Many of the current
events in Iraq harken back to previous times. In 2004 the insurgency made a
major progression from hit and run tactics and setting off roadside bombs to
making a surge into some of the country’s urban areas. The American and Iraqi
forces responded with the two battles of Fallujah and other smaller clearing
operations. By the end of the year, American commanders were claiming that they
had broken the back of the insurgency. A series of intelligence reports were
saying the opposite. They warned that the militants were actually getting
stronger. The parallels with the current situation are obvious. The insurgency
launched a major summer offensive and captured sizeable territory in Ninewa, Salahaddin,
Kirkuk and Anbar provinces in June 2014. Now the ISF are attempting to regain
the initiative just as the U.S. did in 2004 via a number of large-scale
campaigns. The clearing of major urban areas in 2004 was hailed as victories
then, just as the current operations by the ISF are. Despite those setbacks,
the insurgency showed great resiliency and was able to regenerate its losses
and actually increase the pace of its attacks in 2005. The lesson to be learned
from 2004 is that defeating the insurgents in urban areas does not mean their
end, and that their dispersal over other regions may actually lead to an
increase in overall violence in the country in the future.
At the beginning of
2004 the United States had a false sense of security. The commander of the 82nd
Airborne Division General Charles Swannack said that the insurgency was defeated in March. The Americans were moving
their forces out of Iraq’s cities and into large bases. There were also plans to pull out frontline
troops and replace them with National Guard units that were supposed to be 40%
of the force after June. The number of attacks betrayed a different story.
There were around 300 incidents in November 2003, going up to 370 in the first
week of April, before hitting roughly 600 the next week. The Americans didn’t
notice it at the time, but at the start of the year the militants were building
up their networks in Iraq’s cities in preparation for a major uprising to be
launched in the spring.
The 1st battle of Fallujah in April 04 ended almost as soon as it began due to political complaints about civilian casualties (U.S. Marine Corps)
The trouble started
at the end of March in Anbar’s Fallujah and would spread to other areas of the
province. On the last day of the month, a convoy of Blackwater security
contractors was stopped and four members killed in an ambush. Their bodies were
later strung up on a bridge. Marine General James Mattis who was then commander
of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force wanted to conduct a police
operation to quietly find and kill the insurgents responsible for the attack.
The television coverage generated by the ambush however led the Coalition
Provisional Authority and the White House to demand a major military operation
to pacify the city. That led to Operation Vigilant Resolve, which started on
April 5. The Americans wanted to give an Iraqi face to the assault and deployed
the 2nd Iraqi Battalion to participate. The unit proved not ready
with 106 of the 695 soldiers deserting and another 104 refusing to fight. Many
of the Iraqi interpreters that worked with the unit also quit. The Marines went
ahead. After surrounding the city they attempted to move into its environs.
Suddenly, four days after the start of the operation it was called off. Just as
the media played a role in the start of the operation, the coverage of civilian
casualties led America’s political leadership to call it off. General Mattis
was incensed and questioned the decision when none of the goals of the
operation had been achieved. At the same time heavy fighting broke out in Ramadi on April 6. The Marines there were almost overrun as militants
attacked them in four different locations. It started when a routine patrol was
fired upon in the northwest section of the city. Then by the Euphrates in the
north another contingent of fighters was seen and intercepted leading to
another firefight. The shooting would then spread to other sections of the
city, and would last until April 10. At the same time, militants attacked Husaybah near the Syrian border with 300 fighters in an attempt to draw away
American forces from the assault upon Fallujah. These attacks highlighted the
strength of the insurgents in Anbar. They were able to mass forces and carry
out large-scale military operations in multiple locations at the same time. They
were also emboldened by the U.S. withdrawal from Fallujah. This would give the
militants a strong foothold in Anbar that would take the next few years to
reverse.
By June, the Americans
were paying for the failure to carry through with Vigilant Resolve. Various
Islamist factions within Fallujah began imposing their version of Islam upon the city. Many participated in a ceremony that month
to pledge allegiance to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and named him the emir of the
Islamic caliphate of Fallujah. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi officials admitted that the decision to pull back from the city was a mistake, and that insurgents
were now in control of it. This was all setting a stage for the second battle
of Fallujah, but that was still a few months away.
Anbar was not the only
trouble spot however, as Tal Afar in western Ninewa proved. At the beginning of
September the U.S. began a two-week siege of the town to clear it of insurgents called Operation Black Typhoon.
September 12 two U.S. battalions and an Iraqi one moved into the city only to
find that most of the fighters had fled. As was the practice then, the
Americans quickly withdrew to focus upon other areas. That allowed the
militants to move back in. Tal Afar eventually became an important way
station in bringing in weapons and foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq, and
insurgents were able to impose their will over the city. A local tribe aligned
with the militants and the police either disappeared or began collaborating
with the fighters.
The U.S. almost repeated
the same mistake in Salahaddin’s Samarra. At the beginning of September the
Americans decided to pull back from the city. That allowed the insurgents to
establish control there, and cut deals with local sheikhs to widen their
influence. At one point, 500 fighters marched through the streets. That
prompted the American and Iraqi forces to move to retake Samarra at the
beginning of October. 2,000 Iraqis were deployed. There were some problems when one battalion
had 300 of its 750 soldiers desert before the operation started. Others carried
out their duties much more admirably and were responsible for securing the Golden Mosque at the start of the battle. Afterward the
U.S. began major reconstruction projects to try to secure the city after the fighting
was over. This was much different from other operations when the Americans
would mostly leave. The problem was that this was still the exception rather
than the norm. Samarra was also a precursor to the impending battle of Fallujah
as the Coalition command wanted to clear out smaller cities before moving onto
the main target.
A Marine Abrams tank engaged during the second battle of Fallujah (Dept of Defense)
Everyone knew that
Fallujah would have to be dealt with again and in a much more thorough fashion.
In June, General George Casey replaced General Ricardo Sanchez as the commander
of Multi-National Force Iraq. Casey wanted to destroy insurgent strongholds
before the January 2005 elections for an interim parliament. That led to the 2nd
battle of Fallujah dubbed Operation Phantom Fury. The U.S. went in with a much
larger force then the first attempt consisting of 6,500 Marines, 1,500 army
soldiers, 2,500 sailors, and 2,000 Iraqi troops. At first, the U.S. told the
civilian population to leave the city to avoid the conflict. The fighting
started on November 8, and ended up destroying almost the entire city. 2,000
buildings were ruined and another 10,000 badly damaged. It was believed that
1,000 insurgents were killed, although many actually fled before the attack
began. Clearing missions continued for six weeks afterward with more heavy
clashes. General John Sattler the new commander of the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force claimed that Phantom Fury had “broken the back of the insurgency.” The
general’s comments reflected the general mood amongst the Americans at the
time. Fallujah was a major insurgent base where different factions were able to
openly operate and foment their rebellion against the state. The clearing of
the city therefore was considered a major setback, which it was hoped the
militants would not recover from. This proved to be wishful thinking.
The insurgency was
far from over, which was shown in neighboring Ramadi. After the fall of
Fallujah, many fighters regrouped in Ramadi just to the west. By the fall the city was considered
under insurgent control. The governor’s three sons were kidnapped there and only released after he agreed to resign. The deputy governor
was also abducted and executed, and the president of Anbar University was
seized as well. It wouldn’t be until the emergence of the Awakening the next
year that Ramadi would be fully secured. This again showed the ability of the
militants to move on after their losses and re-form in new locations to carry
on with their fight. This was an important trait that would be exercised again
and again.
By the end of 2004
the White House and some military commanders were feeling quite good about the
situation in Iraq, but there were a number of dissenters. In the fall, a senior
administration official told President Bush that the U.S. was not winning.
Later U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte went on to say the same ting. In
November a confidential army report said that the tactics used by the Americans
in Iraq such as mass arrests and holding prisoners for months could be fueling
the insurgency. (1) In December the CIA station chief in Baghdad sent a report
to Washington warning that the insurgency was growing. December 17 Colonel
Derek Harvey a military intelligence analyst briefed the president saying that
the militants were strong, and that a civil war could break out at any time. CIA
Director Porter Goss then met
with the president in the middle of the month telling him that the U.S. and
interim government hadn’t been able to find or exploit any divisions withing
the insurgency, and that they hadn’t been able to win over many Sunnis either. Finally,
a study
by the then Knight Ridder Newspapers showed how violence had only escalated in
the country since the U.S. invasion despite the setbacks the militants faced in
2004. In May 2003 there was an average of 17 U.S. military personnel killed per
month. That went up to 82 per month by the end of 2004. The number of Americans
wounded during that period increased from 142 to 808. Attacks increased from
735 in November 2003 to around 2,400 by October 2004. Finally, mass casualty
bombings went from 0 in the first four months of the U.S. occupation to an
average of 13 per month by the end of 2004. President Bush was fully committed
to the war in Iraq, and did not listen to any of these warnings. Instead, he
pushed ahead despite the U.S. not having a strategy to win the war for three
more years. The predictions in the briefings also proved largely true as the
militants did grow stronger in the following years, and the civil war broke out
in 2005. Finally, the much lauded January 2005 elections showed the level of
Sunni discontent with the new Iraq rather than bringing them in. 58%
of eligible voters participated, but in largely Sunni provinces the turnout
was much lower with 2% in Anbar, 17% in Ninewa, 29% in Salahaddin and 33% in
Diyala. Without winning over that part of the population the insurgency would persist.
A major difference between 04 and 14 is that IS is far more dependent upon holding territory and constant victories to maintain its following then previous insurgent groups (AP)
2004 has many
parallels and lessons for 2014. In the former militants were attempting to take
the insurgency to a new phase by not only attacking the Coalition and Iraqi
government, but also seizing cities. The hope was that this would lead to a
general revolt, and the much hoped for return to power for those that had lost
out after the fall of Saddam. The U.S. and Iraqi forces were able to clear the
militants out of several of these locations, most famously Fallujah, but at the
cost of largely destroying the place. This simply dispersed the armed factions
to other locations where they regrouped and regenerated their losses and
capabilities. The rebellion didn’t materialize, but the violence ended up
increasing. The major problem was that the United States had no strategy to
defeat the insurgency. It could clear out a city, but it lacked the political
and economic follow up to hold any place and win over the populace so they did
not welcome the fighters back. This mirrors current events. The Islamic State
planned a major offensive this summer in cooperation with other armed factions
and tribes. It didn’t imagine that it would be able to take Mosul, but when the
ISF collapsed and the city fell it took advantage of the opportunity to seize
other territory in Kirkuk and Salahaddin. Like in ‘04 the government responded
by ordering massive military campaigns to regain territory. That started with the
relief of the town of Amerli in Salahaddin, and was then followed by the
clearing of the rest of the Tuz Kharmato district, Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil, and now
Baiji also in Salahaddin. The problem is just like in the former period the
Iraqi government has no real strategy to defeat the insurgency. Like the
Americans Baghdad has no plans for how to reach out to Sunnis and break up
militants’ networks, which is necessary in the long run to secure the country. The
major difference between then and now is that the Islamic State is much more
dependent upon holding territory and winning constant victories to maintain
itself. It has taken on a large number of foreigners, fighters from other
organizations, and tribal elements. They have all joined because of the promise
of gaining power. If IS continues to face setbacks in Iraq it could eventually
reach a tipping point when these fellow travellers withdraw their loyalty and
leave the group. That may not end the war however as many of these IS men are
hardcore insurgents who will keep up the fight just under another guise. Ultimately,
the armed factions can survive without places like Tikrit and Mosul. If they
are lost the fighters will just move on to other places and violence might
actually increase just like it did in 2005. The one positive to come out of
that will be the loss of the Islamic State’s dominance over other armed
factions, but it too has shown great staying power over the years as well.
Until the Iraqi government finds a way to appeal to Sunnis so that they no
longer support taking up the gun in order to assume power the war will continue
at various levels for the foreseeable future.
FOOTNOTES
1. San Francisco
Chronicle, “Army told of abuse before Abu Ghraib,” 12/1/04
SOURCES
Cambanis, Thanassis,
“Enemies find common ground,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/7/04
Filkins, Dexter,
“Fallujah now a ‘terrorist hotbed,’” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/8/04
- “U.S. forfeiting
influence in growing number of Iraqi cities,” San Francisco Chronicle, 9/5/04
Fox News, “Showdown
in Samarra,” 10/11/04
Fumento, Michael,
“Return to Ramadi,” Weekly Standard, 11/27/06
Hashim, Ahmed, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency In Iraq,
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006
Kirdar, M.J., “Al
Qaeda In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011
Lasseter, Tom and
Landay, Jonathan, “Analysis: Iraqi insurgency growing larger, more effective,”
Knight Ridder Newspapers, 1/21/05
Lund, Aaron, “Who
Are the Soldiers of the Islamic State?” Carnegie Endowment, 10/24/14
McGeary, Johanna
“Mission Still Not Accomplished,” Time, 9/20/04
- “Which Way Is The
Exit?” Time, 3/15/04
Oppel, Richard,
“Magnet for Iraq Insurgents Is a Crucial Test of New U.S. Strategy,” New York
Times, 6/16/05
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, New York: Penguin Press, 2006
San Francisco
Chronicle, “Army told of abuse before Abu Ghraib,” 12/1/04
Schmitt, Eric, “In
Iraq, U.S. Officials Cite Obstacles to Victory,” New York Times, 10/31/04
Schrader, Esther and
Mazzetti, Mark, “Insurgents threaten Iraqi elections, U.S. officials say,” San
Francisco Chronicle, 11/20/04
Stannard, Matthew,
“The Challenge Of Controlling Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 9/24/04
Strobel, Warren,
Walcott, John and Landay, Jonathan, “U.S. isn’t winning against Iraqi
insurgents, agencies warn,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 12/17/04
Wire Services, “Five
Marines killed in battle near Syria,” St. Petersburg Times, 4/18/04
Zoroya, Gregg,
“Fight for Ramadi exacts heavy toll on Marines,” USA Today, 7/12/04
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