Chilcot Report Section
3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options September to November 2002 – Negotiation
of Resolution 1441
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PM Blair was convinced he could change Pres Bush's opinion about going to the U.N. over Iraq (AFP) |
From September to November 2002 the main issue before the
Blair government was how to approach the United Nations and deal with the
United States’ opposition to that move. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s only victory
so far with the Bush administration was to convince the president to go to the
U.N. to get a new resolution on Iraq. Now there were disputes over whether one
or two resolutions were needed to go to war. The Blair government was told that
two would be necessary, and the problems that would cause with the Americans,
but Blair went ahead anyway taking the risk that things would work out.
In the fall of 2002 the biggest issue before the British
government was whether one or two United Nations resolutions was needed to deal
with Iraq. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued for just one resolution that
would include both a demand for new weapons inspections, and if that failed
would authorize the use of force. The problem was elements in the U.S. didn’t
want to go to the U.N. at all. Some were pushing for a single declaration and
if that was not passed the U.S. would act. The English were against this idea
believing that would not win over its public. In September, Prime Minister
Blair and his staff agreed upon a first resolution that would demand
unconditional inspections and move on from there. The problem from the start
was that the Americans were a very reluctant partner. Bush, and especially Vice
President Dick Cheney was
diametrically opposed to including the U.N. Blair changed Bush’s mind, but
he was still weary. From the start London knew two resolutions were probably
necessary, one for inspections, and one for the use of force, and that
Washington only wanted one. This gamble by Blair to go for one and hope for two
proved to be a major mistake because it did not work out.
When London and Washington discussed drafting the first
resolution, all of their differences came out. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and Cheney were trying to include issues that Iraq would never meet so that action
could be taken immediately as soon as it was passed. The British wanted the
inspectors to play out first, and then discuss the next move. The two sides
finally agreed on a draft at the end of September. Despite that small victory,
the tensions between the two became more apparent.
The next step for Downing Street was to win over parliament.
On September 24, the body began discussion of Iraq. That same day, the
government released its Iraq weapons dossier with the claim that Iraq could use
WMD in 45 minutes. The premier told parliament that Iraq had an active WMD
program, and that his goal was to disarm Iraq via the United Nations. That was
necessary because Iraq had used those weapons before and could use them again
in the future. Ministers and aides to Blair told the legislature that a new
U.N. resolution on Iraq was coming, and that would not authorize force. From
the start, Blair’s main concern about Iraq was its WMD and disarming it. He
laid out his argument to parliament successfully. What he didn’t tell it was
the second resolution that would authorize force was unlikely because
Washington disagreed with one. He didn’t let the lawmakers know that because he
believed that he could convince Bush to change his mind, just like he was able
to get the president to go to the international body to begin with.
During this debate British intelligence released a report
that varied in important ways from the U.S. On October 10 the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) issued a paper saying that Iraq’s ability to
conduct terrorism was limited, and it would only go that path if attacked. The
JIC also noted that Iraq could only use WMD within its borders. It also didn’t
think there was any cooperation between Al Qaeda and Iraq despite various
meetings and the presence of Musab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad and Al Qaeda members
with Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan. The British found no evidence that Saddam
controlled Ansar. These were also diametrically opposed to what the Americans
were saying. Both agreed that Iraq had WMD, but the U.S. pushed that its
missiles gave it the ability to hit targets outside of the U.S. It also pushed
the claim that unmanned aerial vehicles could be delivered off the coast of
America and attack the homeland. The two countries also agreed that Iraq and Al
Qaeda had contacts, that Zarqawi was in Iraq after the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan, and that Al Qaeda refugees had migrated from that country to Ansar
al-Islam’s camp. The Bush administration claimed the two had cooperated for
years however, that Zarqawi was an Al Qaeda agent working with Baghdad, and
together with Ansar showed that Saddam and bin Laden had an alliance. London
and Washington would never agree upon these points, but the very strong ties
between Blair and Bush were all that really mattered. They both agreed that
Saddam had to go, so the underlying disagreements did not matter.
Another difference between the two was over the new
inspection regime. On October 11, the Joint Intelligence Commission argued that
while Saddam believed he could deal with new inspectors he would cooperate
because he wanted to avoid a new military confrontation. Iraq would still try
to hide and block inspections however. The Americans on the other hand, never
believed in the inspections, and just saw them as a step towards war. They
argued no matter what happened, Iraq was guilty of hiding its WMD, and that’s
why Saddam should be deposed. As long as things were moving forward Blair
thought he still had Bush’s ear and could influence him towards London’s
position.
On November 8, U.N. Resolution 1441 passed saying that Iraq
was in breach of previous resolution, and this was the last chance for it to
come clean about its WMD and disarm. China, France, and Russia issued a joint
statement that if Iraq didn’t cooperate the issued would go to the Security
Council for action. Bush said that the U.S. reserved the right to decide what
to do about Iraq regardless of the U.N. Blair’s government was also split. Some
came to the U.S. position that only one resolution was needed while others
believed a second one authorizing force would still have to happen. Blair even
admitted that a second resolution would be very hard given the positions of
France and Russia. He was also told by the attorney general that going back to
the U.N. would be necessary to have a legal invasion of Iraq. Here again, Blair
was being confronted with all of the problems with his position. A second
resolution was needed but the U.S. didn’t want one, and permanent members of
the Security Council would not vote for one either. The prime minister’s
supreme confidence made him believe he could prevail with several different
countries all at once, which proved to be false. Things would eventually
collapse at the U.N., but Blair just moved on anyway not wanting to break with
the U.S. This would be one of many failures the British had in Iraq, which
would characterize its entire engagement in the conflict.
SOURCES
Chilcot Report, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive
Summary, London: House of Commons, 2016
Prados, John, Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How
Bush Sold Us a War, New York: The New Press, 2004
Woodward, Bob, Bush At War, New York, London, Toronto,
Sydney, Singapore: Simon & Schuster, 2002
PREVIOUS CHILCOT
REPORTS
Chilcot Report Section 3.2 Development of UK Strategy and Options, January to April 2002 - "Axis Of Evil" to Crawford
Chilcot Report Volume 2 Section 3.3 Development of UK Iraq Strategy and Options, April to July 2002
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