Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL) party
began challenging some provincial governments in 2014. The last one was Basra
the economic hub of the country. Even though SOL won the most votes there in
2013 and gained the head of council it decided that it preferred the
governorship, held by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISC), and initiated
a lawsuit in March 2014 in the premier friendly courts to obtain it. Iran
brokered a truce between the two parties, but then State of Law brought it up
again in April. This time it appeared that Maliki was just using it to warn the
Supreme Council before this year’s election that if it decided to challenge him
they could lose their positions in the provincial governments.
PM Maliki (left) used
the threat against the Basra government to warn Ammar Hakim (right) of the Supreme Council not to
challenge him in this year’s election (New
Sabah)
At the beginning of April 2014 the case against the Basra
government returned to the news. April
3 a court said that it was moving ahead with the lawsuit filed against
Basra by State of Law. This was after the same court said it was holding off
hearing the case at the end of March. Then on April
7 the judges said they were postponing the case due to a lack of evidence.
Beforehand the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) was complaining that the judges
reviewing the suit had been changed due to interference by SOL. The Supreme
Council was obviously on
the defensive with the threat of losing the Basra governorship hanging over
its head. State of Law on the other hand was playing it cool saying that it was
committed to working with ISCI. The courts in Iraq are under the influence of
the prime minister so the threat of a lawsuit held a lot of weight.
State of Law initiated the lawsuit because it wanted the
governorship of Basra. The provincial government was put together in June
2013. The first session was attended by judges and 28 of the 35 council
members, including 9 of 16 the SOL councilmen. State of Law got the head of
council, while ISCI obtained the governorship. The other seven SOL members
called for a postponement, which was the basis for the court case. That was a
precarious lawsuit since SOL got the most votes in the election, participated
in the government formation process, and ended up with the council
chairmanship. That didn’t matter since the courts would rule whatever way
Maliki wanted showing that this was a pure power grab by the prime minister.
In the aftermath of the lawsuit ISCI and SOL started a war
of words between each other, which brought Iran in to mediate. Maliki and Ammar
Hakim the head of ISCI both met
with Iranian officials. The two then met face to face, which led to a
heated exchange between them, but ended with a peace agreement that included
freezing the Basra case until after the 2014 elections. Publicly Tehran’s role
was not mentioned. Instead the Supreme Council claimed that its threats against
SOL led
to the peace.
The real goal of this confrontation between State of Law and
the Supreme Council was not about the Basra governorship, but the 2014
elections. It was obvious that Maliki was manipulating the courts to threaten
ISCI, hence the on and off again court hearing. The goal of the prime minister was
to warn Hakim that if he opposed him after this year’s vote he could not only
lose Basra, but any other provincial positions the Supreme Council held. This
was shown by the fact that SOL successfully removed
the Diyala government earlier this year due to a lawsuit, and got another
favorable ruling against the Wasit administration as well. ISCI made a strong
comeback in last year’s election and losing any of those governorates would be
a severe loss for the party, especially in important provinces such as Basra.
That will put Ammar Hakim in a difficult position when negotiations start to
put together the next government. Will he be swayed to back Maliki for another
term so that he can hold onto his local assets or will he challenge the premier
in the hopes of removing him and thus assuring that nothing will happen to the
governorates that his party controls? Only time will tell.
SOURCES
Abdullah, Ali,
“Albonza: Basra First coalition exceeded 23 members and a government can be
formed away from others,” Buratha News, 4/5/14
AIN, “Bazoni: Maliki, Hakim reach compromise over canceling
complain over formation of Basra local government,” 3/18/14
- “Breaking
News…Court postpones claim over legitimacy of Basra local government,” 4/7/14
Buratha News, “Basra First coalition and State of Law agreed
to request the postponement of the appeal in the Basra government as a prelude to
withdrawing confidence,” 3/5/14
Al Mada, “”Basra First” denies the partition: the appeal
over the legitimacy of the government was withdrawn,” 3/20/14
- “Basra responds to the challenge of State of Law: Maliki’s
allies attended the configuration session,” 3/11/14
- “Hakim bloc accuses al-Maliki of violating the truce and
expects the issuance of a court challenge to the legitimacy of the government
of Basra,” 4/3/14
- “Hakim bloc in Basra confirms “the futility of”
challenging the lawfulness of the local government by al-Maliki’s coalition,”
3/10/14
- “Hakim to al-Maliki bloc threatening to “turn the tables”
in four provinces if he tried to change the political map in Basra,” 3/12/14
- “Maliki’s bloc in
Basra confirms its commitment to the truce with the Citizen’s Coalition and the
latter shows “no fear” of the judgment,” 4/3/14
- “Shi’ite sources: meeting with Maliki and Hakim was hot
and Iran entered to line up a truce,” 3/20/14
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