Starting in October 2014 the Albu Nimr tribe has faced one
setback after another now verging on tragedy. Based out of central Anbar
province in western Iraq, the tribe had been fighting the Islamic State (IS)
for months, but then lost two of its major strongholds. Afterward, the
Islamists relentlessly hunted down its tribesmen kidnapping some and executing
others. Almost five hundred have died so far. IS has a long history of carrying
out such retaliatory attacks against its opponents, especially in Anbar dating
back to its predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Albu Nimr knows this past all too
well as it had been against the insurgency since 2004. As then the point now is
to instill fear in the tribes in the Islamic State’s attempt to seize control
of Anbar.
The Albu Nimr’s problems began when the Islamic State
started a surge across central Anbar at the beginning of October. On October 3,
the city of Hit
was taken, which was one of the main homes for the tribe. It had been calling
for help for some time, but received little. The displaced fighters
continued their struggle outside of Hit, but then faced another setback when
neighboring Zauiyat fell in the middle of the month. The town had been surrounded,
and the elders of the tribe were begging for coalition air strikes to relieve
the pressure, but all they got were fly overs and a humanitarian
air drop. On October
23 the village was taken. Afterward tribesmen claimed there were sleeper
cells within Zauiyat who provided lists of wanted people. That’s when the
kidnappings and executions began. On October
27 55 tribesmen who were part of the local police and Sahwa surrendered to
IS. They repented
to the group, but then on October 29 they were taken to Hit and killed. Then IS
kicked their family members out and took their homes. That same day another 200
tribesmen were executed in the area. The next day
two sheikhs were kidnapped near Hit who were looking for their massacred
tribesmen, one of which was executed himself on October
31. October 30 200 members of the Albu Nimr were seized in the Lake Thar
Thar region, and 50 were later executed, followed by another 62 on November 1.
The following
day IS caught members of the Albu Nimr who were fleeing their towns, took
17 away, while shooting 67 others. Finally, on November
3 36 were killed, and 24 more on November 4. In total, the
tribe has lost at least 495 people according to press reports. At first, the
Islamic State was just going after tribe members who had fought against it. It
later included women and children who it captured. The Albu Nimr had been
targeted by IS’s earlier manifestation Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but had never
faced these types of losses. AQI didn’t have the strength or control of
territory in Anbar like IS does today. What is similar is that the Islamists
have a long history of taking vengeance upon tribes in the province that
opposed it to make examples out of them and intimidate others.
The Albu Nimr have a legacy of their own in opposing the
insurgency. In October
2003, the tribe offered to form a border patrol force in Anbar in
cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Anbar-Syrian
border had been left open by the U.S. and foreign fighters had already begun
flowing into the country as a result. This was pushed
by CPA Governor Keith Mines as a form of local reconciliation, but the
Coalition leadership was not interested in engaging with tribes believing that
they did not have a place in the new Iraq the U.S. was trying to create. The
next year Sheikh Talal al-Gaood began talks
with the U.S. Marines and the Pentagon in Amman, Jordan to try to form an
alliance between the Americans and elites in Anbar. While that deal never came
to fruition, Albu Nimr’s Sheikh Faisal al-Gaood was appointed governor shortly
afterward. He would later be assassinated
by AQI. In the middle of 2004 Albu Nimr went back
to the U.S. offering fighters for the local police and to form an
anti-insurgent militia in return for money, weapons, and support. The Americans
only sent
in a Special Forces unit to assist the tribe. By the spring of 2005 the Albu
Mahal tribe in Qaim along the Syrian border created the Hamza
Battalion. This group was later expanded to include the Albu Nimr in Hit.
The two tribes asked
for U.S. support, but in a military operation they actually got attacked
because there was no coordination between them. In the end, the Hamza Battalion
was wiped out by AQI. In another sign of the lack of consistency in American
policy at that time, in the fall
a Special Forces unit arrived in Hit and began recruiting Albu Nimr members for
the Desert
Protectors. The tribe promised 200 fighters, but the program never got the
support from local U.S. forces that it demanded. To top things off the day the
recruits were to be picked up for training, the plane didn’t show up due to
maintenance, and the majority of tribesmen went home. The Americans also asked
the fighters to serve throughout Iraq when they were only interested in
protecting their home region. They never became a major part of the program as
a result. In 2006 it finally got several hundred of its men into the local
police as the Awakening movement began. This was when the Americans finally
came up with a successful tribal policy, and security began improving as a
result. Several years later the tribe rose up with others in Anbar when Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki shut down the Ramadi protest site and arrested
Parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani at the very end of 2013. There were reports that
the clan helped
take over Fallujah, but were opposed to IS’s presence in the city. As the
Islamists power increased throughout the governorate the tribe went back to its
traditional role of fighting them. The Albu Nimr’s recent history showed that
it was always willing to work with the U.S. and opposed the Islamic State. By
2013 it had gotten mad at Maliki and joined the Anbar protests and then the insurgency.
It was willing to take part in the tribal revolt against Baghdad, but it was
not willing to work with IS that it had such a bad history with. That led it to
eventually switch sides and join other pro-government tribes, which led it to
its current predicament. Although this flirtation with the insurgency was
brief, it was also the reason why Baghdad was hesitant to aid it and others in
Anbar.
Today, the Albu Nimr are on the run from the Islamic State.
This all happened after its two traditional bases of Hit and Zauiyat were lost
in the current round of fighting in Anbar. The government has promised a major
offensive to relieve the tribe, but nothing substantial has happened yet. This
has only made the tribal leaders even more bitter as they had been asking for
help from Baghdad for months and received nothing. Until then more men, women,
and children from the Albu Nimr will be executed as the IS seems intent on
exacting its revenge upon it. This is part of the Islamic State’s larger
strategy of trying to take the entire province. It is hoping to scare and
intimidate those tribes and local security forces that are still fighting it.
It also highlights the group’s long history of killing any that stand in its
way showing its utter ruthlessness.
SOURCES
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Fallujah and Ramadi,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/9/14
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"Daash executed 50 people from the Albu Himr tribe and trapped 200 others
north of Ramadi," 10/31/14
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Rasheed, Ahmed, Hameed, Saif and Parker, Ned, “Consumed by
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1 comment:
Excellent piece. Explains many reasons for things I encountered while on the ground in Anbar.
Thank you and keep it up.
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