It seems like winter has become the time for new political
crises in Iraq. In December 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued an
arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi forcing him into exile, and
starting a new battle with his Iraqi National Movement (INM). Now, in December
2012, the government raided the offices and home of INM member Finance Minister
Rafi Issawi, and accused some of his bodyguards of working with Hashemi’s
security unit to carry out terrorist attacks. There have been accusations that
Issawi has been involved with violence for quite some time, but also reports
that Maliki has tried to manipulate them as well to gain concessions. This
latest incident appears to be another such case.
The newest controversy started when one of the Finance
Minister’s bodyguards was arrested in Baghdad. On December 21, 2012, a member of Issawi’s security detail was arrested trying to enter the Green Zone. A
spokesman for the Supreme Judicial Council told the press that the bodyguard had a longtime warrant out for him, and that he had been on the run for quite
some time. During his interrogation, he implicated other guards, leading to
raids upon Issawi’s house and offices leading to nine more guards being detained, and a large number of his staff. The Finance Minister originally
claimed that up to 150 members of his entourage were swept up by the authorities. Most were released that day, but the guards remain in custody.
Issawi has been a long time critic of the premier’s rule, and comes from the
rival Iraqi National Movement (INM). The arrests also came just as President
Jalal Talabani was going to Germany for medical treatment after suffering a
stroke, and on the one year anniversary of a campaign against Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi
for running death squads, which drove him into exile. That immediately made
many political parties and the American government to believe that the prime
minister was once again going after his political opponents using the security
forces and courts. This has been something that he has been doing since 2008
when he first started to assert himself.
The prime minister’s State of Law immediately tried to
deflect criticism. A parliamentarian from the list said that an investigation had not found any evidence to implicate the Finance Minister himself, but went
on to claim that his bodyguards were involved with Hashemi’s in attacks. At
the same time, he called for a parliamentary committee to look into the matter.
Another State of Law member told the press that 20 families in Anbar had filed
lawsuits against Hashemi and Issawi’s guards, and that ten judges signed off on
the warrants, with the majority being Sunni in an effort to show that the raids
were not sectarian. Finally, the prime minister himself said that he was not
behind the arrests, only that it was the justice system doing its work. This
has been the modus operandi in many of these cases. The premier’s list is the
one talking to the media, and giving details about controversial arrests rather
than the courts, while claiming that there is no political motivation behind
them. Instead of diffusing things, it only increases suspicions.
The INM was predictably upset that the government was
targeting another one of their leading members. Deputy Premier Salah al-Mutlaq
threatened to withdraw the National Movement from the ruling coalition if there
wasn’t an investigation into the arrests. On December 22 and 25 the INM did not attend the cabinet, and on the 23 it did not show up to parliament. The
protests were merely symbolic, but united the party. After the conflict with
Maliki over the Hashemi debacle in 2011, the list effectively ceased to exist.
The leading members disagreed about how to react, and several lawmakers left.
Now their outrage brought them together if for just a few days. That wasn’t
enough to change Maliki’s course of action, but the reaction of others was.
Finance Minister Issawi at protest in support of him in Anbar Dec. 26, 2012 (AIN)
There was strong backlash by several groups within and
without Iraq as well. President Obama called Minister Issawi the day of the arrests, while the U.S. Ambassador Robert Beecroft visited him, and the U.S.
Embassy issued a protest to the Foreign Ministry. Starting that same day
there were protests in Anbar, Salahaddin, and the Adhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad. The Anbar provincial council complained, and then there were
more demonstrations in Fallujah starting on December 23 that shut down the highway to Jordan and Syria for several days that drew people from throughout Iraq. The head of the Sadr bloc in the legislature Bahaa Hussein
Ali Kamal Araji voiced his concerns, and met with Speaker Nujafi. The Sadrists said that these types of actions cost the government legitimacy, and
accused the prime minister of politicizing the security forces. Finally,
the Kurdish Alliance protested the raids as well saying that they were unconstitutional. This was a far higher level of outrage than occurred
during the Hashemi controversy. The fact that this was the second time that the
prime minister was going after an INM leader obviously made people more concerned
that Maliki was abusing his power. It also likely made the premier re-think
pushing the matter any further as Issawi has not been personally implicated in
whatever charges are going to be made against his bodyguards, and there have
been no other arrests so far.
The detention of the Finance Minister’s guards came after
years of accusations against Issawi. Before he became a politician, he was the head of the Fallujah hospital when the city was an insurgent hotbed. In
2010, Maliki told the American military he was worried about Issawi’s
involvement with militants. There were reports for example, that Hashemi and Issawi ran a death squad in the city called Hamas of Iraq in 2006. A
member of the prime minister’s Dawa party later said that the group was run by the Minister’s guards without his knowledge. As a result of these
concerns, then commander of American forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno
conducted an investigation. In August 2010, he sent the findings to the prime
minister, which found nothing against Issawi. There were some reports that
Maliki tried to use these stories against Issawi. When the government was being
put together after the 2010 elections for instance, there was a report that
Issawi was threatened to support Maliki’s second term in return for the speaker
of parliament position by the prime minister or he would be charged with
terrorism. Then in December 2011, when the security forces went after Vice
President Hashemi, military units were deployed outside of Issawi’s house in the Green Zone placing him temporarily under house arrest. The
Finance Minister then tried to fly to Kurdistan with Hashemi and Deputy Premier
Mutlaq, but was forced off the plane. At the same time, some of his security detail were taken in for questioning about supporting insurgents in Fallujah. A Maliki adviser said there were accusations that Issawi was behind assassinations. Many of Iraq’s political figures have been involved in violence at one
time or another. Claims that Issawi was involved with insurgents then due to
his life in Fallujah should come as no surprise. The fact that General Odierno
claimed that he found nothing on the Finance Minister should not be discounted.
More importantly, the nature of the arrests of his guards in 2011 and currently
point the finger at the prime minister manipulating the charges to pressure one
of his critics more than anything.
The Iraqi government is characterized by the number of
crises it has gone through. Just as one ends, another presents itself. The last
several however, have all been created by Prime Minister Maliki. The arrest of
Finance Minister Issawi’s guards is just the latest example. The Iraqi National
Movement, Americans, and other leading parties have all seen it as another
instance of the premier using the security forces against his political
opponents. The fact that it came on the year anniversary of Vice President
Hashemi going through a very similar set of circumstances only drove the point
home more. Maliki has used targeted detentions before to send the message that
anyone that opposes him is vulnerable. This also comes as all the major parties
are preparing for the 2013 elections. The fact that there have been such strong
reactions not only by the U.S. and the other lists, which were predictable, but
on the Iraqi street as well may put a check on the premier going any further.
He may have never intended to do so anyway as the arrests were a strong enough
message. Now it’s only a matter of the prime minister and Finance Minister
coming to some kind of agreement to end this blow up. Unfortunately it will not
be the last time Iraq sees this type of incident.
SOURCES
Adnan, Duraid and Arango, Tim, “Arrest of a Sunni Minister’s
Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq,” New York Times, 12/21/12
AIN, “Defense Committee: number of Esawi’s guards,
released,” 12/21/12
- “Esawi not involved in criminal actions according to
primary investigations, says MP,” 12/22/12
- “IS suspends its ministers from CoM’s meetings,” 12/22/12
- “MP: Foreign guarantees behind return of Iraqiya Slate to
parliament,” 1/31/12
- “Mutleg calls IS to suspend from current government,”
12/21/12
Alsumaria News, “An informed source disclosed agreement to
resolve the issue individuals protect Issawi conveyed investigation committee
headed by Atta,” 12/22/12
Associated Press, “Iraq finance minister says staff members kidnapped,”
12/20/12
- “Sunni demonstrators challenge Iraq’s Shiite-led
government, denounce bodyguards’ arrest,” 12/23/12
Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Alliance denounces intruding
Issawi’s offices,” 12/22/12
- “Tribal delegation arrives from Missan to take part in
Anbar protest,”12/25/12
Dar Addustour, “Maliki calls for parliament to withdraw
confidence from the al-Mutlaq – Government waited and proclamation of the
results revealed the involvement of senior political terrorist operations,”
12/18/11
Dodge, Toby, “The resistible rise of Nuri al-Maliki,” Open
Democracy, 3/22/12
Gordon, Michael, “Tensions Rise in Baghdad With Raid on
Official,” New York Times, 12/20/12
Healy, Jack and Gordon, Michael, “A Moderate Official at
Risk in a Fracturing Iraq,” New York Times, 12/30/11
Al-Jawari, Fulaih, “Cracks in Iraqiya begin to open,” AK
News, 1/8/12
Knights, Michael, “Iraq’s Political Crisis: Challenges for
U.S. Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12/21/11
Al-Mada, “Power of the Prime Minister’s Office arrested
facilities Rafie al-Issawi,” 12/20/12
Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraq After the U.S. Withdrawal: Update #1,”
Institute for the Study of War, 12/19/11
- “Iraq’s First Post-Withdrawal Crisis,” Institute for the
Study of War, 12/19/11
National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar Provincial Council:
Hashemi scenario repeated with Issawi,” 12/21/12
- “BREAKING NEWS Chalabi, Araji joint Iraqiya’s urgent
meeting,” 12/20/12
- “BREAKING NEWS Obama makes a call to Essawi in response to
the arrest of Essawi’s head of his guards,” 12/20/12
- “Continues to sit for the second day in Anbar province and
cut off part of the international road,” 12/24/12
- “Demonstrations in Salah al-Din condemns “arbitrary
measures” against Issawi protection members,” 12/21/12
- “Demonstrations pro-Issawi in the cities of Alqaim and
Rotba of Anbar province,” 12/21/12
- “Iraqiya coalition suspends its attending in the
Parliament,” 12/23/12
- “Protesters from Fallujah cut off the international
highway and heading to Baghdad,” 12/21/12
Radio Nawa, “Bayraktar: an arrest warrant for official
protection Issawi was issued some time ago but he was on the run,” 12/22/12
Al Rafidayn, “Alfalh: 20 families of Anbar filed lawsuits
against al-Issawi and protection elements Hashemi,” 12/22/12
Sabah, Mohammad, “Sadrists: everyone concerned Maliki risks
and trust no Badthamath and investigations,” Al-Mada, 12/21/12
Salaheddin, Sinan and Schreck, Adam, “Iraq confirms arrest
of minister’s bodyguards,” Associated Press, 12/21/12
Schreck, Adam and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq: New Protests
Break out in Sunni Stronghold,” Assocaited Press, 12/26/12
Shafaq News, “Council of ministers delay its sessions after
al-Iraqiya ministers boycott it,” 12/25/12
- “Maliki gained the support of some of al-Iraqiya leaders;
source said,” 9/3/12
Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 30,” 1/3/12
- “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 40,” 6/20/12
Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis,
Update 2,” Institute for the Study of War, 12/23/11
Al-Tayyeb, Mouhammed, “Government to investigate Issawi’s
alleged support for terrorism,” AK News, 12/22/11
Van Wilgenburg, Wladimir, “Iraqi Government Will Possible
Arrest More Sunni Leaders,” Transnational Middle-East Observer, 12/22/11
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