Early Election Results Show 56% Voter Turnout In Iraq

 

November 11 Iraq held its seventh parliamentary elections. Despite widespread worries about apathy amongst the public there was an increase in voters and the highest participation rate since 2014.

Musings On Iraq 2014 Year In Review

 

2014 was a traumatic year for Iraq. Open fighting started once again at the beginning of the year culminating in the fall of most of central Iraq to militants during the summer. The result was nearly 2 million people being displaced and over 60,000 casualties. There was also a bitterly disputed election that finally saw Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki deposed. His replacement Haider Abadi was left with the daunting task of not only fighting the insurgency, but also trying to repair the political damage done by his predecessor as well as addressing the structural problems within the country. This is a review of last year’s events, but is in no way comprehensive. It is just some of the major stories covered by Musings On Iraq in 2014.

JANUARY

Last year got off to a bad start as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to use the death of the leadership of the Army’s 7^th Division to go after the Anbar protest movement. On December 21 the Islamic State (IS) launched an ambush in western Anbar, which led to the deaths the commander of the 7^th Division and most of his staff. The government immediately announced a retaliatory operation against the insurgents, which received widespread popular support across the country. Instead of using this moment to bring the country together, the premier decided to use it against his opponents. He went on national TV accusing the protest movement of harboring Islamic State (IS) elements. The next day Maliki ordered the arrest of parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani who had been an organizer of the demonstrations, and who was known for his fiery and sectarian speeches attacking Shiites. His detention led to a shootout in which his brother and five of his guards were killed. Maliki then shut down the Ramadi protest area. The province immediately exploded in violence with clashes in cities like Ramadi, Garma and Hit, while Fallujah quickly fell to insurgents. This was the start of open fighting the country, which continues to this day. Protests had been going on for a year when the prime minister decided to try to shut them down. They began after Maliki arrested some of Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s bodyguards on terrorism charges in December 2012. Protests quickly emerged in Fallujah, Tikrit, Baghdad, and other cities. These were eventually organized by the Mutahidun list and several Sunni clerics such as Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Saadi. While the insurgency attempted to exploit the demonstrations for their own means, and there were pro-militant factions at sites like Fallujah and Hawija, the mainstream assemblies were more of an expression of Sunni anger at the failure of the government and Prime Minister Maliki. This was a major change from just a few years ago when in 2009 the majority of Sunnis and even some insurgent factions decided to participate in provincial elections. The next year Maliki came in second in parliamentary balloting, but used the courts and played upon the divisions within his opponents to assure himself a second term. This caused widespread resentment against the prime minister. The leaders of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), which won the most seats in parliament, but failed in its attempt to stop Maliki proved no better as the list’s leader Iyad Allawi resorted to complaining and leaving the country to rally foreign support, while ignoring Iraqis. Other INM members cut deals with the prime minister in order to assure themselves ministries. This started the process of many Sunnis losing faith in their politicians, which culminated in the protest movement. When Maliki decided to shut down the Ramadi site in December 2013 it was the last straw that made people give up on the system, and turn towards violence. Maliki’s short sightedness at going after the demonstrators instead of focusing upon the insurgents played into their hands, and they are still benefiting from it to this day.

The fighting in Anbar had a ripple effect upon Iraqi society by forcing out thousands of families. By the end of January 2014 the Red Crescent reported that over 34,000 families had fled the province due to not only the fighting, but the indiscriminate shelling and air strikes by the government forces. Many of these people went to Kurdistan or Baghdad. Anbar was not the only place this movement of people was going on. In other governorates with insurgent activity Iraqis began to flee due to the violence. Starting in 2013 dozens of families were leaving areas of Diyala as the Islamic State was attempting to scare and intimidate the local population. This was occurring in Ninewa, and Babil as well. When the militants’ summer offensive began this crisis would turn into a tragedy as tens of thousands were forced out of their homes for a total of around 2 million displaced. To add to these problems the special committee set up to deal with displacement and the Migration Ministry were both accused of massive corruption, stealing most of the money set aside to help these people.

FEBRUARY

Moqtada al-Sadr proved to be a mercurial leader once again when he suddenly announced that he was retiring from politics in February. Several politicians from his political bloc, Ahrar followed suit and said they were resigning as well, while the head of his list in parliament was replaced, and a new board of trustees created to run his movement. Sadr was attempting to clean house of some politicians that he was unhappy with as well as rallying the base before the provincial elections as later in the month the Ahrar bloc said that it was still running. Sadr made a similar move in August 2013 only to come back again. While these might have been calculated moves it didn’t seem like anyone but Sadr knew what the plan was as each time he said he was stepping down there was widespread confusion within his movement. This was just the latest example of what a difficult personality Sadr was.

MARCH

March saw a new and short-lived series of protests emerge against the privileges of Iraq’s political elite. At the start of the month people marched in Baghdad, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, Kirkuk, Muthanna, Babil, and Qadisiyah against a new pension law passed in February. There were similar demonstrations in August 2013. The law gave a new round of benefits to Iraqi politicians who were already considered corrupt and incompetent. This was a sign that the public was tired of business as usual with parliament giving itself things like raises, while neglecting governing and developing the country. Unfortunately these demonstrations only lasted a short while and then disappeared meaning they applied no real pressure upon the government.

Iraq’s oil industry took a hit in March. The Kirkuk pipeline had been a favorite target of insurgents because it threatened the countries revenues, and was easy to attack since it travelled through provinces where militants were active. On March 2 the line was blown up in Ninewa, and then again a week later. What was different about this last incident was that the insurgents stayed to prevent repairs. The North Oil Company said that the line would be up and running again by April, but that never happened as repair crews with armed escorts were driven off. The Kirkuk pipeline has been out of service ever since costing Iraq millions of dollars in revenue. This was a major victory for the insurgents and another sign that they had been able to rebuild their cadres.

Maliki showed his political machinations once more by going after the provincial governments in Diyala, Wasit and Basra. In Diyala, State of Law was shut out of the government so it got an arrest warrant issued against the governor on corruption charges and went to court over how the ruling coalition was formed without it. The court ruled in State of Law’s favor leading to two rival governments being formed in the province. In Wasit the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISC) cooperated to keep State of Law out of the government there as well, and Maliki went to court over that process too. Finally, in Basra State of Law got the head of the provincial council, but wanted the governorship as well, so it went to court again. The situation got so bad that Iran had to mediate between Maliki and ISCI. These were all perfect examples of how Maliki considered everyone who was not with him as a potential enemy. The courts were under his influence and the justice system was often used to issue arrest warrants against the prime minister’s opponents. These moves were another example of how Maliki did not respect the political process. He’d gone to the courts to win a second term in 2010, and now used them again to try to overturn the outcomes of the 2013 provincial elections. This was also a warning of what might happen in April’s national vote.

APRIL

At the end of April Iraq held another round of parliamentary elections. The conventional wisdom was that Maliki would win a third term as his opponents were once again divided. The country’s elections however, rarely turn out the way people expect. In 2009 the ruling parties in the governorates were largely thrown out of office for failing to develop the country. In 2010 Maliki came in second when he was expecting a sweeping victory, and then in 2013, his State of Law faced a major defeat as it too was penalized for being the incumbents in the provinces. 2014 would prove to be the same, because Maliki found it beyond his means to return for a third term, although that was still several months away.

MAY

In May the results for the April elections were announced with the State of Law increasing its share of seats in parliament. In 2010 State of Law won 89 seats, and in 2014 that went up to 95. The Sadrists came in second, but were only able to come away with one third of the number of seats, 34, as State of Law. ISCI finished third with 31 seats. That gave Maliki a decided advantage as the prime minister would come from one of these major Shiite parties and together the Sadrists and Supreme Council did not come close to State of Law. To add to that advantage the Sadrists and ISCI spent their time attempting to make their list the National Alliance a formal organization that would represent the Shiite parties and have the power to name the premier. Maliki believed he could ignore these moves and wait the two parties out until they would eventually agree to his re-election. Little did he know that the real threat would come from within his own list.

JUNE

June was the month the insurgents launched their summer offensive. It began with the storming of Samarra in Salahaddin on June 5, followed by an assault upon the counter-terrorism bureau in Baquba, Diyala the next day, and then the seizure of the Anbar University campus in Ramadi on June 7. June 6 was also the start of the battle of Mosul, which fell a few days later. The Iraqi Security Forces collapsed and the route continued as the insurgents headed south taking Tikrit on June 10, along with sections of Kirkuk. Similar success was made in Anbar as the security forces suddenly withdrew from the Syrian border fleeing Rawa, Ana and Qaim on June 14 giving IS control of almost all of western Anbar. The insurgents had largely rebuilt their networks by 2013 after being devastated by the U.S. and Iraqi forces during the Surge. The result was attacks had been ramping up for that entire year culminating in the seizure of several cities in Anbar in December 2013 and January 2014 after Maliki’s misstep of closing down the protest movement. Violence continued to increase in the first half of 2014 pointing to a big push coming during the summer.

The Islamic State was in the forefront of this offensive, but that was in cooperation with other insurgent groups like the Baathist Naqshibandi and friendly tribes. IS had made deals with these other groups to jointly launch attacks starting in June. It seems like the militants were caught by surprise by their own success. They were likely just planning raids like what happened in Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi, and instead ending up seizing around one quarter of the country. This was an overstretch as there was no way the insurgents were going to hold such a large section of territory, especially when the west decided to become involved.

In response to the fall of Mosul Iraq’s militias began to mobilize. Many of these groups had joined in the fight against the insurgents in 2013 as Maliki was unhappy with the Iraqi Security Forces, and called upon their help. Groups like Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization were seen fighting in Anbar and the Baghdad belts throughout early 2014. The June offensive brought in the Sadrists and the Supreme Council as there was widespread fear that Samarra would fall along with its Askari shrine and Baghdad would be next. Iraqi militias from Syria like the Abu Fadhl Al-Abbas Brigade and the Khorasani Brigade also sent their men to fight in Iraq. Their ranks were swollen after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to protect the nation. Sistani meant for people to join the security forces, but many went to the militias as well. Since their deployment in 2013 these militias have been accused of a series of sectarian attacks, and the driving out of Sunni civilians from their homes in an attempt to deprive the insurgents of their support base and redraw the demographics of parts of the country. This repeats tactics they used during the civil war years of 2005-2008, and has added to the displacement crisis.

These militias were supported by Iran who sponsored many of them. Iran sent in hundreds of advisers, began providing military aid to Baghdad under an agreement signed with Maliki, and eventually delivered Su-25 fighter bombers, pilots, and air strikes by the Iranian Air Force as well. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and its leader General Qasim Suleimani led these efforts, and followed the same strategy Tehran used in Syria. Iran lacked confidence in the security forces in both countries, and decided to employ its militia allies to defend the two governments. The Badr Organization was put in charge of both efforts as it had the longest relationship with Iran. That can be seen in Badr head Hadi Ameri leading many of the recent operations rather than Iraqi generals. Iran was just as threatened by the insurgents’ sudden advance in June. In coming to Iraq’s aid it also became the dominant power in the country with its allies in the forefront of the fighting, its advisers in the thick of the fighting, and its men drawing up most of the plans for the defense of the country. This is a position that it will be hard pressed to give up once the insurgency subsides.

JULY

As the Islamic State settled into governing its newly won territories in northern Iraq it was immediately apparent what their rule would mean. Throughout July there were reports of destroyed homes, mass kidnappings, and executions throughout central and northern Iraq as IS attempted to intimidate local populations to control them, and retaliate against those that opposed it. For example, on July 8 IS killed 50 villagers after it was driven out of Ziwiya, Salahaddin. When it was eventually taken the next day, 15 people were executed and almost the entire town was leveled with over 300 homes blown up. IS considers itself a state, and much has been written about the vast assets it controls to finance its operations, but its actions in Iraq showed that it was still about destroying Iraq as much as trying to run sections of it.

AUGUST

In August IS turned its attention northwards and seized Jalawla and Sadiya in northeastern Diyala as well as the Sinjar area of western Ninewa. The Kurdish peshmerga fled in the face of the assaults. In Ninewa it was largely due to Syrian and Turkish Kurdish fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the intervention of Iran that stopped the militants from moving into Kurdistan itself. The Yazidis of Sinjar were not as lucky as IS began massacring them and taking their women and girls for slaves. On August 3 for example, approximately 250 Yazidis were killed in Sinjar, Solagh, Qiniyah, and Wahtanya. This led to the intervention of the United States, which began launching air strikes in the area. IS had long considered Yazidis devil worshippers and had repeatedly attacked the community in previous years. Now that it controlled the main territory in which this group resided it went all out to destroy it.

SEPTEMBER

September 8 the new government of Prime Minister Haider Abadi was sworn in. Rather than being defeated by his opponents, Maliki was forced out due to a split within his own State of Law list. Abadi was a long time Dawa member having joined in 1967, but his background was much different from the previous two prime ministers, Ibrahim Jaafari and Maliki. Abadi was a technocrat and considered a problem solver, while Jaafari was known as a philosopher and Maliki an autocrat. Abadi’s impact was immediately felt as he formed a smaller government than Maliki’s 2010 one. He also proposed a National Guard, which would include local forces recruited to fight the insurgency and be under the control of the provinces, he promised to end government shelling of civilian areas, said he would have no problem if Sunni governorates wanted to form federal regions, and retired General Abboud Qanbar the deputy chief of staff of operations and General Ali Ghidan the ground forces commander, both of which were known as Maliki loyalists, and were blamed for the fall of Mosul. Iraq is beset by a number of structural problems and deep divisions. Abadi knew that without addressing these issues Iraq would never be put right. These early moves were attempts to reach out to the country’s Sunnis, and get rid of some of the politicized and incompetent security leaders. This immediately set Abadi apart from his predecessors who would often talk about reform, and then do nothing substantive about it. The replacement of Maliki might have been the biggest story of 2014, even more so than the fall of Mosul, because it opened hope that Iraq’s long standing problems might finally be addressed, starting with the end of Maliki’s destructive politics.

OCTOBER

By October the economic effects of the insurgency were beginning to emerge. Foreign investors were pulling out of the country, the real estate and car markets collapsed, hundreds of acres of farmland were now under militant control, and imports were down 60-70% with many of the trade routes to Jordan, Syria and Turkey having been cut off. 2 million people were also displaced and out of work, and putting major burdens on the provinces that they now resided in. Iraq was also facing a financial crisis as the 2014 budget was never passed due to Maliki using it against his opponents during the elections. The prime minister had also used money from the general budget and Development Fund for Iraq to pay for the war and the running of the government depriving the country of much of its ready cash. The economic costs of the war were likely the least reported story of 2014. Iraq was one of the fast growing economies in the Middle East after the civil war ended in 2008. Now that was all threatened.

The Islamic State made another big surge in Anbar from September to October. At the end of September it took Camp Saqlawiya, and then proceeded to take most of the center of the province the following month. This was being led by IS commander Abu Omar al-Shishani, who is a Chechen, and who excelled at insurgent tactics. In response the United States sent advisers to Al Taqadum base outside of Habaniya and Al-Assad base in Baghdadi. The Americans were hoping to train a new tribal force in the governorate to oppose the insurgents much like it did with the Awakening previously. Premier Abadi said he supported this idea, but was unwilling to commit any real assets to the province’s defense. The governor, the local council, and sheikhs have consistently complained that their pleas for assistance have been ignored by Baghdad, and that has resulted in 85% of Anbar falling to the Islamic State. The government is more concerned with Salahaddin, which plays a central role in the insurgency throughout central Iraq, and has largely written off Anbar for now.

In Salahaddin’s eastern Tuz Kharmato district the Islamic State was forced out by a combined ISF, militia and peshmerga offensive. This opened the door to a new set of problems as the Kurds and militias began confronting each other for control of the area. This was later repeated in Jalawla and Sadiya in Diyala after they were freed in November. All of these areas are part of the disputed territories the Kurdistan Regional Government lays claim to. The militias not only want them to remain under central control, but are being used by Iran to push the Kurds not to think that they can annex them and then declare independence. Tehran has warned Kurdistan that it opposes the break up of Iraq at this time.

NOVEMBER

Prime Minister Abadi took another stab at reforming the security forces when he forced out another 200 officers. This included several top commanders who were in charge of the regional operations commands. He also replaced deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi who was known as a Maliki man. The premier showed once again that he was committed to addressing the politicization of and corruption within the security forces. Many of these officers such as General Rasheed Flayh formerly of the Anbar Operations Command were known for stealing supplies from their men. These were the first moves in a long process to root out these elements and make the ISF a professional force.

DECEMBER

Abadi’s final move of 2014 was to demand that due process be carried out within Iraq’s Justice System. He ordered that all arrests be recorded, that suspects go to trial within the assigned time, and that anyone acquitted or held without charges be released. Iraq’s prisons and courts have not worked for decades dating back to the Saddam era. The system is also notorious for abuse as confessions are the basis of cases and they are often beaten out of people. The prime minister was again attempting to tackle the nation’s structural problems, which were long overdue.

On the security front, the year ended with the government forces going on the offensive. Starting at the end of the summer the siege of Amerli in Salahaddin was ended, followed by the re-taking of the Tuz Kharmato district. The longtime IS base in northeastern Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhr was cleared out disrupting the group’s southern networks leading to no car bombings there for the last two months of the year. In Salahaddin the Baiji Refinery was relieved, while the southern Balad district was cleared. The Kurds also helped free Diyala’s Sadiya and Jalawla, while re-entering the Sinjar area. On the other hand, militants were still on the offensive in Anbar trying to take the provincial capital of Ramadi and other towns in the center of the province. Despite its setbacks in Salahaddin, IS was able to move back into Baiji, and continued attacks throughout the governorate. Most importantly it had been able to co-opt many smaller insurgent groups like Ansar al-Islam, while pushing out others such as the Baathist Naqshibandi. When the summer offensive began in June IS was the largest of the insurgent groups and made local deals with other factions to carry out joint operations against the government. By the end of 2014, it dominated the insurgency like never before. This poses a risk to the group however as its new recruits’ loyalty is largely based upon the success it has had in Syria and Iraq. If it faces more setbacks, especially if it were to lose a large city such as Tikrit, which will be the focus of the ISF and militias this year, IS could start facing desertions. There are already reports of it executing members who have left their posts. It still controls huge swaths of the country however. More importantly, the loss of territory in no way means the end of the insurgency. In 2004 militants launched a huge summer offensive in several cities. They were turned back, but that simply dispersed the fighters over a larger swath of territory, and the fighting went on. Until the government finds a way to turn Sunnis away from violence, something that was actually achieved from 2008-2009, but thrown away in 2010, the insurgency will continue.

Premier Haider Abadi’s New Iraq Government

President Fuad Masum, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, Dawa, State of Law

Vice President Osama Nujafi, Mutahidun

Vice President Iyad Allawi, Nationalist Coalition/Wataniya

Prime Minister Haider Abadi, Dawa, State of Law

Deputy Premier Salah al-Mutlaq, al-Arabiya

Deputy Premier Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdistan Democratic Party

Deputy Premier Bahaa Araji, Sadrist/Ahrar, National Alliance

Defense Minister VACANT

Interior Minister VACANT

Agriculture Minister Falah Hassan Zaidan, Mutahidun

Communications Minister Hassan Kadhim Rasheed, Badr Organization, State of Law

Culture Minister Fryad Rawanduzi, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Education Minister Mohammed Iqbal Omar, Iraqi Islamic Party, Mutahidun

Electricity Minister Qasim Abdi Mohammed Hammadi al-Fahadawi, Loyalty to Anbar

Environment Minister Qutaiba Jabouri, Iraq Coalition

Finance Minister Rowsch Nouri Shaways, Kurdistan Democratic Party

Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, National Reform Trend, National Alliance

Health Minister Adilla Hamoud Hussein, State of Law

Higher Education Minister Hussein Shahristani, Independents, State of Law

Housing Minister Tariq Kinani, Sadrist/Ahrar, National Alliance

Human Rights Minister Mohammed Bayati, Badr Organization, State of Law

Industry Minister Nasir Issawi, Sadrist/Ahrar, National Alliance

Justice Minister Haider Zamili, Fadhila, National Alliance

Labor Minister Mohammed Shaia’a Sudani, Dawa, State of Law

Municipalities Minister Abdul Karim Younis Aylan, Badr Organization, State of Law

Oil Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq/Citizen’s

Alliance/Mowatin, National Alliance

Planning Minister Salman Ali Hassan Jumali, Mutahidun

Provinces Minister Ahmed Abdullah, al-Arabiya

Science Minister Faris Youssef Jajou

Sports Minister Abdul Hussein Abdul Ridha Abtan, Islamic Supreme Council of

Iraq/Citizen’s Alliance/Mowatin, National Alliance

Trade Minister Mlass Mohammed Husseini, Nationalist Coalition/Wataniya

Transportation Minister Bayan Jabr, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq/Citizen’s

Alliance/Mowatin, National Alliance

Iraq Premier Abadi’s Cabinet Sworn In Amongst Political Disputes

Premier Abadi addressing parliament during swearing in session of his new cabinet (Al Jazeera)

September 8, 2014 Prime Minister Haider Abadi’s new government was approved by Iraq’s parliament. As usual since 2005, all the major winners in the elections were given a position, which allows them to share in the spoils that come from running government offices. This was highlighted in the western press as a new “inclusive” administration, but was really nothing new at all. More importantly if there were hope that this new cabinet would help bring the country’s feuding political parties together to provide a unified stance towards the insurgency they would be disappointed.

Premier Abadi was successful in fulfilling one of his early promises to create a smaller cabinet. 23 ministers were sworn in on September 8 with two more, Defense and Interior unfilled for now because of political disagreements. In comparison, Nouri al-Maliki’s original government announced in December 2010 had 30 ministers with him as acting Defense, Interior and National Security Ministers. By April 2011 a larger administration was in office with a whopping 40 ministers, but Maliki never let go of the security ones. He would eventually name an acting Defense Minister and a deputy Interior Minister, while the National Security office was disbanded. When broken down by list Abadi’s State of Law, which is made up of Dawa, the Independents and the Badr Organization got six ministries, the National Alliance consisting of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Sadrists, Fadhila, and the National Reform Trend received 7 ministries. Together that was 56% of the new cabinet. The Najafi brothers Mutahidun were given three ministries, while Deputy Premier Salah al-Mutlaq’s Arabiya, Loyalty to Anbar and the Iraqi Coalition each received one. Together the Sunni parties ended up with 26% of the ministries. The Kurdish lists got two positions, Iyad Allawi’s secular Nationalist Coalition was given one, and a Christian party took one as well. In comparison, the April 2011 government was split between the Shiite religious parties holding 21 of 40 ministries, 52%, the Sunnis had 12, 30%, the Kurds 6, 15%, and a Christian party one. The ethnosectarian breakdown was roughly the same between the two administrations. That showed that reports about inclusiveness were ahistorical as Maliki’s government was made up of just a wide range of parties as Abadi’s.

Maliki’s Original December 2010 Cabinet

Total ministers: 30

Shiite parties: 14, 46%

State of Law: 6

National Alliance: 8

Sunni parties: 12, 40%

Centralist Alliance: 2

Iraqi National Movement: 10

Kurdish parties: 3, 10%

Kurdish Coalition: 3

Minorities: 1

Maliki’s April 2011 Cabinet

Total ministries: 40

Shiite Parties: 21, 52%

State of Law: 8

National Alliance: 13

Sunni parties: 12, 30%

White Iraqiya: 1

Centralist Alliance: 2

Iraqi National Movement: 9

Kurdish parties: 6, 15%

Kurdish Coalition: 6

Minorities: 1

Abadi’s September 2014 Cabinet

Total ministries: 23

Shiite parties: 13, 56%

State of Law 6

National Alliance 7

Sunni parties: 6, 26%

Arabiya: 1

Loyalty to Anbar: 1

Iraq Coalition: 1

Mutahidun: 3

Kurdish parties 2, 8%

Kurdish Coalition: 2

Secular parties: 1

Nationalist Coalition 1

Minorities: 1

More importantly the new premier will have a tough time ahead of him just getting his new ruling coalition to work together. The reason why the Interior Ministry is empty is because former Transportation Minister and Badr Organization head Hadi Ameri has been nominated. The United States strongly objected to Ameri gaining that post because of his militia background. In 2005 Badr was given control of Interior under the Jaafari government and took over the commando units, set up secret prisons, carried out sectarian raids, and ran death squads out of the ministry. Today Ameri is leading his militias in his home province of Diyala, which Maliki put him in charge of security after the insurgent summer offensive began. Badr temporarily walked out of the parliamentary session on the cabinet to protest the fact that Ameri was not gaining the position. Hussein Shahristani is also being demoted from Deputy Premier in charge of energy policy under Maliki to Higher Education Minister. His Independents list, which is part of Abadi’s State of Law has rejected the office. The Sunni parties are supposed to get the Defense Ministry, but they can’t decide upon a name. Khalid Obeidi, an ex-Air Force general under Saddam Hussein, and a former nominee for Defense by the Iraqi National Movement after the 2010 elections has been mentioned as a candidate. The Kurds objected to his name back then because of his role with the former regime. Finally, the Kurdish parties have given the new prime minister a three month deadline to meet their demands over oil policy, the budget, and the disputed territories. In fact, the Kurds were considering not showing up at parliament on September 8 because Abadi had not responded to their desires beforehand, but attended because they realized Abadi had the votes to form a new administration without them, and were under pressure from the United States, Iran, and the United Nations to show up. There is internal dissent within the Kurdish parties as well with one report from Rudaw saying they had not finalized the names for the two ministries they received, which were Finance and Culture. All together this paints a picture of a dysfunctional government being put together just like the previous ones. That’s not to say that these divisions cannot be overcome, but Abadi has a full plate in front of him. The Shiite and Sunni parties are internally divided over who should be Defense and Interior Ministers. The Kurds have very little faith in Baghdad after the treatment they received at the hands of Maliki, and Abadi needs to take immediate steps to win them back. New Oil Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Council might help as he has a long relationship with the Kurds. Still his party has expressed more centralizing ideas about energy policy in recent times. That’s nothing to say about the Sunni populace. Many of the Sunni politicians come from provinces that are partly under insurgent control, and some of their constituents are now supporting the militants. There’s no telling whether any of the new ministers have any standing in central and nothern Iraq that will be able to win back those areas.

Prime Minister Abadi has gone through a lot of struggles and his government has not even really started. His nomination for premier caused huge internal problems within State of Law as Maliki was intent upon holding onto power. The parliamentary session to approve his new cabinet faced walkouts and threats of boycotts. Two major Shiite parties are unhappy with him, and two of the most important ministries Interior and Defense are empty. Both the Kurds and the Sunnis also need to be won over as well. This is a huge number of tasks standing in front of the new premier, and there’s no telling whether he will be able to do anything about them. His two predecessors Ibrahim Jafaari and Maliki talked about reforms as well when they took office and never did anything substantial about them. Abadi has even less time to prove his worth as a unifier than those two.

SOURCES

Buratha News, “Hadi al-Amiri receives general supervision of the security file in Diyala province,” 6/13/14

Fahim, Kareem and Ahmed, Azam, “Lawmakers Approve Cabinet in Iraq, but 2 Posts Are Empty,” New York Times, 9/8/14

Gutman, Roy, “Discord greets Iraq’s ‘unity government;’ Kurds boycott,” McClatchy Newspapers, 9/9/14

Iraq Oil Report, “UPDATE: Abadi forms government, Abdulmahdi becomes Oil Minister,” 9/8/14

Al Jazeera, “Iraq’s government: united and inclusive?” 9/9/14

Muir, Jim, “Legacy of mistrust haunts new Iraqi government,” BBC, 9/9/14

Mustafa, Hamza, “Iraq: Abadi faces tough choices in filling key jobs,” Asharq al-Awsat, 9/10/14

Al Rafidayn, “Washington vetoed Ameri-Zubaidi as Minister of Defense,” 9/8/14

Al Rafidayn, Alsumaria TV, “Al-Maliki Submits Names Of Candidates For Key Ministries To Parliament,” MEMRI Blog, 3/29/11

Rudaw, “Kurds Undecided among Themselves, Despite Endorsing Iraq Cabinet,” 9/9/14

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 11,” 3/27/11

- “The Political Struggle for Security Control in Iraq,” Global Security, 3/29/11

Visser, Reidar, “The Iraqi Parliament Approves the Abbadi Cabinet,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/9/14

Will Abadi Be Any Different Than Maliki As Iraq’s Next Premier?

 

Many people are wondering whether prime minister nominee Haider Abadi will be any different from current premier Nouri al-Maliki since they are both from the Dawa Party. A comparison of Maliki to his predecessor Ibrahim al-Jaafari also of Dawa shows that membership in the party does not mean that any two individuals will rule the same. Maliki was accused of amassing too much power in his hands and being an autocrat, while Jaafari was known as a horrible manager who did little while the civil war broke out. Given that history Abadi will likely be his own man when he puts together a new ruling coalition.

Ibrahim al-Jaafari who was premier from 2005-2006 and Nouri al-Maliki both lived lives of exile during the Baathist period. Jaafari was a doctor by profession and joined the Dawa Party while he was at the University of Mosul in 1966. During a government campaign against the party in 1980 he fled to Iran where he lived for almost ten years. In 1989 he relocated to London where he was a spokesman for Dawa. It appeared he left on friendly terms with Iranian officials. (1) Nouri al-Maliki became a member of Dawa when he was a teenager following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Upon the suggestion of the party he went to Usual al-Din College in Baghdad, which was founded by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr the spiritual leader of the movement. He later received a degree in Arab Literature. Like Jaafari Maliki fled Iraq and eventually ended up in Iran after a government crackdown in 1979. There he helped run Dawa’s armed wing against the Baathist government. Like Jaafari, Maliki left in 1990 over Tehran’s attemptto take over the party, and moved to Syria where he continued his clandestine activities. Although their professional background was different, they both came from well off families and joined Dawa around the same time, and were forced to flee their homeland as a result. That led them to Iran, which was considered an inspiration to many party members after its 1979 revolution. That eventually wore off for Maliki who resented Iran’s attempt to control his party, but not so much for Jaafari. He ended up going to the West, while Maliki remained in the Middle East, probably because he was a leader in the armed faction and needed to stay in the region to help run its activities. Still, they held much in common.

Jaafari and Maliki returned to Iraq in 2003 and became premier back to back, but their styles of governing were complete opposites. Following the January 2005 elections, Jaafari was made premier in May. He was known as being an intellectual who loved to talk about philosophy and political thinkers. In July 2005 for example, he met with President George W. Bush in Washington where he went on and on about how much he loved Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and other American presidents. In terms of governance Jaafari was completely ineffective. The premier’s chief of staff said that the prime minister’s office was disorganized, while a U.S. diplomat noted that the office was staffed with Dawa members who had no experience in administration. Jaafari himself attempted to micro-manage everything and did little as a result. Many in the U.S. and Iraq ended up blaming him for the civil war when it broke out his first year in office. He did nothing about the Bard Brigade for example, which took over the Interior Ministry under his government, and began using its commandos to carry out sectarian arrests and killings. Maliki turned out to be the complete opposite, although that was not apparent at first. He was chosen to replace Jaafari in 2006. The Sadrists were one of his main supporters, and Maliki returned the favor by protecting its Mahdi Army, which had become the main militia fighting in the sectarian war from the U.S. When the civil war was subsiding he turned on them seeing them as a possible rival and launched the Charge of the Knights in Basra, Amara, and Baghdad. He would then challenge the insurgency in Mosul, and the Kurds in Diyala. This made him widely popular as an Iraqi nationalist, and helped his new State of Law coalition win the 2009 provincial and 2010 parliamentary elections. Along the way he created his own command system over the security forces, took over the intelligence agencies, went after his opponents, became the acting Defense and Interior Ministers, and gained control over the judiciary all of which led to his image as an autocrat. Although Jaafari and Maliki joined Dawa during the same period, and both went into exile in Iran where they participated in plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein they could not be more different when they became premier. Jaafari loved to talk people to death about esoteric topics, while doing very little as leader of Iraq. Maliki was accused of seizing too much power, and doing too much. Their shared experiences therefore did not shape their vision of how to run Iraq nor their management styles.

Haider Abad’s life started out similar to Jaafari and Maliki’s, but then turned out much different. Like the other two, Abadi came from a well off family. Similar to Maliki, Abadi joined Dawa in 1967 as a teen. He then got a bachelor’s degree at the University of Technology in Baghdad where he became a lecturer in Electrical Engineering making him a professional as Jaafari was. The difference was that Abadi ended up going to London for graduate school and his doctorate in the 1970s. During that period he became the head of the Dawa Party in England where Jaafari would later work with him. After 2003 he was made Communications Minister, and then elected to parliament in 2005 where he was made chairman of the economic committee specializing on reviving the state owned enterprises. He later served as an adviser to Maliki and was put in charge of Tal Afar, which was then under insurgent control. In recent years, he was on the finance committee where he pushed for cutting off budget payments to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for its independent oil policy. Unlike Jaafari’s reputation as a philosopher and Maliki’s as an autocrat, Abadi is known for being a technocrat. He has been a State of Law loyalist as well, but that could be expected since he has been in Dawa for most of his life.

Given the history of Jaafari and Maliki and their time in office there is no reason to believe that Abadi will be like them. Jaafari and Maliki were complete opposites while prime minister even though their time as Dawa members had many similarities. Abadi has even fewer things in common with those two. His technocratic background might be just what Iraq needs during this moment of crisis. Working on problem solving rather than political disputes would be a huge step forward. At the same time, his early statements about what he wants to do in government cannot be taken at face value. He has called for a trimmed down government and for militias to all be under state control. Jaafari and Maliki made similar comments when they took office, but did nothing substantial about them. Only when Abadi actually becomes prime minister and starts forming policy will it be known whether he will be similar or different from his predecessors.

FOOTNOTES

1. Worth, Robert, “Iraq’s New Presidential Names Shiite Leader as Prime Minister,” New York Times, 4/7/05

SOURCES

Arango, Tim and Gordon, Michael, “Next Leader May Echo Maliki, But Iraqis Hope for New Results,” New York Times, 8/19/14

Associated Press, “Shiites choose nominee for Iraq prime minister,” 4/21/06

Buratha News, “Who is the prime minister-designate to form the next government, Haider Abadi?” 8/11/14

Burns, John, “Precarious Cease-Fire in Amara Holds,” New York Times, 10/22/06

Cole, Juan, “Saving Iraq: Mission impossible,” Salon, 5/11/06

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barak Obama, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012)

Michaels, Jim, “Shiites Redefine Battle in Baghdad,” USA Today, 8/10/06

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, "Notes From The Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki," World Policy Institute, May 2013

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “FACT SHEET: IBRAHIM AL-JAAFARI,” Institute for the Study of War,” 5/12/10

Tavernise, Sabrina, “Many Iraqis See Sectarian Roots in New Killings,” New York Times, 5/27/05

Worth, Robert, “Iraq’s New Presidential Names Shiite Leader as Prime Minister,” New York Times, 4/7/05

Origins Of Iraq’s Ethnosectarian Quota System

Many are wondering what a post-Nouri al-Maliki government will be like, but one thing that will stay the same are the ethnosectarian quotas. Many believe that the Americans created this system during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While the U.S. did institutionalize the concept, it actually came from the Iraqi opposition groups that were formed during the reign of Saddam Hussein. Starting in the 1990s a series of meetings were held in an attempt to unify the multiplicity of anti-Saddam organizations. Quotas were originally created to try to give proper representation to each one of the factions. Those quickly moved to be based upon sect and ethnicity, which was then taken up by the Americans in their attempt to build a new Iraq. Today these quotas continue to exist and are a major structural impediment to a healthy and functional government, because they create a divided administration that works at cross purposes with itself.

Left to right Jalal Talabani of the PUK, Zalmay Khalilzad of the U.S., Massoud Barzani of the KDP, Ezzidin Salim of Dawa and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of ISCI at 1992 Salahaddin conference where ethnosectarian quotas were solidified amongst the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein (Al-Ahram)

A series of meetings in the 1990s gave rise to quotas to incorporate the plethora of parties interested in removing Saddam Hussein from power. The first took place in March 1991 in Beirut, Lebanon, which was in part organized by Syria and Saudi Arabia, two of the major financiers of the Iraqi opposition. Over 300 delegates attended from 20 different parties. The result was the Free Iraqi Council headed by Saad Salih Jabr. Nothing much came of it however because the groups disagreed about who should have more influence, what percentage each party should have within the council, and voting rights. This reflected the fact that there were far too many organizations, many of which were personal vehicles for individuals with large egos. In June 1992 there was another conference in Vienna, Austria, which led to the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as an umbrella group. 160 delegates attended with the absence of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Dawa Party only sent observers. What was important about the meeting was that after the disagreements in Beirut, a quota system was initiated to try to give each major group some type of say. Islamist parties were given 35.3% of the representatives, democrats, liberals and independents 35.3%, Kurds 23.5%, and Turkmen 5.8%. During the meeting a 17 member executive committee was then put together that included Muhsen Dazai and Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP, Latif Rasheed and Saadi Ahmed Pit of the PUK, Akram al-Hakim of the Supreme Council, Ahmad Chalabi, and others. The INC quickly fell to divisive politics, leading Massoud Barzani to call for another get together in October 1992 known as the Salahaddin conference. Again quotas were set up for representatives with Shiite Islamists getting 33%, Kurds 25%, Arab nationalists 16%, Iraqi tribes, democrats and liberals 4% each, Assyrians and Christians and Communists 3% each, and Sunni Islamists 2%. 234 figures ended up attending representing roughly 90% of the anti-Saddam forces, and a plan was made to reform the Iraqi National Congress. First its National Assembly was expanded from 87 to 234, a 26 member executive council was formed, and a 3 man presidential council was made up as well. The latter two each had quotas. The presidential council was split between a Sunni a Shiite and a Kurd consisting of former general Hassan Mustafa Naqib, Mohammed Ibrahim Bahr Uloom, and Massoud Barzani, while on the executive committee a secular Shiite, Ahmed Chalabi was elected president, along with Hani Fakaiki a Sunni, Latif Rasheed a Kurd from the PUK, and Sheikh Human Hammoudi a Shiite Islamist of ISCI who were the vice presidents. Syria was not happy with the results of the meeting, and called its own in October 1992. Again a three man presidential council was formed made up of a Sunni, a Shiite, and a Kurd. Finally, in February 1993 another meeting of the INC was held in Irbil where a new consultative committee was created to represent the major groups. It originally had 10 people, but that was later expanded to 26. Once more quotas were implemented with Shiite Islamists getting 33% of the seats, Kurds 25%, Sunnis 7%, Turkmen 6%, Assyrians 3%, and the rest going to secular and liberal parties. What was originally created as a means to incorporate all the different anti-Saddam groups whether that was the religious parties or liberal ones or the communists or Kurds eventually became more and more based upon ethnosectarian categories. Hence in June 1992 only 29.3% of the representatives to Vienna were explicitly based upon ethnicity. That turned into 77% of the members of the Salahaddin conference in October, and 100% of the INC’s presidential council that was created there. The eclipse of the secular, democratic, etc. parties was due to two factors. First, Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship had shut out and destroyed most of the Iraqi parties that had developed since the British Mandate and post-independence period. The Iraqi Communist Party for example went from one of the largest in the country to being hunted down by the Baathists in 1963 and 1968, and then being undone by an alliance with that very same party in 1973. With these traditional organizations being repressed more and more people began turning to ones based upon religion and ethnicity as two of the only avenues available within the country. This was spurred on by regional events and actors as well such as the Shah of Iran’s support for the Kurdish parties to pressure Saddam, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War that gave rise to ISCI, Syria’s backing of factions within Dawa, and the growth of Islamism in general in the 1990s. By the time the 2000s rolled around those ethnosectarian parties were some of the main ones talking and working with the Americans.

When the Coalition Provisional Authority was created in April 2003 it believed in the necessity of creating ethnosectarian quotas as well to try to ensure all the various groups were represented just like the earlier opposition meetings had, as well as to ensure that the Shiite majority would finally have its fair share in the new Iraq. It set up the 25 member Iraqi Governing Council with 13 seats for Shiites, 5 for Kurds, 5 for Sunnis, and one each for Assyrians, Turkmen, and women. These positions were all filled by individuals who had taken part in the anti-Saddam movement such as Mohammed Uloom who had been on the INC’s presidential council, Ahmed Chalabi the head of the INC, Jalal Talabani the head of the PUK, Massoud Barzani the leader of the KDP, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim from ISCI, and others. More than that these council members were then given control of ministries, which allowed them to pack them with their followers and become the basis for their patronage networks. This had the effect of institutionalizing the ethnosectarian system the Saddam opposition had already created on its own during the 1990s. Now it became expected that the top government positions would be handed amongst the major sects and ethnicities, and so would the government offices. This was a major cause for dysfunction as it created a government made of many parts that worked at cross purposes rather than committed to the prime minister. Hence there have been both opponents and supporters of the premier within each ruling coalition since 2005. It also meant government positions were distributed based upon party loyalty rather than competence. This trend continues to today. In July 2014 a new speaker of parliament and his deputies were elected. That followed the precedent set in 2005 when the first post-Saddam government was formed with the speakership going to a Sunni, Salim Jabouri of Mutahidun, while his deputies, Haidar Abadi of State of Law and Aram Sheikh Mohammed of Change were a Shiite and Kurd respectively. With the subsequent nomination of Abadi for premier he will have to put together a ruling coalition where the ministries will be split along ethnosectarian lines. It wasn’t the Americans who created these divisions, they just built upon what the anti-Saddam groups had been doing in the previous decade, and made it a practice that every Iraqi government would followed afterward.

Ethnosectarianism has become a dominant factor in Iraqi politics. It represents one of the main structural problems the Iraqi state faces, which constrains the development of democracy, and perpetuates divisiveness. It wasn’t just the Americans fault that the CPA came along and broke up offices and ministries in this way. It was the Iraqi opposition that originally came up with these quotas. The U.S. simply accepted this concept in 2003 and then used it itself. This system persists to this day and has become more entrenched. That doesn’t meant ethnicity and sect will always dominate Iraq as there have been times in Iraqi history where ideology was the driving force. It’s just that the major parties are now organized around identity politics. It will require them or a new political class to move away from these ideas for Iraq to change. Until then it will suffer through one dysfunctional government after another.

SOURCES

Al-Ahram, “Untying the knot,” 2/19/03

European Institute for Research On Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, “Iraqi National Congress – INC”

Gunter, Michael, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, (St. Martin’s Press, 1999)

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime,” Congressional Research Service, 10/3/02

- “Iraq’s Opposition Movements,” Congressional Research Service, 6/27/00

Rabil, Robert, “Iraqi opposition: From conflict to unity?” Asia Times, 1/18/03

Al-Shamrani, Ali, “The Iraqi Opposition Movement: The Post-Gulf War Era 1990-1996,” Department of War Studies, King’s College, 2001

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Tyler, Patrick, “Iraq pieces together its first postwar governing council,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/13/03

The Death Throes Of The Maliki Government In Iraq

 

Iraq’s political class has been slowly but surely moving towards a new government since the April 2014 parliamentary elections. A speaker of parliament and president were named, but the final barrier to completing the process was Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s insistence on a third term. The Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Mutahidun were all demanding that Maliki’s State of Law list come up with an alternative for the premiership, while Maliki claimed that his victory in the polls gave him first dibs at forming a new government. This was part of the prime minister’s strategy to drag out the process as long as possible in the hopes that he could out last his opponents, which was what he did in 2010 to gain a second term. This strategy backfired, as not only did State of Law fracture in the process, but so did Maliki’s own Dawa Party. Those differences became public when the National Alliance put forward Deputy Speaker of Parliament Haidar Abadi from Dawa as its candidate for prime minister, which was condemned by Maliki. The premier continues to try to cling to power, but the writing is on the wall that his days are numbered.

The nomination of Haidar Abadi (right) seen here with from left to right Speaker Jabouri, President Masum and Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the National Alliance marks one of the final steps in the end of the government of Nouri al-Maliki (Al Mada)

The future of Maliki’s government came to a head when his own list abandoned him. On the night of August 10, 2014 the prime minister went on television attacking President Fuad Masum for not naming a candidate for prime minister according to the constitutional deadlines, and threatened to sue him in court over it. At the same time Maliki called out the security forces in Baghdad’s Green Zone setting off wild rumors that he was staging a coup. His argument against Masum was that since State of Law (SOL) won the most votes in the April elections it deserved to name him as the candidate for a third term. This came after SOL held a meeting earlier in the day over the premiership. There was no news over whether anything came of that, but the list was fragmenting beforehand. For example, on July 26 Maliki’s Dawa Party, which is part of State of Law said that it would follow the guidance of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who said that Iraq’s leaders should not “cling” to power. The next day, the National Alliance (NA) made up of SOL, the Sadrists, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) put forward Deputy Speaker of Parliament Haider Abadi from the Dawa Party as its candidate for prime minister. According to reports, 12 members of Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani’s Independents within SOL and 38 from Dawa backed Abadi’s nomination. Maliki and his remaining supporters immediately struck back. The prime minister returned to television accusing the United States and parts of State of Law of conspiring against him, Dawa parliamentarian Khalaf Abdul Samad said that Abadi did not represent the list, while Maliki’s son in law Hussein al-Maliki said that Abadi’s candidacy was illegal. At the same time SOL lawmaker Hanan al-Fatlawi told the press that the Supreme Court had named it the largest bloc thus giving it the sole right to name the candidate for prime minister, a story quickly denied by the judiciary. These all appeared to be wild verbal swings by Maliki and his shrinking base in light of their realization that their game to hold onto power was finally coming to an end. To highlight how much Maliki’s support has shrunk, when he went on TV he was only backed by 28 lawmakers out of 95 from State of Law, and SOL’s Twitter account started criticizing him on August 10 as well. The prime minister’s strategy all along was to repeat what he did in 2010. Then SOL came in second place to the Iraqi National Movement (INM). He then got the Supreme Court to rule that it wasn’t the list that won the election but the one that could form the largest coalition afterward that had the right to nominate the prime minister. Maliki then played upon the divisions within the INM, and worked for months to wear down the other parties until he could form a new government. He has tried to play the same game this year, but 2010 has come back to haunt him. That court ruling meant that SOL could not nominate him since it is not the largest list, which was why he agreed to join the National Alliance. The Sadrists and ISCI ran against Maliki, but he hoped to outlast them once again. Instead his plan backfired as SOL and even Dawa split over a third term. Some members could’ve seen the writing on the wall that his time was up, and some might have been influenced by Iran who also came out against Maliki’s return to office. Whatever their motivation, they have lost faith in Maliki putting the nail in his coffin.

On the other hand, many other blocs and political leaders immediately were happy about Abadi’s nomination. The Supreme Council and Moqtada al-Sadr both issued statements welcoming Abadi, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan hoped that he would ease the problems between the central and regional government. When Abadi went on television Deputy Premier Shahristani, Speaker of Parliament Salim Jabouri of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and members of the Sadrists, ISCI, and the Fadhila Party accompanied him. Many of the major parties have been waiting for this moment when the National Alliance would come up with an alternative to Maliki. There might be some complaints that since Abadi is from the Dawa Party he may not bring the types of changes that all are hoping for, but it does offer the possibility of a fresh start.

Nouri al-Maliki came away from the April balloting assured that he would get another term, which is why he has dealt with the recent events so poorly. Maliki received the most personal votes, and State of Law won a plurality of seats in the new parliament. He then joined with the National Alliance to give himself the largest bloc. The problem is Iraqi elections never go the way most believe. Rather than finding the chinks in his opponents’ armor like he did in 2010, it was SOL who ended up breaking apart. Now he’s left to verbal threats, claims of illegality, and intimidating maneuvers by the Iraqi Security Forces in Baghdad. Maliki still believes that he should be the leader of the country, which is why he is not going quietly. He will continue with these tactics, but with all the support Abadi is garnering it will all be over when he presents his ruling coalition for approval to parliament in the next 30 days.

SOURCES

AIN, “Federal Court denies nominating SLC as biggest bloc,” 8/11/14

- “SLC discuss presenting candidate for PM post,” 8/10/14

Ashton, Adam, “Maliki clings to power in Iraq despite criticism,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/10/14

Associated Press, “Iraqi cleric urges leaders not to ‘cling’ to power,” 7/25/14

Buratha News, “Keep their faces and their names well ..!..The 28 deputies who were sold and bought through misguided guidance,” 8/11/14

- “ISCI congratulated Dr. Haider Abadi after the assignment, headed by Minister,” 8/11/14

Georgy, Michael and Rasheed, Ahmed, “Power struggle on Baghdad streets as Maliki replaced but refuses to go,” Reuters, 8/11/14

Lando, Ben, “Maliki claims foul play as Abadi’s support grows,” Iraq Oil Report, 8/11/14

Al Mada, “Sadr welcomes commissioning of a candidate for prime minister by the “grace”, and calls for the Dawa Party not to resort to violence,” 8/11/14

- “Sunnis and the Kurds: The Committee will work with Abadi to launch political reform,” 8/11/14

Al Masalah, “Dawa Party renews its commitment under the guidance of reference and timings of the constitution on forming of government,” 7/26/14

- “Khalaf Abdul Samad: 45 out of 54 deputies in the Dawa block did not vote for Ebadi,” 8/11/14

- “Maliki: assigning no value to Abadi, and the rule of law is the largest bloc,” 8/11/14

Morris, Loveday and Gearan, Anne, “Iraqi president names Haider al-Abadi new prime minister, defying Maliki,” Washington Post, 8/11/14

Al Rafidayn, “Araji: representatives of the National Alliance chose Abadi and some did not vote at all,” 8/11/14

- “Fatlawi: Haider Abadi does not represent the coalition of state of law,” 8/11/14

Reuters, “Iran seeking successor to Iraqi PM Maliki: official,” 8/5/14

Visser, Reidar, “Haydar al-Abbadi Is the New Iraq PM Candidate,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 8/11/14

Pressure Grows On Iraq’s Premier Maliki To Give Up On A Third Term

 

Iraq’s politicians have taken some important steps towards forming a new government. A speaker of parliament and a new president were elected in July 2014. Now President Fuad Masum must pick a candidate for prime minister from the largest bloc in parliament, which is the National Alliance (NA) made up of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL), the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s Citizen’s Alliance, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. That’s the last major barrier as Premier Maliki has refused to step aside despite opposition from within the NA, his own State of Law, the religious establishment in Najaf, and Iran.

New Iraqi President Masum is waiting for the National Alliance to name its candidate for premier. Will it be Maliki, another figure from State of Law or a politician from another list within the coalition? (Al Arabiya)

In mid-July a new speaker of parliament and president of Iraq were elected. On July 15, Salim Jabouri of Mutahidun was elected the new speaker, with Haidar Abadi of State of Law his first deputy and Aram Sheikh Mohammed of the Change List his second deputy. It took two rounds of balloting to select Abadi as he was challenged by Ahmed Chalabi who was elected to parliament as part of the Citizen’s Alliance. Chalabi did not actually desire the position, but wanted to make a point that Maliki could be stopped from being elected to a third term by his opponents. Then after some internal divisions within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were overcome Fuad Masum was elected the new president of Iraq on July 24. This was a break from former elections when the speaker, president and premier were all part of a package deal worked out by the winning lists. That was impossible this year since Maliki insisted that he be the candidate for prime minister, while his critics within the NA could not agree upon an alternative. What did hold was the ethnosectarian quota system with a Sunni becoming speaker and a Kurd being president. Likewise the premiership will remain with the Shiite parties.

Maliki is trying to wait out his opponents like he did in 2010, but there is more writing on the wall each week that he will not be able to hold onto power. Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme Council’s Citizen’s Alliance ran against the prime minister and have continued to demand that his State of Law replace him. Both Ahrar and Citizen’s said they had their own candidates such as former vice president Adel Abdul Mahdi, Ahmed Chalabi, and ex-Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and that State of Law had alternatives like Maliki adviser Tariq Najm, Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani and Transportation Minister Hadi Ameri, but could not move forward as long as Maliki demanded to remain in office showing the divisions within the National Alliance. The Najaf clergy has become more and more vocal against the prime minister. July 16 Sheikh Ali Najafi the spokesman for his father Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi said that a new government needed to be formed quickly without Maliki to solve the on going crisis in the country. July 25 during Friday prayers Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani released a statement that Iraq’s leaders should not “cling” to power obviously referring to Maliki. Third, Iran has apparently come out against the premier’s third term. According to the Associate Press, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force General Qasim Suleimani talked with Maliki about stepping down, but he refused. Last splits have arisen within State of Law as well. After Sistani’s remarks the prime minister’s own Dawa Party said that it would follow the Ayatollah’s guidance. July 28 ISCI’s Buratha News reported that the Badr Organization left State of Law because of Maliki’s obstinacy. SOL has responded to all of these attacks by claiming that since it won the most seats it therefore has the right to pick the next premier. Maliki even went to the courts trying to get them to declare State of Law not the National Alliance as the largest bloc in parliament and thus giving it the sole right to name the premiership, but he was turned down. In 2010 the victorious parties took ten months to put together a new ruling coalition. Maliki dragged out the process and brought the courts, Tehran, and Washington eventually to his side. The Supreme Court for example ruled that the party that was able to put together the largest alliance after the election not the one that won the most votes had the right to name the candidate for premier. This has now come back to haunt Maliki as it makes his claim that the SOL’s victory in the polls gives him the right to stay in office invalid. Instead it is up to the divided NA to make that decision. His opponents within the coalition now have the backing of Najaf and Tehran if the AP story is correct. The latter was instrumental in ensuring Maliki a 2^nd term after the last elections, but the Iranians may now seem him as a source of instability and want him out. Finally State of Law has lost its internal cohesion. The report about Badr leaving SOL may not be true, but there is definitely dissension within its ranks. The Iraqi elite is still not following the timetable laid out in the law to form a new government, but it is making slow progress as the election of Jabouri and Masum show. That means the final step of naming a candidate for prime minister may occur sooner rather than later as Maliki’s support is being worn down.

Nouri al-Maliki was the resounding winner in the 2014 elections, but that does not assure him staying in power. Ibrahim Jaafari became premier in 2005 not because his Dawa party won the most votes, but because it was part of the largest bloc the United Iraqi Alliance. Maliki was named prime minister in 2006, because the U.S. and others had lost confidence in Jaafari with the escalating civil war. Again, his Dawa was not the largest party, but he was chosen within the United Alliance as a compromise candidate. In 2010 the Iraqi National Movement won the most seats, but thanks to the Supreme Court ruling Maliki was able to put together the largest coalition after the voting and win a 2^nd term. Coming out victorious in 2014 was therefore an important step for Maliki, but not the final word. Immediately after the election it looked like he had the momentum, but then the insurgent summer offensive came and most of northern Iraq fell, and the prime minister’s star began to fall as more and more groups from Najaf to Iran added their voices calling for him to step down. This whole process still has minutes left on the clock, but they are counting down for Maliki.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraqi Shiite cleric tells AFP: PM Maliki must go,” Agence France Presse, 7/16/14

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim Salama, Vivian, “Talabani ally is Iraqi Kurds presidential choice,” Associated Press, 7/23/14

Associated Press, “Iraq elects new president as attacks kill dozens,” 7/24/14

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Buratha News, “After news of its withdrawal from the state of law coalition….Badr Organization declares its commitment to the decision of the National Alliance for the prime minister post,” 7/28/14

- “Ibrahim al-Jaafari:: National Alliance is the largest parliamentary bloc, not the rule of law we have all started and announced that,” 7/27/14

Independent Press Agency, “Bayraktar: deny the issuance of a new resolution concerning the largest parliamentary bloc,” 7/24/14

Al Mada, “Differences within Maliki’s bloc: Will the call bring together more than one candidate for premier?” 7/19/14

- “Liberals and the Council: our deal with al-Maliki to withdraw and his replacement a condition that has been accepted by National Alliance,” 7/17/14

Al Masalah, “Dawa Party renews its commitment under the guidance of reference and timings of the constitution on forming of government,” 7/26/14

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Visser, Reidar, “The Iraqi Parliament Elects Its New Speakership,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 7/15/14