At the end of 2002 into January 2003 the Blair administration went through a sea change in its Iraq policy. In the previous period Prime Minister Tony Blair had his one and only victory in the entire Iraq War when he convinced President George Bush to go to the United Nations for a new resolution on weapons inspections. After that however the discussion immediately shifted to invasion.
In November 2002 Iraq said it would comply with United
Nations Resolution 1441 for new weapons inspections but London was skeptical of
that. A British intelligence report said that Baghdad would treat the new round
of inspections like the previous ones in the 1990s, meaning it would hide its
programs. That was because Saddam believed that WMD was integral to him staying
in power and therefore he would never give them up. The United States took the
same position. Blair’s foreign policy adviser Sir David Manning told National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that this would eventually ensure
international support for action against Iraq. In fact, France and Russia had
voiced skepticism that anything the U.N. did would justify an invasion.
That same month was the first time that London started
seriously discussing overthrowing Saddam. Blair told his cabinet that
Resolution 1441 meant that military action could be taken without a second one
if Iraq was found in material breach. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw however
disagreed saying another resolution would be needed. London was also worried
that the U.S. would jump the gun and start a war over any little violation Iraq
might make, which was confirmed by the U.K. ambassador to the U.S. Sir
Christopher Meyer. Despite this Blair promised America military support for any
action against Saddam. The prime minister told Bush he believed that the
inspectors would find something and that would be the trigger for military
action. Blair’s top priorities were to disarm Iraq and stand by the United
States. He believed the U.N. would not only provide a reason to move against
Iraq, but that he could talk it into authorizing it as well. This proved to be
wishful thinking, something Blair suffered from during the entire lead up to
the 2003 invasion.
On December 7, 2002 Iraq provided a 7,000 page weapons
declaration to the U.N. inspectors that said it had no WMD. The U.K. and the
U.S. both said that was a patented lie. Bush thought this proved that Iraq was
not only unwilling to cooperate with the international community, but that it
would not disarm, and that therefore the invasion was inevitable. While there
were many problems with Iraq’s declaration, Baghdad was not lying. It had no
active WMD stockpiles or programs. The problem was the attitude of London and
Washington was shaped by the 1990s inspections when Iraq actively sought to
hide what it was doing. They therefore believed Iraq would never come clean
about its weapons programs. Blair however thought the inspection would uncover
some WMD and allow for the overthrow of Saddam. Bush on the other hand, never had
confidence in the U.N. and only agreed on going to it to support Blair who said
it was necessary to win domestic support on Iraq.
Bush and Blair were not helped by the U.N. inspectors. On
December 19 for example, the head inspectors Hans Blix and Mohammed al-Baradei
reported to the Security Council. Blix said no smoking gun was found, but then
said that didn’t mean Iraq wasn’t hiding something. He demanded Baghdad turn
over more information saying there were inconsistencies with its 2003 declaration
and its old ones from the 1990s. El Baradei however said no nuclear weapons
program was discovered. His questions focused upon what Iraq had done in the
1980s. The inspectors would ultimately be proved right. Not all of Iraq’s paper
work added up because it had secretly destroyed all its remaining WMD and not
documented it, but there was no WMD in Iraq. Again, this didn’t matter because
Bush and Blair already believed Iraq was hiding what is was doing.
January 16, 2003 Blair had his first cabinet debate on Iraq.
Blair said that the inspectors needed more time, and a second U.N. resolution
would be necessary for using force if Iraq didn’t comply. Foreign Secretary
Straw said there was a good chance that a second resolution would pass, but
then claimed one wasn’t necessary. Blair did not tell his ministers that he was
already contemplating military deployments to the Middle East and had promised
Bush England would stay by the U.S. no matter what. The Chilcot Inquiry would
come down hard on Blair for taking so long to talk with his cabinet about Iraq.
Especially because he didn’t tell them he was going to join the invasion. The
Inquiry criticized Blair for holding almost all his discussions on Iraq with a small
circle of advisers and not getting a wider range of opinions and including more
of his cabinet. Since Blair wanted to follow Bush’s lead that probably wouldn’t
have mattered.
SOURCES
The Iraq Inquiry, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 7/6/16
Other stores on the Chilcot Report
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