Both the taking of Ramadi by the Islamic State and its
recapture by the Iraqi forces were a long time coming. IS attacked the city for
almost a year, while the operation to free it took five months. The aftermath
of securing the area, re-establishing governance and services will take even
longer. Despite these difficulties the liberation of Ramadi was a huge setback
for the militants proving that they lack the resources to hold urban areas in
Iraq, and a boost for the Iraqi government that was severely criticized for
losing the city in the first place.
Both before and after the summer 2014 offensive, which saw
the seizure of Mosul and Tikrit, the Islamic State remained focused upon Anbar
and its capital Ramadi. The province was one of its major bases, and was the
first place it seized territory when the insurgency was reborn. Its Sunni
population and its tribes were also seen as an enticing base for the
organization to build within. The final push that took Ramadi came in two
waves. First, in mid-April
IS started a new series of attacks, which led to the seizure
of several neighborhoods. On April
16 a security source told the National Iraqi News Agency that 70% of the city
was under IS control. The final assault came in mid-May. IS sent in reinforcements
from Mosul and Salahaddin, and began
with men dressed in military uniforms and driving Humvees to infiltrate the
defenses, and then unleashed thirty suicide car
bombs against the government complex
in the downtown. The Iraqi Security Forces and allied tribes quickly crumbled,
IS took the city, and immediately began
executing
people.
This was a huge victory for IS. It solidified the group’s control over more
than half of the governorate topped off by capturing the provincial capital. It
also caused dissent amongst local tribes and undermined the government’s
attempt to create a new Sahwa in Anbar. Ramadi was the birthplace of the
Awakening and its loss was a sign that Baghdad could not protect its allies
there. For example, several sheikhs accused the government of betraying them
during the battle as they felt abandoned when the ISF pulled out of the city.
Anbar’s tribes would only back the side that would stand by them to assure
their self-preservation, and after Ramadi the government did not look like it
could play that role.
There were also repercussions for Prime Minister Haider
Abadi. First, he was talking about
freeing all of Anbar after Tikrit was taken in March. Then Ramadi fell and his
strategy looked like a failure. Second, even before Ramadi was lost the premier
was coming under increasing
pressure from Nouri al-Maliki and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr and
Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). They complained they were being kept out of the Ramadi
fight, and being constrained in Anbar overall even though they were already
operating in places like Garma. Even though Abadi is commander and chief and
the Hashd are supposed to be under his command Badr’s Hadi Ameri said they
would fight in Anbar no matter what the premier said. Third, the Anbar
provincial council undercut Abadi as well authorizing
the Hashd to deploy to the governorate since it was shell shocked after the
fall of Ramadi. Finally, members of the prime minister’s own Dawa Party and
State of Law (SOL) list came out against him. One SOL parliamentarian said
that IS’s victory in Ramadi proved that the United States was helping the
insurgents, and that Iraq should turn towards Iran instead. A Dawa official claimed
elements of the security forces and the tribes the Abadi was arming were
working with IS. Abadi had been riding high just a few months beforehand when
Iraqi forces retook Tikrit the first major city to be liberated from IS. Then
he lost all of that prestige with Ramadi. Not only that it allowed his rivals
like Maliki and Ameri to attack his governance, and his alliance with the
Americans as everything was blamed on the two. That split continued as plans
were made to retake the city.
The divide between Abadi and the pro-Iranian Hashd continued
when the offensive to retake Ramadi began. Immediately after the city was taken
the prime minister said there would be a swift response to liberate it. Ameri contradicted
him by saying he had his own plan for Anbar, and that did not include going
after Ramadi right away. Ameri’s strategy was quickly revealed to not include
the city at all, but going
for Fallujah instead. That meant the day the Ramadi offensive began the
Hashd started
their own one in Fallujah. Hashd leaders like Ameri were directly
challenging Abadi’s leadership of not only security in Anbar, but the entire
country. Ameri and others had already been calling for them to take over
command of operations instead of the security forces. Now the fall of Ramadi gave
them the opportunity to claim the premier had failed, and now they were going
to bring victory to the province. Not only that, it split the forces that could
have been arrayed against Ramadi. That hurt because the lack of manpower has
been an on going dilemma for the Iraqi forces as they have not been able to
hold many of the towns and suburbs that they cleared. In turn, the Hashd did
not have the fighters to be successful in Fallujah either causing problems in
both cities.
On the other hand, the United States stepped up its support
to make sure that Ramadi would be retaken. U.S. advisers in Anbar helped
plan the operation. The Americans trained
the army units fighting for the city, and a new force of tribal fighters. Washington
also wanted to keep the Hashd out of Ramadi to make sure that it was an Iraqi
Security Forces’ (ISF) victory. That eventually happened as Hashd units left
bases where U.S. advisers were working, and then a mass
exodus occurred by October under pressure from Baghdad. An Iraq Oil Report article
claimed there was an agreement between the Abadi government, the U.S. and the
Hashd to withdraw from the operation. The Americans got their tribal fighters
into the Hashd so that they could get paid. Finally, the U.S. fired
artillery from bases they were stationed at and carried out air strikes to
support the ISF’s advances. The Americans were determined that Ramadi would be
liberated. They also wanted to make sure that it would help PM Abadi after all
of the criticism he received for losing the city. That meant building up ISF
and Sunni Hashd units to capture Ramadi, and pushing the Shiite Hashd out that
were trying to undermine the premier. While much of this happened behind the
scenes by the end of the battle the Iraqi papers were full of stories of U.S.
special forces and helicopters taking part. It’s not clear how much the
Americans were involved in end, but their influence was apparent to all especially
to the pro-Iran Hashd who were opposed to their presence and assistance.
The final attack on Ramadi started on December
22. The elite Golden Division led the operation crossing a bridge that was
construction by the ISF to cross the Warar canal into the center of the city. Iraqi
police units came from a different direction. Five days later the Khalidiya
Council said
that IS was withdrawing to the east taking civilians with them as civilian
shields. Then the next day the ISF declared victory and hoisted the Iraqi flag
over the government center that was taken by the Islamic State seven months earlier.
This was a huge accomplishment for the ISF, which had been humiliated back in
May. Not only was it able to liberate the city, the ISF did it largely on their
own with Shiite Hashd units mostly on the periphery. This helped PM Abadi as
well because he could say his forces and leadership were the right way to take in
the fight against IS unlike the pro-Iranian groups who quickly got bogged down
in Fallujah, and worked against the Ramadi campaign from the start. Most
importantly it exposed the Islamic State. The group can put up a grinding
defense, but it lacks the fighters to hold any city against a large and
determined government force. At the same time, reaching the middle of a city is
only the start of the larger battle to rid Iraq of the insurgency.
The taking of the downtown was not the end of the struggle
for Ramadi or against the Islamic State. There are still IS elements in many of
the surrounding suburbs and towns and it has re-infiltrated into others. A
member of the Anbar council said
that there were insurgents in 25% of the city and in the outlaying region that
would have to be dealt with. It will take a lot to permanently clear out these
fighters, something the ISF has always struggled with. The government is trying
to create a new
police force to carry out these duties, but the numbers that have appeared
in the press are nowhere close to what is required. There are also fears that
tribes will want to exact revenge upon those who worked with IS. For example,
there was a story that
claimed that tribes had lists of collaborators. Carrying out vendettas will not
help bring stability to the city or prove that the government is back in
control. Last, 80% of the city is reportedly destroyed,
and a member of the Anbar Council believed that it would take 10 years worth of
budgets to rebuild it. None of these issues are easy to tackle. Fighting will
continue in the city and its environs and could quickly deteriorate to what it
was like right before the city fell with neighborhoods under IS control. The
tribal vengeance can only be deterred if the government is strong, but it may
not have the forces or judicial capacity to fully deal with the situation.
Finally, real stability can not return to Ramadi until it is reconstructed,
services are restored and the authorities have real power over the entire area.
These are the challenges that lie ahead and could very well be replayed in
future military operations in places like Fallujah and Mosul. If the government
can’t get Ramadi right it may not be up to the task of providing real security
to other cities after they are freed of IS in the future. The victory in the
city therefore, brings both promise and peril that will play out in the coming
months.
SOURCES
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