Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.7 May 2008 To October 2009

Section 9.7 of the Chilcot Inquiry covered the end of the British presence in Iraq. It dealt with two main issues. First was the aftermath of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Charge of Knights security operation against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia in Basra. The second was the timetable for the U.K.’s withdrawal from the country.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.6 28 June 2007 To April 2008

Section 9.6 of the Chilcot Inquiry covers the new British government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown who wanted to withdraw from Iraq and the Charge of Knights security operation launched in Basra against the Mahdi Army. The irony was the British made deals with the Sadrists so it could pull out its forces and then the Iraqi government went after Sadr’s militia and the UK was drawn back into the fight.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.5 June 2006 To 27 June 2007

By the summer of 2006 the British were much more realistic about their assessments of the situation in Iraq than their American counterparts. While the Bush administration was full of hope for the new government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki the UK said he was weak. There was report after report to London that violence was out of control. What was similar between the Bush and Blair governments however was that they both were focused upon withdrawing from Iraq.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.4 June 2005 To May 2006

From the summer of 2005 to the summer of 2006 the British were having trouble on two fronts in Iraq. First, despite Prime Minister Tony Blair still thinking positively about the war officials in his government still believed that the Coalition was failing. In the south which the U.K. was responsible for its own strategy was also not working and the focus turned to how it could withdraw as quickly as possible, which mimicked the American plan which the Brits were critical of.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.3 July 2004 To May 2005

The Chilcot Inquiry shows that the British were far more aware of the deteriorating situation in Iraq than the Americans. From July 2004 to May 2005 the U.K. was concerned about growing violence from the insurgency and militias and didn’t think that the new Iraqi political system would solve either one.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.2 23 May 2003 To June 2004

During the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War the Blair government was very optimistic. It believed that it could influence the Bush administration’s war plans and that everything would work out even when things didn’t go according to plan during the invasion. As soon as the occupation of Iraq began the British changed their tuned. They believed that the U.S. had no plan for postwar Iraq and that security was quickly deteriorating. They warned the Americans who largely ignored them.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.1 March to 22 May 2003

The British were caught off guard by the post-war situation in Iraq. That’s because the Blair government had made so few plans for what it was to do the day after the invasion ended. There were mixed ideas about who would run Iraq, the security situation and deBaathification.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 8: The Invasion

The British entered the invasion of Iraq focused upon taking Basra province which they initially believed would be an easy task. They ended up getting much more than they were planned for. The UK found itself an occupying power afterward with no strategy on what to do.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.5 Planning And Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

From January to March 2003 the Blair government was frantically trying to draw up its plans for post-war Iraq. One issue it pushed was getting the United Nations involved which was opposed by the United States. It was also worried that the Americans were not adequately strategizing for the day after the invasion. Third, Prime Minister Tony Blair was not providing the necessary leadership to make an organized effort to tackle the situation. The result was that the U.K. went to war without the resources and ideas for dealing with the post-Saddam situation in Iraq which endangered all its goals

Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation For A Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, Mid-2001 To January 2003

The Blair government knew that dealing with post-war Iraq would be a huge challenge. Unlike the United States it had a history with the country and had reporting about what was happening within the nation. Still London suffered from the same lack of planning that the United States did from having too many groups working separately and never coming up with a final product on what to do the day after Saddam Hussein was deposed.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.2 Military Planning For the Invasion, January to March 2003

In 2003 the U.K. had to completely change its war plans. Previously it was thinking of invading from Turkey but that had to be scrapped. The Americans suggested that the British deploy in southern Iraq instead. Prime Minister Tony Blair largely kept this from his cabinet which had done from the start. Finally, London ignored its responsibilities by not strategizing for how to administer Iraq after the war.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 6.1 “Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq”

The Bush administration wanted the U.K. included in the invasion of Iraq to make it look like Washington wasn’t acting unilaterally. This was a given because Prime Minister Tony Blair early on promised to follow President Bush on any decision he made. Like everything else on Iraq London ran into nothing but problems and yet never changed its position.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 5 Advice On The Legal Basis For Military Action, November 2002 To March 2003

The Blair government needed a legal ruling to go to war with Iraq. That centered around whether a second U.N. resolution was needed to authorize force against Saddam. The man that determined that was Lord Goldsmith the U.K. Attorney General who gave a convoluted opinion on the matter.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.4 The Search For WMD

Tony Blair had been convinced since the 1990s that Iraq still had WMD. When none was found after the 2003 invasion it challenged not only the justification for the war but Blair’s entire mindset about Saddam Hussein. London followed the same script as the United States shifting from claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction to Saddam wanting them. The fact that the latter would not make Baghdad a threat was never mentioned as Downing Street was thrown on the defensive.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

In the fall of 2002, the Blair government was concerned about how the return of United Nations inspectors would work out. Prime Minister Tony Blair believed that they would find something and that would justify the war. At the same time London had to deal with the Bush administration which was growing impatient and wanted to go to war sooner rather than later.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.2 Iraq WMD Assessments, July to September 2002

2002 was when the U.K.’s assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction dramatically changed. British intelligence became more assertive about Iraq producing WMD and restarting its nuclear weapons program despite the sources being very sketchy. This was topped off by the Blair government’s dossier on Iraq which had headline grabbing claims such as Iraq being able to deploy WMD in 45 minutes. This kicked off London’s information campaign to win support for war.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 4.1 Iraq WMD Assessments, Pre-July 2002

Early British assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were almost exactly the same as the Americans. In the 1990s to the early 2000s the U.K. assumed that Iraq still had its WMD and wanted to expand its programs. It also felt that Baghdad would always hide what it was doing. Just like the U.S. the threat assessments also gradually increased.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March 2003

In March 2003 the decision was officially made in London to go to war. The Blair government constantly asked for more time from the Bush administration to try to work out a deal with the United Nations but time had run out. Prime Minister Tony Blair did not tell his cabinet the full situation and the U.N. never had a vote to authorize the conflict. England joined the invasion because Blair had promised President Bush he would back him no matter what. This was another example of Blair not getting what he wanted on Iraq but going ahead anyway because of his relationship with Bush.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

In the months immediately before the March 2003 invasion of the Iraq the number one priority of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government was getting a second United Nations resolution to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein. This was despite the fact that the weapons inspectors had found nothing, and France, Russia and others on the U.N. Security Council opposed going to war. Despite that Blair was convinced that he could win the day. He would be proved wrong again and again.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy and Options, November 2002 to January 2003

At the end of 2002 into January 2003 the Blair administration went through a sea change in its Iraq policy. In the previous period Prime Minister Tony Blair had his one and only victory in the entire Iraq War when he convinced President George Bush to go to the United Nations for a new resolution on weapons inspections. After that however the discussion immediately shifted to invasion.