demanded that Damascus turn over the two Baathists to Baghdad, followed by Maliki’s spokesman calling on Syria to expel or turnover all terrorists in the country. This began a war of words between the two countries with Iraq withdrawing its ambassador to Syria and then Syria doing the same. The timing of these accusations were odd as well as Maliki had just gone to Damascus and promoted closer ties between the two the day before the bombing. Not only that but the Baathists in Syria denied involvement.

Then the government began promoting a completely different story. On August 25 Al Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks on a website. On August 29 the Interior Ministry reported that it had arrested 14 suspects from a terrorist cell that were behind the bombings. The men led authorities to a bomb factory in the Ghazaliyah district of Baghdad and were allegedly members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Both of the suicide bombers involved in the attack were supposedly released from the American prison Camp Bucca a few months ago. This of course, contradicts the video taped confession aired on the 23rd that said Baathists from Diyala, taking orders from others in Syria, were responsible.

The Iraqi government has announced questionable arrests and deaths, and aired suspicious confessions before. In April 2009 for example, they claimed to have captured the prince of the Islamic State of Iraq Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. In May the government aired a taped confession by their prisoner, but that was quickly contradicted by new speeches by Baghdadi that experts said matched the voice used in previous releases. Iraqi officials also could not get their story straight on Baghdadi’s background. Even earlier in May 2007 the Interior Ministry claimed they had killed Baghdadi in a shootout in Salahaddin. Coincidentally, the supposed arrest of Baghdadi in April coincided with a new wave of bombings in Baghdad by insurgents.

The August 19 bombings were obviously a shock to the Iraqi government and public. They were the largest blasts since 2008, and came after Prime Minister Maliki had been bragging that he had secured the country. In its rush to show that it had the situation under control and could provide security once again, Baghdad blamed everyone from Al Qaeda in Iraq to Baathists to Sunni politicians to Saudi Arabia to Iran to Syria. The fact that they came up with two completely different stories didn’t seem to bother the authorities because either one was easily believable by the Iraqi public as Baathists and Al Qaeda in Iraq get blamed for almost every terrorist act in the country. Baghdad has also not been beyond airing questionable confessions by insurgents after attacks in the past. The point was to protect the government’s image as much as finding the suspects. Whether the real parties responsible will or have been found is unknown since Baghdad has played with the story so much. Finding the truth then, has been another casualty in these bombings.

SOURCES

Arraf, Janes, “Baghdad governor: Sunni MPs may be arrested for bombing,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “11 officers arrested after Baghdad bombings – Qassem Atta,” 8/20/09
- “Al-Maliki asserts Iraq’s keenness to boost ties with Syria,” 8/18/09
- “Al-Maliki urges neighboring countries not to shelter criminals,” 8/25/09
- “Cabinet urges Syria to hand over suspected bombers,” 8/25/09
- “Final toll from Baghdad explosions 82 dead, 1203 injured,” 8/20/09
- “Footage of “confessions” by Wednesday bombings’ prime suspect broadcast,” 8/23/09
- “PM: Persons involved in Wednesday bombings captured,” 8/22/09
- “URGENT/Syria rejects Iraq’s remarks, recalls ambassador,” 8/25/09
- “Wednesday attackers Baathists – BOC,” 8/22/09

BBC, “Baghdad blasts ‘were inside job,’” 8/22/09

Chulov, Martin, “Wave of bombings kills up to 70 as al-Qaida chief is caught,” Guardian, 4/23/09

Dawn Media Group, “Iraq ministry bombers had been ‘recently freed’ by US,” 8/30/09

Fordam, Alice and Latif, Nizar, “Bombed back to a state of fear,” The National, 8/22/09

Ignatius, David, “Behind the Carnage in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 8/25/09

Iraq The Model, “Azzaman: Special Groups Responsible for Wednesday’s Rocket and Mortar Attacks,” 8/20/09
- “Baghdad: Cell involved in Wednesday’s attacks captured” 8/29/09
- “Maliki blames Syria for last week’s attacks,” 8/25/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “’Al-Baghdad’ on TV,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/18/09
- “Al-Baghdadi’s Sixteenth Speech,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/12/09
- “Al-Waili on al-Baghdadi (Updated),” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/10/09
- “More Twists in the ‘al-Baghdadi’ Sage,” Talisman Gate Blog, 5/22/09
Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraq Military Broadcasts Confession on Bombing,” New York Times, 8/23/09

Roggio, Bill, “Islamic State of Iraq leader reported captured,” Long War Journal, 4/23/09

Sabah, Zaid, “Iraqi Official Says Security Forces May Have Colluded in Bombings,” Washington Post, 8/23/09

Sands, Phil, “A safe haven in Damascus,” The National, 8/29/09

Santora, Marc, “Iraqis Demand Syria Turn Over Suspects,” New York Times, 8/25/09

Santora, Marc and Mohammed, Abeer, “After Blasts, Iraqi Officials Point Fingers,” New York Times, 8/21/09

Sly, Liz, “Al Qaeda-linked group claims two recent Baghdad bombings that killed 95,” Los Angeles Times, 8/26/09

Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi And Ansar al-Islam In 2002?

The August 2009 issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies contains an article by Micah Zenko entitled, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam.” Before 2003, the Bush White House singled out Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Islamist group, and its camp in Kurdistan as a reason to invade Iraq. The U.S. claimed hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters had fled there after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. One of these was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who the administration said was an Al Qaeda terrorist leader. Finally, they said that Ansar was producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and was supported by Saddam’s government. The base appeared to fit all of the criteria of President Bush’s new war on terror because it was an intersection of a dictator that supported terrorists working with Al Qaeda on WMD. In 2002 the U.S. drew up several plans to destroy Ansar’s base, but Bush vetoed the idea with no explanation. Zenko argues that the President made this decision because he thought that military action could derail the invasion of Iraq.

9/11 forever changed the Bush administration’s foreign policy. In the president’s first speech after the attack he said that the U.S. would not only go after terrorists, but the states that supported them. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz went even farther on September 13, 2001 when he said that the U.S. would end states that sponsored terrorism. This new stance was solidified in the President’s January 2002 Axis of Evil State of the Union where he said that preventing countries from possessing weapons of mass destruction and providing them to terrorists would be America’s new top priority. How this was going to be achieved was outlined in an address the President gave at West Point in June 2002 where he said the U.S. had the right to conduct pre-emptive wars to deal with threats in the newpost-9/11 world. This idea was incorporated into the White House’s September 2002 National Security Strategy that was very similar to a Defense Policy Guidance paper written by Wolfowitz in 1992, who was then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy under the 1st President Bush that called for unilateralism in foreign policy and pre-emptive war.

In a March 2002 issue of the New Yorker Jeffrey Goldberg wrote a piece about a Kurdish terrorist group called Ansar Al-Islam entitled “A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror.” While on a trip to Kurdistan he was taken to a jail controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) where he interviewed three prisoners who claimed, amongst other things, that Ansar was secretly controlled by Iraqi intelligence. This article caught the eye of the Bush administration.

Ansar was a breakaway group from the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, formed at the beginning of September 2001. They operated in a small camp near the town of Khurmal along the Iranian border. They declared war on the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and invited Islamist militants to join their fight. They received support from Al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. They had about 600-1,000 fighters, who were quickly joined by thousands of militants, including Al Qaeda members, fleeing the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his Jund al-Sham group, Soldiers of the Levant, were one such group who arrived in the Ansar camp in December 2001.

Beginning in March 2002 the Bush administration began discussing what to do about Ansar, its growing camp of militants, and Zarqawi. In May the Joint Chiefs of Staff received its first intelligence briefing that said Ansar was a separate group from Al Qaeda, and that it was working on poisons. The Pentagon also began working on military plans against the camp. In the meantime officials were split over what to do, some were for taking action, and others were not. By June the White House was presented with a recommendation for a joint air-ground strike against the Khurmal base. The President vetoed the plan, but with no explanation even though it seemed like a perfect case to apply the new Bush doctrine to fight terrorism, the spread of WMD, and their state sponsors.

Zenko goes over four theories for why Bush might have made this decision. The first was that the threat was not great enough. The problem with this was that the reports about Zarqawi’s presence in the Ansar camp and the group’s production of WMD was believed to be real and a growing danger. Administration officials, beginning in May 2002 also began mentioning the importance of Ansar as an example of Iraq’s alleged support for Al Qaeda. Second was that there was no actionable intelligence to base the attack upon, but that was countered by the National Security Council’s Director for Combating Terrorism, Kurdish intelligence, and others who all said that Zarqawi was at the camp at that time. Third was that the White House was afraid of any possible negative repercussions of an attack such as dead American soldiers or civilian casualties. Zenko refutes this by going through a series of limited strikes by other presidents that failed, but had no real repercussions. Bush himself was also not against limited strikes as he okayed several missile attacks against Al Qaeda operatives in western and central Asia. The last possible reason was that Bush did not want to derail the drive to overthrow Saddam by a sideshow like attacking the Ansar camp. Sometime in the first half of 2002 the President decided to remove Saddam by force. In April 2002 Bush told the BBC that, “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.” In a July 23, 2002 memo from the British cabinet, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of British intelligence, said that after a recent trip to Washington he came away with the impression that the U.S. was now committed to using force to remove Saddam. Geoffrey Hoon, the Defense Minister said that the Americans had come to no specific decision yet, but he expected the invasion to begin by January 2003. Douglas Feith, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy told Zenko in 2006 that a strike on the Ansar camp that turned up nothing would’ve been problematic for the push to remove Saddam. General Jack Keane, who was the Army Chief of Staff at the time, said that he kept asking about striking Ansar in the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003 and was told that it was too close to the invasion date. To Zenko this was the most convincing reason for Bush’s decision.

During the 2003 invasion, U.S. and Kurdish forces took the Ansar camp after four days of fighting. There they found that Ansar was working on poisons and WMD. They did not find evidence that the group was supported by Baghdad however. The group did receive foreign aid, and was considering launching attacks in other countries. Zarqawi was no longer at the camp though, having left when plans for a military strike against Ansar began leaking out to the press in 2002. Khurmal turned out to be the only place in Iraq that the U.S. actually found WMD being produced, which was the major justification for the war in the first place.

Bush’s decision not to attack the Ansar camp and Zarqawi was not only a tactical error, but showed that removing Saddam was the centerpiece of the Bush administration by 2002. Zenko writes that this was a mistake because Zarqawi became a leader of the insurgency in Iraq, was also responsible for terrorist attacks in Jordan, and organized a network that reached into France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Turkey. In late 2004 he also joined Al Qaeda, and gave them a new base of operations outside of their strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His reign of terror could’ve been ended before the war. Bush’s decision not to attack the Ansar base also showed that by the summer of 2002 the President was focused upon planning and preparing for the invasion of Iraq, and apparently did not want other operations in the country that could detract from the ultimate goal of removing Saddam from power. This was seen in the fact that the Ansar camp and Zarqawi increasingly became talking points in speeches by the president and other administration officials advocating for war, while people like General Jack Keane were told that the U.S. would do nothing about them.

SOURCES

Eisenberg, Daniel, “’We’re Taking Him Out,’” Time, 5/5/02

Goldberg, Jeffrey, “A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror,” New Yorker, 3/25/02

Karon, Tony, “Why Saddam Remains a Tough Target,” Time, 1/30/02

PBS Frontline, “Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine,” War Behind Closed Doors, 2/20/03
- “Interview Richard Perle,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03
- “The War Behind Closed Doors – Transcript,” War Behind Closed Doors, 2/20/03

Zenko, Micah, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, August 2009

Kirkuk Looks To Be Voting In The 2010 Elections

There was some controversy as to whether Tamim province, home to the disputed city of Kirkuk, would be allowed to participate in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Tamim has still not voted for a new provincial government even though the balloting was held in January 2009 in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen governorates. One of the big hold ups was over the voter rolls. The four major groups in Kirkuk, the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians can not agree on who should be able to register. The Kurds asked that displaced families that had been kicked out by Saddam and since returned should be allowed to vote, while Arabs and Turkmen call them squatters who have been moved in by the Kurdish authorities to gerrymander the demographics of the city in their favor. The dispute has been not resolved. A proposed national census was also supposed to help with the voting lists, but that was indefinitely postponed in mid-August 2009 out of fear that it would create more divisions. Tamim has not held provincial elections as a result.

The Iraqi Election Commission is moving forward with preparations for the parliamentary vote in the province anyway. The Commission said that anyone that had a food ration card by July 15, 2009 would be eligible to register to vote. The centers to do this will be open until September 20, and the election is scheduled for January 16, 2010. The national vote is less controversial in Tamim than the local one, because it will not disturb the delicate and disputed balance of power within the province.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC in Kirkuk stipulates ration card before mid July,” 8/27/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Reuters, “Citing Tensions, Iraq Abandons Census Plans,” 8/16/09

Kurds Might Have Scored Small Victory In Oil Dispute With Baghdad

The Chinese are claiming that Iraq’s Oil Ministry has okayed a deal for the state-run Sinopec company to buy Switzerland’s Addax, which is now exporting oil from the Taq Taq field near the city of Irbil in Kurdistan. For the past several years the Kurdish authorities and Baghdad have argued over who has the right to sign oil deals, and conduct exploration and exports. The Oil Ministry claims all contracts must go through them, while the Kurds claim they have the constitutional right to follow their own independent petroleum policy. In May 2009 there seemed to be a small break through when Kurdistan announced that it was to begin exporting oil from the Taq Taq and Tawke fields for the first time with the okay of the central government. While the Kurds held this up as a victory, Baghdad may have come out with the upper hand because the profits from the oil exports are going into their coffers, but the Oil Ministry has refused to pay the companies. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not paid them either. This may derail the entire process, as many experts do not think the Kurds can afford to pay the exporting companies for a long time out of their own budget.

If Sinopec is allowed to buy Addax it may be another small boost for the KRG’s plans however. Its new strategy is to try to get big oil companies to buy up the small independent ones now doing exploration and exporting in Kurdistan. Baghdad could not say no to this because many of those same major petroleum corporations are bidding on Iraq’s large fields. If they said their deals were illegal in Kurdistan, they may not invest in the rest of Iraq. At the same time, if Sinopec takes over work at Taq Taq, they would still not be paid for their work, furthering the deadlock between Kurdistan and Baghdad. This conflict could drag on for years because no one is really mediating between the two sides.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq approves controversial Sinopec oil rights deal,” 8/26/09

Ciszuk, Samuel, “No clarity on Iraq-KRG oil export flap,” Iraq Oil Report, 5/13/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Reuters, “Iraq Kurds to start Tawke crude exports June 1,” 5/8/09

Webb, Tim, “Oil giants find scramble for Iraq is a game with complex rules,” Observer, 10/19/08

Latest Return Statistics For Iraqi Refugees/Displaced

The latest report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the number of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced that have returned is now available. Like the last report, 2009 has continued to see a number of Iraqis come back, but varying by month. In June, 2009 14,750 displaced and 3,490 refugees for a total of 18,410 Iraqis made the trip back. That compared to a total of 15,330 in May. March saw the largest number of returns this year with 26,540. Since 2005 displaced returns, 61% of the total, have far outweighed the refugees coming back, 39%. In the first six months of 2009 roughly 101,490 Iraqis have returned. That would put this year roughly on track to match last year's total of 221,260. 2004 has seen the most returns since the U.S. invasion with 291,997 making the trip. That year 193,997 were refugees coming back to see the new Iraq. In total, the UNHCR estimates that approximately 3,195,899 lost their homes, and about 1,075,986, 33.6%, have returned so far. The number of displaced and the percent that have returned is definitely incomplete because the UNHCR counts no refugees before 2006 when there were tens of thousands of them under Saddam.

Total displaced

Time	Displaced	Refugees	Total
Pre-2006	1,212,108		1,212,108
After 2006	1,695,899	1,500,000	3,195,899

Number of Returns 2003-June 2009

Time	Displaced	Refugees	Total
2003	0	55,429	55,429
2004	98,000	193,997	291,997
2005	98,000	56,155	154,155
2006	150,000	20.235	170,235
2008	195,890	25,370	221,260
Jan. 09	6,390	1,130	7,520
Feb. 09	15,810	2,970	18,780
Mar. 09	20,690	4,860	26,540
Apr. 09	11,020	3,890	14,910
May 09	10,540	2,990	15,330
Jun. 09	14,750	3,490	18,410
2009	79,200	18,970	101,490
Total	657,090	183,727	1,075,986
	61%	39%	100%

The vast majority of Iraqis are going back to six of Iraq's eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, and Babil. Baghdad has been at the center of the fighting since the U.S. invasion, so it should be no surprise then that the capital has seen the most displaced, and the most returns. 54% of the displaced and 52% of refugees have gone back to that province. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the premier aid group working with Iraq's displaced, has extensively surveyed this community and found that 26.6% were forced from their property in Baghdad, 20.6% did so because of the fighting, 20.1% because of direct threats to their life, 15.8% fled the general violence, and 15.7% left out of fear. Those figures are signs of the death and destruction that were wrought in the capital, especially after the 2006 Amarra bombing when the Shiites began ethnically cleansing Sunnis. Overall, the major reason why the displaced have come back is the improved security according to the IOM, followed by a mix of better security and difficulties in their current locals. Those are probably the same reasons for refugees, although far fewer of them, 12.2% of the total, have come back so far.

Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Sulaymaniya	140	0%
Muthanna	180	0%
Irbil	190	0%
Salahaddin	440	0%
Dhi Qar	440	0%
Dohuk	510	1%
Qadisiyah	510	1%
Maysan	510	1%
Anbar	520	1%
Tamim	740	1%
Basra	1,250	1%
Wasit	1,130	1%
Karbala	1,350	1%
Babil	1,680	2%
Najaf	2,170	2%
Ninewa	2,920	3%
Diyala	31,770	31%
Baghdad	55,040	54%
TOTAL	101,490	100%

Refugee Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Ninewa	20	0%
Anbar	60	0%
Sulaymaniya	140	1%
Irbil	160	1%
Salahaddin	160	1%
Muthanna	180	1%
Dhi Qar	430	2%
Maysan	440	2%
Wasit	450	2%
Dohuk	510	2%
Qadisiyah	510	2%
Basra	680	3%
Tamim	690	3%
Babil	1,030	5%
Karbala	1,320	6%
Diyala	1,660	7%
Najaf	2,170	10%
Baghdad	11,680	52%
TOTAL	22,290	100%

Displaced Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Dohuk	0	0%
Qadisiyah	0	0%
Muthanna	0	0%
Najaf	0	0%
Sulaymaniya	0	0%
Dhi Qar	10	0%
Irbil	30	0%
Karbala	30	0%
Tamim	50	0%
Maysan	70	0%
Salahaddin	280	0%
Anbar	460	1%
Basra	570	1%
Babil	650	1%
Wasit	680	1%
Ninewa	2,900	4%
Diyala	30,110	38%
Baghdad	43,360	55%
TOTAL	79,200	100%

The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is still encouraging the return of Iraq's displaced. The UNHCR does not think it's time, and the latest Pentagon report to Congress on Iraq said Baghdad has no serious plan to assist the process. The new plan is to try to get them to come back to violent areas in Abu Ghraib outside of Baghdad and Diyala. The authorities have plans to move in 3,000 mostly Shiite families into Abu Ghraib, and to begin evictions of squatters in Diyala. The governor of that province also hopes that families will come back, and has set up six committees in various regions of Diyala to look into damages and pay compensation to returning families. The displaced are worried about insurgent attacks.

Baghdad is trying to close the refugee file this year in an attempt to improve the image of the country, and to help Maliki in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Already, in February 2009 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration ordered a stop to registering new displaced claiming that most families have gone back to their homes. This is an important development because not only is the claim not true, but no Iraqis can receive government aid without registering. The authorities have also promised rewards for those that go back to Baghdad, but very few have received any payments.

The process of return has begun, but the majority of Iraq's refugees are still without their homes. The displaced are coming back in much larger numbers than refugees, mostly because of the improved security situation in the country. The major concern is what they will find when they come home. The government has promised help, but it has not come through in many cases. Prime Minister Maliki seems more concerned about the reports on returns to improve his standing, than actually bettering conditions for when families come back. International organizations have only been able to assist a small fraction of this community, which means many are likely to have to fend for themselves whether they decide to go back or stay where they are.

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “displaced fear new al-qaeda violence,” Niqash, 6/24/09

Alsumaria, “UNHCR: Iraq not prepared for refugees return,” 6/3/09

Dagher, Sam, “Iraq’s Government Orders Barriers Removed,” New York Times, 8/6/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

International Organization for Migration, “Baghdad Governorate Profile July 2009 IOM IDP and Returnee Assessment,” July 2009
- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments Assessment of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009

Reilly, Corinne, “Prospects are dismal for returning Iraqi refugees,” McClatchy Nespapers, 5/22/09

UNHCR, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – June 2009,” 8/3/09

The Passing Of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

Today, August 26, 2009 saw the passing of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Hakim was a symbol of Iraqi politics immediately after the 2003-invasion. He was an opportunist and pragmatist who was willing to align himself with various groups to gain power. He was widely successful in the early years following the overthrow of Saddam, but then his star began to fade in 2007.

The SIIC has its roots in the Dawa Party and Tehran. In the 1950s, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim created the Dawa Party rallying Shiites to the cause of an Islamic state. Hakim eventually left Dawa, and in the 1980s fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War with his two sons, Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. In 1982 Tehran formed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq to counter the Dawa Party, and assert more influence over the Iraqi opposition. The Hakims in turn, pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. In 1983 Iran created the Badr Brigade, which was an official arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. It fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War, and recruited amongst Iraqi prisoners of war. After the Gulf War, Badr moved into southern Iraq and tried to unsuccessfully take over the Shiite uprising. These origins were always a major problem for the SIIC as many Iraqis resented the Hakims fleeing to Iran, their role in the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 uprisings, and their pro-Khomeini stance.

Despite their Iranian origins, the Hakims were always pragmatic opportunists who would ally with any group that would give them a better chance at gaining power in Iraq. Beginning in the late-1980s they started quiet relations with the United States. In 1992 they joined the Iraqi National Congress, and its leader Ahmad Chalabi, was able to garner Washington’s support for the SIIC as the major Shiite party they would work with after the invasion. They also worked closely with the ruling Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The three had forged ties when they all fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War.

When the 2003 invasion of Iraq occurred, the SIIC was able to sweep into power and assume a larger position than they had support. First, they took over a series of cities like Kut, Khanaqin, Baquba, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala because of the vacuum left from Saddam’s overthrow. They also sank early attempts to include internal Iraqi leaders in any new government put together by the U.S. They quickly aligned themselves with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as well to gain legitimacy and standing, and supported his call for elections to determine a new government and constitution, knowing that would benefit themselves since Iraq had a Shiite majority. Abdul al-Aziz al-Hakim ended up joining the Iraqi Governing Council, and assumed the leadership of the SIIC, when his brother Ayatollah Mohammed al-Hakim was killed in a car bombing in August 2003.

Beginning in 2005 Hakim and the SIIC were able to put together a string of ringing victories after the U.S. handed back sovereignty to Iraq. The SIIC was the driving force behind the United Iraqi Alliance in the 2005 elections, which came away with the most votes. It also joined with the Kurds to push through a new constitution, and together the SIIC, PUK, and KDP were the ruling coalitions behind the Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki governments. The SIIC also took over the Interior Ministry under Jaafari, got their Badr Brigade integrated into the security forces, and set up death squads to begin the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad. In August 2005 they began promoting federalism, and a nine-province southern Shiite autonomous region. In 2006, the U.S. came to rely upon the SIIC to counter the Sadrists, who were their greatest rivals. The two had been having a long-running battle across southern Iraq. The SIIC was able to gain these victories because they were better organized than their rivals, the Sunnis and Sadrists boycotted the first two elections in 2005, and both Washington and Tehran supported them.

In 2007, the SIIC’s fortunes began to change. First, their call for an autonomous region proved to create more problems than good since many Shiites rejected the idea. The SIIC also controlled most of the southern provinces, and did a poor job governing and providing services. Third, the Hakim’s base was the middle class and merchants, who began to flee the country during the sectarian war. Fourth, the SIIC was never able to shake their image as tools of Tehran. To counter this the party tried to remake itself, dropping “Revolutionary” from their name becoming the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, claimed that they supported Ayatollah Sistani rather than Ayatollah Ali Khamanei in Iran, and said they had disbanded their militia the Badr Brigade, which they then called a social and political group. They also tried to provide social services to gain support amongst the poor, a move led by Abdul Hakim’s son, Ammar al-Hakim, who was being groomed as the successor to his father.

In 2008 and 2009 things got worse. Prime Minister Maliki began distancing himself from the SIIC by creating his own popular base with the Tribal Support Councils. Maliki also came out against federalism in both northern and southern Iraq, and called for a strong central government. In turn, the SIIC, KDP, and PUK talked about having a no confidence vote against the Prime Minister in December 2008, but they couldn’t decide upon a successor and were hoping that Maliki would trip up, and ruin his image. In the 2009 provincial elections, Maliki ran his own State of Law List against the SIIC, who was soundly beaten across the south and Baghdad. Despite these setbacks, Hakim tried to mend fences with Maliki by lobbying him to join a new version of the United Iraqi Alliance to run in the 2010 parliamentary balloting. This failed to materialize, as the Prime Minister wanted to lead the new list, something Hakim and the other parties refused to agree upon.

By the time of Hakim’s death, the SIIC was a shell of its former self. After the sweeping victories in 2005, the Supreme Council is now fading, and desperately trying to remake itself once again to return to power. They now talk about national unity, but they are remembered for their Iranian roots and pro-federalist stance. The death of Hakim could also lead to a power struggle within the organization. While Hakim’s son, Ammar, was the anointed successor, there are a number of possible rivals in the old guard like the head of the Badr Organization Hadi al-Ameri, Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi. The SIIC may be at a crossroads, lacking popular support and strong leadership with Hakim’s passing.

SOURCES

Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003

Dagher, Sam, “Rising player with a vision for Shiite Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/07

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Kemp, Geoffrey, “Iran and Iraq The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2005

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Packer, George, “War After The War,” New Yorker, 11/24/03

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Shiite Clerics’ Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/21/06
- “Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/26/07

Ramzi, Kholoud, “daawa-siic conflict splits Shiite unity,” Niqash,” 11/27/08

Santora, Marc, “Shiite Power Broker Dies, in Blow to Iraqi Party,” New York Times, 8/26/09

Semple, Kirk, “Heavy battle between shiite militias reveals deep split in ruling coalition,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/22/06

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Visser, Reidar, “Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim Dies in Tehran,” Historiae.org, 8/26/09

Walt, Vivienne, “U.S. Ally: Shiite leader preached unity before attack,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/30/03

Life In Iraq Before and After The Invasion

One of the major points of contention over Iraq is whether the war has improved the standard of living for the average citizen. Obviously there is much more freedom now than under the previous dictatorial regime of Saddam, and Iraq is a fledgling democracy. Being able to vote however does not provide people with food, jobs or services. A comparison of aggregate statistics from before and after the 2003 invasion actually shows a mixed bag of results for Iraq.

In the 1970s Iraq was a developing country with an increasing standard of living. Health and education were both up. Iraq instituted a mandatory primary education system, and worked on adult literacy. People from around the Arab world went to Iraq to get a college education. Infant mortality and diseases also declined. This expansion was fueled by the growth in oil prices in the 1970s. In the 1980s Saddam decided to go to war with Iran, the first of many poor foreign policy decisions, which placed a tremendous burden upon Iraq's economy, and began a steady decline in the country. The invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War, and the international sanctions in the 1990s had an even more devastating affect upon daily life. One U.N. study found that living standards dropped 2/3 from 1988 to 1995 as a result. By the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003 Iraq was in a sorry state. The looting that took place immediately after the overthrow of Saddam along with a slow reconstruction effort appeared to make things worse. In the last couple years however, parts of Iraq's economy and services have begun to recover and grow.

Per Capita Gross Domestic Product

The rising oil prices in the 1970s boosted Iraq's per capital Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By 1980 it had risen to $3,812. The Iran-Iraq led to a dramatic drop to around $250. The Gulf War and sanctions brought per capita GDP down to its lowest level at $180 by 1994, after which it steadily improved. By 2002 on the eve of the war per capita GDP was up to $770. The invasion brought it down again to $570, but then it started increasing again. By 2007 it was at $2,848, and in 2008 it was approximately $3,100. The numbers show that Iraq's economy was slowly improving even before 2003, and that in recent years it has gotten much better. The 2008 per capita GDP however, is still not at the level that it was in 1980, one of the high points in Iraq's development.

Per Capita GDP

1980	$3,812
1988	approx. $3,700
1989	approx $250
1994	$180
2002	$770
2003	$570
2007	$2,848
2008	approx $3,100

Even with the improvements in the economy however, Iraq is nearly at the bottom compared to other countries in the region. When looking at purchasing power parity numbers for example, Iraq is second to last amongst 16 neighboring countries. Qatar was at the top with $58,004, Iraq was at $3,880, with only Yemen lower with $2,290.

Comparison Of Iraq's Purchasing Power Parity Figures With Other Countries In The Region

Qatar	$58,004
Kuwait	$40,826
United Arab Emirates	$29,063
Saudi Arabia	$23,928
Bahrain	$23,702
Oman	$23,654
Libya	$16,431
Iran	$11,748
Lebanon	$10,742
Algeria	$8,344
Tunisia	$7,894
Egypt	$5,689
Jordan	$5,051
Syria	$4,763
Morocco	$4,405
Iraq	$3,880
Yemen	$2,290

Life Expectancy

Life expectancy in Iraq has declined since the U.S. invasion. In 1987 it was an average of 65 years. By 2006 it was down to 58.2 years. The violence in Iraq may have played a role in that, but the general poor quality of services was another major factor in this change. Again, when compared to other countries in the region, Iraq is at the bottom in this category. Iraq is also the 3^rd least healthy country in the Arab world. Iraqis have a 19.4% chance of not surviving past 40 years old. Only Sudan at 26.1% and Djibouti at 28.6% were worse off.

Life Expectance In Iraq Compared To Region 2006-2008

Country	Life Expectancy
United Arab Emirates	78.3 years
Kuwait	77.3 years
Syria	73.6 years
Saudi Arabia	72.2 years
Jordan	71.9 years
Turkey	71.4 years
Iran	70.2 years
Yemen	61.5 years
Iraq	58.2 years

Infant Deaths

Care for young children was another area that improved during the 1970s and 1980s, and has since recovered to those levels. In the 1970s there were 80 deaths per 1,000 live births. That dropped to an average of 40 deaths per 1,000 births by the 1980s. In 1984 for example, there were 30 deaths per 1,000 births. Deaths of children under five also declined during this period going from 120 deaths per 1,000 children in the late 1970s to 50 deaths per 1,000 children in 1984. The sanctions imposed in the 1990s however led to Iraq's health system falling apart. In 1990, the year of the Kuwait invasion, there were 50 deaths per 1,000 live births, which then doubled to 101 deaths per 1,000 live births by 1999. Fatalities for young children also increased from 62 deaths for children under 5 per 1,000 to 122 per 1,000 in 1999. These two areas have improved since 2003 up to what they were during the 1980s. In 2006 there were 35 deaths per 1,000 live births, and 41 deaths of children under 5 per 1,000. Again, despite the better numbers, Iraq is still worse off compared to other Arab countries. In Kuwait there are 11 deaths per 1,000 live births and 26 deaths per 1,000 live births in Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 2006.

Infant Mortality Rate/Under 5 Mortality Rate In Iraq per 1,000

	Infant Mortality Rate	Under 5 Mortality Rate
1984-1989	30	50
1990-1994	50	62
1999	101	122
2004	32	40
2006	35	41

2006 Infant Mortality Rates Iraq Compared to Arab Countries

Country	Infant Mortality Rate
Kuwait	11 per 1,000
Syria	15 per 1,000
Saudi Arabia	26 per 1,000
Jordan	26 per 1,000
Iraq	35 per 1,000

Child Malnutrition

Other statistics for children have only slightly improved since the invasion. Child malnutrition for example is only marginally better. The rate for stunting children under five declined from 22.1% in 2000 to 21.4% in 2006. That meant 1 in every 5 Iraqi children was under nourished. Iran, Syria and Jordan did better in this category, with only Yemen at 53% doing worse. Iraqis in general largely rely upon the government's food ration system, the largest in the world. This was set up during the 1990s sanctions under the Oil For Food Program. Before the war 60% of Iraqis relied upon the rations, the same amount today.

Education
One area that has seen a big improvement since the war is education. Iraq already had a reputation for a great higher education system before its series of wars. That was largely devastated beginning in the 1980s, but schooling overall has improved since 2003. A 2006 United Nations survey found 78% of Iraqis were literate, 86% for men and 70% for women. Access to education varies across the provinces from a high of 89% in Diyala to a low of 57% in Dohuk. Overall however, this is one category where Iraq is comparable to its neighbors like Jordan where 86% have access to education, and 75% in Syria. Students in Iraq's primary, secondary, prep, colleges, and post-graduate schools have all seen increases, with only those in kindergarten going slightly down since the invasion.

Education

School Level	1995/1996	2005/2006
Kindergarten	88,000	82,000
Primary (1st-6th)	2,900,000	4,100,000
Secondary (7th-12th)	861,000	1,019,000
Prep (10th-12th)	293,000	472,000
University	233,000	353,000
Post-Graduate	8,000	15,500

Inflation

Until recently inflation was a major cause for the decline in living standards in Iraq. The inflation rate for fuel and electricity from 1996 to 2002 was 18%. After the invasion in 2005 the government ended subsidies for these two products causing the inflation rate for them to skyrocket to 71.6%. Fuel and energy expenses grew 590% from 2002 to 2005 as a result. They continued to go up 129% from 2005 to 2006. In the 1980s and 1990s an average Iraqi family spent 11% of their money on fuel and energy. That went up to 35% by 2006. In the last few years Iraq's Central Bank has gotten control of the problem, and greatly decreased inflation overall. That has improved the spending power of Iraqis.

Economy Overall
Iraq's overall economy is in some ways worse off than before the invasion. It is much more dependent upon oil now than ever before because of the decline in other sectors. Oil now accounts for roughly 70% of Iraq's GDP, while services are 22%. Industry went from 9% of GDP before the war to less than 1.5% afterward. Farming went from 35% of the GDP in the 1970s to 6.5% after 2003. Oil is also not a labor-intensive industry, and only employs about 2% of the work force. That means 98% of Iraqis are employed in businesses that only contribute around 30% of the GDP. This is the reason why the government is the largest employer in the country, because not only is it safe and steady work, but it provides one of the few opportunities in Iraq since the private sector is so small. In turn, the labor market is distorted as the government starves businesses of workers.

U.S. attempts to improve the economy have only made the situation worse. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) tried to implement free market and free trade reforms. This led to the lifting of tariffs that opened up the country to a flood of cheap imports, which caused major problems for many small businesses and farms. The CPA also cut support for Iraq's state-owned industries that accounted for 90% of industrial capacity and employed around 500,000. Eventually the CPA decided to help some of these businesses, but by then 2/3 of them had closed. Since 2007 the U.S. has tried to bring back many of these companies to very mixed results.

Conclusion

This is only a review of a few factors in the lives of average Iraqis. They can only tell so much as there are large variations from province to province, between rural and urban areas, and between classes. What the numbers provided do show is mixed living standards before and after the invasion. Per capita GDP is better now than before 2003, but not up to the level it reached in 1980. Life expectancy and child malnutrition have declined, but infant mortality is back to what it was in the 1980s. Education and inflation have both gotten better, but the economy overall is in a worse state for those looking for work. In most of those categories, Iraq also ranks at near the bottom compared to its neighbors. Those who want to argue that the U.S. intervention has improved Iraq or not can find numbers to argue both sides. What everyone can hopefully agree upon is that Iraqis deserve much better.

SOURCES

Collier, Robert, “Imports inundate Iraq under new U.S. policy,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/10/03

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/4/09

Fairweather, Jack, “Iraqi state enterprises warily reopen,” Financial Times, 6/16/08

Government of Iraq, “Iraq National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008,” 12/31/08

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

McGeary, Johanna, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time, 3/10/03

Reuters, “Iraq must cut food rations in 2008-trade minister,” 12/6/2007

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Whitelaw, Kevin, “After The Fall,” U.S. News & World Report, 12/2/02

The New National Alliance And Other Political Maneuverings

Today, August 24, 2009 the new Iraqi National Alliance was announced. This was the long-awaited revised version of the United Iraqi Alliance, which was the largest vote getter in the 2005 elections. The new grouping includes the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party, the Dawa-Iraq Party, and two Sunni figures, Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes of the Anbar Salvation Council and Khalid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mulla from Basra. It appears that the new list was unable to convince the Fadhila Party to join. In July 2009 they said they would not, and in August claimed they were going to form their own list, the Alliance for Integrity and Development. More importantly, the National Alliance did not include Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party.

Dawa was said to be involved in negotiations right up to the last minute of the press conference of the new list, but couldn’t get their demands met. Maliki was asking for a majority of seats in the alliance and a promise that he would be their sole candidate to be prime minister, which the other parties objected to. The National Alliance however did leave the door open to Maliki joining the list at a later date.

As reported before, Maliki’s main reason for flirting with rejoining the alliance after running separately with his own State of Law List in the 2009 provincial balloting, was to secure the top post in the country. While Maliki was considered the biggest winner in the 2009 election, a breakdown of the results show that he was in no position to hold onto the prime ministership if he ran alone again. Of the fourteen provinces that held elections, Maliki’s State of Law only won majorities in two, Baghdad and Basra, and even then, came away with 38% and 37% of the vote respectively. Overall, State of Law won 15.1% of the ballots and took 27.5% of the 440 seats up for grabs. That was hardly a hold on the electorate to ensure that he be re-elected. In comparison, the new National Alliance members walked away with 17.1% of the vote and 27.7% of the seats.

January 2009 Provincial Election Results Comparison
Maliki’s State of Law: 15.1% of vote, 121 seats, 27.5%
SIIC’s Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.6% of vote, 58 seats, 13.1%
Sadrists’ Independent Free Movement List: 6.3% of vote, 41 seats, 9.3%
Jaafari’s National Reform Party: 4.2% of vote, 23 seats, 5.2%
Iraqi National Alliance members together: 17.1% of vote, 122 seats, 27.7%

This leaves the Prime Minister in a quandary because there are few other major parties left for him to align with. The Fadhila Party and Dawa have not gotten along. The State of Law List did not include it in any of its ruling coalitions after the 2009 provincial elections, and Fadhila had a poor showing in the voting. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening and National Independents List has repeatedly expressed a desire to run with Maliki in 2010. The al-Hadbaa Party of Ninewa, the Change List in Kurdistan, and Mithal al-Alusi’s Ummah Party may also be new partners. Those together would still probably not deliver a plurality of the vote. Maliki flirted with allying with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Front after the 2009 balloting, but was attacked for it by the other Shiite parties who claimed Mutlaq was a Baathist. Mutlaq is now in discussions with former speaker of parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council, Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party, former Prime Miniser Ilyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani of the Constitution Party to form a new alliance. Bolani is said to be a candidate for prime minister, so it’s unlikely that Maliki would want to work with this grouping. After that there are only a plethora of smaller parties that tend to have very localized support.

Iraqi politics are in a state of flux. The Shiites along with the other ethnosectarian groups are fragmenting into smaller parties as the 2009 elections showed. This makes it much harder to form winning coalitions. Maliki may have to cobble together an ad hoc group of parties and hope for the best if he wants to be prime minister again. Even if he ran with the National Iraqi Alliance there was no guarantee he would hold onto the spot as the SIIC was only hoping to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him afterwards. After the 2010 vote is completed and negotiations begin for a ruling coalition, the Prime Minister will also have to contend with the fact that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP) alliance is set against him, along with many in the Islamic Party. No matter what then, Maliki is facing an uphill battle after his spate of military and political victories in 2008 and 2009.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “New Iraq political coalition in the offing,” 8/24/09

Associated Press, “New Shiite alliance excludes Iraqi prime minister,” 8/24/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Fadhila party announces new alliance for next elections,” 8/10/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Fox News, “Iraqi Clan Leader May Hold Key to Lasting Political Stability After U.S. Exit,” 4/4/09

Iraq The Model, “Accord Front Collapses, Sunni Tribes Seek Shiite Allies,” 8/15/09
- “Maliki promises a crackdown that could reach political figures,” 8/23/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Announcing the ‘New’ UIA,” Talisman Gate, 8/24/09
- “Iraq: Alliances Galore,” Hudson Institute, 7/17/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi Shiite Parties Form Coalition Without Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/24/09

Myers, Steven Lee, “Iraqi Shiite Leaders Create Alliance, Minus Maliki,” New York times, 8/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In Basra, political skirmishing heats up as elections near,” Los Angeles Times, 12/28/08

Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, Political Ambiguity,” Washington Post, 4/4/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09
- “Claiming Nothing Has Really Changed, Fadila Rejects the Offer to Rejoin a ‘Reformed’ UIA,” Historiae.org, 7/17/09

Sons Of Iraq Integration Update

Beginning in September 2008, the United States began transferring control of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program to Baghdad. The process went in stages with the SOI in Baghdad handed over first, and those in Salahaddin last in April 2009. 88,383 SOI are now on the government’s payroll. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has pledged to give 20% of the SOI jobs in the security forces, and the rest employment in civilian ministries. So far the integration plan has gone in fits and spurts, and does not appear to be on time to meet the goals set by the U.S.

From October 2008 to July 2009 only 6,282 SOI have been given jobs. Of those 4,565 have gone into the security forces, and 1,717 into non-security work. The provincial government in Diyala however announced in early August that it had accepted 8,800 SOI into the workforce. Since the January 2009 elections the Iraqi Accordance Front has controlled Diyala, which has actively allied itself with the SOI there to gain popular support and victory at the ballot box, so it should come as no surprise that so many SOI were taken in there.

In total, 17,423 SOI have gotten jobs since the program was created by the United States during the Surge up to July, with approximately 13,000 joining the Iraqi army and police. From June 2007 to September 2008, before the hand over, 11,141 were accepted by the government with 8,777 getting security jobs and 2,364 other government work. Baghdad has also processed 47,000 questionnaires filled out by the SOI, 3,331 of which were sent to the ministries at the beginning of August.

The U.S. general in charge of the transfer program said that he expected Baghdad to give all 94,000 SOI jobs by the end of 2009. So far however, only around 25% have found employment two-thirds of the way through the year, and there has been a hiring freeze of SOI in the Ministries of Defense and Interior since April because of their budget problems. In its latest report on Iraq to Congress, the Defense Department warned that Baghdad was not on tract to meet its promises.

There have been a number of other problems as well. In March and April 2009 the SOI were not paid because the budget did not originally include their salaries. Even after this mix up was fixed there are still on-going complaints by SOI about not getting paid. This has led to an unknown number of fighters to leave their posts and look for work elsewhere. The government has also carried out a series of arrests of SOI with 41 leaders detained since November 2008 with six released. In May 2009 the SOI and the U.S. registered complaints about this policy and things slowed, but then started again in July. There have also been reports that the SOI have been targeted for kidnappings by local police to be ransomed off, and of families charging SOI members with murdering their insurgent relatives.

Baghdad has always viewed the Sons of Iraq program with ambivalence. The fighters were mostly former insurgents organized by the United States without any role played by the Iraqi government. Shiite politicians have often complained about them being infiltrated by militants, denigrated their role in improving security, and said they are only relevant to the Americans. This lack of concern and the normal bureaucratic delays in the government has held up their integration into the Iraqi government. It’s very unlikely that all of them will get jobs by the end of the year, especially with the country’s budget problems holding up all new hiring. That will mean Washington will have to lobby Maliki to include their pay in the next budget as well. Since Iraq’s parliament takes months to pass anything that could leave the SOI without pay for several months all over again. Even then it seems unlikely that Baghdad has the will or capacity to take in all these former fighters. Ultimately, many will probably have to look for work on their own or end up on the unemployment line.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “3,331 files of Sahwa fighters referred to concerned ministries,” 8/2/09
- “8,800 Sahwa council personnel absorbed into Diala’s security apparatus,” 8/9/09

Clark, Dave, “Some US-backed Iraqi militias plotting attacks: VP,” Agence France Presse, 4/14/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

Dolan, Jack and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqi militiamen frustrated that promised jobs haven’t materialized,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/20/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraq’s unpaid Awakening Council,” 8/8/09

Nordland, Rod, “Arrests of Sunni Leaders Rise in Baghdad,” New York Times, 7/30/09

Nordland, Rod and Rubin, Alissa, “Sunni Fighters Say Iraq Didn’t Keep Job Promises,” New York Times, 3/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Corruption plays key role in Iraqi justice,” Los Angeles Times, 6/29/09

Rasheed, Ahmed and Cocks, Tim, “Some U.S.-backed Iraqi fighters desert posts,” Reuters, 5/6/09

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09

Santora, Marc, “Iraq Arrests 2 Sunni Leaders, Raising Fears of Violence,” New York Times, 5/19/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Major Problems Found With Iraqi Oil Ministry

Iraq Oil Report recently had an article on a 2008 audit done of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, which found massive on-going problems. The depth of the difficulties touched upon every aspect of the Ministry from its bureaucracy to its oil operations to its business dealings. Here is a rundown of the audit’s main findings:

1. There is a lack of control over accounts and receipts

2. As of December 31, 2008 only one-third of Iraq’s plan to install meters on its oil industry had been completed

3. The North Oil Company burned 1.4 million barrels of oil condensates because it couldn’t sell it

4. The state-run oil companies re-injected 605,000 barrels of oil back into the fields damaging them

5. There were 698,000 unaccounted for barrels of oil which were believed to have been stolen

6. The Ministry recorded 6 million less barrels of oil than the South Oil Company claimed it produced

7. The Ministry put $3 billion in oil revenues in an Iraqi bank that was supposed to be deposited in Iraq’s oil account in the New York Federal Reserve Bank

8. The Ministry was fined $24.4 million for delinquent carrier loading

9. It hasn’t collected $26.2 million from Shell for reducing its shipping costs

10. It hasn’t collected $9.1 million from oil sales to Jordan

Iraq depends upon oil for over 85% of its revenue. Although Iraq has the third largest petroleum reserves in the world, its oil production has been hobbled by years of wars and sanctions, which severely limited investment and maintenance leaving much of the infrastructure old and deteriorating. The Oil Ministry claims it needs $75 billion to reach its potential. In the meantime, Iraq has been roundly criticized for its haphazard, and contradictory oil plans. The country doesn’t have a strategic vision for developing its oil and natural gas, the Oil Ministry lacks trained and qualified personnel, equipment, and services, and oil legislation has been deadlocked in parliament for years because it is one of the major disputes between Baghdad and Kurdistan. The 2008 audit just adds to this already long-list of difficulties Iraq is facing with its most precious resource.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Lando, Ben, “Mixed review,” Iraq Oil Report, 8/16/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Iraq Becoming The Forgotten War In America’s Media

A July 2009 report by the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism chronicled the dramatic drop in media coverage of Iraq in the United States. The Pew Center keeps track of the top ten stories in America in its “New Coverage Index.” Based upon this information they charted how U.S. TV, radio, newspapers, and the internet have covered Iraq from 2007 to July 5, 2009. In the first quarter of 2007 Iraq was the top story in America, receiving 22.3% of all media coverage. After that, the number of stories dropped going from 15.5% of all stories in 2007 to 3.6% in 2008 to 2% in the first half of 2009.

U.S. Media Coverage of Iraq - % Of All Stories
1st quarter of 2007 22.3%
2nd quarter of 2007 14.8%
3rd quarter of 2007 16.1%
4th quarter of 2007 8.7
2007 15.5%
1st quarter 2008 5%
2nd quarter of 2008 4.4%
3rd quarter of 2008 3%
4th quarter of 2008 2.1%
2008 3.6%
1st quarter 2009 2.4%
2nd quarter 2009 1.7%
1st half of 2009 2%

The main job of U.S. news agencies is to report what’s going on. The major source of this information is the government. When Washington stopped talking about Iraq in 2007 with the debate on withdrawal ending and General Petraeus’ testimony to Congress over, so did America’s news. By 2009 Iraq had become the forgotten war in the press. In March Iraq did not make the top 10 news stories in America for an entire month for the first time. By June Iraq was not in the top ten of any of the four major media sources, TV, radio, newspapers, or internet for the four full weeks of the month. The recent withdrawal from Iraq’s cities on June 30, 2009 led to a short spike in coverage to 6.6% of news stories for the week of June 29 to July 5, but otherwise, the war will continue to fade from the headlines. During time of conflict, the media’s main job is to inform the public. America’s news companies have abrogated this role in Iraq.

SOURCES

Jurkowitz, Mark, “Why News of Iraq Dropped,” Pew Research Center’s Project For Excellence In Journalism, 3/26/08

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Iraq – The Incredible Shrinking Story,” 7/9/09

Sartor, Tricia and Jurkowitz, Mark, “Iraq War Coverage Plunges,” Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, 3/25/08

New Iraqi Survey On Security

The latest edition of the Pentagon’s Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq report to Congress includes a public opinion poll of Iraqis done in April 2009 on security. The results showed that Iraqis felt that security in their neighborhood was good, but that they had apprehensions about the rest of the country, and that the Iraqi Security Forces had widespread support.

A majority of respondents said they felt secure in their neighborhoods and provinces, but less so in Iraq in general. 76% said security was calm in their neighborhood, and 60% said the same about security in their province. 90% said that security was the same or better in their neighborhood over the last six months. These numbers were relatively unchanged since August 2008. When asked about Iraq in general however, only 31% said security was calm. This was a 10% increase from August 2008. In November 2007, 23% felt that security was calm in the country. When asked whether they felt safe traveling outside their neighborhood only 42% said yes, largely unchanged since November 2007 when 39% said yes. A majority however, 56%, said they felt that the country was stable. These numbers reflect the new status quo in Iraq. The sectarian war ended in 2007, and the crackdown against the Shiite militias was over by the fall of 2008. That has led to relative stability in most Iraqis’ lives. There is still violence though, which could be the reason why so many are unsure of the security situation across the entire country, and have reservations about leaving their immediate area.

Said security was calm in neighborhood
April 09 76%
Jan. 09 77%
Oct. 08 76%
Aug. 08 73%

Said security was same or better in neighborhood over last 6 months
April 09 90%
Jan. 09 90%
Oct. 08 89%
Aug. 09 91%
Nov. 07 82%

Said security in province was calm
April 09 60%
Jan. 09 57%
Oct. 08 57%

Said security in Iraq was calm
April 09 31%
Jan. 09 29%
Oct. 08 28%
Aug. 08 21%
Nov. 07 23%

Said security was the same or better in Iraq in last 6 months
April 09 86%
Jan. 09 86%
Oct. 08 79%
Nov. 07 81%

Said Iraq was stable
April 09 56%
Jan. 09 51%
Oct. 08 45%
Nov. 07 38%

Said felt safe traveling outside of neighborhood
April 09 42%
Jan. 09 42%
Oct. 08 42%
Aug. 08 37%
Nov. 07 39%

One of the main changes in the security situation in Iraq has been the increasing size and abilities of the Iraqi security forces to conduct day-to-day operations, and the public’s confidence in them. In all the questions about the Iraqi Army and police, respondents had positive views. The same could not be said of the U.S. military that seemed to be considered in low regard, and tribes, militias, and other groups were largely not considered relevant to providing security. 72% said they felt secure around the army, and 75% said they were winning the war against terrorists. In contrast, in November 2007 only 51% said they felt safe around the army, and 52% said they were winning. 66% said they felt secure around the police, and 65% said they were winning against crime. 79% responded that the either the army or police were responsible for security in their neighborhood. The security forces were also trusted more than the local, provincial or national governments. A major change between the April 2009 survey and the October 2008 one was the complete disappearance of trust in militias and armed groups. This is important not only for the development of the Iraqi forces, but for the U.S. withdrawal as well, as security will eventually be turned completely over to Baghdad’s control, and they need the support of the public to operate effectively.

Said they felt secure around Iraqi Army
April 09 72%
Jan. 09 70%
Oct. 08 65%
Nov. 07 51%

Said Iraqi Army was winning battle against terrorists
April 09 75%
Jan. 09 72%
Oct. 08 70%
Nov. 07 52%

Said felt secure around police
April 09 66%
Jan. 09 62%
Oct. 08 61%
Nov. 07 53%

Said police winning against crime
April 09 65%
Jan. 09 61%
Oct. 08 61%
Nov. 07 60%

Who was responsible for security in your neighborhood?
Police 40%
Army 39%
Tribes 6%
Sons of Iraq 3%
Neighbors 2%
Religious leaders 2%
U.S. 2%
Militias 0%

Who did you trust to protect you? – April 09
Army 87%
Police 83%
Provincial government 74%
National government 72%
Local government 66%
U.S. 27%

Who did you trust to protect you? – October 2008
Army 85%
Police 81%
Provincial government 68%
National government 66%
Local government 64%
U.S. 26%
Armed groups 12%
Militias 12%

The Pentagon’s April 2009 survey had roughly the same results as a poll conducted by the international news agencies the BBC, ABC, and Japan’s NHK from March 2009. Both groups found an overwhelming majority of Iraqis felt safe and secure in their neighborhoods, but had questions about the situation in the rest of the country. Respondents in both surveys also said they had confidence in the Iraqi security forces to do their jobs, and felt that they were winning. Both of these polls were taken before the recent wave of bombings however. While overall deaths have gone up and down, the constant attacks and publicity take a psychological toll and could change perceptions. Those create reality for people, and could change opinions about the security situation. If it does, the first victim could be Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is running in the 2010 parliamentary election on the claim that he has brought security and stability to Iraq.

SOURCES

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008

Obama Administration Needs A Real Iraq Strategy

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies is one of the leading military analysts on Iraq. Every month he authors a few reports on the subject, and at the end of July issued a short paper on the short-comings of the Obama administration called “Iraq: A Time To Stay? The US Needs an Exit Strategy, Not Just an Exit.” Cordesman thinks the Obama White House is solely focused upon withdrawing, and isn’t adequately planning for a long-term Iraq policy afterward.

June 30, 2009 was the beginning of the American pull out of Iraq. That was when U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq’s cities. Until today’s slew of bombings in Baghdad, things were going better than expected. What will come next is Cordesman’s main concern. The U.S. needs to leave behind a stable Iraq that can defend itself. There are still some major barriers to overcome before this can happen. Those are continued development of the Iraqi security forces, the Arab-Kurd divide, political divisions, fighting insurgents and Special Groups, and the development of Iraq’s economy. Cordesman believes that the Obama White House will fail if it doesn’t adequately manage this situation properly. They have to come up with a sustainable strategy for Iraq that switches emphasis from a military led effort to a civilian one.

There are several policies Cordesman suggests that could help with this process. First, American trainers need to remain in Iraq for the long-term until the Iraqi forces are self-sufficient. Second, the U.S. needs to work with the United Nations to try to moderate the Arab-Kurdish disputes, something that could take years to resolve. Aid needs to be sustained, and used strategically to push for reforms in the Iraqi government and economy, as well as alleviate differences. Fourth, Iraq’s economy needs serious investment and reform. The U.S. could help by providing business models for Iraq’s oil and agriculture sectors, as well as getting an investment law passed in parliament. Last, the White House needs to prepare the Congress and the American public for a lasting relationship with Iraq so that these policies can be implemented.

Cordesman’s sees some planning going on in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for this change, but none in Washington. According to him, this is mostly happening on the military side in Iraq. The civilian agencies in comparison are caught up in short-term goals such as finishing on-going projects instead of planning for the future. In the U.S. Cordesman sees no leadership by the Obama administration on Iraq. This seems like a strong call for action, but one that may not be heeded. According to members of the Tamim provincial council, when Vice President Joe Biden talked to them this year, he told them that development aid was coming to an end since the U.S. had such a large deficit. There are plans to cut the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that work in each province by more than half. While administration officials are talking about the need to mediate the Arab-Kurd dispute and Kirkuk, there is no strong push by the U.S. to actually do something. Whenever a U.S. role is mentioned, it appears to be going on quietly behind closed doors, when this needs to be a major policy push before U.S. forces are out and America’s influence fades even more. The Americans are not the solution to everything, but they can definitely help in selected areas like governance, development, security, and the Baghdad-Kurdistan dispute. With domestic issues taking a precedence, and emphasis switching to Afghanistan in foreign affairs, the Obama administration may not have the time, focus or patience to deal with Iraq adequately. The White House talks about Iraq every now and then, but actual action seems lacking.

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: A Time To Stay?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/30/09

Dagher, Sam, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” New York Times, 8/19/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Political Parties Playing Into The Hands Of Insurgent Attacks

Ninewa province and its districts

The recent mass casualty bombings in Ninewa have only added to the on-going dispute between the ruling al-Hadbaa party and the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List to the point that the U.S. is offering extra troops to help patrol the province. On August 7, 2009 there was a bombing of a Turkmen Shiite mosque in the provincial capital Mosul that killed 38 and wounded 140. On August 10, two truck bombs leveled the town of Khazna, ten miles east of Mosul killing 28 Shabaks and wounding 155. Finally, on August 13 a suicide bomber detonated his device in a café in Sinjar in western Ninewa killing 20 Yazidis and wounding 35.

Ninewa’s minorities have often been caught in the middle of the battle for control between Arabs and Kurds, so it was no surprise when Al Hadbaa and the Kurdish List used the bombings to attack each other. A senior Kurdish politician in Mosul said al-Hadbaa was directly involved in the violence, and that Arabs were trying to ethnically cleanse the Kurds from the province. The Kurdistan Regional Government went farther saying al-Hadbaa was responsible for the deaths of over 2,000 Kurds and the displacement of both Kurds and Christians. Governor Atheel al-Najafi replied by saying that the bloodshed benefited the Kurds because it justified the continued presence of their peshmerga in the province. The al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council also said the Iraqi army and police should take over security for the entire province and replace the Kurdish forces, an idea rejected by the Kurdish List.

The situation has grown so tense that the U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno has proposed increasing the U.S. troop presence in Ninewa. He has recently met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani about creating joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish patrols in the disputed areas of the province. The general said that Al Qaeda in Iraq is exploiting the political differences to carry out their attacks and sow dissension. The U.S. has tried similar things in Tamim province, but has only been successful in the Kirkuk area. While this tactic might improve security, it would only be a band-aid on a growing wound.

What is needed is some kind of power-sharing agreement between al-Hadbaa and the Fraternal List, but they seem intractable. In June 2009, the Sadrists in parliament sent a delegation to Ninewa to try to negotiate between the two sides, but failed. More recently, the Iraqi Islamic Party gave it a go, but neither side was willing to compromise. The United States is now working on the issue behind the scenes.

In the meantime, the inflammatory rhetoric continues, and 16 of Ninewa’s 37 administrative units, which are majority Kurdish, are boycotting the provincial government and threatening to create their own independent administration. The insurgent attacks were meant to incite just such responses, and the two political lists in Ninewa seem to be intent on accommodating them.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “KRG blames Hadbaa for murder of Kurds, displacement of Christians in Mosul,” 8/14/09
- “Kurdish list says Ninewa to see serious escalation if govt. fails to intervene,” 8/15/09
- “Sinjar suicide blast casualties up to 55,” 8/13/09

Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Kurds in troubled Iraqi province threaten to secede,” Reuters, 7/19/09
- “Qaeda stronger as blasts feed Iraqi Kurd-Arab feud,” Reuters, 8/16/09

Dagher, Sam, “Minorities Trapped in Northern Iraq’s Maelstrom,” New York Times, 8/16/09
- “Sectarian Bombings Pulverize a Village in Iraq,” New York Times, 8/11/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Wed: A Wounded Country,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/23/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Shiite Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09

Reuters, “Iraq bombs kill 50, mostly Shi’ites targeted,” 8/7/09

Shadid, Anthony, “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Moves To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, 7/27/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraq attacks raise fears of renewed ethnic tensions,” Los Angeles Times, 8/11/09

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, "Iraq Report - 2008," December 2008

Casualties From Bombings In August Already Exceeds July’s Totals

The toll from bombings in Iraq continues to increase. The number of casualties from such attacks half way through August 2009 has already passed the total from July 2009. In that latter month there were a total of 35 mass casualty bombings that resulted in at least ten dead or wounded. 180 were killed and 655 wounded in July, averaging out to 5.8 killed per day and 21.2 wounded. From August 1 to 18 there have been 23 such bombings in Iraq causing 182 deaths, an average of 10.1 per day, and 677 wounded, 37.6 per day. There is not a direct correlation between the number of attacks and overall casualties in Iraq however. In June 2009 for example, there were 14 mass casualty bombings compared to the 35 in July, yet June had more deaths. May only had five fewer attacks than June, but recorded the lowest death figures since the U.S. invasion. The U.S. military has only reported a slight increase in the overall number of security incidents in Iraq, going from an average of 323.0 per month from January to March to 396.7 from April to July, and deaths have fluctuated up and down since the beginning of the year. What is unquantifiable at the moment is the feelings and perceptions of the Iraqi people. The constant reports of attacks could change people’s moods about the security situation in Iraq, and play into the hands of insurgents who are attempting to undermine the current status quo.

Mass Casualty Bombings In Iraq May to August 18, 2009

May 2009
Bombings: 9
Deaths: 111
Wounded: 262

June 2009
Bombings: 14
Deaths: 174
Wounded: 517

July 2009
Bombings: 35
Deaths: 180
Wounded: 655

August 1-18, 2009
Bombings: 23
Deaths: 182
Wounded: 677

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Car bomb kills 20 outside Shiite mosque in Iraq,” 8/7/09

Ahmed, Hamid, “String of bombings kill at least 43 in Iraq,” Associated Press, 8/10/09

Associated Press, “Bombs kill at least 8 at Iraqi market,” 8/17/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kirkuk bomb casualties rise to 32,” 8/6/09
- “Toll from Falluja car bombing increases to 23,” 8/3/09
- “URGENT/2 killed, 26 wounded in 2 blasts in Babel,” 8/3/09

Al-Badrani, Jamal, “Bombs targeting Shi’ite Muslims kill 44 in Iraq,” Reuters, 8/7/09

Gamel, Kim, “Double bombing kills more than 20,” Associated Press, 8/14/09

Hammoudi, Laith and Ashton, Adam, “Bombings kill dozens in Baghdad and northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/10/09

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq –Friday 7 August, 2009,” 8/7/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq –Monday 10 August, 2009,” 8/10/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq –Monday 17 August, 2009,” 8/17/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Explosions in Iraq Leave at Least 36 Dead,” Washington Post, 8/7/09

Middle East Online, “Five police killed in Iraq bombing,” 8/5/09

Monsters & Critics, “Cab bomb kills at least seven, wounds 20, in Iraqi market,” 8/2/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 7,” 8/7/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Aug 10,” 8/10/09

Santora, Marc, “Blasts Kill 21 at a Café n North Iraq,” New York Times, 8/13/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, - "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/09
-"Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 7/30/09

Xinhua, “Eight killed in Iraq car bomb attacks,” 8/12/09
- “Suicide bomber kills 2 security members in W Iraq,” 8/15/09
- “Suicide car bomb kills three in western Iraq,” 8/3/09

Maliki Wants Referendum On SOFA In January 2010

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s cabinet submitted a draft law to parliament calling for a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to coincide with the January 2010 parliamentary election. The SOFA was originally passed in November 2008 by the Iraqi parliament. Alongside it was a second law, the Political Reform Document, which also called for power sharing in the government and security forces, and a referendum on the SOFA by July 2009. The Reform Document was pushed by the Iraqi Accordance Front, and was the only concession they were able to get from the negotiations over the SOFA. It was not binding however, which was why the referendum was not held on time, and there has been no change in the administration or army and police. There was also no one advocating for the referendum from within the parliament, Maliki’s cabinet, or the United States.

Now Maliki is on the campaign trail, and is portraying himself as the leader that got the Americans to leave Iraq. Maliki for example, called the June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities a national holiday and a great victory. If the Iraqi public votes the SOFA down in January, which American officials seem to believe will happen, the U.S. will have one year to withdraw its forces. As the policy now stands, the Obama administration plans to accomplish that by December 31, 2011. In pushing for the referendum, Maliki needs to balance the continued need for U.S. support with his desire for a nationalist image. He appears to be going for the route that will assure him the most votes.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Sunni Arab support key to US-Iraq security deal,” Associated Press, 11/25/08

Ashton, Adam, Landay, Jonathan and Youssef, Nancy, “U.S. staying silent on its view of Iraq pact until after vote,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/26/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi govt. allocates $100 million for referendum on security agreement,” 6/9/09

Domergue, Jeremy and Cochrane, Marisa, “Balancing Maliki,” Institute for Understanding War, June 2009

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraq May Hold Vote On U.S. Withdrawal,” Washington Post, 8/18/09

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Tragedy Near Kirkuk,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/21/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraq Marks Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Cities,” New York Times, 6/30/09

Rubin, Alissa, Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Iraqi Parliament Approves U.S. Security Pact,” New York Times, 11/27/08

Critique Of Mayor’s Warning of Politicization Of Iraq’s Security Forces

In July 2009 the former mayor of Tel Afar in Ninewa Najim Abed al-Jabouri authored a paper for the National Defense University warning of sectarianism and political influence in the Iraqi Security Forces. The report, “An Iraqi ISF Assessment after U.S. Troop Withdrawal” warned that the U.S. must protect the security forces from Iraq’s political parties before it withdraws in 2011 or face a possible civil war. While touching on an important issue, there are some major problems with Jabouri’s argument.

Jabouri starts off by saying that many American officials have warned about politicization of the security forces. He notes General James Jones’ report on Iraq’s forces, General Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and the Defense Department’s quarterly reports to Congress, have all mentioned political meddling in Iraq’s army, police, and Interior and Defense Ministries. This is the first issue with the paper. General Jones’ report from September 2007 mentioned that the Iraqi police were open to political influence because they were locally recruited and thus under local political leaders’ sway. It also talked about the sectarian nature of the Interior Ministry and the lack of top leadership. At the same time it found that the Defense Minister was independent of politics. Later in the paper Jabouri actually seems to admit this by saying that the Iraqi Army is less influenced by politics as the police because the U.S. has spent much more time training and mentoring the armed forces. Newer reports like one by the United States Institute of Peace from August 2009 has found that Interior Minister Jawad Bolani has successfully instituted a series of reforms of the ministry, and cleaned up a lot of the previous problems. A further issue is that the two quotes used, one by General Odierno and one by the Defense Department, mentioned politics and sectarianism were still problems in Iraq in general, but never mentioned the security forces. That’s not to say that Jabouri’s thoughts are off, but the examples he gives don’t quite support his point.

Next Jabouri goes over Iraqi concerns about their forces. According to him Iraq assessments see problems with political meddling, lack of professionalism and training, and logistics and organization as the major issues facing the army and police. He gives examples of political influence over the army by saying the 8th Division is under the influence of the Dawa party, the 4th Division under the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the 7th Division under the Anbar Awakening, and the 5th Division under the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC). Here Jabouri does a much better job. In Anbar for example, almost all of the soldiers and police were recruited from the Awakening tribes. During the standoff between the Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in the Khanaqin district of Diyala in August 2008, a Kurdish led Brigade in the province refused to take orders from Baghdad, while another commander and 200 of his soldiers in Ninewa quit and marched back to Irbil. Maliki has also tried to centralize control of the Army divisions by placing his supporters in command positions. There is definitely political influence in the security forces; the question is to what extent.

Jabouri is afraid with U.S. forces withdrawing, the different sectarian parties will launch attacks to try to undermine the security situation and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s standing, which could have wide ranging affects upon the country. If the security forces are not able to deal with the violence, then Iraqis might look to other groups like militias or insurgents for protection. He’s also afraid that this could escalate into civil war, where the security forces will loose its national character and become solely beholden to each one of the ruling parties. Jabouri writes that the attacks will seek to test the security forces’ strengths and weaknesses. Yet if they are already under the control of the political parties as he argues, wouldn’t they already know the capabilities of the security forces? A second problem is why would the political parties escalate these attacks into an open armed conflict with each other? What event could be the cause of this breakdown? All of the parties are planning for the 2010 parliamentary elections, and are trying to figure out whether to oppose or support Maliki. While Iraqis are increasingly blaming political actors for the increase in bombings lately, there have been no retaliations for the attacks, and people are demanding more from their security forces instead. Things could obviously change after the balloting or some event could spiral out of control, but for now the status quo is based upon political, not armed struggle.

Jabouri writes that there are six steps to reform the security forces. First is to have a renewed push for reconciliation and to support free elections. The Obama administration and U.S. military have been talking about both. Jabouri also says that former soldiers that are not getting any government support should be paid their pensions. This could help with reconciliation because many of the former soldiers are Sunnis, but this doesn’t seem like a way to keep the political parties’ hands off the security forces. Second, corrupt officers should be removed and time limits should be set on officers, because many get their positions through political connections. Third, there are already laws on the books prohibiting political meddling. The judicial system and media could play a role here as well enforcing the laws and exposing backroom deals. The Prime Minister is one of the main actors trying to strengthen his control over the security forces however, and it may be hard to determine which of his actions are legitimate and which are not. Fourth, Army battalions should be moved around the country to break the hold the local ruling party has over them. He cites the example of Maliki’s deployment of army units to northern Iraq, and his attempt to lesson the Kurdish influence in those forces. The problem is that this was a political move by the Prime Minister, just the type of action that Jabouri is seemingly writing against. Fifth, conscription should be brought back so that the armed forces are truly national in character. On the other hand, Jabouri’s last suggestion is to reduce the Interior Ministry’s forces because they are too large, and the most open to political influence.

Finally the paper has four steps for the U.S. to take to achieve these goals. First the U.S. needs to be forceful with Iraqi leaders to make sure that they get the message that America wants to fix these problems before it leaves. Second, Iraq’s neighbors need to be brought into the process. All of the countries that Jabouri mentions however are Sunni ones. Why would the Shiite or Kurdish parties listen to them? They have little influence in Iraq right now. Third, the U.S. needs to use its media assets to increase transparency within the security forces and ministries. Last, the Iraqi Army needs to turn to national security, which will them a goal that is less political than internal defense

Jabouri writes about an important issue. There are undoubtedly political influences in the Iraqi forces, especially the local police. The U.S. is also loosing influence every month as they plan for their withdrawal. At the same time, Jabouri brings up many issues that are not relevant to his point like using quotes by American officials that don’t mention the security forces, arguing that Sunni Arab countries could influence Iraq’s political parties, and saying that Maliki’s use of the armed forces to pressure the Kurds is an example of lessoning political influence. More importantly, he warns over and over of a civil war, yet Iraq’s problems are being largely dealt with on the political field today. There is a real possibility of an armed clash between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga that everyone is talking about. Other than that though, all of the major disputes are over Maliki’s growing power, not sectarian divisions. In fact, opposition to Maliki unites a wide swath of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish parties. That being said, many of the paper’s suggestions for solving the problem of politicization are good such as moving Iraqi units around, which is already done to some extent. That should be mixed with a rotation of officers rather than term limits, something the armed forces are unlikely to adopt. The real problem could be stopping the Prime Minister from naming commanders, as that would be extremely hard to prove as a political move rather than just an exercise of his executive power. Overall, Jabouri could’ve done a lot better with a more focused argument and better analysis to prove his point.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “Arabs-Kurd Tensions Could Threaten Iraq’s Peace,” Time, 3/24/09

Amos, Deborah, “Ethnic, Sectarian Discord Threaten Iraq Security Gains,” All Things Considered, NPR, 8/13/09

Ashton, Adam and Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis remaining cool despite attacks on mosques, minorities,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/14/09

Cordesman, Anthony Mausner, Adam, “Withdrawal from Iraq, Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2009

Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed, “An Iraqi ISF Assessment after U.S. Troop Withdrawal,” Strategic Forum, July 2009

Jones, General James, “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 9/6/07

Paley, Amit, “Uncertainty After Anbar Handover,” Washington Post, 9/2/08

Perito, Robert and Kristoff, Madeline, “Iraq’s Interior Ministry,” United States Institute of Peace, August 2009

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

National Census Cancelled

As reported before, Iraq was set for a national census on October 24, 2009, the first since 1987. That has now been indefinitely postponed because of fears that it will create more tensions in Tamim and Ninewa provinces. The Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology said they proposed holding the census after the January 2010 parliamentary elections in either April or October. It is now up to the cabinet to decide whether the country will go ahead with the census or not. The survey was especially important for Tamim, the home of Kirkuk since it has had no provincial elections, partly over disputes over the voter rolls. Article 140 of the constitution also called for a census before a referendum could be held on the future of Kirkuk.

SOURCES

Reuters, “Citing Tensions, Iraq Abandons Census Plans,” 8/16/09

Could The U.S. Have Done Better In Iraq?

In the October 2008 issue of the journal Security Studies, Daniel Byman of Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution, asked the question could the U.S. have done better with post-war Iraq? The article was entitled, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. didn’t have enough international support going into the war, didn’t commit enough troops, didn’t expect an insurgency, and then made bad policy choices like disbanding the Iraqi army. That was too many mistakes to be successful. The question then is if the U.S. made better decisions would post-war Iraq have turned out differently? Byman’s answer is no. There were too many structural barriers that limited choices to make things decidedly different immediately after the 2003 invasion.

Even before U.S. forces entered Iraq in March 2003, Byman believes the Bush administration faced three structural impediments to creating a stable Iraq. First, the U.S. knew little about the country. For example, when the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, the first civilian group put in charge of post-war Iraq was making plans to run Iraq’s ministries, it didn’t even know how many there were. In light of facts about Iraq, Washington instead relied upon a best-case scenario for what the nation would be like after the war, which was that the U.S. would be greeted as liberators, the Iraqi government would still be up and running, reconstruction would be limited and paid for by Iraqi oil, democracy would sprout, and American forces would be out in a number of weeks. Second, many of these ideas of what Iraq would be like came from Iraqi exiles that were actively lobbying the administration for regime change. The liberators scenario for example came after three Iraqi exiles met with President Bush at the White House. This skewed America’s vision of the situation in Iraq, and what the likely outcomes of an invasion would be like. Finally, the U.S. lacked the resources and staff to conduct nation building. As Professor William Olson of the National Defense University recently wrote in an article for Small Wars Journal, the U.S. spent fifty years fighting the Cold War, which privileged spending on the Pentagon and the military over the civilian agencies of the U.S. government like the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Pentagon was thus given control of post-war Iraq because the State Department couldn’t handle the job even if it wanted to. The Defense Department however didn’t have the expertise or personnel either to take on what the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has called the largest rebuilding project in American history. These three issues greatly limited the choices the U.S. could make before and after the war, and put the administration in a hole before it even entered Iraq.

To make the situation worse, the U.S. made several pre-war policy mistakes. First, the U.S. did not adequately plan for post-war Iraq. As reported before, the White House usually had at least two different organizations strategizing for Iraq after the invasion completely independently, and usually with no knowledge of what the other was doing. That meant there was no comprehensive or unified plan for what to do with Iraq. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice tried to coordinate this planning phase, but failed. The best-case view promulgated by the White House also meant that the various agencies tasked with thinking about post-war Iraq never really thought about serious contingencies. There were also some in the administration that didn’t want any detailed post-war planning because they thought it would cause political problems in convincing the country to go to war. Second, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld micromanaged the military planning, and whittled down the invasion force to match his plans for transforming the U.S. armed forces. That meant there were enough troops to overthrow Saddam, but not enough to deal with the country afterward. Third, the U.S. military had also rejected counterinsurgency strategy since the Vietnam war, which made them unprepared for the insurgency that quickly sprouted after the fall of the government. Byman doesn’t believe any of these choices were inevitable. The military for example is known for its in-depth planning, yet failed to do that with post-war Iraq. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki famously warned that Iraq would take several hundred thousand troops to run the country, but was ignored by policy makers. The U.S. thus set itself even farther back in dealing with the eventual occupation of Iraq through these decisions.

There were also structural barriers within Iraq. Most importantly, Iraq was a devastated country. In the 1970s it was a middle class and developing nation, but the costs of the Iran-Iraq War and the sanctions imposed after the Gulf War destroyed all that. The United Nations estimated that the standard of living dropped 2/3 from 1988 to 1995 as a result. Many political scientists believe that a middle class is necessary to support democracy, so any attempt by the U.S. to build one would be constrained by this factor. Second, occupations often create backlashes, and the American presence in Iraq caused resentment by both Sunnis and Shiites, some of which took up arms against the U.S. as a result. Third, Saddam’s divide and conquer policies created deep ethnosectarian divisions in Iraqi society, which would explode after the invasion. The fact that the U.S. knew nothing about these issues, and didn’t want to plan for them anyway because it expected everything to go well after the war, had devastating effects upon the country and the U.S. occupation.

As if these barriers within America and Iraq, and poor pre-war choices weren’t enough, the U.S. made more mistakes after the invasion. First, Paul Bremer decided to disband the Iraqi Army leaving thousands of angry and out of work ex-soldiers. Second, Bremer also set up a deBaathification program that went too deep and caused resentment amongst Sunnis. Third, the U.S. didn’t stop the looting, which cost millions of dollars in damages, slowed the administration of Iraq, and made the Americans look powerless. Fourth, the U.S. went back and forth on Iraq’s political future causing confusion and anger. Fifth, the Coalition Provisional Authority implemented a privatization and free trade policy, which failed at turning Iraq into a capitalist country, but did put many Iraqi enterprises out of business, and added to the unemployment problem. Sixth, the U.S. military refused to acknowledge and adapt to the insurgency. Seventh, reconstruction went slowly due to the post-war chaos and lack of security, which caused growing anti-Americanism amongst Iraqis. Eighth, the Coalition Provisional Authority lacked a trained and stable staff. Ninth the U.S. occupation lacked unity of command with Bremer and General Ricardo Sanchez both claiming authority over Iraq, and neither cooperating or liking each other. Finally, the military rotated units in and out of Iraq, which meant a loss of knowledge and local contacts each time a new set of troops replaced an old one. Again, policy makers had various alternative policies they could have pursued, and were often warned about the decisions they did make.

Byman believes the U.S. didn’t follow Sun Tzu’s axiom, “Know they self, know they enemy” when it went it decided to go to war. The U.S. knew next to nothing about Iraq, and didn’t understand the limits of the U.S. government’s capabilities either. That created too many structural barriers, which severely constrained the options open to the administration. To add to that the U.S. made bad choices again and again before and after the invasion. Byman believes that even if the U.S. had made some different decisions it would’ve only marginally improved the situation. For example, if the U.S. had sent more troops that didn’t mean they would’ve dealt with the looting or suddenly adopted counterinsurgency tactics. The results as everyone knows, were a burgeoning guerrilla war, the rise of Shiite militias, political fragmentation, sectarianism, mass unemployment, crime, and the growth of Iranian influence. Iraq quickly turned into a failed state as a result. The U.S. has been trying to make up for many of these mistakes since then. For all of these reasons Byman does not think post-war Iraq could’ve turned out any better.

SOURCES

Byman, Daniel, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies, October 2008

Collins, Joseph, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008

Elliott, Michael, “So, What Went Wrong?” Time, 10/6/03

Fineman, Mark, Wright, Robin, and McManus, Doyle, “Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace,” Los Angeles Times, 7/18/03

Government of Iraq, “Iraq National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008,” 12/31/08

Gordon, Michael, “Army Buried Study Faulting Iraq Planning,” New York Times, 2/11/08

McGeary, Johanna, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time, 3/10/03

Olson, Dr. William, “Mistakes Were Made, How Not to Conduct Post-Conflict Management and Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 7/17/09

Parker, George, Assassins’ Gate, 2005

PBS Frontline, “INTERVIEWS Karen DeYoung,” Bush’s War, 3/24/08

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Thompson, Mark and Duffy, Michael, “Pentagon Warlord,” Time, 1/19/03

Rice: We Didn’t Know How Bad Iraq’s Infrastructure Was Because Baghdad Looked So Modern

One of the major problems for the United States before the invasion was the complete lack of knowledge the administration had about Iraq. This was summed up perfectly in an interview with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on NBC’s Meet The Press on September 28, 2003. She said the U.S. didn’t know about the devastation of Iraq’s society because Baghdad looked so good. She told Tim Russert, “We did not have perfect foresight into what we were going to find in Iraq. The fact of the matter is that this deteriorated infrastructure, one that was completely covered and covered over by the gleaming picture of Baghdad that made it look like a first-world city.” It seems that Rice looked towards TV and pictures as her main source of information on Iraq, because there were several studies done beforehand by think tanks and experts on the problems with Iraq’s services and infrastructure, and the United Nations had a wealth of information as well. In December 2002 for example, the Council on Foreign Relations and the James Baker Institute at Rice University estimated that it would cost $20 billion to restore Iraq’s power system to its 1990s level, and $30-$40 billion to restore the oil industry. A 2002 U.N. report said that Iraq’s electrical network wasn’t meeting demand because of a lack of spare parts and maintenance. A military war college professor also briefed administration officials on the power system saying that it was likely to fall apart even if it wasn’t attacked during the war. None of this was considered because the White House believed in a best-case scenario for post-war Iraq where its ministries and services would all be up and running the day after the war ended. $24.42 billion later in U.S. reconstruction funds and Iraq’s services are still a mess.

SOURCES

Elliott, Michael, “So, What Went Wrong?” Time, 10/6/03

Fineman, Mark, Wright, Robin, and McManus, Doyle, “Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace,” Los Angeles Times, 7/18/03

Meet The Press, “Transcript for Sep. 28 GUESTS: Dr. Condoleeza Rice, national security adviser Rep. Dick Gephardt, (D-Mo.), Democratic presidential candidate Tim Russert,” moderator,” NBC News, 9/28/03

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Iraqi Oil Would Pay For Reconstruction

One of the arguments made by the Bush administration before the invasion was that most of the reconstruction costs after the war would be paid for by Iraq itself. Almost all of the top White House officials said that Iraq was an oil rich country that could easily cover its own rebuilding. In September 2002 for example, President Bush’s economic adviser Larry Lindsey predicted that Iraq would be producing 3-5 million barrels a day after the invasion. In March 2003 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told Congress that Iraq would earn $50-$100 billion in oil in the first two to three years after the invasion. Neither Lindsey nor Wolfowitz had any idea what poor condition Iraq’s oil industry was in at the time.

As it turned out, Iraq never came close to meeting either of those predictions. In May 2003 Iraq exported no oil, followed by 200,000 barrels in June, 322,000 barrels in July, and 646,000 in August. Iraq finally broke the one million barrels a month mark in October 2003. In July 2009 it reached its highest export level since the invasion, 2.037 million barrels per day.

One major problem with Iraq’s exports was that its oil pipelines became an immediate target for the insurgency. In August 2003 there was the first of many major disruptions when the northern pipeline was shut down due to an attack. This would happen over and over again for years until the U.S. was able to build and fund a security network to protect the lines.

Iraq’s oil revenues also never met those early statements by administration officials. By the end of 2003 Iraq only earned $200,000 from its petroleum. In 2004 it earned $8.1 billion. By 2005 when Wolfowitz had predicted Iraq would’ve earned $50-$100 billion, Iraq had only made $18.6 billion. In total, from May 2003 to June 2009 Iraq’s crude has brought in $99.3 billion. Iraq’s Oil Minister believes that the petroleum industry needs $75 billion to be rebuilt, and meet its potential.

Iraq Post-Invasion Oil Exports - 2003
May 0.0
June 0.2 mil/bar/day
July 0.322 mil/bar/day
Aug. 0.646 mil/bar/day
Sep. 0.983 mil/bar/day
Oct. 1.149 mil/bar/day
Nov. 1.524 mil/bar/day
Dec. 1.541 mil/bar/day

Iraq’s Oil Revenues 2003-June 2009
2003 $0.2 bil
2004 $8.1 bil
2005 $10.3 bil
2006 $15.2 bil
2007 $15.4 bil
2008 $35.5 bil
Jan.-June 2009 $14.6 bil
TOTAL: $99.3 bil

SOURCES

Kher, Unmesh, “3 Flawed Assumptions About Postwar Iraq,” Time, 9/22/03

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 7/16/09

Observer, “Carve-up of oil riches begins,” 11/3/02

Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq’s oil exports rise to 2.037 mln bpd in July,” 8/2/09

Sanders, Edmund and Kraul, Chris, “Iraqi oil flow halted for a week by attack,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/17/03

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Only 3 of 13 Reconstruction Contracts Were Signed Before War

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) was a last minute addition to the already chaotic post-war planning within the Bush Administration. Donald Rumsfeld decided he wanted control over the process so he ordered the creation of the ORHA. They only had 56 days before the invasion to get a staff together, go through strategies, and create a plan for Iraq. Many thought it was a mission impossible because of the lack of time. Retired General Jay Garner didn’t seem to think so in an October 2003 interview with PBS’ Frontline, but he did say that the rushed time frame they were working under meant that only three of the thirteen planned reconstruction contracts were signed before the war. The largest deal was with Bechtel for $1.03 billion to work on everything from electricity to water, to airports to telephones to transportation. That wasn’t finalized until April 17, 2003, its personnel didn’t enter Iraq until May, and then it was asked to do an assessment of Iraq's infrastructure before any real work started in September. Many of the ten other ORHA contracts weren’t singed until May and took 30-70 days to become operational. Garner said it would’ve been better to have all these deals done beforehand and have the contractors go in immediately after the war was over, but that was not possible because the ORHA was set up so late in the game. He also mentioned that the Bush administration didn’t want to sign any major deals because it had not publicly said that it was going to war yet, and that would’ve created a public relations problem.

After the war many of Iraq’s services, especially in the capital collapsed. That was one of the major early complaints about the U.S. occupation, and the fact that so many contracts were not even signed meant there was a long delay before any work even started on Iraq’s infrastructure. This was one of many examples of how the White House did not adequately plan for the post-war situation. The military side was the priority, and the aftermath was not considered a big deal since the administration believed in a best-case scenario.

SOURCES

Baker, David, “Bechtel under siege,” San Francisco Chronicle, 9/21/03

PBS Frontline, “Interview Gen. Jay Garner,” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Not So Fast On A New United Iraqi Alliance

As reported before, the major Shiite parties including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa party, with ample support from Iran, have agreed in principle to reform the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The UIA was the major vote getter in the 2005 elections, but has since broken apart. The announcement of the new UIA line-up has been delayed several times, most recently August 13, 2009. Officially, members of the Dawa party say there are three holds ups. First, Dawa is asking for more parties to be added to the list. Second, Members of the UIA want it to be a Shiite coalition first and foremost, while Dawa disagrees. Last, there is a debate about how parliamentary seats will be awarded within the alliance. The real reason, as always is what role Prime Minister Maliki will play.

Maliki’s greatest desire is to maintain his position as prime minister, which is why he agreed to rejoin the UIA after forming his own State of Law List for the 2009 provincial elections. According to Nibras Kazimi of the Hudson Institute, Maliki wants to be assured that he will be the only UIA candidate for prime minister. The problem is the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) only want to ride Maliki’s coattails back into power and then drop him. There are rumors that Interior Minister Jawad Bolani of the Constitution Party may be an alternative candidate within the alliance to Maliki. His other possible rival, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the SIIC, has been politically wounded by members of his security detail robbing the Rafidain Bank, one of the three largest in the country. Bolani and Mahdi are also political rivals, and the Interior Minister has been trying to take credit for the arrests, while implicating the Vice President. Maliki has joined the fray as well saying that Mahdi’s office has turned over the stolen money, but not the guards involved in the heist.

If Maliki does not get the nod for prime minister from the UIA, he is threatening to run alone. Sheikh Abu Risha of the Anbar Awakening has consistently said that he wants to run with Maliki in 2010. Maliki also recently gave a speech in Anbar to tribal sheikhs where he praised their work, called for Iraqi nationalism, and an end to sectarian politics. Other possible allies mentioned are Sheikh Ahmad Abdul Ghafoor Samarraei who runs a series of Sunni mosques, and parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, who Maliki courted after the 2009 elections. Running with independent Sunnis like these would fit Maliki’s rhetoric of forming a truly nationalist and cross-sectarian alliance, something he promised after the provincial elections but failed to follow through on.

Either way Maliki decides to go he may have found himself caught in a Catch-22. If he runs with the United Iraqi Alliance he will be taking a step backwards in Iraqi politics, and will be accused of returning to sectarianism after promoting nationalism. On the other hand, if he chooses to run his own list, and brings in Sunnis he will be accused of collaborating with Baathists, something that still resonates with the Shiite public. The Prime Minister actually tried to reach out to former regime elements after the provincial elections, but was forced to back off because of constant attacks of trying to bring back the Baath party. Maliki’s negotiations also show that his ultimate goal is holding onto power, and he will use anything, nationalism, sectarianism, etc. to maintain his position.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Bank robbers not handed over yet Maliki says,” 8/11/09
- “Iraq’s new coalition on the agenda,” 8/13/09
- “New Unified Iraqi Coalition put off,” 8/8/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Baath should not be allowed in Iraq – Hakim,” 3/14/09
- “Sunni leader envisions alliance with Maliki in next polls,” 7/26/09

August, Oliver, “Iraq bank robbers were Vice-President’s security guards, police say,” Times of London, 8/3/09

Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09

Kazimi, Nibras, “Catching Up on Iraq Stuff,” Talisman Gate Blog, 8/13/09
- “Iraq: Rumors Swirl,” Hudson Institute, 8/6/09
- “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09

Parker, Ned, “Maliki remakes himself ahead of elections,” Los Angeles Times, 7/21/09

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq Shi’ite alliance may split, other allies eyed,” Reuters, 8/7/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki Under Pressure as He Visits DC,” Historiae.org, 7/21/09

Iraqi Oil Finally Meets Production And Price Goals Set In Budget

In July 2009 the Iraqi Oil Ministry announced that oil exports had finally reached the 2 million barrel a day mark set in the 2009 budget. In that month the Oil Ministry reported that it exported 2.03 million barrels a day, the largest amount since the U.S. invasion. That was up from June’s average of 1.92 million barrels. In July the average price of a barrel of Iraqi crude was between $60 to $61 dollars, which was a decrease from June when it went for $64.37. The 2009 budget originally called for a $50 a barrel price, which was finally met in May when Iraqi oil went for $57.16 a barrel. May was also the first month that Iraq brought in the $3 billion in oil revenue required in the budget. Despite these increases, Iraq is still facing a large budget deficit.

While Iraq’s exports are up in 2009, they are not at their highest post-war level, which was achieved in the first six months of 2008. Iraq’s overall exports in the 1st half of 2009 were up to 1.87 million barrels a day, compared to the last half of 2008 when Iraq exported an average of 1.75 million barrels a day. However, Iraq’s oil production has always gone up and down, so neither of those halves were as high as the first half of 2008 when Iraq averaged 1.93 million barrels a day.

Monthly Oil Production (mil/bar/day)

1st Half of 2008 Avg. 1.93
2008
July 1.85
Aug. 1.7
Sep. 1.65
Oct. 1.69
Nov. 1.88
Dec. 1.73
2nd Half of 2008 Avg. 1.75
2009
Jan. 1.89
Feb. 1.89
March 1.81
April 1.82
May 1.90
June 1.82
1st Half of 2009 Avg. 1.87
July 2.03

Baghdad responded to the increase in exports and revenue by presenting parliament with a supplemental budget of around $3 billion on July 19, 2009. The Finance Committee in parliament however, said that it had such a large deficit, that there was no reason to pass it. This was no surprise as the original budget is running a deficit already. If it called for $3 billion a month, then in the first six months Iraq needed to bring in $18 billion from oil, but only earned $11.13 billion.

To make up the difference, Baghdad was discussing a loan and hoping for bonuses from international companies investing in Iraq’s oil sector. The Finance Minister was discussing a $7 billion 2-year loan from the International Monetary Fund in May 2009. The amount went down to $5.5 billion over 5 years by June, until later in that month the Finance Minister said he had cancelled the deal hoping that increased exports would meet the country’s needs. That may turn out to be wishful thinking. Iraq was also hoping for an influx of cash from its first round of oil bidding in June 2008. The Oil Ministry asked for large up-front signing bonuses from the international oil companies, but after only one bid was accepted, that hoped for money is unlikely to materialize. As of July 2009 then, Iraq was expected to run a $16 bill deficit, the first since the 2003 invasion.

Iraq’s Monthly Oil Revenues – 2009
Jan. $2.15 bil
Feb. $1.7 bil
March $2.49 bil
April $2.69 bil
May $3.4 bil
June $3.17 bil

As reported before, the budget deficit has had wide ranging effects upon Iraq from a hiring freeze to holding up new development projects in the provinces. Iraq is almost completely dependent upon oil for its revenues, so the economy goes up and down with the price of crude. The government doesn’t plan for this, so when oil prices skyrocketed in 2008 it signed hundreds of development projects, hired new workers, and raised their pay. That has come back to bite them this year with the world recession as operational costs take up $45.9 billion of the $58.6 billion 2009 budget. The parliament was also either misled or didn’t take the time to ask the Finance Ministry or Central Bank, which hold Iraq’s sizeable surpluses whether they could use that money for the 2009 budget, because when they were drafting it they consistently said they would draw upon this reserve to make up the deficit, but after the budget was passed they were told they couldn’t touch that money. This seems like an extreme case of incompetence on the part of the Iraqi government. Even now when faced with a sizeable deficit, the cabinet still acted like this was a normal year and suggested a supplemental budget. Iraq is famous for lacking trained and competent bureaucrats because of the brain drain caused by the violence, and inexperienced politicians. The budget is a perfect example of both. It will probably take several years of trial and error like the last few years before Iraq’s government gets the hang of planning and managing its money. In the meantime, the country will suffer for it with inconsistent government spending, which is largely responsible for driving the economy and providing jobs.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq is considering a supplementary budget,” 6/25/09

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq, IMF near agreement on $5.5 bln standby deal,” Reuters, 6/16/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Finance ministry to sign new agreements with IMF,” 5/27/09
- “Increase in oil exports contributes to budget balance – ministry,” 6/2/09
- “Iraq’s oil exports reach $3.17m in June 2009,” 7/22/09
- “Supplementary budget shows deficit of ID3.9 trillion,” 7/29/09

DiPala, Anthony, “Iraq Oil Export Income Rose 8.2% to $2.69 Billion in April,” Bloomberg, 5/25/09

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports, revenue up,” Iraq Oil Report, 6/29/09

Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq’s oil exports rise to 2.037 mln bpd in July,” 8/2/09

Sly, Liz, “Economic downturn finally hits Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/11/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

Unemployment And Underemployment Numbers For Iraq

The new quarterly report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) includes the latest figures on Iraq’s unemployment and underemployment rates. The national averages were 17.3% unemployment and 29.4% underemployment. That compares to a United Nations survey conducted in January 2009 that found 18% of those questioned out of work and 10% underemployed. The SIGIR report shows that joblessness and lack of steady employment are spread throughout the different provinces of Iraq with no real regional patterns, while the U.N. survey pointed out that the young are the worst effected.

The SIGIR broke down employment numbers by province. Wasit, Irbil, Baghdad, Tamim, and Qadisiyah had the lowest unemployment rates ranging from 13.6% to 15.9%. Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Salahaddin, Dohuk, and Ninewa on the other hand with jobless rates going from 20.9% to 36.5% did the worst. The top and bottom five showed that there was no real connection between region and employment. Northern Iraq for example, had both one of the best labor markets in Tamim, and one of the worst in Ninewa. Kurdistan, which has a much more stable environment than the rest of Iraq had 14.5% unemployment in Irbil, but 21.6% in Dohuk. The same was true for southern Iraq with Wasit and Qadisiyah at the top, and Muthanna and Dhi Qar at the absolute bottom.

Unemployment by Province July 2009
Wasit 13.6%
Irbil 14.5%
Baghdad 14.5%
Tamim 15.7%
Qadisiyah 15.9%
Babil 15.9%
Sulaymaniya 16.0%
Maysan 17.3%
Anbar 17.4%
Najaf 18.6%
Basra 18.8%
Diyala 19.0%
Karbala 19.1%
Ninewa 20.9%
Dohuk 21.6%
Salahaddin 21.9%
Muthanna 30.5%
Dhi Qar 36.5%
National Avg. 17.3%

That order didn’t quite hold up for underemployment. Wasit with the lowest jobless rate in Iraq had the highest underemployment at 51.4%. Irbil however with the second best labor market also had the lowest underemployment with 18.1%, while Muthanna was in the bottom five in both categories. The three Kurdish provinces tended to do better with underemployment than the rest of the country, but otherwise the problem was evenly distributed across the other regions of Iraq.

Underemployment By Province July 2009
Irbil 18.1%
Sulaymaniya 21.1%
Najaf 21.1%
Basra 21.6%
Dohuk 23.2%
Dhi Qar 25.8%
Tamim 26.0%
Salahaddin 27.1%
Baghdad 27.3%
Qadisiyah 27.3%
Karbala 31.1%
Diyala 31.9%
Maysan 32.9%
Anbar 33.3%
Muthanna 33.5%
Ninewa 37.5%
Babil 40.9%
Wasit 51.4%
National Avg. 29.4%

What is another pressing issue is the fact that the United Nations found that young people were the most likely to be jobless in a society facing increasing demographic pressure from that exact group. The U.N. survey reported that men between the ages of 15-29 had a 28% unemployment rate. They made up 57% of all the unemployed in Iraq. 26% of all women were without a job. They were also only 17% of the labor market. The U.N. said one of the major causes of this was the fact that the government, which provided 43% of all the jobs in the country, 60% of full time work, and was the largest employer in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, preferred hiring older males. This in a society where 313,000 males turn 18 each year, and 38.8% of the population is 14 or under.

The overall employment situation would probably be even worse if the government hadn’t increased its hiring in recent years. Many state-run industries, for example have far more workers than needed. Reuters went to a power plant in Baghdad that was supposed to have 2,500 employees, but had hired 4,370. The Minister of Industry and Minerals in a July 27, 2009 interview said that because of this bloated work force, the average public employee only works two hours a day. This also distorts the labor market as everyone wants a government job because of its security, which means fewer people available for private business.

Iraq is still a state-run economy despite all the attempts by the Americans at reform. A whole range of structural and security issues hinders the private sector, and foreign investment, while increasing, is still very limited. All together that means that the government will play the determining factor in employment in the future. Unless the civil service diversifies its practices, that means an increasing jobless rate as more and more young people enter the labor market to no avail, which could lead to more unrest and greater dissatisfaction with Baghdad.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq investors face bloated workforce dilemma,” Reuters, 8/10/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

International Crisis Group Report On Baghdad-Kurdish Divide

In early July 2009 the International Crisis Group issued its latest report on Iraq covering the simmering Baghdad-Kurdish dispute entitled “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line.” This has been one of the biggest problems in Iraq over the last two years, and has replaced the sectarian war as the major dividing line in the country. The U.S. is especially worried that it might blow up and lead to new violence as the administration is trying to draw down forces. Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill, have all talked recently about this issue needing to be resolved. There may not be enough of a commitment on the part of Washington, Baghdad, and Kurdistan however to fix this problem anytime soon.

The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.

As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.

The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.

The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08

Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09

Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08

Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09

Centerpiece of Iraqi Army Maintenance System On Brink Of Failure

The new Defense Department quarterly report to Congress says that the Taji National Depot is the centerpiece of the maintenance and supply network for the Iraqi security forces. This is part of the American goal to make the Iraqi army and police self-sufficient so that they can carry out their own logistics and repair their own vehicles and equipment. The Pentagon claimed that the Iraqis have made progress at the tactical level in this field, but still need work at the strategic level. A recent memo by Col. Timothy Reese, the head of the U.S. advisory team in Baghdad stated that the Iraqi forces are institutionally incapable of becoming self-sufficient however. His opinion seems to be supported by two recent audits by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the latest of which dealt with the Taji Depot.

In December 2007, the U.S. military signed a $350 million contract to build and develop the Taji National Maintenance Depot within two years. It was one of the largest contracts given out under the money appropriated for the Iraqi security forces. The contractor was to build the facilities, install the equipment, train Iraqis how to use them, and then eventually turn it over to Iraqi control by the end of 2009. When completed the Taji Depot was to be the main repair facility for the Iraqi forces.

This contract ran into two major problems. First, poor work and lack of supplies meant that many pieces of equipment were not installed, and some areas were unsafe to work in. The U.S. military was in charge of all supply orders, but couldn’t make timely deliveries. Today, the Taji facility is still waiting for parts and equipment to arrive. The U.S. has also failed miserably in providing manuals for the Iraqi students. Of the 115 manuals required for Taji, only two had been translated into Arabic. This obviously led to delays in the training of Iraqis, and the contractor was found to have set overly optimistic goals for how many could complete their lessons in the set amount of time. The company created a plan where Iraqi soldiers would first go to basic training, then spend two weeks in vocational classes, get one week off, return for four weeks of basic maintenance, then go on leave again, to return for the final 26 week, non-stop course. The Iraqi ministries however, never showed any commitment to supply the necessary soldiers to go through training. First, not all the soldiers assigned to Taji had completed basic training, and those who hadn’t were routinely pulled out to complete that task. Second, Iraqis couldn’t stick to the training schedule, and would often leave early before completing their lessons. 46% were said to be absent at any time, and most Iraqis only completed 12-13 weeks of the final 26-week course. More importantly the Iraqi security forces never sent enough soldiers to begin with. The depot dealing with tracked vehicles for example, only had 179 assigned students in July 2009 when 556 were required, and of those sent there, 45 were in basic training. Overall the U.S. military reported that as of July 2009 Taji only had 62% of its assigned Iraqi soldiers. Due to troops going to basic training however, only 33% of those were ever actually at the Taji Depot. The ministries would also sometimes pull soldiers out of the training program so that they could be sent on regular security duties. The contractor ended up trying to work around these problems to finish training, but was largely unsuccessful.

The result is that the Taji Depot is barely able to carry out its assigned tasks of maintaining the Iraqi security forces’ equipment. The U.S. military set a low rate goal, which is the minimum number of jobs the Iraqi Army is supposed to perform to show that they are proficient and productive. SIGIR found that only the low rate goal for transmissions on wheeled vehicles had been met, but even that had problems. The goal was 30 and that was accomplished, but of those, only 7 were tested good. Taji had a low rate goal of 500 jobs on the AK-47 rifle and none had been accomplished. The same thing was true for another rifle type. The low rate goal for the Humvee was 30, but only one of those had been completed.

SIGIR does not believe that the Iraqis will be able to maintain the Taji Depot once it’s turned over to their control on December 31, 2009. The Depot requires 1,037 skilled workers, but only 771 students had graduated by May 31, 2009. Of those, many were ranked as only marginally skilled because they had not completed all their courses. If the Iraqi government wanted enough troops to meet this goal, they would’ve had to send them to Taji by May 21 to start training. That obviously did not happen. Two Iraqi army officials said that the Iraqi military was not involved when the Americans decided to create the Taji Depot. They said it took a year before the U.S. really included the Iraqis in the process. This is a problem noted here before in the general American reconstruction effort in Iraq where the U.S. came in and built what they wanted, without ever really asking the Iraqis what they needed. At the same time, this audit, and another earlier one in April 2009 found that there was no commitment by Iraq to create a self-sufficient security force. Whether it was for maintenance, supply, transportation, or health services, the Iraqis never sent enough troops to go through training, those that did show up often left, and none were held responsible for not finishing. Again, this is similar to the overall experience the U.S. has had with rebuilding Iraq. There are millions of dollars worth of projects in Iraq that Baghdad didn’t want, and are either unwilling or incapable of running. In the end, the SIGIR and U.S. military are committed to turning over Taji at the end of 2009 no matter what. Unless Washington or Baghdad hires a contractor to run it afterwards, that will mean the centerpiece of the Iraqi forces maintenance program will operate at such a low level as to be almost completely useless.

SOURCES

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

Reese, Col. Timothy, “It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home,” July 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Developing A Depot Maintenance Capability At Taji Hampered By Numerous Problems,” 7/30/09
- “Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems,” 4/26/09

VIDEO: Sons of Iraq in Samarra, Salahaddin Complain About Government Not Paying Them

Full Kurdish Election Results

The 2009 Kurdistan parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in the first real challenge to the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). While their Kurdistan List still came in first with 69.57% of the vote, parties that claimed to be reformers received 39.43%. While most of the smaller parties in this group didn't qualify for seats in the 111-member Kurdish parliament, the largest one, the Change List, will control just under one-quarter of the legislature. The major reason for their success is that many Kurds wanted a real opposition to try to force the KDP-PUK alliance to end its corruption, provide greater transparency, allow more dissenting opinions, and develop the region.

The competition between the Kurdistan List and the Change List was intense. The Change List claimed that their followers were being fired from their government jobs by the PUK and KDP before the vote. A U.S. officer confirmed one such example when a Kurdish border patrol commander and his entire unit were fired by the PUK peshmerga because he supported the Change List. The ruling parties were also accused of hiring 2,500 government workers after a four year hiring freeze, all of whom were expected to vote for the Kurdistan List in return. The Change List and Kurdistan List accused each other of tearing down the others posters. In early June 2009 the Minister of Peshmerga was accused of attacking Change supporters at a rally. Finally, on election day, the opposition parties claimed that PUK and KDP followers were voting without IDs, blocking opposition observers from polling stations, campaigning after deadlines, and voting more than once. Afterwards the Change List said that their offices in Irbil were attacked by the KDP, and there were reports of violence between different supporters in Sulaymaniya.

As reported before, these election results are likely to have far ranging effects not only upon Kurdish politics, strengthening Barzani against Talabani, and creating the first real opposition, but also upon national ones, perhaps weakening the Kurds' unified position in Baghdad, and offering a new partner in the Change List for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the parliamentary balloting.

Kurdistan Regional Government Presidential Election Results

Massoud Barzani – Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Re-Elected KRG President	69.57%
Kamal Mirawdeli – Independent scholar who won a majority in Sulaymaniya	25.32%
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed – Head of the Progress List and brother-in-law of the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. His father was a famous PUK leader, and Halo was kicked out of the party for forming his own reform faction in 2008	3.49%
Safin Sheikh Mohammed – Independent businessman and former PUK member who quit in 1995 over the KDP-PUK civil war to form his own party	1.40%
Hussein Karmiani – Another former PUK member who left the party in 2005 and runs agriculture business	0.59%

Seats Awarded In Kurdish Parliament – 111 seats total

Kurdish List 59 seats

Change List 25 seats

Service And Reform List 13 seats

Islamic Movement of Kurdistan List 2 seats

Social Justice and Freedom List 1 seat

Turkmen had a 5 seat quota

Turkmen Democratic Movement In Kurdistan 3 seats

Turkmen Reform List 1 seat

Irbil Turkmen List 1 seat

Christians had a 5 seat quota

National Council of Chaldean Syriac Assyrians 3 seats

Al-Rafidain List 2 seats

Armenians had a 1 seat quota

Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan

Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Results

Kurdistan List – KDP-PUK Coalition. Ran together in previous two Kurdish elections. PUK is now the weaker of the two parties as they lost in their own home province of Sulaymaniya	69.57%
Change List – Led by former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa, media magnet. Won Sulaymaniya and will be the first real opposition party if it can keep its disparate group of followers together	23.75%
Service And Reform List – Coalition of Islamists and Leftists, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, and Future Party. The Islamists were the previous opposition to the ruling parties, but had a history of cooperating with them	12.8%
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan List – Formed by Sunni mullahs in 1979 who call for Islamic government and greater transparency	1.45%
Turkmen Democratic Movement In Kurdistan – Calls for Turkmen unity, annexation of Kirkuk, and is opposed to Turkish influence. Won 3 of the 5 seats set aside for Turkmen	0.99%
Social Justice and Freedom List – Leftist coalition of the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Independent Work Party, the Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, and the Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People that calls for equal rights and secularism	0.82%
National Council of Chaldean Syriac Assyrians – Calls for the Ninewa Plains, a historically Christian area, to be annexed by Kurdistan. Is assured of at least one seat as 5 were reserved for Christians	0.58%
Turkmen Reform List – Wants more power for Turkmen and is against Turkish influence. Won 1 of 5 seats set aside for Turkmen	0.38%
Al-Rafidain List – Wants a greater role for Christians, especially in the security forces	0.3%
Aram Shahine Dawood Bakoyan – An Armenian politician assured of at least one seat as 2 were set aside for Armenians	0.22%
Irbil Turkmen List – Wants Kirkuk to be annexed and is against Turkish influence. Won the last of 5 seats set aside for Turkmen	0.21%
Kurdistan Toilers and Workers Party List – Calls for rule of law in Kurdistan	0.18%
Aertex Morses Sargisyan – Independent Armenian politician likely to receive other seat reserved for Armenians	0.15%
Kurdistan Conservative Party – A tribal party that has ties with the PUK	0.13%
Kurdistan Reform Movement – Led by Abdul Barzani, cousin of Massoud Barzani. Calls for an end to corruption, rule of law, and human rights	0.11%
Independent Youth List – Only includes ten people who call for more rights for the young	0.1%
Kurdistan Democratic National Party List – Calls for Kurdish unity throughout the region, plus more housing and women and youth rights in Kurdistan	0.1%
Unified Chaldean List – Made up of the Chaldean Union Party and the Chaldean National Council	0.09%
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Autonomy List	0.09%
Kurdistan Bright Future List – Wants separation of political parties from administration and justice system	0.05%
Eshkhan Malkin Sargisyan – Independent Armenian candidate	0.05%
Progression List – Led by Jalal Talabani's brother-in-law and presidential candidate Halo Ibrahim Ahmed. Call for better standard of living	0.05%
Iraqi Constitutional Party – National party founded by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani	0.04%
Independent Turkmen List – Calls for Kirkuk to be an independent region	0.02%

SOURCES

Bakri, Nada, "Challengers Face an Uphill Battle in Elections in Iraq's Kurdish North," Washington Post, 7/19/09

Carpenter, J. Scott and Ali, Ahmed, "Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?" Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/23/09

Cocks, Tim, "Before polls, Iraq Kurds fret about graft not land," Reuters, 7/14/09

Druzin, Heath, "Iraqi border patrol officers fired by rival party supporters," Stars and Stripes, 7/25/09

Hamad, Qassim Khidhir, "kurdish election lists," Niqash, 6/30/09

- "kurds seek new political opposition," Niqash, 7/16/09

Institute for War & Peace Reporting, "KDP Flexes Muscles in Dohuk," 7/21/09

Kurdistan Regional Government, "Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections," 8/8/09

Mahmoud, Shakhwan, "fired and hired for their political beliefs?" Niqash, 7/20/09

- "opposition claim kurdish election fraud," Niqash, 8/4/09

Monsters & Critics, "Official Iraqi Kurdish election results confirm incumbent victories," 8/8/09

Muhammad, Sardar, "kurdish presidential candidates," Niqash, 7/9/09

Rath, Tiare, "PUK and KDP Face Challenge," Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 7/17/09

Reuters, "Iraq's Kurdish Opposition Allege Poll Violations," 7/26/09

Sands, Phil, "Victory for Kurdistan opposition," The National, 7/30/09

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, "UNAMI Focus," July 2009

The Constitutional Conundrum Of The Kurds

Officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) consistently claim that the Constitution and its Article 140 need to be followed when it comes to resolving Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Most recently KRG President Massoud Barzani said at the end of July 2009 that he rejected the United Nation’s recommendations for the disputed areas and any other plan that does away with Article 140. At the same time the Kurds maintain de facto control of the city and other areas of northern Iraq they claim is part of a historical greater Kurdistan. This despite the fact that the constitution says they should not be there. This is their dilemma, the Kurds demand that part of the constitution be followed so that they can annex the areas they want, while at the same time they are ignoring other parts of the constitution that stand in the way of this goal.

Article 140 called for normalization, a census and a referendum on the future of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in Iraq by December 31, 2007. When it appeared unlikely that the article would be implemented in time the Kurds agreed to a six-month extension. That June 2008 deadline came and passed as well with no resolution to the problem. This has caused a huge amount of frustration on the part of the Kurds, who have held up major legislation in parliament in protest.

Despite this, the Kurds still maintain control over a large area of northern Iraq including Kirkuk. With the overthrow of Saddam, Kurdish peshmerga forces swept south into the areas they claimed to be theirs. The U.S. also asked for their help when the insurgency took off. This allowed the Kurds to establish themselves in northern sections of Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, and Diyala. The Kurds also call a swath of northern Wasit theirs as well. If annexed this land would almost double the size of Kurdistan from 15,400 square miles to 30,100 square miles.



The problem is the 2005 Iraqi constitution says that this presence is illegal. The 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq until it drew up its own constitution included Article 53(A). It said that the Kurds only had authority over areas that they controlled before the 2003 U.S. invasion. This area was established in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi forces withdrew and the U.S. and England established a northern no fly zone. The border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq became known as the Green Line. Article 53(A) was later incorporated into the 2005 constitution.

Since 2007 Kurdish officials have said they no longer recognize the Green Line since they have de facto control of these disputed territories. In late 2007 for example, the KRG Natural Resources Minister said the Green Line was passé. The KRG also told oil and security companies working in Kurdistan to remove any maps that included the Green Line. In early 2009 Masrour Barzani, son of KRG President Massoud Barzani, and head of the KRG’s security forces, stated that the Green Line was a relic of Saddam’s time and that the KRG refused to abide by it. In May he told the International Crisis Group that everything in the constitution should be negotiated to resolve the fate of these areas.

This is the conundrum the Kurds now find themselves in. On the one hand, they demand that Article 140 and the constitution be followed when it comes to Kirkuk, and the disputed territories. At the same time the constitution says they have no right to be in those areas as they now are. The Kurds have increasingly rejected this part of the constitution, and said that everything in it needs to be discussed. They can’t have it both ways. They can’t insist on the constitution being followed when they are breaking it and demanding revisions of it. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially with U.S. forces withdrawing. Even though Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently traveled to Kurdistan to meet with top KRG officials, positions will probably harden as the 2010 parliamentary elections near.

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09

Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
- “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Iraqi Constitution

Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08

Mohammed, Shwan, “Kurdish forces refuse to quit Iraq battlefield province,” Agence France Presse, 8/13/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

The New Dispute In Kirkuk – The National Census

On October 24, 2009 Iraq is set to conduct a national census. This will be the first one held since the overthrow of Saddam. Its results will have the largest effect upon the disputed area of Kirkuk in Tamim province. Article 140 of the constitution called for a census in Tamim before a referendum on the future of Kirkuk could be conducted no later than December 31, 2007. Neither happened. The Kurds want the census to occur because they are the majority in the province, and it would create facts on the ground to support their claim to the area. Arabs and Kurds in Tamim are therefore opposed to it. They claim that the Kurdish parties moved in thousands of their followers into the province after the U.S. invasion, sometimes by force, thus gerrymandering the demographics in their favor. The Kurds dispute this, claiming that the returns were simply people who were forcibly displaced by Saddam’s Arabization policy. Neither side appears willing to compromise.

The government survey will also be of importance because it will determine the voting rolls for the province. Tamim has still not had provincial elections, which were held in January 2009, and unless the census happens there, may not participate in the January 2010 parliamentary elections either.

As usual, Iraq’s political leaders are unable to deal with this dilemma. Some Turkmen political parties say they want Baghdad to delay the census until it can figure out how many Kurds moved to Tamim after 2003. They have threatened a boycott of the census if this doesn’t happen, and the Arabs may join them. In parliament, one proposal is to simply drop Tamim from the national census. Another is to push ahead with a referendum and parliamentary elections in Kirkuk without one. A major sticking point is that the presidential committee, which includes Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, will veto any law devised by parliament unfavorable to the Kurds. The most likely scenario then, is that parliament will do nothing, and Tamim will be excluded from the census, and participation in voting again.

SOURCES

Gibbs, Nancy, “Unfinished Business,” Time, 4/28/03

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Iraqi Constitution

Nordland, Rod, “Now It’s A Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Williams, Timothy, “Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census,” New York Times, 7/24/09

2002 CIA White Paper On Iraq Vs The 2002-2003 U.N. Inspectors

In early September 2002 the Bush White House announced that it wanted Congress to authorize the use of force against Iraq by the next month. Members of Congress demanded that a public paper be released by the administration so that lawmakers could use it in their arguments, especially after meetings with high officials provided little new in details about Iraq’s weapons programs. This led the CIA to release an Iraq White Paper in October 2002.

The document claimed that many of Iraq’s facilities had been rebuilt, and efforts to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons were all underway. On chemical weapons the White Paper said that Iraq could produce these agents using its chemical industry, and said that it could convert some of its commercial facilities to produce biological weapons as well. In fact it said many of these plants had expanded and that Iraq’s program was larger than what it was before the Gulf War. Similar comments were made about Iraq’s nuclear program. In the text it named the Fallujah II Chlorine Plant, the al-Dawrah Vaccine Facility, the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, and the Fallujah III Castor Oil Plant as examples of Baghdad’s attempt to rebuild and expand its WMD program under the guise of dual-use facilities.

In October 2002 the United Nations passed Resolution 1441, which renewed weapons inspections for Iraq. Hans Blix’s U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would do the work. They both arrived in Iraq in November. By the end of December the inspectors had gone on 202 visits, and admitted that they had gone through their entire list of suspected sites, and found no evidence of renewed weapons programs. They were going on repeat visits, and requested the United States provide actionable intelligence to track down other potential leads. By January they had doubled the number of inspections, but still turned up nothing.

The problem was that most of the American reports on Iraq were based upon speculation and a strong bias against Iraq due to Saddam’s repeated hindering of the 1990s inspection regime. It had become an article of faith within the U.S. intelligence community that when the original inspectors left in 1998, Iraq had restarted its weapons programs. All the U.S. had to go on however was satellite intelligence, and Iraqi defectors, most of whom were making up stories either for money or to push the White House into war. The inspectors were actually going into these facilities that the U.S. had photos of, and found no incriminating evidence inside them. UNMOVIC went to the Amiriyah Institute found nothing. Fallujah II and III weren’t even in commercial use anymore. When they went to the al-Dawrah Facility it was abandoned and full of trash.

The Bush White House never believed in the inspections in the first place, and were only hoping to use them to build international support, and as a pretext to go to war. In March 2002 Tony Blair’s office suggested just that when political advisor David Manning met with National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Washington. The administration did nothing but attack Iraq and the inspections during the whole process, and never ended up sharing intelligence as they had promised. In doing so, they ignored the fact that UNMOVIC had disproved much of the argument made in the October 2002 CIA White Paper that Baghdad had restarted its WMD and nuclear programs, and that they were larger than before, since all of the major plants listed were either abandoned or not working on any military related activities. A nuclear weapons program for example, required huge amounts of equipment and electricity to all be assembled together that would be easily detectable. These would be too large and unwieldy to be moved around covertly by Iraqi agents as the White House claimed at the time. Yet after inspectors went to the al-Tuwaitha complex twelve times, which the U.S. said was one of Iraq’s main nuclear sites and turned up zero evidence, the administration claimed this was proof that the inspections would never work. The American government’s perception was that Iraq had these programs, so UNMOVIC not finding them was just further proof that Saddam was hiding them. The result was that the U.S. ended up going to war in March 2003 only to find out afterwards that UNMOVIC and the IAEA were right.

Excerpt From David Manning Memo to Prime Minister Tony Blair After Trip To Washington, 3/14/02 – Known As One Of The Downing Street Memos

“- the Un dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of the international framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal base. Renwed refused by Saddam to accept unfetted inspections would be a powerful argument;”

UNMOVIC Inspections of Sites Named In White Paper

Fallujah II: Visited on 12/9/02, 12/17/02, 1/8/03, 1/19/03, 3/2/03 and had an aerial inspection on 1/31/03. Was found not to be in use

Al-Dawrah: 11/29/02. Was found not in use and abandoned

Amiriyah: 12/15/02 and 1/19/03. Nothing found

Fallujah III: 12/8/02, 12/19/02, 1/6/03, 2/16/03 and had an aerial inspection on 1/31/03. Had tagged dual use equipment, but plant had stopped being used by Iraqis in July 2001

SOURCES

Allen, Mike, “War Cabinet Argues for Iraq Attack: Bush Advisers Cite U.S. Danger,” Washington Post, 9/9/02

Collier, Robert, “Repeated inspections but no hard evidence; To Iraqis, site visits are a pointless charade,” San Francisco Chronicle, 12/30/02

MacLeod, Scott, “Live From Baghdad: What the Iraqis Told Blix,” Time, 11/21/02

Manning, David, “Your Trip To The US,” 3/14/02

McGeary, Johanna “6 Reasons why So Many Allies Want Bush To Slow Down,” Time, 2/3/03
- “Dissecting The Case,” Time, 2/10/03

Prados, John, Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War, 2004

Rangwala, Glen, “Claims and evaluations of Iraq’s proscribed weapons,” University of Cambridge, 2004

Risen, James and Johnston, David, “Split at C.I.A. and F.B.I. on Iraqi Ties to Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 2/2/03

Tumulty, Karen, “Making His Case,” Time, 9/16/02

Interview With VP Dick Cheney On Weapons Inspections March 2003

On March 15, 2003 then Vice President Dick Cheney was interviewed on NBC’s Meet The Press. The main topic of conversation was Iraq. Early on in the discussion host Tim Russert asked Cheney what he thought about the on-going United Nations weapons inspections, and the fact that they had failed to find Iraq’s nuclear program. The Vice President said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had missed Iraq’s nuclear program in the 1990s, and that they weren’t doing any better this time. He warned that Iraq made so much money off of oil that it was only a matter of time before they got a nuclear weapon. He went on to say that the Iraqis were defying the inspections as they had in the past, and that the United Nations had never been able to deal with Saddam anyway. This was a typical administration attack on the inspections process at that time. The White House line was that Saddam had never complied with U.N. resolutions now or in the past, so therefore the inspections were a waste. Iraq still maintained its weapons programs, and therefore the United States needed to invade to disarm him.

Two months before in January 2003, IAEA director Mohamed El Baradei stated that he had heard American criticisms of his work. In an interview with Time magazine he expressed hope that the United States wasn’t keeping information from the inspectors when they kept saying Iraq was close to having a nuclear weapon. El Baradei said that his team had found no evidence of Iraq trying to produce uranium domestically for a bomb, and that it would be extremely hard for them to hide a nuclear program. He went on to say that they could stash away parts and equipment, but not enough to make a weapon.

This was based upon extensive IAEA inspections within Iraq from 2002-2003, but work that ultimately didn’t matter. They found no active nuclear program, and no fissile material or equipment to enrich uranium itself. The two major nuclear facilities at al-Qaim and Tuwaitha had been inspected several times by February 2003. Al-Qaim was destroyed and in a state of disrepair, while Tuwaitha was being used for civilian purposes. Other sites were also looked at. Dual use equipment like magnets had been investigated and were either unsuitable for a weapons program or were being used for civilian purposes. The IAEA was going through all the sites and materials mentioned by U.S. intelligence and turning up nothing incriminating. That didn’t register with the administration because their perception was that Iraq possessed a nuclear weapons program. That was the reality to the Bush White House, who had already made the decision to go to war in 2002. President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair had given up on the inspectors finding anything by the end of January 2003, and the war was set for later in March. Saddam had painted himself into a corner. His earlier objections to the inspections in the 1990s convinced Cheney and others that Iraq had nefarious programs no matter what the IAEA said.

SOURCES

Doward, Jamie, “Confidential memo reveals US plan to provoke an invasion of Iraq,” Observer, 6/21/09

El Baradei, Mohamed, “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 2/14/03

International Atomic Energy Agency, “News Update on Iraq Inspections,” 12/19/02

Meet The Press, “Interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney,” NBC, 3/16/03

Michael, Marge, “Q&A with the Top Sleuth,” Time, 1/12/03

Rangwala, Glen, “Claims and evaluations of Iraq’s proscribed weapons,” University of Cambridge, 2004

How The Administration Reversed Itself On Finding Iraq’s WMD

The Bush White House was nothing but contemptuous of the United Nations inspectors when they began again in November 2002. The administration constantly claimed that they knew that Iraq was hiding its WMD, and that the inspections would never find them. When the inspectors said they needed more time, the U.S. said time was running out.

After the invasion the tables were turned. In a March 30 interview on ABC’s This Week With George Stephanopoulos, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he knew exactly where the WMD were, “We know where they are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.” A month into the war however, and the U.S. had found nothing. By mid-April Rumsfeld had changed his tune saying that the U.N. inspectors had not turned up any WMD in Iraq, so it was not surprising that the U.S. had not done so either. The Defense Secretary and President Bush were sure that they would turn up, but now they said it would take time. By May the administration had completely changed its story, floating the idea that Iraq did not have large stocks of WMD, but rather a “just in time” network that could produce WMD just before a conflict. In just six months the White House went from condemning the inspectors for not finding Iraq’s illicit weapons, to saying they were having the same problems. The U.S. went from claiming they knew exactly where the WMD was, to saying that perhaps Iraq had no stockpiles. In the end the U.N. inspectors turned out to be right, Iraq did not have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs just Saddam’s hope that he could restart them sometime in the future.

SOURCES

Elsner, Alan, “Bush Officials Change Tune on Iraqi Weapons,” Reuters, 5/14/03

Epstein, Edward, “Little evidence of banned weapons found so far,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/6/03

Gibbs, Nancy, “Unfinished Business,” Time, 4/28/03

McGeary, Johanna “6 Reasons why So Many Allies Want Bush To Slow Down,” Time, 2/3/03
- “Dissecting The Case,” Time, 2/10/03

Milbank, Dana, “U.S. Voices Doubts on Iraq Search,” Washington Post, 12/3/02

Sanger, David, “Bush Says It Will Take Time to Find Iraq’s Banned Arms,” New York Times, 5/3/03

Schlesinger, Robert, “US edges closer in search for arms,” Boston Globe, 4/13/03

Strobel, Warren and Landay, Jonathan, “White House Maintains Its Case against Iraq,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 12/6/02

This Week with George Stephanopoulos, “Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks on ABC "This Week with George Stephanopoulos,”” U.S. Defense Department, 3/30/03

Charles Duelfer’s Account Of The End Of The 1990s U.N. Inspections

In the July/August 2009 issue of The National Interest, former U.N. weapons inspector Charles Duelfer painted a picture of the first round of Iraq inspections in the 1990s. On the one hand, his piece is informative because it explains how international support for inspections in Iraq deteriorated. This was pushed along by Saddam’s astute use of bribes and lucrative petroleum deals through the United Nations’ Oil for Food program to sow dissent amongst the Security Council. On the other hand nowhere does he mention the work that the inspectors did in Iraq, which was largely successful in destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and nuclear programs. Rather Duelfer solely concentrates upon the political squabbles that occurred behind the scenes in Iraq, and within the United Nations that led to the end of the inspections in 1998.

As part of the 1991 cease-fire that ended the Gulf War, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq until it divulged and destroyed all of its WMD and nuclear programs. To achieve this goal the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created as the first inspectors in Iraq. This was the toughest and most intrusive inspection regime created since Germany after World War I. Duelfer skips all of UNSCOM’s early work, and goes to its last two years in 1997 and 1998 to highlight the political problems it ran into.

1997 was the beginning of the end of UNSCOM. In that year Iraq refused to admit American inspectors into the country claiming that Washington was trying to undermine the government. That was true as Pres. Clinton tried to launch a coup the previous year using the inspections. At the same time, Saddam was making another concerted effort to undermine and end the process, and the sanctions. UNSCOM didn’t comply with Baghdad’s request, and withdrew. They returned in three weeks, but under a deal brokered by France and Russia where foreign diplomats acted as chaperons for the inspectors. A few months later Baghdad refused to let the inspectors into presidential palaces. A deal was eventually worked out with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, but many saw it as appeasement of Saddam. The delay also allowed Iraq to empty the palaces of any incriminating material.

By 1997 support for the inspections and sanctions were weakening anyway within the Security Council. Iraq was offering Russia, France, and other countries preferential oil contracts under the Oil for Food program to weaken and undermine UNSCOM. Iraq was also correctly arguing that the inspections were being used by the U.S. for political ends, beyond what the U.N. resolution called for. Duelfer argues that these divisions made the inspections useless. The inspectors themselves became divided, some collecting intelligence for their own countries, some giving it to Iraq, and the lack of a united Security Council meant that Baghdad could chip away at the inspections little by little with no repercussions.

In 1998 Iraq refused to cooperate with the inspectors anymore. They withdrew as the U.S. and England launched Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign for non-cooperation with UNSCOM. Duelfer calls the attack a “feckless bombing,” and said that afterwards U.S. containment of Iraq ended with the suspension of inspections. This is far from true. Gen. Anthony Zinni, who was the commander of the U.S. Central Command at the time, received intelligence that Saddam was teetering and was seriously afraid that he might be overthrown as a result Desert Fox. More importantly, as a result of the bombing, Iraq decided to give up on its weapons programs. The Iraq Study Group later found out that labs were shutdown and work was ended as Baghdad believed that it could never continue under U.N. sanctions and U.S. attacks. The U.S.-U.K. no fly zones continued, as well as U.N. sanctions, and Iraq never restarted its weapons programs. The problem of course was that the West completely missed these changes in Iraq. Saddam’s constant refusal to cooperate with inspections, convinced the United States that Iraq would never give up its desire to have WMD. These unresolved issues were left to fester, and became a driving issue for many American politicians and foreign policy officials, who later gained office in the Bush administration.

Where Duelfer’s article really falls short however is that he never really discusses what UNSCOM accomplished. He writes that the inspections did find out a lot about Iraq’s WMD programs in seven years, but never mentions that by 1996 Iraq’s known WMD munitions and equipment, and nuclear programs had been dismantled and destroyed. There was still an unaccounted for stockpile of weapons and WMD agents left over from the Iran-Iraq War, much of which was probably useless as it had expired, but as far as new production or active programs was concerned, there were none by the time UNSCOM left the country in December 1998.

Instead what you walk away from the Duelfer piece thinking is that the inspections were eventually undermined by political divisions within the U.N. and maneuvers by Saddam, and that overall they were failure. It seems that Duelfer came away from his work with UNSCOM mad and bitter because he was forced to leave before he felt his job was done. His comments after 1998 show that he was open to any and all allegations of Iraq breaking the U.N. resolutions on its WMD and nuclear programs. Even now in 2009 he apparently still holds a grudge from his experience, which makes him ignore the successes that he achieved while an inspector.

SOURCES

Blix, Hans, “An Update On Inspection,” UNMOVIC, 1/27/03

CNN, “Scott Ritter: Facts needed before Iraq attack,” 7/12/02

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, “S/1997/779,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/8/97

Duelfer, Charles, “Canaries in the Cooling Tower,” The National Interest, July/August 2009

Gordon, Michael and Miller, Judith, “Threats And Responses: The Iraqis; U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For A-Bomb Parts,” New York Times, 9/8/02

Guardian, “The coup that wasn’t,” 9/26/05

Miller, Judith, “An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites,” New York Times, 12/20/01

PBS Frontline, “Interview: Kenneth Pollack,” 2/20/03

Rangwala, Glen, Hurd, Nathaniel, and Millar, Alistair, “A Case For Concern, Not A Case For War,” Middle East Report Online, 1/28/03

Ricks, Tom, Fiasco, 2006

Ritter, Scott, “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, June 2000

Rose, David, “Iraq’s Arsenal of Terror,” Vanity Fair, May 2002

Warrick, Joby, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal, The ‘Reality Is Uncertainty,’” Washington Post, 7/31/02

Violence Up In Anbar?

In mid-July 2009 Aswat al-Iraq reported that officials and tribal sheikhs in Anbar were worried about an up-tick in violence in their province. Sheikh Hashim Khalifa blamed the attacks on political factions vying for position before the January 2010 parliamentary elections. He said the provincial security forces were unable to deal with this violence because they were afraid of offending political parties. A former Iraqi Army officer had a slightly different take blaming the political blocs for selecting unqualified personnel to join the security forces. These accusations come in the midst of a drive by the new provincial council to oust the police chief. They voiced similar concerns saying that he has not been able to stop recent attacks, and that his force, while numbering around 28,000 are not qualified. Almost all of the local police and soldiers are made up of tribesman and Awakening members. A review of English language news reports shows that there has been an increase in attacks over the last two months, and a doubling of the number of casualties. In April 2009 there were 11 security incidents resulting in 95 casualties. May like the rest of the country had a large dip with 9 incidents and only 23 casualties. June saw a big jump with 24 attacks and over 82 dead and wounded. July had just about the same number of attacks, 22, and deaths, 33, but a huge increase in wounded, 126. This mirrored casualties in Iraq in general in July with a surge in wounded.

Security Incidents In Anbar April-July 2009

July 09
Attacks/Incidents: 22
Deaths: 33
Wounded: 126

June 09
Attacks/Incidents: 24
Deaths: 29
Wounded: 53+

May 09
Attacks/Incidents: 9
Deaths: 12
Wounded: 11

April 09
Attacks/Incidents: 11
Deaths: 31
Wounded: 64

As for the causes and culprits behind the attacks little is know. The favorite targets are Awakening members and local police. Al Qaeda in Iraq who usually gets blamed for almost all incidents only has a marginal presence left in a few of the province’s cities. Tribal rivalries could also be playing a role as well. The U.S. and Baghdad, because of their weaknesses and inadequacies, largely abrogated the security responsibilities in the province to the tribes, offering them money and jobs in return for their support. This led to the Awakening movement that was always a loose confederation of groups that broke apart into different factions in the 2009 elections. With Anbar turned over to Iraqi control in September 2008 the tribes now have pretty much free sway in Anbar, and their rivalries could be a cause of the violence.

Overall, the number of incidents and casualties in Anbar are still relatively low compared to the more violent areas of central and northern Iraq. At the same time it shows that the sources of attacks have changed in Iraq. Most are no longer based upon sectarian differences, the insurgency has largely been defeated, with most of its fighters having switched sides through the Sons of Iraq, and the Mahdi Army is largely dormant. Political differences and terrorism are some of the main causes of attacks today, as shown in Anbar.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Riechmann, Deb, “Iraq PM flies to US to meet Obama, seek investment,” Associated Press, 7/20/09

Abouzeid, Rania, “US Allies Angry at Anbar Handover,” Time, 9/1/08

Agence France Presse, “Four Iraqi cops killed,” 6/25/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 cops wounded in armed attack in Anbar,” 6/25/09
- “2 kids killed by IED in Anbar,” 4/20/09
- “2 policemen wounded in blast in Ramadi,” 7/26/09
- “4 civilians wounded in 2nd Falluja blast,” 7/25/09
- “4 cops wounded in Falluja,” 5/27/09
- “4 cops wounded in Falluja twin blasts,” 6/22/09
- “4 Islamic party’s guards inured in Falluja,” 4/30/09
- “4 wounded in car bomb blast in Anbar,” 7/9/09
- “5 cops killed, wounded in Anbar blast,” 6/6/09
- “Attacks on the rise in Anbar amidst violence scare,” 7/18/09
- “Car bomb dismantled in Ramadi,” 7/29/09
- “Car bomb explodes near IPP HQ, 12 wounded,” 7/25/09
- “Car bomb wounds Anbar police chief,” 6/6/09
- “Civilian shot down in Falluja,” 4/6/09
- “Cop found dead in northern Ramadi, 6/15/09
- “Cop found dead in western Anbar,” 6/22/09
- “Cop killed, 3 wounded in southern Falluja,” 4/24/09
- “Emergency police chief killed by IED,” 7/27/09
- “Falluja blast casualties reaches 7,” 7/2/09
- “Gunman killed in attack on police in Falluja,” 6/8/09
- “IED attack foiled in Falluja,” 4/20/09
- “IED wounds 2 cops in Anbar,” 6/9/09
- “IED wounds 3 in Anbar,” 7/18/09
- “IED wounds 3 Sahwa fighters in Anbar,” 4/8/09
- “Intelligence officer survives assassination attempt in Falluja,” 7/2/09
- “Katyushas kill 2, wound 7 in Anbar,” 7/8/09
- “Kidnapped officer found dead in Anbar,” 4/13/09
- “Mass grave found in Anbar,” 5/26/09
- “Police commander killed by IED in Falluja,” 6/25/09
- “Police gun down man while planting bomb in Anbar,” 7/1/09
- “Policeman killed, 2 others wounded in Anbar blast,” 7/29/09
- “Qaem blast kills 4, wounds 8,” 7/30/09
- “Senior officer escapes attempt in Falluja,” 5/23/09
- “Suicide blast sets U.S. vehicle ablaze in Falluja,” 5/7/09
- “Tribal official wounded in bomb blast in Anbar,” 4/21/09
- “U.S. soldier wounded in Falluja,” 6/4/09
- “Unknown body found in Anbar,” 6/24/09
- “Urgent/Sahwa leader survives assassination attempt,” 6/24/09
- “Urgent/Toll from Falluja car bomb reaches 7,” 6/20/09

BBC, “Suicide blast hits Iraq army base,” 4/16/09

DPA, “One child killed, eight wounded in Iraq rocket attacks,” 6/20/09

Fayad, Ma’ad, “Al-Anbar Salvation Council to Run in Parliamentary Elections,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 9/21/08

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 26 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/26/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 25 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/25/09

Hammoudi, Laith and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 25 May 2009,” 5/25/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday 6 June 2009,” 6/6/09

IANS, “Twin blast in Iraq kills nine policemen,” 4/5/09

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 17 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/17/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 5 April 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/5/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 14 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 16 July 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/16/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 7 April 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/7/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 23 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/23/09

Issa Sahar and Kadhim, Hussein, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 9 June 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/9/09

Javno, “Angry Iraqis Demand Protection From Bombings,” 6/25/09

Kami, Aseel, “Bus terminal bombing kills seven in Baghdad,” Reuters, 6/8/09

Knights, Michael, “The Status and Future of the Awakening Movements,” Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2009

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08

Niqash, “anbar police chief faces council hostility,” 7/14/09

Paley, Amit, “Uncertainty After Anbar Handover,” Washington Post, 9/2/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “A New Breed Grabs Reins in Anbar,” Washington Post, 10/21/08

Reuters, “Emergency declared in Iraq’s Ramadi,” 7/21/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 6,” 6/6/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 29,” 6/29/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 4,” 5/4/09

Riechmann, Deb, “US military in Iraq says 3 soldiers killed,” 7/17/09

Yacoub, Sameer, “Bombs kill 11 in Iraq, highlight security fears,” Associated Press, 7/15/09

Mosul Remains As Violent As Ever

July 2009 saw a drop in deaths across Iraq, but the situation in Mosul, the third largest city in the country, stayed the same. The number of security incidents last month was exactly the same as June, with an increase in deaths and wounded. In July there were 73 incidents for an average of 2.35 per month. Those led to 79 deaths, 2.54 per day, and 169 wounded, 5.45 per day. Those compared to 73 incidents in June, 58 deaths, 1.93 per day, and 123 wounded, 4.1 per day. While not as high as October 2008, attacks and casualties from November 2008 to July 2009 have roughly stayed the same.

Attack Statistics In Mosul Based Upon Press Reports

July 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.35 attacks & incidents/day
79 Deaths – 2.54 deaths/day
169 Wounded – 5.45 wounded/day

June 2009
73 Attacks/Incidents – 2.43 attacks & incidents/day
58 Deaths – 1.93 deaths/day
123 Wounded – 4.1 wounded/day

May 2009
83 Attacks/Incidents – 3.06 attacks & incidents/day
64 Deaths – 2.06 deaths/day
164 Wounded – 4.70 wounded/day

April 2009
79 Attacks/Incidents – 2.63 attacks & incidents/day
53 Deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
191 Wounded – 6.36 wounded/day

March 2009
86 attacks/incidents – 2.77 attacks & incidents/day
69 deaths – 2.22 deaths/day
169 wounded – 5.45 wounded/day

February 2009
81 attacks/incidents – 2.89 attacks & incidents/day
58 deaths – 2.0 deaths/day
111 wounded – 3.96 wounded/day

January 2009
52 attacks/incidents – 1.67 attacks & incidents/day
56 deaths – 1.80 killed/day
85 wounded – 2.74 wounded/day

December 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.09 attacks & incidents/day
68 deaths – 2.19 deaths/day
181 wounded – 5.83 wounded/day

November 2008
65 attacks/incidents – 2.16 attacks & incidents/day
53 deaths – 1.76 deaths/day
249 wounded – 8.3 wounded/day

October 2008
92 attacks/incidents – 2.96 attacks & incidents/day
112 deaths – 3.61 deaths/day
188 wounded – 6.06 wounded/day

The major cause is the Arab-Kurdish divide. Immediately after the invasion the peshmerga swept into the city and began kicking out Arab families, and looting their businesses and government offices. American forces quickly put an end to that, but when the security situation deteriorated in the following years the U.S. came to rely upon the Kurdish militias more and more. During the Surge insurgents were also pushed into the city where they have been able to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arabs against the Kurds. Violence in the city is down from previous years, but has basically leveled off since the end of 2008. Several military offensives there by the U.S. and Iraqi forces since then have failed to have any real affect upon casualties. The election of the Al-Hadbaa List in the January 2009 election, far from relieving tensions in Ninewa have only increased them, meaning that violence is likely to continue in Mosul at the current rate for the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Haim, “6 killed in Iraq Attacks,” Associated Press, 7/6/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 bombings in Mosul leave 31 casualties,” 7/8/09
- “2 children wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/29/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul shootings,” 7/14/09
- “2 killed, 2 wounded in bomb attack in Mosul,” 7/31/09
- “3 cops wounded by car bomb in Ninewa,” 7/16/09
- “6 Iraq soldiers wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/27/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 7/18/09
- “Car bomb in front of Shiite mosque wounds 3 kids,” 7/13/09
- “Car bomb wounds 8 in Ninewa,” 7/6/09
- “Civilian gunned down in western Mosul,” 7/6/09
- “Civilian killed in two car bomb blasts in Ninewa,” 7/24/09
- “Civilian shot down by gunman in Mosul,” 7/28/09
- “Cop gunned down in Mosul,” 7/5/09
- “Cop killed in Mosul shooting,” 7/7/09
- “Cop wounded in Mosul shooting,” 7/6/09
- “Gunman wounded while attacking patrol in Mosul,” 7/19/09
- “Gunmen blow up house in Mosul,” 7/21/09
- “Gunmen break into Pepsi factory, kill worker,” 7/26/09
- “Gunmen kill contractor in Mosul,” 7/4/09
- “Gunmen killed while planting bomb in Mosul,” 7/1/09
- “Gunmen shoot down armless man in Mosul,” 7/18/09
- “Hand grenade injures 7 in Ninewa,” 7/8/09
- “Mosul blast casualties up to 5 deaths, 52 wounded,” 7/11/09
- “Mosul car bomb wounded up to 14,” 7/5/09
- “Officer, civilian wounded in Mosul,” 7/21/09
- “Policeman killed by grenade blast in Mosul,” 7/5/09
- “Policeman killed in IED blast in Mosul,” 7/10/09
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/16/09
- “Sticky bomb kills chieftain in Ninewa,” 7/27/09
- “Sticky IED kills servicemen in Mosul,” 7/13/09
- “Turkmen council chief wounded in Mosul blast,” 7/30/09
- “Woman wounded by roadside bomb in Mosul,” 7/8/09

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Dagher, Sam, “Fractures in Iraq City as Kurds and Baghdad Vie,” New York Times, 10/28/08

DPA, “At least 30 killed, 37 injured in Baghdad attacks – update,” 7/31/09

Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 20 July 2009,” 7/20/09
Al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Monday 27 July 2009,” 7/27/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 14 July 2009,” 7/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq-Tuesday 21 July 2009,” 7/21/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 6 July 2009,” 7/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 29 July 2009,” 7/29/09

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 8 July, 2009,” 7/8/09

Myers, Steven Lee and Robertson, Campbell, “Insurgency Remains Tenacious In North Iraq,” New York Times, 7/10/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 2,” 7/2/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 3,” 7/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 8,” 7/8/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 17,” 7/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 20,” 7/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 30,” 7/30/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, July 31,” 7/31/09

Xinhua, “10 wounded in bomb attacks in N Iraq,” 7/5/09
- “Four policemen, gunman killed in N Iraq,” 7/7/09

A Look At Violence In Iraq In July 2009

All the major sources on Iraq noted a drop in deaths for the month of July 2009. This is despite a high number of mass casualty bombings. The pattern being set in 2009 is one month of high casualties, followed by a drop, and then an increase.

All four organizations that have up-to-date statistics on deaths in Iraq recorded a drop in July compared to June 2009. That ranged from 420 by Iraq Body Count, the group with historically the highest numbers, to 308 of the Associated Press, which keeps its own independent count, to 275 by Iraq's ministries, to the 240 of icasualties.org, who states that the actual numbers are higher than their figures. Despite the differences, all these groups follow the same trends, and all witnessed drops from June. All but Iraq Body Count recorded a July amount below or at the average number of deaths over the first six months of 2009 set by each organization. The Associated Press for example counted 447 deaths in June and an average of 317.5 deaths from January to June of 2009.

Iraqi Deaths

	Iraq Body Count	icasualties. Org	Brookings Iraq Index	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press
July 08	584	419	500	851	N/A
Aug. 08	592	311	450	N/A	475
Sep. 08	535	366	400	440	503
Oct. 08	528	288	350	317	N/A
Nov. 08	473	317	270