Early Election Results Show 56% Voter Turnout In Iraq

 

November 11 Iraq held its seventh parliamentary elections. Despite widespread worries about apathy amongst the public there was an increase in voters and the highest participation rate since 2014.

Review Mugged By Reality, The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions

Agresto, John, Mugged By Reality, The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions, New York: Encounter Books, 2007

 

John Agresto worked for the Coalition Provisional Authority from 2003-2004 as the advisor to the Ministry of Higher Education. The book covers two themes. The main one is the author giving a neoconservative argument for why he supported the Iraq War. The second is what were the root causes for the failure of the U.S. occupation sprinkled with anecdotes about the people he met in Iraq. The book is about how the author struggled to hold onto his ideas as they were confronted by the occupation. Some of his criticisms are poignant but too many times he rambles on and contradicts himself.

Review Hope Is Not A Plan, The War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone

Mowle, Thomas, Hope Is Not A Plan, The War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone, Westport London: Praeger Security International, 2007

 

Hope Is Not A Plan, The War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone is a very informative book about the lack of U.S. strategic planning and coordination from 2004-05. It’s an anthology with each chapter written by military officers who served in Iraq during that period. As the editor Thomas Mowle points out everyone should know that the Bush administration did not plan for the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion that led to looting and the collapse of the Iraqi state. What this selection tries to point out is that the Americans continued to fail at planning afterward.

Chilcot Inquiry Section 9.4 June 2005 To May 2006

From the summer of 2005 to the summer of 2006 the British were having trouble on two fronts in Iraq. First, despite Prime Minister Tony Blair still thinking positively about the war officials in his government still believed that the Coalition was failing. In the south which the U.K. was responsible for its own strategy was also not working and the focus turned to how it could withdraw as quickly as possible, which mimicked the American plan which the Brits were critical of.

U.S. Army History of Iraq War Vol 1- Chapter 19 The Iraqi Civil War Comes Into The Open, January-June 2006

The winter of 2005-06 saw Iraq’s civil war come out into the open. That was after the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra shrine. Unsurprisingly the U.S. commander General George Casey still thought his plans were working and pushed for a timely withdrawal. He failed to realize that Sunnis were disenfranchised or that the government was actively taking part in the fighting. That also meant that the Americans continued to miss the splits within the insurgency. This period was a testament to how disconnected the U.S. was from what was going on in the country. Thousands of people were ending up dead and General Casey still claimed everything was going alright.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 - Chapter 18 – Defeated By Democracy, Winter 2005-2006

The end of 2005 brought continued failure for the U.S. effort in Iraq which the American military was ironically completely unaware of. The commanding General George Casey actually thought his strategy was working and the U.S. could start withdrawing its troops soon. He couldn’t have been more wrong. The country was moving towards civil war as shown by not only violence, but the elections and constitutional drafting process. The U.S. was also ignoring Iran’s interference and England’s failure in Basra. It would take another year for the Americans to realize that things had gone tragically wrong in Iraq.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 - Chapter 15 – Transformation In A Time Of War, January-April 2005

The start of 2005 was a transition period for both the United States and Iraqis. On the one hand the U.S. was trying and failing to implement its first strategy for Iraq. On the other Al Qaeda in Iraq was announced, other insurgent groups were breaking with Zarqawi, and Moqtada al-Sadr moved towards Iran.

Review The U.S. Army In The Iraq War: Volume I, Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War, 2003-2006

Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank Editors, with Godfroy, Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne, Morton, Colonel Matthew, Powell, Colonel James, Zais, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War: Volume I, Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War, 2003-2006, United States Government, US Army, 2019

 

The U.S. Army’s official history of the Iraq War was delayed for years. When it was released the military tried to bury it claiming that fighting irregular conflicts like Iraq was not what the army’s doctrine was about. It wanted to focus upon taking on a major power instead. This is the exact same thing that happened after the Vietnam War and a reason why America was so unprepared for Iraq. The first volume of the history deals with the period from 2003-2006. It provides five major reasons why the U.S. strategy failed during the start of the occupation of Iraq.

Review Iraq in Fragments, The Occupation and Its Legacy

Herring, Eric and Rangwala, Glen, Iraq in Fragments, The Occupation and Its Legacy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006

 

The thesis of Iraq in Fragments, The Occupation and Its Legacy by Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala is that the United States failed to create a successful state after the 2003 invasion. The book is divided into three broad sections. First is the politics of the U.S. occupation, then security and finally the economic changes the Americans attempted. The first part is good and has some interesting takes on why the Iraqi ruling parties are not responsive to the public. After that however it runs into more and more problems as it makes assertions about things that never happened. It makes the last two-thirds of the book a bit of a mess.

Review The Triumph of the Martyrs, A Reporter’s Journey into Occupied Iraq

Rosen, Nir, The Triumph of the Martyrs, A Reporter’s Journey into Occupied Iraq, Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc, 2008

 

The Triumph of the Martyrs, A Reporter’s Journey into Occupied Iraq by Nir Rosen tries to explain the fracturing of Iraq during the first two years of the U.S. occupation. Journalist Rosen spent most of his time in the country talking with Iraqis from all different groups from Sunni and Shiite clerics to members of the Kurdish parties to Turkmen to insurgent groups. He found during the first few months after the invasion Arab Iraqis were united in their opposition to the Americans but this quickly came apart. That was replaced by communal demands for power and violence by insurgents and militias. Rosen’s argument is that the Bush administration came to Iraq claiming it was going to bring democracy but instead it spit the nation.

Review Patriotic Ayatollahs, Nationalism In Post-Saddam Iraq

Review Sayej, Caroleen Marji, Patriotic Ayatollahs, Nationalism In Post-Saddam Iraq, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019

Caroleen Marji Sayej set out to document the role of the leading Ayatollahs from Najaf. She argued that they played a pivotal role in post-Saddam Iraq. They were not quietist as many believed staying out of politics, but saw themselves s guides for the new Iraq. That didn’t mean they wanted an Iranian style Islamic state where clerics would run the government. Instead they pushed for a democratic Iraq. At the same time, they were challenged by others such as Moqtada al-Sadr who claimed equal standing with the ayatollahs even though he did not have their religious education. There were two major problems with the author’s thesis. The first was that she believed they wanted a non-sectarian Iraq, when they supported a Shiite majority victory in the 2005 elections. The second issue was that she took statements and fatwas from the clerics at face value and didn’t do the research into the overall situation leading to many very questionable assertions.

Moqtada al-Sadr’s Difficult Relationship With Iran Interview With Subaltern Research Services’ Dr. Nicholas Krohley

For many years during the U.S. occupation of Iraq Moqtada al-Sadr was considered an Iranian proxy. Iran gave military assistance to Sadr’s Mahdi Army and during the Surge Moqtada left Iraq and went to Qom for religious training. The truth of the matter was that Tehran never really trusted Sadr to do its bidding, while he expressed strong nationalist ideas. In more recent times Iran got many of its Iraqi allies to send fighters to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, while Sadr did not. Today Iran is mobilizing militias to confront the insurgency in Iraq and Sadr has brought out his new Peace Brigades to join the fight. That doesn’t mean that he is any more open to Iran’s plans for Iraq as he has attacked the other militias as “foreigners” referring to their funding and direction from Tehran. To help explain the ebb and flow of Sadr’s ties with Iran is Dr. Nicholas Krohley, founder of Subaltern Research Services and author of The Death of the Mehdi Army: Insurgency and Civil Society In Occupied Baghdad.

Sadr always had a difficult relationship with Iran having to balance his nationalist rhetoric with his need for assistance to arm his militia against the Americans (Reuters)

 

1. Immediately after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 it appeared that Moqtada al-Sadr was moving towards Iran’s orbit. In June Sadr travelled to Iran to talk with officials there and Ayatollah Haeri. Upon his return Sadr said that he believed in Iranian style clerical rule except that the leader had to be an Iraqi. Then in July he started criticizing Haeri for not staying in Iraq during the Saddam period like he did. It seemed like Sadr was willing to receive support from Tehran, but he wanted it to be on his terms. Was that a fair characterization of how Sadr saw Iraq’s neighbor?

Muqtada’s relationship with Iran was, and remains, necessarily complex. For context, it’s critical to emphasize the anti-Iranian rhetoric of his father, Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who created the Sadrist Movement during the 1990s. The elder Sadr was an ardent Iraqi nationalist who placed enormous emphasis on Arabism and tribalism as defining attributes for Iraqi Shi’a. His most important scholarly/clerical work was an attempt to reconcile Arab tribal customs with Sharia law. Central to his life’s work was the message that Iraq’s Arab Shi’a are the rightful leaders of the Hawza, and that Persian ‘interlopers’ like Sistani (who was his contemporary and bitter rival) have no business dominating Najaf. Likewise, the (largely underclass) Shi’a followers of the elder Sadr were generally hostile to Iran, due in significant measure to their having played a central role in the brutal 8-year war between the two countries. A strong case can be made that the elder Sadr’s populist anti-Iranianism was a key reason that Saddam Hussein allowed the Sadrist movement to develop as it did, because it helped distance Iraq’s Shi’a from Iran’s influence and promoted nationalist/Arabist sentiments at a time of intense sectarian insecurity for the regime.

 

Sadr's father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr was an ardent Iraqi nationalist who argued that Iraq's Arab Shiite should run the Hawza (Al Sadr office)

It’s an issue that deserves deeper discussion – but the short of it is that a partnership between Iran and Muqtada was by no means natural, nor was it easily reconciled with the ideological foundations of the popular movement that Muqtada inherited from his father. Similarly, Muqtada’s advocacy of clerical rule for Iraq – with Iraqi/Arab leadership – was entirely consistent with the teachings of his father, and a direct challenge to the Iranian government.

That said, the political landscape of the post-Saddam era created strong incentives for cooperation. Muqtada and the newly rekindled Sadrist movement were positioning themselves as the premier Shi’a opponents of the US and its Iraqi allies (some of whom were prominent former rivals of Muqtada’s father), and they needed funding, training, weapons, etc. The tactical weakness of the Mehdi Army in the ’04 battles with the Americans in Najaf underscored the urgency of this. Iran, for its part, wanted to establish as much influence as possible in the new Iraq to advance its own interests, and was prepared to form working relationships with just about anyone (to include Sunni militants) to that end. So I would argue that the relationship was viewed with intense pragmatism on both sides – it wasn’t a partnership between friends or natural allies, but rather an alliance of mutual convenience, in which each side was attempting to use the other to achieve their own (at times contradictory) goals.

2. In 2004 there were the Sadrist uprisings against the Americans. There were Iranian advisers amongst his Mahdi Army in Najaf. At the same time, Iran pushed for a negotiated settlement because it was more interested in the 2005 elections, which would usher into power some of its long time allies such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). What was Iran’s view of Sadr as a militia leader and Iraqi politician?

I couldn’t say how Iranian leaders viewed Muqtada on personal terms. A good answer to that question would require intimate access to key decision-makers in Tehran – people like Qassim Suleimani. What does seem clear to me, however, is that the Iranian government treated Muqtada, the Sadrist movement, and the Mehdi Army as a set of tools to be used in pursuit of their national interests. No more, no less. And the Iranians always kept their options open, and were quick to reposition when it suited them. In the run-up to the 2005 elections, I would assume Iran’s overriding goal was to cement strong influence within a religiously-defined Shi’a government of Iraq that would be (at worst) friendly to Iran, if not actually subservient. This required forging a measure of unity among Iraq’s Shi’a factions (something that is by no means a naturally occurring state of affairs), so the Iranians helped orchestrate a quite awkward alliance between the Sadrists and establishment parties like ISCI and Da’wa. Meanwhile, the Iranians wanted to keep bleeding the Americans – hence the their diversification of Shi’a militant assets via men like Khazali at a time when the mainstream Mehdi Army stepped back from the front lines of ‘resistance’ (in keeping with Sadrist participation in the political process as an ostensible ally of the Shi’a establishment).

3. When the Surge started in 2007 Sadr went to Qom for religious training, which many saw as him seeking protection from the Americans. What’s your take on why he left Iraq, and do you know what his time was like in Iran?

There are a number of good reasons why Sadr might have left Iraq when he did. One would certainly be fear of the Americans, who were growing increasingly aggressive, and effective, in targeting the Mehdi Army (and who made at least one attempt to capture him personally, I believe). Or perhaps he was playing ‘the long game’, and he figured it was best to wait out the Surge from the safety of Iran – knowing that the Americans would eventually pack up and leave. Another possibility would be fear of targeting by his fellow Iraqi Shi’a, as there was serious, multi-directional intra-Shi’a violence across southern Iraq at that time that involved the Mehdi Army, the Special Groups, and Badr. It’s also been argued that he was trying to distance himself from the abuses of the Mehdi Army and the mediocrity and corruption of prominent Sadrist politicians. By decamping to Iran, the argument goes, he would be able to return to Iraqi politics at some point in the future with not only enhanced clerical credentials, but also a measure of deniability for the failings/misdeeds of those who had been operating in his name. He could play the part of the returning reformer. Beyond that, you can pick from a colorful array of conspiracy theories.

As to his time in Iran, I don’t have any direct insight there. But it would be fascinating to hear how he was received/treated by Iranian officials in Qom, what Muqtada really thought of them, and what the dynamic was between him and other ‘scholars-in-residence’.

 

Qais Khazali (left) was a close aide to Sadr's father and Sadr himself (right) and would eventually leave the movement and receive Iranian backing to create Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. This was part of Tehran's move to gain greater control over Shiite armed factions in Iraq that would do its bidding. (Shafaq News)

4. Qais Khazali was one of the close aides to Moqtada’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, and after his death he took on a similar role with the son. In 2004 after the Sadr uprisings Khazali left the movement and started receiving backing from Iran. He would rejoin the trend and then leave again eventually forming Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), the League of the Righteous. Similarly Iran began organizing members of the Mahdi Army into what became known as Special Groups. What was Iran’s strategy behind taking on these breakaway factions and what was Sadr’s response?

Iran’s immediate purpose was to develop assets that could be used to kill American soldiers, Iraqi politicians, and members of the Iraqi Security Forces. Whenever possible, Iran wanted to exert direct operational control over these assets, as the ability to escalate/deescalate violence in Iraq was a key strategic weapon. Iran worked with the Mehdi Army to that end, but, as discussed above, this was a difficult relationship that I think was ultimately unsatisfying for Iran. The Mehdi Army, like the wider Sadrist movement, was a major player in Iraqi politics with objectives and interests that were not always compatible with the Iranians’. It was also large and unwieldy, with locally-oriented commanders exerting significant (and unpredictable) influence. So it made perfect sense for the Iranians to take advantage of divisions within the militia to develop separate relationships with splinter groups like AAH. These groups were far smaller and more manageable, more radical/militant, and more dependent on Iranian patronage due to their lack of popular/political support among Iraqi Shi’a.

You can think of it this way: the Mehdi Army, like the Sadrist movement, was a distinctly Iraqi phenomenon, which emerged independent of Iranian involvement and could pursue its ends, albeit much less effectively/efficiently, without Iran’s help. But AAH and the other Special Groups are inconceivable without Iran’s direct, ongoing involvement.  The underlying dynamics are evident in the example you give at the outset: AAH has sent fighters to Syria and Lebanon, where they fight alongside Quds Force and Hizballah. They are creatures/creations of Iran, and their orientation is international – in line with the international objectives of the Iranian government. The Mehdi Army, on the other hand, is Iraqi at its core. The militia maintained a relationship of convenience with Iran, but it was by no means a tool thereof.

With that in mind, on a longer-term horizon, Iran’s cultivation of groups like AAH looks like an attempt to undercut Sadrist influence in Iraq and reshape Iraq’s domestic politics in Iran’s favor. As noted below, the long-term aspirations of Muqtada and the Sadrist movement pose a direct challenge to the Iranian government, and the Iranians have good reason to be wary of both. By enabling AAH’s growth, and its transformation into a political organization that now competes with the Sadrists for the votes/loyalty of the latter’s traditional demographic base, the Iranians have altered the political landscape in Iraq. The ultimate success of this effort remains uncertain (AAH managed only 1 seat in the recent round of elections), but sudden changes of political fortune have been commonplace in the post-Saddam era.

5. Do you think today Sadr continues with this love hate relationship with Tehran?

As an outsider looking in, I’d suspect that the Iran-Sadr relationship leans more toward “hate” from both sides. I see Muqtada as an Iraqi nationalist who wants to realize his father’s dream: a place of preeminence for Iraq’s long-suffering Shi’a underclass within a unified Iraq, and an Iraqi Arab (in this case, Muqtada himself) at the helm of the Hawza in Najaf, providing leadership to Shi’a across Iraq and beyond. If achieving that dream requires working with Iran, then so be it. Yet this makes Muqtada a serious threat to Iran in the medium- to long-term. A forceful, popular/populist, and outspoken Iraqi Arab Marja’ advocating clerical rule from Najaf would be an enormous challenge to the Iranian establishment. But in the interim, the dance of politics goes on, as each side tries to make use of the other to navigate the immediate, day-to-day challenges of the region.

SOURCES

Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03

How Faults With Iraq’s Constitution Undermines The Country, Interview with Constitutional Scholar Zaid Al-Ali

 

In October 2005, 79% of Iraqi voters came out in favor of a new constitution. The document was drafted in only a few weeks however, due to pressure from the United States. While the new government it created included many basic rights like freedom of association, and the right to education and work, it also had more controversial issues like creating a new federal system. Most of these new rules were not fleshed out in the final draft however, and were to be finalized in an amendment process that has never happened. Because of those vagaries, and the lack of further legislation, every political party in Iraq claims that its position is supported by the constitution making it a source of contention rather than unity. What follows is an interview with Zaid Al-Ali, a lawyer who has worked for the United Nations on constitutional and parliamentary issues on why he thinks the 2005 constitution is a flawed document. He just published a book The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy. He can also be followed on Twitter @zalali.

1. Many countries that have written constitutions in the last several decades have had outside help and influence whether from foreign governments or international bodies such as the United Nations. In Iraq however, the U.S. had an overwhelming influence by setting the timetable, influencing the make-up of the drafting committee, and the final document. The Americans for instance, decided that there would be elections for an interim parliament in January 2005, who would then select a committee to write the constitution, which wasn’t put together until May, and their work was due by August, for a final referendum in October. Was this enough time to do all of the necessary work, and what was the overarching goal of Washington to have the document completed in just a few months?

It was absolutely not enough time.  In countries that emerge from harsh dictatorships such as Iraq, political forces and society as a whole need a lot of time to recover and to debate a set of vital issues, including what type of state they want to establish for themselves, and what relationship the state should have with various communities and with the individual.  You need to be able to have a national debate on issues like federalism, fundamental rights, the role of religion, etc.  Once again, in countries like Iraq, which emerged from a period of decades in which none of these issues could be discussed in a critical or free manner, we were absolutely not in a position to have a national debate on something like federalism by 2004 and 2005.  And if a national debate had to take place, it should have taken place over a significant period of time, and certainly not rushed.  Rushing these issues can lead to all sorts of unexpected outcomes in relation to really fundamental issues, which is far from desirable. 

Something else is that when you are intent on redesigning the state in countries like Iraq, it is advisable to do so in as scientific a way as possible.  One of the things that you would do is look into your own institutions of state and study which operate effectively and which do not.  You would study your anti-corruption framework in detail and figure out where the cracks lie.  You would also try to understand if your due process requirements are being respected in practice, and if not, if there is an institutional reason for that.  These are issues that take time, particularly in countries like Iraq where free debate and critical analysis was forbidden for decades.   Once again, to rush these issues or to just ignore them, which is what eventually happened in Iraq is to invite either unexpected outcomes or simply the continuation of practices from the previous regime, which is also what ended up happening in Iraq. 

By way of comparison, Tunisia’s new constitution took two years to draft in a very free and relatively peaceful environment.  All in all, South Africa took 7 years to draft its text.  Kenya also took that amount of time to draft its constitution.  Each country needs to decide on its own what amount of time it should take to draft its constitution; and that process should not be overtly influenced by foreign nations as was the case in Iraq. 

In terms of why Washington was so determined to finish the drafting process so quickly, I can’t really speak as to what their motivations were, and I wonder if they really understood what they were doing.  Certainly they were determined to transition as soon as possible to a fully “legitimate” according to their definition of the term, constitutional system of government that would be in place for a full legislative term.  Some analysts have speculated that the U.S. was purely motivated by domestic considerations: by insisting in August 2005 that the drafting process should come to an end immediately, they were essentially ensuring that a new permanent government would be in place before the 2006 mid-term elections.  A 6 month extension, which was allowed under the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), would probably have meant that the government might not be formed before the mid-term elections. 

The main question however is whether they realized what a disaster they were creating and I am still unsure about that.  There is evidence that they realized that the system of government that they were creating did not reflect the majority of what Iraqis wanted, but aside from that, they will have to answer for themselves as to why they proceeded in the way that they did. 

2. The issue of Sunni representation was always a pressing one, while writing the constitution. Of the original 55 members of the constitutional committee Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List got 8 seats, some of which were Sunnis, and there were two other Sunnis as well. This was due to the fact that the Sunni community largely boycotted the January 2005 vote. In June 15 Sunnis were selected as permanent members, and 10 became advisers, but they weren’t approved until July, just one month before the document was to be finalized. Were the Sunni members able to get their opinions included in the constitution, and how did that affect the October referendum?

The issue of “Sunni representation” in the constitutional drafting process has been very misunderstood.  The common understanding is that after the 15 Sunnis were added to the committee, that they were not included in the discussions and were essentially ignored, which is what led to the rejection of the constitution in Sunni-majority provinces in October 2005.  The drafts that were produced by the constitutional drafting committee tell a very different story.  What we know by reviewing the drafts is that the expanded constitutional drafting committee was making progress towards a constitution in which the central government would have played a much more important role than under the TAL, the interim constitution that was drafted by US officials and two Iraqi-Americans.  It turns out that most of the Sunni and Shia Islamists who were on the constitutional drafting committee had very similar ideas about what their future state should look like: they wanted for the state to be heavily influenced by religion, and also wanted for the central government to be the dominant force in the state and not the regions and provinces. 

In the end however, because the expanded committee was unlikely to meet the August 2005 deadline, some of the parties to the process and the U.S. embassy prevented the deadline from being extended by 6 months, and shut out a large number of drafters (most of the Shia and Sunnis) from the rest of the discussions altogether.  Suddenly, once again, by tracing the evolution of the drafts, the tone of the negotiations shifted altogether in favor of a very loose federation in which the central government played hardly any role.  Then, when the elected interim parliament , which was supposed to be responsible for putting together the draft demanded to be given the right to debate and vote on the draft, they were snubbed.  Instead, Hussein Shahristani, who was deputy speaker, merely read the draft to them without giving them a chance to debate or vote on it. 

In summary therefore, its not that the Sunnis’ views weren’t taken into account; in reality, most of the drafters and most of the elected representatives of the people were totally shut out of the process and were not allowed to debate or influence the final product.  Therefore the reasons for Sunni-majority provinces rejecting the draft in the referendum and for Shiite and Kurdish majority provinces voting in favor lie elsewhere. 

3. The U.S. went from pushing for including more Sunnis in the constitutional committee, and then excluding them from the Leadership Council, which put together the final draft. Why did it suddenly change its opinion?

Because it realized that having an inclusive negotiation process in which all the “components” defined on an ethno-sectarian basis of Iraqi society are involved would mean that an extension past August 2005 would be necessary.  Constitutional negotiations are very complex, particularly in societies that are emerging from totalitarian rule.  If you want to pay an expert to write a constitution for you on his own, then that might take him just a few days.  But if you want the constitution to be the result of a deliberative, political process in which representatives of the people are involved in decision making, etc. then you need to allow them sufficient time.  And the U.S. decided that the Iraqis would not be giving sufficient time to complete the draft. 

To be clear however, it was not just the Sunnis who were excluded from the Leadership Council; in fact, a large majority of the drafters were shut out altogether.  The only parties who were still fully involved in the drafting process after the Leadership Council took control were the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and then-Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), now ISCI. 

4. Did the leading role the U.S. played in the writing of the constitution affect its legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis?

Yes but not in the way that you would ordinarily assume.  Most Iraqis do not know what role the U.S. played in influencing the process and content of the constitution during those crucial weeks in August and September 2005.  So it is not the fact that the U.S. was involved that is the problem. 

The problem is that the U.S. skewed the process in favor of certain parties (PUK, KDP and SCIRI) which represent around 20% of the population and whose ideas on federalism were not shared by the remainder of the population.  The constitution lacks legitimacy mainly because of what it says and not necessarily because of U.S. involvement per se.  An increasing number of constitutional processes around the world have some type of foreign involvement, so it is not foreign involvement in and of itself that is the problem.  The problem is what the foreigners were doing and what impact they had on the final draft.  If U.S. involvement had been motivated by a genuine desire to bring all parties towards a negotiated solution and that enshrined a workable system of government, then there would far less to complain about.  But that isn’t what happened. 

5. Why did those three parties, the PUK, KDP and ISCI propose a federal system, and why were their ideas not popular in Iraq?  

It’s clear why the PUK and the KDP were in favor of federalism.  The Kurdish people of Iraq have suffered for a long period of time, and in reaction to that suffering pushed for more autonomy to be able to decide upon many of their own affairs.   As a minority within a much larger country, that arrangement made sense for them. 

In so far as SCIRI (now ISCI) was concerned, its much more difficult to understand.  The reason that Abdel Aziz al-Hakim gave during a speech that he gave in August 2005 was that the Shia should govern themselves in a large federal region in the south of the country as a means to benefit from the Kurdish experience, which had made significant progress in standards of living since the 1990s, but also in order to protect themselves in the context of a worsening civil conflict in 2005.  Some analysts have speculated that SCIRI was also encouraged by Iran to push for the formation of a single Shia region in the south of the country, but I don’t have any evidence to support that. 

Despite the fact that the constitution was approved by 80% of the population, the system of government as provided for by the constitution was immediately rejected by the large majority of the country’s political leaders as soon as it entered into force.  The Sadrists, Iraqiya, Iraqi Islamic Party, Dawa, the Independents, all made very harsh statements in 2006 in which they claimed that the constitution was deeply flawed.  In addition, for years, dozens of opinion polls were carried out throughout the country about what type of state Iraqis wanted, and a large majority consistently responded that they preferred a system that would keep them united (the only exception was during the worse period of the civil conflict in 2006 and 2007). 

The question then becomes why did the population vote in favor if they didn’t agree with its contents.  There are several reasons: (a) the vast majority didn’t read the text before the referendum and didn’t have a clear idea of what it provided (that is typical of constitutional referenda, not just in the Middle East but in most wealthier countries as well); (b) Shia political leaders who were opposed to the text were very reluctant to argue against the text, because of the sectarian and violent context.  SCIRI had a lot of momentum at the time, particularly in the media, and many felt that to argue against SCIRI’s position might have exposed them to accusations of being weak and not representing Shia interests.  The fact that there was rising violence (including terrorist attacks in crowded areas) at the time, made it very difficult to go against the tide, and so most kept quiet until after the referendum (including Moqtada al-Sadr); (c) in times of conflict, people’s priorities shift towards existential issues (survival, protection, separation, etc.) at the expense of those interests that would be prioritized during times of peace and stability (including corruption, fundamental rights, etc.).  Given that the conflict was worsening at the time of the October 2005 referendum, many voters were convinced by the argument that the central government should be very weak and that regions and provinces should dominate; (d) during times of transition in countries all over the world, there is always a strong tendency amongst voters to vote in favor of a proposed constitution (even one that they haven’t read) merely as an expression of a desire to move forward, and to reach some state of stability and normality. 

All those factors and others explain why the large majority of Iraqis voted in favor of the text.  They certainly did not vote in favor because they were convinced that they system of government that it provided was adequate for the country’s long term future.  

Ballots on Iraq's constitution 2005 (AP)

6. Many of the Sunni delegates were unhappy with federalism, and other ideas placed in the document. To appease them, just before the October 2005 referendum, the U.S. said that a committee would be set up to amend the constitution. That work was supposed to be done in six months, but that deadline was missed, and the committee got extension after extension until finally in June 2009 it submitted its report. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also called for the constitution to be changed in 2008 and 2009, but nothing has happened. Why has there been no action been taken? 

For the same reason that no action is taken in relation to the vast majority of the points of contention between Iraq’s ruling parties (including the oil and gas law, the formation of a second chamber of parliament, etc.).  The distance between the parties is too great, they are lazy, and have very little experience in successful negotiations.  Finally, the distance between the ruled and the rulers is so great in Iraq that the various components of government and parliament do not feel that they are under any obligation to reach an agreement on any of these outstanding issues.  They would all prefer to wait for years without making any concessions rather than work to reach an agreement that would be beneficial to the people.  The people’s interests are never part of the equation. 

7. You have compared Iraq’s 2005 constitution with its previous ones that were drafted from the monarchy up to the Baathist era. You’ve argued that they all followed a similar pattern, promising general rights, but then saying that future legislation would determine the specifics. For example, they all called for an independent judiciary. How has that worked out in practice?

My criticism of the Iraqi constitution in so far as judicial independence is concerned is that the 2005 constitution is almost identical to its predecessors (including the 1970 interim constitution).  You would have thought that the drafters of the 2005 constitution would have taken the time to include some more detail about this issue.  Based on comparative practice, it is now accepted internationally that in developing countries, if a constitution limits itself to merely stating that the judiciary is independent without actually providing any detail about how that independence should be protected, then the courts are highly exposed to manipulation.  The reason for that is because the detail has to come in the form of legislation, which is typically drafted by the government; and governments around the world always try to find ways to control the courts in some way or another.  In developing countries, which usually do not have democratic traditions and customs to fall back on one of the only defenses against this phenomenon is to set out in the constitution in what circumstances a judge can be dismissed, or sanctioned, and to set out what the possible sanctions are.  Iraq’s 2005 constitution does not do any of that, leaving everything to legislation, exposing the courts to manipulation and pressure by the government. 

There is also a separate problem, which is that judges are heavily reliant on the government’s security forces for their own protection, and in an intensively violent context, that exposes them to several opportunities for pressure. 

8. The Iraqi constitution names the prime minister as the commander and chief of the security forces, and states that the parliament should approve division commanders and above, which isn’t much of a check upon the executive using those forces for its own ends. Have other post-conflict countries placed stricter controls upon their army and police, and was that ever considered in Iraq?

Yes, under the South African and German constitutions for example, there are very detailed provisions on how the military should be used, how it should coordinate with other branches of government, what procedures it should follow in specific circumstances, etc.  These matters are sufficiently important particularly in post-conflict countries to merit including significant detail in the constitution. 

In Iraq, despite the role that the military played in the decades prior to 2003, the constitutional drafters did not include any specific rules governing the military’s rules of procedure or its chain of command.  All it says is that the prime minister is the “commander in chief of the armed forces” which is extremely unusual perhaps even unique in comparative practice for a parliamentary system of government.  The constitution does not even make an attempt to explain how the prime minister should relate to the minister of defense, and what each should be responsible for.  Under our constitutional system, legislation should have been passed to clarify this issue, but needless to say, nothing has been done about this since 2005.

Normally, the minister of defense would be the political figurehead of the military, and the minister would operate and issue instructions with the parliament’s approval.  That would have been far preferable in Iraq given that the parliament, in case of partisan abuse of the armed forces, would have been able to withdraw confidence from the minister of defense without causing for the entire government to fall.  That option doesn’t exist under the current system sadly.   

Iraq's parliament being sworn into office 2006 (AP)

9. One thing the constitution seems to be specific about is that the parliament is to oversee the government through investigating its agencies, passing the budget, questioning ministers, and having the power of holding no confidence votes. The parliament has either neglected those responsibilities or been stymied. What problems does the legislature have carrying out these duties?

The parliament has several problems.  The first is that the federal supreme court, which is responsible for interpreting the constitution, and whose decisions are binding, has essentially been captured by the government.  Since 2010, the Court has essentially not issued a single decision that does not favor the government.  At the government’s instigation, the Court has issued a number of decisions that have heavily limited the parliament’s powers.  Amongst other things, the Court has found that legislation must first be approved by the government before it can be voted on.  The parliament has therefore been reduced to the status of a rubber stamp institution.  The Court also found that parliament cannot question ministers unless evidence of a specific crime has been found.  The impact of that decision was essentially to remove all political responsibility from the government vis a vis the parliament. 

A second problem is that the parliament’s political divisions also prevented the parliament to act against the government and to withdraw confidence.  Since 2005, there has been a very negative practice of forming governments of national unity, according to which virtually every party that has any parliamentary representation is represented in some form in government.  That practice makes it very difficult to muster enough support to withdraw confidence from government given that parties that would otherwise not be in government and that are not particularly ideological (to put it mildly) have a direct and personal interest in seeing the government survive.  Accountability is made very difficult under such circumstances. 

A third problem is that the parliament’s internal divisions have seriously impaired its effectiveness.  When the 2005-2010 parliament first started its work, its members of staff were seriously criticized for being incompetent, and the parliament’s administration was criticized for not giving clear instructions or terms of reference to its staff.  Hence, from 2005 to 2010, serious effort was made to train staff members, and some progress was made.  After the 2010 elections took place, many positions within the parliament were reshuffled.  For example, Khaled Attiya, who was previously the first deputy speaker and who was a member of the State of Law Coalition, was replaced by a Sadrist one of the State of Law Coalition’s most important rivals.  Many of the new occupants of powerful positions within the parliament promised not to dismiss their predecessors’ staff, advisers and experts.  Although that promise was generally kept, something perhaps more sinister was done: predecessors’ staff were kept on in their positions, but were not allowed to do any work; they no longer received any instructions and were forced to just sit at their desks and do nothing.  They found much to their dismay that the new leaders within the 2010-2014 parliament simply brought on board their own staff who sat in the same offices as those staff members who had been there since 2005, but were the only ones to receive any instructions.  Although the parliament’s staff were never particularly impressive, the little know how that had been developed from 2005 to 2010 was essentially wasted. 

Finally, and this is something that is well known to anyone who has spent any time working on this issue, the parliament is populated by incompetent and lazy MPs who have been unable to organize themselves in a convincing fashion since 2006.  I was intimately familiar with the 2005-2010 parliament, and found its work ethic very problematic.  Contacts of mine within the parliament have complained that the current parliament is even worse than its predecessor.  The government is obviously not much better, but governments always have the upper hand against parliaments around the world and that is even more the case when parliamentarians spend more time in the cafeteria than working. 

10. You have written that the federalist system set out in the constitution cannot solve Iraq’s problems, and instead it needs decentralization. Can you explain the differences between the two, and given Iraq’s history of a centralized government, are there many in Iraq pushing for it?

I actually do not have a preference between decentralization or federalism.  My preference is merely that whatever system Iraq adopts, it should be designed in a way that is grounded in a desire to improve service delivery and standards of living and to reduce corruption, inequity and injustice.  My problem with Iraq’s 2005 constitution and the system that it provides is that it was designed not with good governance in mind, but based on a desire to allow Iraq’s “ethno-sectarian communities” to protect themselves from each other.  It is a text that reinforces the mentality of separation and fear, and not one that encourages reconciliation and progress.  The 2005 constitution allows for Iraq’s provinces to merge together and form larger regions that can essentially govern themselves almost entirely.  That was a recipe for disaster and thankfully that system was never adopted.  Al-Maliki’s first government, which was formed in 2006, refused to implement the constitution because it found that the system of government that is provided for was so problematic.  The problem with that decision is that it left us without an alternative set of rules to govern our country – no constitutional system to guide our country.   

The 2005 constitution provided for a deeply flawed system of government that did not even convince the country’s most powerful politicians and so was set aside and ignore.  The consequence is that we now have no rules to govern our system of government.  The fact that the constitution has not been revised since 2005 has meant that we are totally left at the politicians’ mercy: they are making it up as they go along, and the only standard that they apply in so doing is what is good for them personally.  This is no way to run a state and we desperately need a solution to this problem.  

Many people make the mistake of thinking that federalism is a system that allows for communities or geographic areas (let’s call them “regions” for the purposes of this discussion) in a given state to govern themselves within the confines of that state.  In reality, federalism does allow regions significant autonomy in relation to specific issues, but it also works the other way: the regions’ representatives also play an important role in setting national policy (typically through a second chamber of parliament), whether in relation to issues of national importance or matters that are of importance to other regions.  One of the differences between decentralization and federalism is that decentralized “regions” do not necessarily have the constitutional right to influence national policy. 

Despite the circumstances, there are still Iraqis who favor a centralized system of government but it’s difficult to know exactly what they represent given that most people do not really have a clear idea of what federalism is, or what decentralization entails, etc.  In an ideal world, my preference would be for more authority to be granted to provincial authorities, but under current circumstances that would probably be a disaster.  Corruption is already astronomically high in the country – the more you decentralize, the more difficult it becomes for anti-corruption and audit institutions to oversee contracting and implementation of major projects at a local level.  Under current circumstances, corruption would therefore likely increase in the short term, which is something that I am very concerned about.  

11. Finally, you have argued that Iraq needs better leaders that will be committed to amending the constitution and passing meaningful laws that will help the country move forward, rather than supporting the status quo. Can you see that kind of politician emerging out of Iraq’s current situation?

Under current circumstances, that will be very difficult.  The current legislative framework heavily favors incumbents (particularly those that are in control of ministries).  There is no political party legislation to speak of, and so parties are under no obligation to report any of the income or any of the expenditure.  They don’t even have to pretend.  It’s been more than ten years now, and the ruling parties are now deeply entrenched in the state.  They have developed sophisticated methods to steal vast sums of money; they have business interests throughout the country; they have television channels, websites, various media outlets; they have developed important patronage networks as well.  It would be difficult to imagine that a group of people that does not have access to that type of money and influence could really represent an electoral threat to the ruling parties.  There have been some exceptions – there was Yousef Haboubi, who in 2009 returned an incredible result in the provincial elections in Karbala province based on his reputation for integrity, but as an individual he was not able to achieve anything.  What we need is a national campaign of people of integrity and who have a desire to change, but that would require significant support, including financial support, and its difficult to see where that would come from.  Also – and in any event – if a new coalition of Iraqis were to find a way to represent a real electoral threat to the current ruling elites, then those people better learn to defend themselves, because the politicians will not go down without a fight.  Literally. 

SOURCES

Al-Ali, Zaid, “Iraq: ten years of hubris and incompetence,” Open Democracy, 3/22/13

Al-Ali, Zaid and Thiruvengadam, Arun, “The competing effect of national uniqueness and comparative influences on constitutional practice,” June 2012

Alkadiri, Raad, “Oil and the question of federalism in Iraq,” International Affairs, November 2010

Associated Press, “Iraq official: Country still needs U.S. military,” 11/8/08

Anderson, Liam, “Internationalizing Iraq’s Constitutional Dilemma,” will appear in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009

Chatham House, “Iraq’s Political Systems,” 3/19/13

China Daily, “Iraq to draft constitution despite boycott,” 7/25/05

Chronicle News Services, “Constitution drafters halt work,” 7/24/05

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07

- “Iraqi Force Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/29/05

Dann, Philipp Al-Ali, Zaid, “The International Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution-Making Under External Influence In Iraq, Sudan and East Timor,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2006

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2008

- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 2/15/10

- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq June 2010,” 9/7/10

Filkins, Dexter and Glanz, James, “Delegates submit incomplete constitution,” San Francisco, 8/23/05

Finer, Jonathan and Sarhan, Saad, “Lawmakers reverse voting rule change,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/6/05

Galbraith, Peter, “Iraq: Bush’s Islamic Republic,” New York Review of Books, 8/11/05

Ginsburg, Tom, Dixon, Rosalind, Comparative Constitutional Law, Edward Elgar Publisher, 2011

Grote, Rainer and Roder, Tilmann, Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Elections and New Government,” Congressional Research Service, 6/24/05

- “Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service, 4/22/09

Marshall, Tyler and Roug, Louise, “Key pillar of Bush policy on Iraq being questioned,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/9/05

Mosher, Andy and Fekeiki, Omar, “Accord on Sunni involvement in constitution,” San Francisco Chronicle, 6/17/05

Moubayed, Sami, “Assembly faces 18 difficult steps,” Asia Times, 8/10/05

Parker, Ned, “Iraq’s Nouri Maliki may gain power with U.S. security agreement,” Los Angeles Times, 11/24/08

Sanders, Edmund, “Draft charter leaves many tough issues unsettled,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/31/05

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/07

United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),” 1/14/08

Wong, Edward, “Constitution squeaks past strong Sunni Arab ‘no’ vote,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/26/05

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraqi PM calls for reforms in handing out posts,” Associated Press, 3/7/09

Ayatollah Sistani’s Role In Post-Saddam Iraq Interview With Fadel Reda Al-Kifaee

 

(LA Times)

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. Although he comes from what is known as the quietist school of thought that is supposed to mean staying out of politics he played an active role in shaping the post-Saddam government in the early years of the U.S. occupation. Since then he has not been so publicly involved in affairs, but he did try to quell the violence during the civil war, and today has become a critic of the poor governance in the country. To help explain the Ayatollah’s role in Iraqi society since 2003 is Fadel Reda al-Kifaee a senior adviser at Management Systems International who has extensively studied the Hawza, the Shiite religious establishment.

1. Ayatollah Sistani was a vocal critic of the U.S. occupation under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Paul Bremer came into the country with his own vision of how he wanted the new Iraq to develop that included a two-year transition to put together a constitution, develop democratic principals amongst the society, and then eventually hold elections for a new government. What problems did Sistani have with Bremer’s plans, and who won this battle of wills?

I think the main concern on the part of Ayatollah Sistani regarding the CPA's approach was the Islamic identity of the Iraqi people. The Ayatollah feared Americans would engineer the constitution in such a way that fixed the western style of liberal freedoms. I think he also feared that the CPA would ignore, or marginalize, the role of Islam in the judiciary and legislation. Ayatollah Sistani was sure that the Shi'a would revive even with the CPA's original plans realized. Sistani also seemed to worry about the American presence in Iraq. He may have feared that having a political process based on the American roadmap would produce governments that legitimized a long military presence, which in turn was likely to compromise the social identity of Iraq.

It seemed that both sides, the CPA and the supreme Marji', ended up with a deal that secured, or so they thought, their respective minimum level of demands. The result constitution’s Article 2 states that, "Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source of legislation," and it prohibits enacting laws that violate one of Islam's pillars. At the same time, it mentions that no law is passed if it violates democratic principles or the rights and freedoms mentioned in the constitution. In the same article, it comes back to emphasize that "the constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people…". No doubt that Sistani won the battle over having a direct-elected constitutional assembly, but it turned out that it was a battle within a war of wills.

2. After the CPA seemed to give in to Sistani’s demands it went ahead and drafted the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that acted as the constitution until a new one was drafted by the Iraqis. Why do you think the Americans went ahead with this move, and what was the Ayatollah’s reaction?

The TAL represented the CPA's counter attack to Sistani's moves, if we continued calling it a war. Bremer made use of his relations with Iraqi politicians, including the Shi'a, in his Iraqi Governing Council in passing this dangerous legal document. The Americans were trying to make sure that they would end up with a constitution that led to a 'liberal state' that didn’t threaten its neighbors even if that came at the expense of its internal cohesion. The Americans also feared that Sistani would urge his followers to ask for a sort of religious constitution, one that didn’t embrace the Iranian style of vilayat al-faqih but granted the religious establishment a considerable role over state institutions.

Sistani immediately realized that the TAL was formulated to be a blueprint for the permanent constitution. His stance over this move was one of his most powerful positions. In addition to issuing many communiqués condemning the TAL, the Ayatollah warned the Security Council not to mention the TAL in its then prospective resolution on Iraq and the council respected Sistani's will. Sistani's main objection was that the TAL would threaten Iraq's unity by promoting sectarian politics and racist divisions.

A man kisses a Jan. 2005 election poster featuring the image of Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf (AP)

3. Iraq held two elections in 2005. The first was to put together a temporary parliament that would draft a new constitution, and the second was to create a permanent government. Sistani was largely responsible for putting together the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which was made up of the largest Shiite Islamist parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Dawa Party, the Fadhila Party, some Sadrists, and others. In turn, the UIA used Sistani’s image in its campaigning. What was the Ayatollah’s thinking behind putting together this list?

Formulating the UIA seemed controversial considering the Ayatollah's anti-sectarian methodology. I think Ayatollah Sistani was mainly trying to have a major block in the constitutional assembly that would be able to embed the principles Sistani had long advocated, some of which were mentioned above, in the permanent constitution as well as preventing the attempts of transferring some of the TAL's articles into the constitution. What happened after winning the election was that Sistani seemed to lose control over the leadership of the UIA. Although the UIA's leaders pressed and managed to include some of Sistani's major demands in the constitution, they began acting independently in many political fronts. Their control over the state's resources after forming the government led by Ibrahim al-Ja'afari made them feel confident to the extent that they built the second UIA, formed prior to the December 2005 elections, basically without consulting the supreme Marji' ! Eventually, some controversial articles of the TAL were copied to the constitution; for instance, the condition that the constitution could be vetoed once three provinces voted against it, a matter, which Sistani openly opposed.

The apparent outcome of formulating the UIA was avoiding the dispersal of Iraqi Shi'as' votes by the one list-one constituency electoral system that helped the Shi'i political parties consolidating power inside the first elected parliament. If this was what Ayatollah Sistani envisaged, then this would be a contradiction to his many fatwas that called for a government based on a political majority rather than a sectarian one. I think the main goal on the part of Sistani on the UIA matter was to draft a constitution away from the TAL and the American influence.

Another factor may have been trying to help these Shi'i parties to sit together and practice dialogue because Sistani sensed the high level of hostility among some of them, one that might have risked the security of holy Shi'a cities and that was what happened latter on in some occasions.

By formulating the UIA, I don't think Ayatollah Sistani was planning to have those Shi'ite Islamist parties permanently ruling the country for a simple reason; those parties believed in versions of vilayat al-faqih, and that methodologically contradicted the school of thought of Sistani.

4. Sistani’s role in putting together the constitution and Iraqi government brought up questions about what his position was towards democracy. Did he just want elections so that Shiite Islamists could come to power, did he believe in some kind of compromise between Islam and constitutional rule, etc. What are your thoughts on Sistani’s views?

Although the Grand Ayatolah avoids directly announcing his stance towards democracy, I can say that he at least believes that the people should be a source of political legitimacy. The tone of his fatwas and statements dealing with elections and related issues uncovers a methodological tendency rather than mere pragmatic tactics to help Shi'ite Islamists winning. Ayatollah Sistani went further than many other Shiite Ulama in this regard as he frequently emphasized that parliament whether being a constitutional assembly or not must be directly elected by the people underscoring the issue of representativeness. In short, he not only accepts but also adopts democracy. At the same time, he makes sure that the religious authority has the right to dictate a democracy's outcomes should this process produce something the marji' believes threatens the Islamic social identity or the well being of society. The subject marji' should use his social powers to practice this dictation.

5. In 2006 the Shiite shrine in Samarra was bombed and Iraq moved towards full-scale civil war. What was Sistani’s response, and was he able to stem the violence at all?

The Ayatollah’s response was issuing a statement asking believers to peacefully protest the action asking not to involve in any retaliatory reactions. This fatwa and all the meetings the Supreme Marji' had with various political and social players was not enough to prevent the violence. It seems that all Sistani's efforts to stem the anger of Shi'a during the 2004-2005 escalating violence were gone with the wind. One important factor was the role of the Sadrist militia. Without this role, I think the country wouldn't have gone to full-scale civil war. The issue was that Moqtada al-Sadr's followers didn’t emulate Sistani and so were not religiously bound by his fatwas.

6. You mentioned how Sistani has had a mixed relationship with the Shiite religious parties that took power after 2005. Moqtada al-Sadr for example has fluctuated between trying to usurp Sistani’s position, sometimes through violence, while relying upon the Ayatollah to save him from crises like the August 2004 uprising and Premier Maliki’s 2008 Charge of the Knights offensive against the Mahdi Army. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq claimed Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei as their spiritual leaders, but then claimed they switched to Sistani. The Dawa Party on the other hand, has consulted with Sistani, but do not claim to emulate him. In recent years, Sistani’s representatives have issued a steady stream of criticisms of the ruling parties in Baghdad about the lack of services, the deadlock in parliament, etc., and he has refused to meet with politicians. Why hasn’t he been more influential over these parties that he helped put into office?

The relationship with the Da'wa Party has been relatively impacted by historic complications. The traditional current in Hawza has been basically against having clerics involved in politics. There is also the fact that the Hawza's clerics have felt uncomfortable towards persons with western style outfits let alone having those same gentlemen specialize in Shari'a. The early leadership of the Da'wa was composed of both kinds of men; clerics involved in politics and suited men educated in Islamic jurisprudence. However, Ayatollah Sistani positively interacted with Da'wa leaders after they came back from exile as part of his openness to the exile opposition.

Sistani has been known to have a warm relationship with the Al-Hakim family, which introduced prestigious religious figures to the community of Hawza. The late Ayatollah Mohamed-Baqir al-Hakim, who led the ISCI since 1982 until his death in a bombing in Najaf in 2004, made use of this relationship and so did his brother Sayed Abdul-Aziz who succeeded him at the top of the ISCI.

Regarding the Sadrist Current, there has been clear alienation between them and the Grand Ayatollah. This current represents a Shiite social class of mostly poor and uneducated persons who feel they are discriminated against by other Shi'a especially the traditional Hawza.

Away from the Sadrists, the relationship between Sistani and both ISCI and Da'wa has gone through many phases. The constitutional phase that lasted from 2003 to late 2005 witnessed relatively positive interactions. As shown above, Sistani helped those parties rise to power aiming at influencing the process of drafting the constitution. Since 2010 this relationship has been damaged with the Grand Ayatollah refusing to host leaders of those parties at his office. Sistani sounds fed up with the leadership of these parties, which has begun to openly disobey his guidance. The Ayatollah also may feel that they let him down for what the country ended up with in terms of corruption, public services, and security.

In 2012 there was talk that Iran was promoting Ayatollah Shahroudi as Sistani’s replacement (Reuters)

7. In 2012 there was a tidal wave of articles about Iran trying to find a successor to Sistani, specifically with Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi. Was there any basis for these reports, and overall what role will Tehran play in determining who becomes the head cleric after Sistani passes?

I acknowledge that promoting Shahroudi to Marji'iya (the Hawza's supreme leadership) is implausible, in the foreseen future at least, considering the well-established doctrine of quietism in Najaf. The move of opening an office for Shahroudi in Najaf came as a part of integrated, well-organized efforts to influence the Hawza. The Iranians seemed to have long-term plans in Najaf. They are building socio-religious networks in mid and southern Iraq in general and in Najaf in particular, a matter that they envisage using at a later stage to influence the process of having a new supreme marji' in Najaf. Such a process is too unofficial in Shi'ism and so the post-Sistani era will witness a transition in which no clear candidate will rise to the supremacy. Tehran will use its networks of institutions, students, teachers and scholars at the Hawza to promote publicity their desired candidate. The effectiveness of such efforts will partly depend on whether the camp of the traditional Hawza of Najaf has formed a consensus over whom to succeed Sistani.

8. The conventional wisdom about Ayatollah Sistani is that he comes from the quietest school of Shiite clerics as opposed to the activists such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, and Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who believed in some form of direct clerical rule over society. There are all kinds of interpretations of Sistani’s stance towards politics ranging from the quietist school doesn’t mean complete absence from social affairs, to the Ayatollah having his own form of activism or that he has developed a middle road between the two. What’s your theory on Sistani’s stance towards involvement in politics?

In a previous publication I called Ayatollah Sistani a 'neo-quietist' marji''. I know these classifications may be confusing, but they are generally valid. Sistani still adheres to the mainstream of quietism; having clerics abstaining from directly involving in politics unless a sociopolitical threat emerges. Meantime, the development Ayatollah has brought in to quietism has been in two integrated aspects; one is political and the other is social. Political wise, the Ayatollah advocates a principle according to which the religious establishment must act as the guardian of the society's Islamic identity. What he differs in from those Shiite constitutional clerics (Na'ini and clerics of Iran's 1906 constitutional revolution) and others is that he believes that the marji' must practice this guardianship using his social powers within the community of believers and must practice that from outside the government's apparatus. The ulama that supported the 1906 revolt in Iran demanded having a quota for clerics in parliament mandated to observe the accordance of laws with Shari'a. In short, Sistani accepts democracy but with having an uncodified veto over its outcomes in exceptional occasions.

In the social dimension of Sistani's neo-quietism, I think the Grand Ayatollah is in favor of a principle in which the Islamic authority, the supreme marji' in Shi'ism, must have the society's 'authorization' to intervene to impose a social, or political, measure. By authorization I mean the readiness of the subject society to socially and politically accept this measure.  I think that this approach on the part of Sistani is in accordance with his approach that a reform must be a bottom-up process that starts from society. The Ayatollah is a strong opponent of the Khomainian style of imposing Islamic virtues by state forces because according to the quietist doctrine the government has no legitimacy to impose Islamic measures in the age of occultation (Shi'as call the current age as the time of the hidden Imam).

These two political and social aspects are integrated. Sistani encourages civil society to facilitate government reforms. The Ayatollah supports competent civil society organizations that try to be a partner in the public policy making process through communicating with policy makers and encouraging them to meet the real needs of citizens as the Grand Ayatollah sees them. These organizations are well-funded and employ prominent figures.

In the long run, Grand Ayatollah Sistani seems to be preparing society in a way that would make the outputs of democracy in accordance with Islam's core values and so the incidents of religious intervention in politics would be considerably minimized. This future condition would eliminate, if realized, the pretexts that a society needs the vilayat al-faqih system to preserve its Islamic identity.

SOURCES

Arango, Tim, “Iran Presses for Official to Be Next Leader of Shiites,” New York Times, 5/11/12

Baram, Amatzia, “The Iraqi Shi’i Community: Between Sistani, Muqtada, the IGC, and the CPA, Testimony by Amatzia Baram, senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee,” United Sates Institute for Peace, 4/21/04

Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08

Al-Khoei, Hayder, “why iran-sponsored cleric can’t become iraq’s next religious leader,” Niqash, 6/28/12

Al-Kifaee, Fadel Reda, “The Role of the Hawza of Najaf and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Restructuring the Iraqi Governance System in Post-Ba’athist Iraq,” Masters Thesis American University of Cairo, May 2010

McGeough, Paul, “Speculation grows Iranian cleric may lead Iraq’s Shiites,” Newcastle Herald, 4/28/12

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Rizvi, Sajjad, “Political mobilization and the Shi’i religious establishment (marja’iyya),” International Affairs, November 2010

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Could Sistani Be Iraq’s Last Hope?” Al-Monitor, 5/2/13