Justice For Assassinated Analyst Hisham al-Hashemi

(BBC)

Almost three years after his assassination analyst Hisham al-Hashemi may finally be getting justice. His killer, an officer in the Interior Ministry Ahmed al-Kenani was just given the death sentence.

Review Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War, The Legal Cynicism of Criminal Militarism

 Hagan, John, Kaiser, Joshua, and Hanson, Anna, Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War, The Legal Cynicism of Criminal Militarism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015

 

One of the great faults of the Social Sciences is the belief that it can be like actual sciences and use math, equations, charts and graphs to explain human behavior. For some in the field you can’t just explain events and analyze them, you have to quantify them. That’s the problem with Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War, The Legal Cynicism of Criminal Militarism. The authors set out to prove that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was an illegal war, which created cynicism amongst Iraqis that undermined the occupation and the new Iraqi government. It uses interviews and public opinion polls to try to prove its point but gets lost in its own arguments and half the time doesn’t prove its points.

Continued Reports Of Dysfunctional Iraqi Justice System

In the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission’s latest report it found that Iraq’s judicial system is not working. It observed almost 800 cases across nine provinces, most of which had to do with terrorism charges, and found a lack of due process. There was a shortage of competent lawyers, torture and abuse were commonly used to obtain confessions, there was a broad application of the anti-terror laws, and liberal handing out of death sentences. These are the same problems that human rights groups have been noting about Iraq for years.

Iraqi Courts Finally Begin To Follow The Law And Demand Due Process

(AP)

After years of complaints by human rights groups one Iraqi court has finally started implementing rules to assure due process is served. Human Rights Watch reported that the Ninewa counterterrorism court issued new regulations on evidence and court procedures to improve investigations and court procedures.

Iraq Has Another Year With Poor Human Rights Record According to Amnesty International

Amnesty International recently released its annual review of human rights in the Middle Est for 2018. The section on Iraq could have been taken from any of the previous reports from the last fourteen years. The government’s forces continue to use torture. There is no rule of law nor due process for those that go through the justice system. The government also went after protesters in southern and northern Iraq. People associated with the Islamic State face group punishment. This is the underside of Iraq. Not only does it have a poor human rights record it also lacks some of the basics necessary for it to develop into a full democracy.

Iraq’s Troubles Fighting Corruption Interview With Vincent Foulk Former US Anti-Graft Official

Vincent Foulk served in Iraq from 2003-12 in all types of capacities. He started as an Army Civil Affairs officer in 2003, then worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority, and assisting Iraq’s courts. He then returned as a legal adviser to the Iraqi police, moved onto helping Iraq with anti-corruption activities, and finished with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. He is also the author of The Battle for Fallujah, Operation, Resistance and Stalemate in the War in Iraq. This interview focuses upon Foulk’s time trying to combat fraud and graft in Iraq.

Is Reconciliation Possible In Iraq?

Reconciliation is often discussed in Iraq, but rarely ever accomplished. The Prime Minister has talked about it, there have been joint Sunni-Shiite prayers and tribal meetings, but nothing ever comes of them. The National Democratic Institute recently released a report “Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation” about this topic based upon interviews with religious, tribal, community and protest leaders. One of the major difficulties was that people often don’t agree upon what reconciliation means and who should be included. The biggest problem however was that the country’s political elite who are expected to lead Iraq in this process, have no desire to do so because they live off of division to stay in power.

All of those included in the National Democratic Institute survey agreed that Iraq’s politicians were barriers to reconciliation. That was because the country’s leaders advocated sectarianism and division to maintain their positions. At the same time, the elite were believed to be the only ones capable of pushing the process forward. Reconciliation between the political class was also important because their differences were a major reason why the country remained deadlocked on so many important issues. That history and the political benefits garnered from sectarianism were why none were willing to seriously deal with rapprochement. The people in the survey thought that it was up to the public therefore to pressure the government towards change. The problem with that approach is that the ruling parties are not beholden to the public, but instead the people are reliant upon them. For example, there have been years of protests in Iraq, and there are ones going on right now, but all they have garnered is lip service from politicians. That’s because Iraq’s oil based economy means that the government does not need taxes from the public for funds, but rather uses its natural wealth to become the largest employer and provider in the country. This is a common practice in petroleum dependent countries. Without that connection it’s unlikely that any demonstrations can make Iraq’s rulers move towards reconciliation unless they themselves want to, which does not look like it will happen any time soon.

Even if that process were to begin there are major barriers to it being successful in Iraq. First, no one seemed to agree on the terms and players that should be involved. Each group looked at the issue different. For example should it be Shiites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, Baathists and everyone else, Iraq and foreign countries, should insurgents be involved, etc. There was also the issue of whether it should just focus upon present wrongs or historical ones. The National Democratic Institute brought up amnesty as a perfect example of this dilemma. Many said they supported the idea as a concept, but when they got into the specifics there was no agreement. For example, not many thought that people that had killed should be included. Given all the differences in Iraq there was probably no consensus on what even that meant. Would that just be members of the former regime, insurgents, militias, etc. That led few to believe that amnesty could be implemented in practice. Another issue was that few had any trust in the judiciary, which would be intimately involved in any amnesty program. The courts were considered corrupt and under political control, and thus easily manipulated. Finally, many Kurds had lost trust in Baghdad, and did not want to work on many of these issues because they had decided on independence instead. What everyone could agree upon was that any rapprochement had to be based upon Iraqi identity instead of sect or ethnicity. Again, all of these differences pointed to how far away Iraq was from even opening the door to reconciliation because so few could agree on even basic terms.

The third factor brought up was that sectarianism within society needed to be addressed, not just with the political parties. In polls, Iraqis say that they do not think in ethnosectarian terms, but when they were questioned on specific issue they often did. This was especially true today as the Islamic State has played upon the divisions within the country and increased tensions between communities. The violence of the insurgents has also created a deep seated desire for revenge amongst many groups that will take years to overcome.

The National Democratic Institute finished with six steps Iraq should take to move forward with reconciliation. The first was judicial reform. The courts play a crucial role in this process. They would oversee the release of prisoners, enforcement of due process, impartial prosecutions, etc. Making judges independent, and not beholden to political parties would be an important move to ensure that Iraq would start moving towards those goals. Second was a more equitable distribution of resources. Many of those interviewed thought that politicians and their cronies got all the benefits from the country. This was an especially important issue for the Kurds who believe Baghdad has cut them off. There was also a push for great transparency over the budget and decentralization of power to the provinces. The third was disarming groups. The Hashd, tribes, and others need to be demobilized after the war with the Islamic State. This would be easier said then done as many foreign powers back armed groups and would not agree to having them give up their weapons. Four was ending the quota system in government that determines the top positions in government. Many believe that the quotas are at the heart of the ethnosectarian political system that rules the country, and therefore ending it would be a blow to it. Five was holding reconciliation conferences, which was self-explanatory. Last was countering foreign influence in Iraq. Outside powers were seen as supporting the political divisions within the country to maintain their influence. Pushing Iraqi nationalism over ethnosectarianism was seen as a possible way to lesson this interference. These were all good suggestions, but the likelihood of them happening was little to none. As the study already noted Iraq’s politicians have no stomach for any real reform, especially if it threatens their hold on power. All of these proposals would do that. Prime Minister Abadi for example, brought up judicial reform at the end of 2015. When it came to it however, he left it up to the judges to change themselves, which never happened. That in a nutshell is the problem with reconciliation in Iraq. The public wants it, and even some politicians, but as long as the majority of elite do not, nothing will happen. The country’s leadership simply has too much to lose in such a process, and therefore will continue to stand in the way.

SOURCES

National Democratic Institute, “Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation,” 1/14/16

Autumn 2015 Iraq Public Opinion Poll: PM Abadi Widely Popular Not So Much Rest Of Government

In December 2015 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research released a new public opinion poll on Iraq. The company has done several such surveys over the last couple years, and the data is some of the most comprehensive available on how Iraqis are feeling about their country. The survey was done from August 12 to September 3 and included 2,000 people from all major regions of the country. The results showed that Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was still widely popular in Iraq, far above any other national leader. On the other hand, the public had a low opinion of the ruling parties and government in general, and had different thoughts on what needed to be fixed in the country apart from what politicians talk about.

Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was by far the most popular politician in the poll. He had an approval rating of 65%, and 58% of respondents said they wanted to continue in the direction he was leading the country. The only region that disagreed was Kurdistan with only 14% agreeing with the premier. In comparison, in Baghdad and the south 76% wanted to follow Abadi, and 42% in western Iraq. When compared to other national leaders the prime minister also had the highest rating with 54% versus 30% for Muqtada al-Sadr, 17% for Ammar Hakim head of the Supreme Council, 16% for ex-Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, 15% for Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, 11% for Speaker of Parliament Salim Jabouri, 10% for former VP Iyad Allawi, 9% for Iraq’s President Fuad Masum, and 5% for dismissed VP Osama Nujafi. When broken down by sect 75% of Shiites approved of the prime minister and 39% for Sunnis versus 34% unfavorable. Only Kurdish respondents had a bad view of him at 82% unfavorable. Abadi came in with a very positive approval rating when he was first elected in December 2014 at 75%. Even though it dipped after that he was still far above any other politician. August when the survey was done was also when the premier announced his reform program in response to national protests, and that could have maintained his support. The low rating amongst Kurds was likely due to Baghdad’s on going dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over the budget and oil exports.

Do you approve/disapprove of the job PM Abadi is doing?

65% Approve

29% Disapprove

I want to continue in the direction PM Abadi is taking Iraq versus I want to go in a different direction than the PM

Overall 58% Follow PM, 21% Different Direction

Baghdad 76% Follow PM, 8% Different Direction

South 76% Follow PM, 11% Different Direction

West 42% Follow PM, 17% Different Direction

Kurdistan 14% Follow PM, 77% Different Direction

How do you feel about Iraq’s political leaders?

Abadi 54% Favorable, 31% Unfavorable

Sadr 30% Favorable, 45% Unfavorable

Hakim 17% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

Maliki 16% Favorable, 73% Unfavorable

M. Barzani 15% Favorable, 68% Unfavorable

Jabouri 11% Favorable, 63% Unfavorable

Allawi 10% Favorable, 75% Unfavorable

Masum 9% Favorable, 68% Unfavorable

O. Nujafi 5% Favorable, 79% Unfavorable

Opinion of PM Abadi by sect

Shiites 75% Favorable, 15% Unfavorable

Sunnis 39% Favorable, 34% Unfavorable

Kurds 5% Favorable, 82% Unfavorable

The survey showed the majority of Iraqis had a very low opinion of the country’s ruling parties. The Badr organization had the most favorable responses at 36% with 43% not liking the party. After that Sadr’s Ahrar bloc had 20% favorable 49% unfavorable, Abadi’s Dawa came in with 18% favorable 57% unfavorable, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had 15% favorable 56% unfavorable, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 14% favorable 57% unfavorable, the Kurdistan Democratic Party 14% favorable 59% unfavorable, Gorran came in with 11% favorable 62% unfavorable, Nujafi’s Mutahidun had 10% favorable 66% unfavorable, and Allawi’s Iraqi Nationalists finished with 6% favorable 71% unfavorable. After the fall of Mosul in June 2014 the Badr Organization was quick to respond with its militia, which became part of the Hashd al-Shaabi/Popular Mobilization units, while its leader Hadi Ameri took a commanding role in security operations. That probably accounts for why his party had the best rating out of the ruling parties. Still they were all held in low regard.

Favorable/Unfavorable View Of Iraq’s Political Parties

Badr 36% Favorable, 43% Unfavorable

Ahrar 20% Favorable, 49% Unfavorable

Dawa 18% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

PUK 15% Favorable, 56% Unfavorable

ISCI 14% Favorable, 57% Unfavorable

KDP 14% Favorable, 59% Unfavorable

Gorran 11% Favorable, 62% Unfavorable

Mutahidun 10% Favorable, 66% unfavorable

Iraqi Nationalists 6% Favorable, 71% Unfavorable

Despite Abadi’s high rating the majority of people believed that the country was going in the wrong direction. 65% felt that way compared to 26% who thought Iraq was heading the right way. Since 2012 most Iraqis had a negative opinion of the way the nation was heading. The easiest way to explain the pessimistic responses in 2015 would be to blame the war against the Islamic State. Since the feelings were steady for several years however other issues were probably at play, which led to the next question.

Is Iraq going in the right or wrong direction?

Nov 2010: 45% Right, 44% Wrong

Aug 2011: 37% Right, 50% Wrong

Nov 2012: 40% Right, 54% Wrong

Sep 2013: 31% Right, 65% Wrong

Dec 2014: 34% Right, 55% Wrong

Sep 2015: 26% Right, 65% Wrong

When asked what were the most important topics the government needed to deal with security and corruption were at the top of the list. Security was at 48% followed by corruption at 43%. After that services, 37%, jobs, 30% were the next highest. The displaced, sectarianism, inflation, schools, and the Baghdad-Irbil dispute all received 15% or less showing they were not major concerns. Instead, the war, graft, and the lack of opportunities and services were what Iraqis believed were the most pressing issues. That’s been true for the last decade as the insurgency rose and fell and returned, while the government has never been able to resolve chronic shortages in things like electricity in part due to the widespread theft amongst government officials.

What two issues are the most important for the government to address?

Security 48%

Corruption 43%

Basic services 37%

Jobs/unemployment 30%

Internally displaced 15%

Sectarianism 12%

High prices 5%

Education 3%

Central government-KRG dispute 2%

Few believed that the authorities were dealing with these problems. When asked how had the government responded to people’s needs three out of four regions said worse with the south at 68%, the west 50%, and Kurdistan 85%. Only in Baghdad did 37% say better versus 35% worse. Those were all higher than when people were asked that same questions in December 2014 showing growing frustration. Likewise, provincial governments did no better with 59% saying worse in Baghdad, 72% worse in the south, 66% worse in the west, and 70% worse in Kurdistan. Again, those were all worse then December 2014 with the exception of Kurdistan that was up 6%. This ties in with the low opinion of Iraq’s leaders and parties. Iraqis didn’t believe that their needs were being met, and blamed their representatives.

Is the government responsive to the people’s needs?

Baghdad 35% Worse, 37% Better

South 68% Worse, 24% Better

West 50% Worse, 20% Better

Kurdistan 85% Worse, 9% Better

Is the local government responsive to the people’s needs?

Baghdad 59% Worse, 33% Better

South 72% Worse, 22% Better

West 66% Worse, 21% Better

Kurdistan 70% Worse, 23% Better

Two solutions that have been proposed to help resolve Iraq’s chronic violence and political discord are to pass laws aimed at reconciliation and decentralize power neither of which rated well with respondents. When asked which law was the most important to be passed for political accommodation none of the three major ones before parliament seemed important. The Amnesty Law that would deal with prisoners got the most positive results, but that only stood at 26%. Even amongst Sunnis it only got 36%. The Federal Court law that would reform the judiciary received 16% and the National Guard Law that would create new regional defense units got 12%. Premier Abadi has tried to push the latter as a means to include Sunni forces into the government, but just 10% of Sunni respondents in the poll believed it was necessary. When the topic of giving the provinces more power was brought up it didn’t fare any better. Only 18% thought that would be very effective in solving problems with 54% saying somewhat. When asked what would be the best way to accomplish political reconciliation decentralizing power to the governorates the numbers went down to 14% thinking it would be very effective and 43% somewhat. This has been something that Abadi has pushed as well and the provincial councils have been lobbying for years for.

Which of the following laws before parliament are the most important to achieve political accommodation?

Amnesty Law

Overall 26%

Shiites 27%

Sunnis 35%

Kurs 9%

Federal Court Law

Overall 16%

Shiites 21%

Sunnis 5%

Kurds 15%

National Guard Law

Total 12%

Shiites 13%

Sunnis 10%

Kurds 11%

What are the most important ways to achieve reconciliation in Iraq?

Fair judicial process 49% Very Effective, 78% Somewhat Effective

Improving economy 38% Very Effective, 73% Somewhat Effective

Equitable sharing of resources amongst sects 37% Very Effective, 76% Somewhat

Effective

Equitable sharing of political power among sects 34% Very Effective, 80% Somewhat

            Effective

Giving provinces more power 18% Very Effective, 54% Somewhat Effective

Decentralizing power to provincial governments 14% Very Effective, 43% Somewhat

            Effective

What are the most important ways to achieve reconciliation in Iraq by sect

Fair judicial process Shiites 51%, Sunnis 59%, Kurds 27%

Improving economy Shiites 37%, Sunnis 40%, Kurds 37%

Equitable sharing of resources amongst sects Shiites 33%, Sunnis 52%, 19% Kurds

Equitable sharing of political power among sects Shiites 36%, Sunnis 40%, Kurds 19%

Giving provinces more power Shiites 20%, Sunnis 14%, Kurds 20%

Decentralizing power to provincial governments Shiites 11%, Sunnis 16%, Kurds 26%

For Sunnis the two most important issues were a fair judiciary, 59%, and equitable sharing of resources amongst the country’s sects, 52%. Mass arrests and prisoners being held indefinitely without warrants or after release orders have been issued have been long time complaints by the community as they feel like they are facing group punishment by the government. That would be partly dealt with by the Amnesty Law, which was why it received the highest importance from Sunni respondents amongst the three bills asked about. The sharing of resources and political power, which was at 40% amongst Sunnis ties in with the sects’ belief that they have gotten the short end of the stick by the Shiite parties since 2003. Even though government offices are all doled out by quotas and Sunni parties have been given a mix of meaningful, speaker of parliament, and symbolic positions, vice president, and a larger percentage of posts within each administration then their percentage in the population that has not changed the widespread belief that they have been marginalized. That applies to sharing the country’s oil wealth and development as well. How or even if these feelings can be overcome is one of the questions Iraq has struggled with for over a decade now and may not be resolvable since some Sunnis will not be happy until they rule the country once more.

For Shiites the two biggest issues were a fair judiciary as well, 51%, and improving the economy, 37%. Many see Iraqi courts as being corrupt and pliant to the ruling parties, and they also turn a blind eye to the institutionalized abuse that takes place for anyone that is arrested in order to obtain a confession. The judiciary for example, was a major point for protests that started across Iraq during the summer. The fact that the Federal Court law was not seen as an effective way to deal with this problem by both Sunnis and Shiites may reflect the fact that they don’t believe it will address the root problems with the judicial system. The economy is also stagnating due to the drop in oil prices. Since Iraq is a petroleum dependent country it has little leverage to pull itself out of this problem as it is dealing with forces outside of its control.

Finally, for Kurds the two top priorities were improving the economy, 37%, and equitable sharing of political power, 36%. Kurdistan’s economy has been hit even harder than the rest of the country because former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stopped sending the region its share of the budget due to the dispute over who should control oil resources in 2014. While budget payments were temporarily revived under Abadi when a new agreement was made, that fell apart as well. In turn, that has meant the regional government has not been able to pay its workers for months nor the oil companies that it depends on to develop its energy sector that is paying the bills. Like the rest of Iraq the KRG is an oil dependent and public sector heavy economy meaning that any changes in the petroleum industry trickles down to all segments of the population. The Kurds also feel that they are not getting their fair share of power in Baghdad due to the Shiite parties. This hit a low point with the Maliki administration who directly challenge the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over a number of issues, and those negative feelings have carried over to Abadi. Like the Sunnis these perceptions are hard to change.

What these results show is that what has been bandied about both within and without Baghdad as some steps to resolve the country’s problems are not seen as important by the public. It also highlights that there are some issues upon which both Sunnis and Shiites agree upon like fixing the judiciary that the ruling parties could work on that would find widespread support. Then again there are more intractable disputes such as power sharing that are likely to go nowhere as both Sunnis and Kurds believe they are not getting enough positions as they are due, while Shiites think they have enough or even too much. The fact that so many Iraqis have a very low opinion of their government and the people elected to run it means they have little faith that these problems will be properly addressed anytime soon. Overall, Iraqis seemed to be very dissatisfied about their nation with few exceptions. That explains why there have been protests almost every year in the country that only gain token responses from the country’s leaders. Sadly the ruling parties are more concerned with preserving their own power and thinking of politics as a zero sum game where no concessions can be given to their rivals that blocks almost all serious work from being done other than what is necessary such as passing a budget so that things can keep running as they are. Until that changes many Iraqis will continue to feel frustrated.

SOURCES

Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, “Lack of Responsiveness Impacts Mood, August-September 2015 Survey Findings,” 11/23/15

Iraq’s Former Trade Minister Finally Convicted Of Corruption But In Absentia

An Iraqi court recently sentenced former Trade Minister Abdul Falah Sudani in absentia for graft. Sudani is from the Dawa Party and was in office during Maliki’s administration. His ministry was investigated several times and in 2009 he received his first of many arrest warrants for corruption. He was acquitted the next year after Dawa interfered in the case, and then arrested again in 2011. That case was dropped as well after political interference. Today Sudani lives in England having escaped any punishment for his crimes. This highlights the weakness of Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies and courts as it took six years to finally find Sudani guilty, and that was only after he was out of office and out of the country.

At the end of November 2015 a court in Karbala sentenced former Trade Minister Abdul Falah Sudani to seven years in absentia for corruption. Sudani was Trade Minister from 2006-09. Sudani was convicted of three charges filed by the Integrity Commission, Iraq’s anti-graft agency in August. This was the final end to several investigations of Sudani, which had been going on for at least seven years.

Iraq’s Trade Ministry was suspected of illegal activity for a long time. Back in September 2008 several high and low level officials at the ministry including the Director General of the State Company for Cars and Machinery, the Director General of the legal department and the Director General of the Sector Directorate were dismissed on suspicion of corruption. They were forced out after members of parliament’s integrity commission collected signatures against them. The committee also wanted Minister Sudani to resign as well since he was responsible for all the illegal business under him and did nothing about it even though he knew about it. Then in May 09 the minister received an arrest warrant from the Integrity Commission along with the Director of the Grain Board, the head of the Ministry’s oversight office, and Sudani’s two brothers who were also employed at Trade. All of them were suspected of taking kickbacks and other illegal work involving food imports. The charges were started when $8 million worth of expired food products were found in a warehouse in Muthanna that were bought by the ministry for the food ration system it administers. Soldiers were sent to the ministry’s offices in Baghdad to serve the warrants, which resulted in a shootout with one of Sudani’s brothers that allowed him and his entourage to escape. He was later arrested at a border crossing trying to leave Iraq and found with $150,000 that he tried to bribe police with to let him go. The Integrity Commission charged the two brothers and Sudani’s nephew of charging $40 in kickbacks for every ton of sugar imported into Iraq. (1) Sudani was in charge of a huge amount of money to run the food rations and other government programs. Like too many Iraqi officials he used that power to enrich himself and his relatives.

The next year Sudani went to trial in Baghdad, (2) but his party saved him. The day before he was to appear in court he tried to get on a plane to leave for the United Arab Emirates, but was stopped and arrested. As soon as the case started there were charges that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Dawa Party, were interfering. (3) There was a move to try to get the case transferred to another court to delay it, and then the presiding judge resigned. In April 2010 Sudani was acquitted for lack of evidence. (4) That was appealed, but his verdict was upheld. (5) The next year, he was issued a warrant again on charge of taking $55 million. (6) Just like the first time, there were reports that politicians were trying to interfere in the case. (7) That was likely why a judge rescinded the warrant the next month. (8) Iraq’s courts are notorious for giving into political pressure and not dealing with high profile corruption. Sudani was a perfect example as the premier and Dawa both made sure he would not be found guilty. Later in 2015 when he was finally sentenced the situation was different because he was no longer a minister and was out of the country so nothing would happen to him.

Sudani finally being convicted was not a victory for Iraq, but rather a sign of its weak institutions. It took years to finally find him guilty, but that was only after he had resigned, left the country, and probably taken his ill gotten loot with him to England. This is rather typical in the country. The ruling parties have threatened and bribed judges to drop these types of trials, which is why the courts are unwilling to take on any serious corruption cases because of the political repercussions. It’s just these types of situations that have led to protests this summer across the nation, and in the past, and led to a deep level of cynicism about the government by the citizenry. There is no serious attempt to change the system, because the elite rely upon payoffs, bribes and kickbacks to rule. It would take a generation to root out these practices, but there is no will to do so as seen by the backlash against Prime Minister Haider Abadi’s reform program.

FOOTNOTES

1. Aswat al-Iraq, “Lawmaker says trade minister misled authorities, violated the law,” 5/17/09

2. Aswat al-Iraq, “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09

3. Al Jeeran, “The Integrity Committee in the Iraqi parliament warns of intervention in the case of Minister of Commerce accused of corruption,” 12/5/09

4. Alsumaria, “Iraq court acquits former Trade Minister,” 4/29/10

5. AK News, “Federal Appeals court discharges former Iraqi Trade Minister,” 9/2/10

6. Alsumaria, “The issuance of arrest warrants for two of the leaders of the Dawa Party, on charges of corruption,” 6/30/11

7. Aswat al-Iraq, “Cancellation of arrest warrant against ex-trade minister – MP,” 7/12/11

8. Al-Rayy, “Saadi accused the President of the Judicial Council “fail” on the back of the cancellation of arrest warrants,” 7/12/11

SOURCES

AK News, “Federal Appeals court discharges former Iraqi Trade Minister,” 9/2/10

Alsumaria, “Iraq court acquits former Trade Minister,” 4/29/10

- “The issuance of arrest warrants for two of the leaders of the Dawa Party, on charges of corruption,” 6/30/11

Antelava, Natalia, “Iraq arrests minister’s brother,” BBC News, 5/9/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Cancellation of arrest warrant against ex-trade minister – MP,” 7/12/11

- “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09

- “Lawmaker says trade minister misled authorities, violated the law,” 5/17/09

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor, “2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq,” U.S. State Department, 3/11/10

Chon, Gina, “Graft Case Against Ex-Minister Splits Iraq Parties,” Wall Street Journal, 6/1/09

Dagher, Sam, “Gunfight Breaks Out as Iraqi Soldiers Try to Arrest Trade Officials,” New York Times, 5/3/09

Dolan, Jack and Hammoudi, Laith, “Iraq’s disgraced trade minister expected to step down,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/23/09

Dow Jones, “Iraqi Trade Officials Ousted In Corruption Sweep – Sources,” 5/6/09

Al Forat, “Yasiri: Former Minister of Trade convicted in 3 corruption files,” 8/21/15

Al Jeeran, “The Integrity Committee in the Iraqi parliament warns of intervention in the case of Minister of Commerce accused of corruption,” 12/5/09

Al Mada, “7 years imprisonment in absentia of former Minister of Trade,” 11/29/15

- “Integrity Committee: a second arrest warrant against Sudani and net,” 7/19/11

Rasheed, Ahmed and Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq issues warrants for trade chiefs over corruption,” Reuters, 5/3/09

Al-Rayy, “Saadi accused the President of the Judicial Council “fail” on the back of the cancellation of arrest warrants,” 7/12/11

Reuters, “Iraq Trade Minister Resigns Over Corruption Scandal,” 5/25/09

Robertson, Campbell and al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraqi Officials Expect Moves Amid Inquiry,” New York Times, 5/24/09

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Trade Officials Ousted in Corruption Sweep,” New York Times, 9/24/08

Saadi, Ahmed, “A third arrest warrant was issued against another leader of the Dawa Party on charges of financial and administrative corruption,” Shatt al-Arab, 7/5/11

Sly, Liz, “Ex-trade minister arrested after attempting to flee Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/31/09

Anti-PM Abadi Forces Strike Back At Reforms In Iraq

In August 2015 Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider Abadi responded to a new wave of public protests by announcing a series of reforms. That included cutting waste and getting rid of several government positions. He had the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, which gave added weight to the premier’s program. His opponents quickly began making moves against him largely behind the scenes. Now three months later the anti-Abadi factions have gone on the offensive reversing and limiting his actions.

At the end of October into early November the anti-Abadi forces began a series of counter attacks upon the prime minister and his reform package. Starting on October 20, Abu Muhandis one of the leaders of the Hashd al-Shaabi leaked a letter attacking the premier for not funding the fighters. On October 27 60 members of the State of Law list sent Abadi a letter criticizing him for acting unilaterally, while others called the premier’s program unconstitutional. Another group threatened to withdraw their support for Abadi if he didn’t ask Russia to carry out air strikes against the Islamic State. On October 29, Nouri al-Maliki said that that he and the other vice presidents were not dismissed despite a decree by Abadi. At the end of the month there was a Dawa party meeting in which members went after Abadi’s proposals to change the salary scales for government workers in the draft 2016 budget to offset the country’s financial crisis. Finally, at the start of November parliament voted on a resolution that Abadi could not make any more reforms without its approval and the Federal Supreme Court ruled that the vice presidents could not be fired. These moves not only publicly threw down the gauntlet against the premier, but effectively put an end to his reforms. The ruling parties use corruption and patronage systems via government jobs and contracts to stay in power. That means parliament will not approve any future moves that threaten this system. Abadi can now count on the courts coming out against him as well.

Abadi’s premiership has split the Shiite alliance. On his side is the pro-western wing of the Dawa Party, Ammar Hakim and his Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and to a lesser extent Moqtada al-Sadr and his Ahrar bloc in parliament. Against him are Nouri al-Maliki and the pro-Iran side of Dawa, the Badr Organization, and the Tehran linked Hashd al-Shaabi groups like Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. For now the critics of the prime minister are happy to attack him in the press and block his reforms, but their ultimate goal is to replace him. That seems unlikely for right now, but next year things may change depending upon the economic and security situation. This all highlights the precarious situation Abadi is in.

SOURCES

Kazimi, Nibras, “What is happening in Iraq?” Talisman Gate, Again, 10/29/15

Al Mada, “The call for a crucial meeting attended by al-Abadi in the lst hour .. Al-Maliki and partisan committee to settle differences,” 10/31/15

- “Citizens and Liberals: Abadi’s recent criticism of past administration reveals a conflict within Dawa,” 10/6/15

- “”Commander of necessity” and not cooperating with the quartet raise the wrath of State of Law against the Prime Minister,” 10/28/15

- “Deputy: Federal Court decides to return the Vice Presidents of the Republic to their offices,” 11/2/15

- “Sayadi: 45 deputies from the State of Law withdraw authority from Abadi,” 10/28/15

Al Masalah, “Maliki reveals reasons why he blasted premier,” 10/29/15

- “Shura Dawa Party confirms its support for Abadi’s reforms,” 10/30/15

NINA, “National Alliance Plans To Dismiss Abadi And Replace Him By Another Character,” 10/22/15

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s coalition members press PM to consult before ordering reforms,” Retuers, 10/28/15

Al Rayy, “Maliki confirms that the posts of Vice-President of the Republic has not been canceled,” 10/29/15

Sotaliraq, “Maliki warns Abadi after being called “the leader of necessity,”” 10/6/15

Xinhua, “Iraqi parliament says Abadi’s reforms should comply with constitution,” 11/2/15

Iraq’s Judiciary Resistant To Reforms

Iraq’s newest protest movement has come to focus upon the country’s judiciary. Demands have been made to prosecute crooked officials and get rid of the chief judge Medhat Mahmoud who is seen as part of the corrupt system. Their voices have been joined by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who has brought up judicial reform as well. The judges have responded with promises of greater action, but this is just meant to stave off any real change.

Starting in August demonstrators began calling for Iraq’s judges to be reformed and the head of the Supreme Judicial Council Medhat Mahmoud to be dismissed. On August 14, 2015, in a show of strength demonstrators in Maysan’s Amarah, Babil’s Hillah, Dhi Qar’s Nasiriyah, Wasit’s Kut, and Karbala and Najaf cities all called for changing the judiciary starting with Judge Mahmoud. That same day Ayatollah Sistani’s office urged the government to focus on the judges as well. This was the latest focus of the protesters and the Ayatollah to try to clean up the Iraqi government.

That pressure led both Prime Minister Haider Abadi and the courts themselves to offer reform packages. The premier issued a reform program in August that called for the courts to come up with their own program to improve their work, and asked that corruption cases be expedited. At the same time, chief Judge Medhat Mahmoud said that the judiciary would be more aggressive in their prosecutions, which included committing more officials to delve into the issue. At the same time, the Judicial Council rejected any calls for the top judge to resign. Neither of these moves looked like they would be worthwhile. As constitutional scholar Zaid Al-Ali wrote in an article for the Washington Post these reforms suffered from a “poverty of ideas.” Asking for the judiciary to reform itself is no panacea for the problem. There is no reason for them to take any serious actions right now because the protesters can’t tough them, and Abadi is unwilling or unable to seriously take on any of Iraq’s institutions right now. A spokesman for the premier said as much when he told the press that Abadi has no real power over the judiciary. In fact the judges may move in the opposite direction.

On September 1, Judge Medhat Mahmoud met with two Hashd leaders that raised eyebrows. The judge met with Haid Ameri, the head of the Badr Organization and Abu Muhandis who is a commander of the Hashd forces. The two said that they fully supported the judiciary, which stood in contrast to the protesters and Ayatollah Sistani. That came on top of several Shiite politicians including former premier Nouri al-Maliki and Iranian officials like the Chief of Staff of the Iranian military General Hassan Firouzabadi becoming increasingly critical of the demonstrations as threatening Islam. This may be a move by pro-Iranian elites to use Judge Mahmoud to rule parts of Abadi’s reform effort as unconstitutional if they go too far and to protect themselves from any corruption charges.

Iraq’s courts and especially Judge Mahmoud have played important roles in the corruption of Baghdad. That starts with the fact that almost all of the judges are holdovers from the Saddam era, and are used to doing the bidding of the country’s rulers. That has led them to give into political pressure to not deal seriously with graft trials. They have also been open to bribes and been threatened and attacked by the ruling parties. For example under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq successfully demanded that he personally review all corruption cases and ordered specific cases be dropped. That helped explained why from 2004-2007 only 8% of corruption cases sent to court by the anti-graft Integrity Commission got a guilty verdict. Those that were convicted have almost all been low levels officers or people outside of the country while the powerful have consistently been let off. The courts were also notorious for giving into Maliki’s demands to go after his political opponents such as the heads of the Central Bank of Iraq and Integrity Commission. That alliance with the prime minister also protected Judge Mahmoud from his critics in 2013 when the Accountability and Justice Commission unsuccessfully tried to remove him for working under Saddam.

So far Iraq’s judiciary has done nothing substantive in the face of the increasing pressure from demonstrators and Najaf. They have said that they will do more about corruption, which is likely just meant to appease the Iraqi street rather than lead to any meaningful changes. Judge Mahmoud may be sensing that he can simply ride out the wave of protests by issuing such statements. Maliki showed that the executive can exert huge influence upon the judiciary that has a historical mindset to do the bidding of the ruling party, but Abadi may not be willing or able to bring about the necessary changes. Until there is real pressure aimed at the judges from the political class the courts will continue to carry out business as usual.

SOURCES

Al-Ali, Zaid, “Premature excitement about Iraq’s new government reforms,” Washington Post, 8/14/15

Mamouri, Ali, “Iraqis protest corruption, lack of services while politicians blame everyone but themselves,” Al Monitor 8/25/15

Al Masalah, “Medhat al-Mahmoud al-Khazali calls to resign,” 8/30/15

Morris, Loveday, “Beyond terrorism, Iraq’s leader is struggling to fight

New Sabah, “Integrity confirms the judiciary announced exceptional procedures in resolving the theft of public money,” 9/7/15

- “The judiciary to take important decisions to speed up the resolution of the corruption files and punish the corrupt,” 9/6/15

- “President of the Supreme Judicial Council gives direct orders to hold accountable those who are corrupt,” 8/15/15

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq’s Top Cleric Urges Reforms To Focus On Judiciary,” 8/14/15

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq Judicial Council Rejects Calls for Top Judge to Resign,” Associated Press, 8/17/15

Shafaq News, “Al-Muhandes and al-Amiri inform Mahmoud of their “full support” to the judiciary and its symbols,” 9/1/15

Sotaliraq, “Demonstration in Karbala support Abadi and demanding the resignation of Mahmoud,” 8/14/15

- “Demonstrations in Baghdad before the court building to demand the dismissal of Mahmood,” 8/31/15

- “Dhi Qar protesters demanding appointment of efficient administrators and closing party offices,” 8/14/15

- “Hundreds demonstrating in the center of Hilla, demanding the dissolution of the provincial council and the dismissal of the governor,” 8/14/15

- “Hundreds demonstrating in the center of Kut demanding the reform of the judiciary and the accelerate the pace of reforms,” 8/14/15

- “Maysan protesters are demanding the resignation of Mahmoud and activation of the amnesty law and the dismissal of the provincial council,” 8/14/15

- “Najaf protesters demanding the dissolution of the council and an independent judiciary,” 8/14/15

UN: Iraq’s Courts Accept Torture & Abuse of Due Process

Iraq has long been known for having a flawed justice system. The 2005 constitution and other legislation ensure due process and protections against torture, but those are rarely followed. Due to the fact that the Iraqi courts rely so heavily upon confessions to decide cases and the history of abuse within the system dating back decades there is a built in bias to force detainees to admit to crimes. Other issues routinely occur as well such as the denial of lawyers and the ability to form a defense, and misapplying terrorism charges. The United Nations released a report in February 2015 alleging that the root problem lies with the Iraqi judges who do nothing about torture charges and overlook other violations.

The Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Human Rights Office did a preliminary investigation of cases in Iraq in 2013 that found widespread violations in Iraq’s justice system. That was initiated after the United Nations received complaints from northern and western Iraq that the government was not following due process, were not providing fair trials, was abusing the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006, and torturing prisoners. From October to December 2013 the U.N. looked at several cases where they found evidence to support those claims. They observed nine cases involving 11 defendants where the police were accused of torture to obtain confessions. During the trials the accused brought up the abuse allegations, but none of the presiding judges did anything about it. In all of the cases the judges asked that the defendants prove that they had been tortured. That was impossible because the authorities held them from when they were arrested to when they arrived at court. In most of the cases the judges decided to use their confessions even though they were said to be obtained under duress. Torture is banned in Iraq yet there is a long history of its widespread use. Since the police know that a confession will generally guarantee a conviction they often beat one out of suspects. These charges have often been with terrorism charges, but the U.N. found that in all types of cases the police are accused of beatings and other techniques to get suspects to talk. This initial look into the court system led to a more in depth investigation the following year.

From January to June 2014 the U.N. observed 92 cases where it found its initial concerns were substantiated. The U.N. went to Basra, Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan for six months, and looked at capital, anti-terror, honor killing, prostitution, human trafficking, and drug cases. 28 defendants in 17 cases alleged that they had been tortured to force a confession. In none of those cases did the judge order an investigation into those charges. In 9 cases a judge did ask for medical records to prove that they had been abused. Only in 2 cases were those provided, but they had no affect upon the trial as the judges proceeded anyway. Only in one case was a suspect asked about his torture allegations. The judge asked why the defendant did not report the torture to the investigating judge when he was questioned. The man said that he didn’t say anything because the police that beat him where with him in the room during the interrogation. In five other cases the U.N. heard witnesses provided by the prosecution say that they had been tortured to get them to accuse a defendant. In the end, 19 of the 28 defendants were convicted, four were acquitted and five had their cases adjourned. This pointed to one of the root problems with Iraq’s judicial system. Judges routinely hear about abuse, but do nothing about it. This implicit acceptance of torture means that there is no reason to stop it and gives the green light to the police to continue with their practices.

In some instances, the abuse dealt out by the Iraqi police was extreme. One woman in Basra claimed she had been beaten so badly that she had a miscarriage and had her arm broken. Another defendant accused the police of murdering his co-suspect during questioning, which was supported by his lawyer at trial. Another was told that his sister would be raped if he didn’t implicate another person of a crime. Again, many of these involved common criminal cases showing that the police were just as likely to commit violations against terrorism suspects as regular citizens.

The U.N. heard accusations of corruption within the police. In one case involving terrorism charges in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar, a suspect said that the police told him they would not torture him and would let him go if they were paid $20,000. In another case a defense lawyer claimed the police asked him for bribes to release his defendants. Corruption is rampant throughout the Iraqi government so it should be no surprise that the security forces are involved. What is another concern is the fact that the authorities were willing to let a terrorism suspect go for money. That raises the question of how many insurgents might have been let go over the years if they were willing to pay off the police.

Other violations the U.N. heard about were not providing lawyers, not allowing a defense to be prepared, denying communication with attorneys, and misapplying terrorism and capital charges. In hardly any of the cases the U.N. reviewed were the suspects told that they had a right to a lawyer. This was further complicated by the fact that few of the people had the money to hire one. Usually the judge picked a lawyer in court to defend a person even though they had not met with their client before and therefore had no time to prepare a defense. In many of the cases the U.N. witnessed the lawyers usually made very few comments during the trial as a result. In one case in Nasiriya involving three accused of terrorism they had hired a lawyer, but a judge refused to accept him and picked a lawyer from the court instead. In four trials in Basra involving prostitution judges added the death penalty to their cases for no apparent reason. In one case in Basra involving the murder of a taxi driver a policeman got terrorism added to the charges because he claimed the defendant had killed his father. In another case where Red Crescent workers were arrested for handing out old flyers with a picture of Saddam Hussein on them, intelligence officers got terrorism charges added to their case as well. That was dismissed. Just like the torture allegations it is only with the complicity of the judges that these abuses are allowed to continue. The judiciary did not appear to care whether due process was being followed, and in some cases would carry out violations themselves. The reigning view appeared to be that if people were arrested and their case went to trial they were presumed guilty. Therefore any post-arrest abuses were accepted because the defendants were likely going to prison anyway.

The United Nations investigation provided more damning evidence against Iraq’s courts. Many other human rights groups have issued similar reports in the past noting these types of violations. The Iraqi government has done little to address these issues until recently. Prime Minister Haider Abadi did issue an order that arrest warrants had to be issued for all arrests and that people who were detained without them had to be released. There are a few reports that this is being followed. The deeper institutional problems of torture and denying a fair trial however have yet to be dealt with.

SOURCES

Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Human Rights Office, “Report on the judicial response to allegations of torture in Iraq,” February 2015

Musings On Iraq 2014 Year In Review

 

2014 was a traumatic year for Iraq. Open fighting started once again at the beginning of the year culminating in the fall of most of central Iraq to militants during the summer. The result was nearly 2 million people being displaced and over 60,000 casualties. There was also a bitterly disputed election that finally saw Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki deposed. His replacement Haider Abadi was left with the daunting task of not only fighting the insurgency, but also trying to repair the political damage done by his predecessor as well as addressing the structural problems within the country. This is a review of last year’s events, but is in no way comprehensive. It is just some of the major stories covered by Musings On Iraq in 2014.

JANUARY

Last year got off to a bad start as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to use the death of the leadership of the Army’s 7^th Division to go after the Anbar protest movement. On December 21 the Islamic State (IS) launched an ambush in western Anbar, which led to the deaths the commander of the 7^th Division and most of his staff. The government immediately announced a retaliatory operation against the insurgents, which received widespread popular support across the country. Instead of using this moment to bring the country together, the premier decided to use it against his opponents. He went on national TV accusing the protest movement of harboring Islamic State (IS) elements. The next day Maliki ordered the arrest of parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani who had been an organizer of the demonstrations, and who was known for his fiery and sectarian speeches attacking Shiites. His detention led to a shootout in which his brother and five of his guards were killed. Maliki then shut down the Ramadi protest area. The province immediately exploded in violence with clashes in cities like Ramadi, Garma and Hit, while Fallujah quickly fell to insurgents. This was the start of open fighting the country, which continues to this day. Protests had been going on for a year when the prime minister decided to try to shut them down. They began after Maliki arrested some of Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s bodyguards on terrorism charges in December 2012. Protests quickly emerged in Fallujah, Tikrit, Baghdad, and other cities. These were eventually organized by the Mutahidun list and several Sunni clerics such as Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Saadi. While the insurgency attempted to exploit the demonstrations for their own means, and there were pro-militant factions at sites like Fallujah and Hawija, the mainstream assemblies were more of an expression of Sunni anger at the failure of the government and Prime Minister Maliki. This was a major change from just a few years ago when in 2009 the majority of Sunnis and even some insurgent factions decided to participate in provincial elections. The next year Maliki came in second in parliamentary balloting, but used the courts and played upon the divisions within his opponents to assure himself a second term. This caused widespread resentment against the prime minister. The leaders of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), which won the most seats in parliament, but failed in its attempt to stop Maliki proved no better as the list’s leader Iyad Allawi resorted to complaining and leaving the country to rally foreign support, while ignoring Iraqis. Other INM members cut deals with the prime minister in order to assure themselves ministries. This started the process of many Sunnis losing faith in their politicians, which culminated in the protest movement. When Maliki decided to shut down the Ramadi site in December 2013 it was the last straw that made people give up on the system, and turn towards violence. Maliki’s short sightedness at going after the demonstrators instead of focusing upon the insurgents played into their hands, and they are still benefiting from it to this day.

The fighting in Anbar had a ripple effect upon Iraqi society by forcing out thousands of families. By the end of January 2014 the Red Crescent reported that over 34,000 families had fled the province due to not only the fighting, but the indiscriminate shelling and air strikes by the government forces. Many of these people went to Kurdistan or Baghdad. Anbar was not the only place this movement of people was going on. In other governorates with insurgent activity Iraqis began to flee due to the violence. Starting in 2013 dozens of families were leaving areas of Diyala as the Islamic State was attempting to scare and intimidate the local population. This was occurring in Ninewa, and Babil as well. When the militants’ summer offensive began this crisis would turn into a tragedy as tens of thousands were forced out of their homes for a total of around 2 million displaced. To add to these problems the special committee set up to deal with displacement and the Migration Ministry were both accused of massive corruption, stealing most of the money set aside to help these people.

FEBRUARY

Moqtada al-Sadr proved to be a mercurial leader once again when he suddenly announced that he was retiring from politics in February. Several politicians from his political bloc, Ahrar followed suit and said they were resigning as well, while the head of his list in parliament was replaced, and a new board of trustees created to run his movement. Sadr was attempting to clean house of some politicians that he was unhappy with as well as rallying the base before the provincial elections as later in the month the Ahrar bloc said that it was still running. Sadr made a similar move in August 2013 only to come back again. While these might have been calculated moves it didn’t seem like anyone but Sadr knew what the plan was as each time he said he was stepping down there was widespread confusion within his movement. This was just the latest example of what a difficult personality Sadr was.

MARCH

March saw a new and short-lived series of protests emerge against the privileges of Iraq’s political elite. At the start of the month people marched in Baghdad, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, Kirkuk, Muthanna, Babil, and Qadisiyah against a new pension law passed in February. There were similar demonstrations in August 2013. The law gave a new round of benefits to Iraqi politicians who were already considered corrupt and incompetent. This was a sign that the public was tired of business as usual with parliament giving itself things like raises, while neglecting governing and developing the country. Unfortunately these demonstrations only lasted a short while and then disappeared meaning they applied no real pressure upon the government.

Iraq’s oil industry took a hit in March. The Kirkuk pipeline had been a favorite target of insurgents because it threatened the countries revenues, and was easy to attack since it travelled through provinces where militants were active. On March 2 the line was blown up in Ninewa, and then again a week later. What was different about this last incident was that the insurgents stayed to prevent repairs. The North Oil Company said that the line would be up and running again by April, but that never happened as repair crews with armed escorts were driven off. The Kirkuk pipeline has been out of service ever since costing Iraq millions of dollars in revenue. This was a major victory for the insurgents and another sign that they had been able to rebuild their cadres.

Maliki showed his political machinations once more by going after the provincial governments in Diyala, Wasit and Basra. In Diyala, State of Law was shut out of the government so it got an arrest warrant issued against the governor on corruption charges and went to court over how the ruling coalition was formed without it. The court ruled in State of Law’s favor leading to two rival governments being formed in the province. In Wasit the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISC) cooperated to keep State of Law out of the government there as well, and Maliki went to court over that process too. Finally, in Basra State of Law got the head of the provincial council, but wanted the governorship as well, so it went to court again. The situation got so bad that Iran had to mediate between Maliki and ISCI. These were all perfect examples of how Maliki considered everyone who was not with him as a potential enemy. The courts were under his influence and the justice system was often used to issue arrest warrants against the prime minister’s opponents. These moves were another example of how Maliki did not respect the political process. He’d gone to the courts to win a second term in 2010, and now used them again to try to overturn the outcomes of the 2013 provincial elections. This was also a warning of what might happen in April’s national vote.

APRIL

At the end of April Iraq held another round of parliamentary elections. The conventional wisdom was that Maliki would win a third term as his opponents were once again divided. The country’s elections however, rarely turn out the way people expect. In 2009 the ruling parties in the governorates were largely thrown out of office for failing to develop the country. In 2010 Maliki came in second when he was expecting a sweeping victory, and then in 2013, his State of Law faced a major defeat as it too was penalized for being the incumbents in the provinces. 2014 would prove to be the same, because Maliki found it beyond his means to return for a third term, although that was still several months away.

MAY

In May the results for the April elections were announced with the State of Law increasing its share of seats in parliament. In 2010 State of Law won 89 seats, and in 2014 that went up to 95. The Sadrists came in second, but were only able to come away with one third of the number of seats, 34, as State of Law. ISCI finished third with 31 seats. That gave Maliki a decided advantage as the prime minister would come from one of these major Shiite parties and together the Sadrists and Supreme Council did not come close to State of Law. To add to that advantage the Sadrists and ISCI spent their time attempting to make their list the National Alliance a formal organization that would represent the Shiite parties and have the power to name the premier. Maliki believed he could ignore these moves and wait the two parties out until they would eventually agree to his re-election. Little did he know that the real threat would come from within his own list.

JUNE

June was the month the insurgents launched their summer offensive. It began with the storming of Samarra in Salahaddin on June 5, followed by an assault upon the counter-terrorism bureau in Baquba, Diyala the next day, and then the seizure of the Anbar University campus in Ramadi on June 7. June 6 was also the start of the battle of Mosul, which fell a few days later. The Iraqi Security Forces collapsed and the route continued as the insurgents headed south taking Tikrit on June 10, along with sections of Kirkuk. Similar success was made in Anbar as the security forces suddenly withdrew from the Syrian border fleeing Rawa, Ana and Qaim on June 14 giving IS control of almost all of western Anbar. The insurgents had largely rebuilt their networks by 2013 after being devastated by the U.S. and Iraqi forces during the Surge. The result was attacks had been ramping up for that entire year culminating in the seizure of several cities in Anbar in December 2013 and January 2014 after Maliki’s misstep of closing down the protest movement. Violence continued to increase in the first half of 2014 pointing to a big push coming during the summer.

The Islamic State was in the forefront of this offensive, but that was in cooperation with other insurgent groups like the Baathist Naqshibandi and friendly tribes. IS had made deals with these other groups to jointly launch attacks starting in June. It seems like the militants were caught by surprise by their own success. They were likely just planning raids like what happened in Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi, and instead ending up seizing around one quarter of the country. This was an overstretch as there was no way the insurgents were going to hold such a large section of territory, especially when the west decided to become involved.

In response to the fall of Mosul Iraq’s militias began to mobilize. Many of these groups had joined in the fight against the insurgents in 2013 as Maliki was unhappy with the Iraqi Security Forces, and called upon their help. Groups like Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization were seen fighting in Anbar and the Baghdad belts throughout early 2014. The June offensive brought in the Sadrists and the Supreme Council as there was widespread fear that Samarra would fall along with its Askari shrine and Baghdad would be next. Iraqi militias from Syria like the Abu Fadhl Al-Abbas Brigade and the Khorasani Brigade also sent their men to fight in Iraq. Their ranks were swollen after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to protect the nation. Sistani meant for people to join the security forces, but many went to the militias as well. Since their deployment in 2013 these militias have been accused of a series of sectarian attacks, and the driving out of Sunni civilians from their homes in an attempt to deprive the insurgents of their support base and redraw the demographics of parts of the country. This repeats tactics they used during the civil war years of 2005-2008, and has added to the displacement crisis.

These militias were supported by Iran who sponsored many of them. Iran sent in hundreds of advisers, began providing military aid to Baghdad under an agreement signed with Maliki, and eventually delivered Su-25 fighter bombers, pilots, and air strikes by the Iranian Air Force as well. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and its leader General Qasim Suleimani led these efforts, and followed the same strategy Tehran used in Syria. Iran lacked confidence in the security forces in both countries, and decided to employ its militia allies to defend the two governments. The Badr Organization was put in charge of both efforts as it had the longest relationship with Iran. That can be seen in Badr head Hadi Ameri leading many of the recent operations rather than Iraqi generals. Iran was just as threatened by the insurgents’ sudden advance in June. In coming to Iraq’s aid it also became the dominant power in the country with its allies in the forefront of the fighting, its advisers in the thick of the fighting, and its men drawing up most of the plans for the defense of the country. This is a position that it will be hard pressed to give up once the insurgency subsides.

JULY

As the Islamic State settled into governing its newly won territories in northern Iraq it was immediately apparent what their rule would mean. Throughout July there were reports of destroyed homes, mass kidnappings, and executions throughout central and northern Iraq as IS attempted to intimidate local populations to control them, and retaliate against those that opposed it. For example, on July 8 IS killed 50 villagers after it was driven out of Ziwiya, Salahaddin. When it was eventually taken the next day, 15 people were executed and almost the entire town was leveled with over 300 homes blown up. IS considers itself a state, and much has been written about the vast assets it controls to finance its operations, but its actions in Iraq showed that it was still about destroying Iraq as much as trying to run sections of it.

AUGUST

In August IS turned its attention northwards and seized Jalawla and Sadiya in northeastern Diyala as well as the Sinjar area of western Ninewa. The Kurdish peshmerga fled in the face of the assaults. In Ninewa it was largely due to Syrian and Turkish Kurdish fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the intervention of Iran that stopped the militants from moving into Kurdistan itself. The Yazidis of Sinjar were not as lucky as IS began massacring them and taking their women and girls for slaves. On August 3 for example, approximately 250 Yazidis were killed in Sinjar, Solagh, Qiniyah, and Wahtanya. This led to the intervention of the United States, which began launching air strikes in the area. IS had long considered Yazidis devil worshippers and had repeatedly attacked the community in previous years. Now that it controlled the main territory in which this group resided it went all out to destroy it.

SEPTEMBER

September 8 the new government of Prime Minister Haider Abadi was sworn in. Rather than being defeated by his opponents, Maliki was forced out due to a split within his own State of Law list. Abadi was a long time Dawa member having joined in 1967, but his background was much different from the previous two prime ministers, Ibrahim Jaafari and Maliki. Abadi was a technocrat and considered a problem solver, while Jaafari was known as a philosopher and Maliki an autocrat. Abadi’s impact was immediately felt as he formed a smaller government than Maliki’s 2010 one. He also proposed a National Guard, which would include local forces recruited to fight the insurgency and be under the control of the provinces, he promised to end government shelling of civilian areas, said he would have no problem if Sunni governorates wanted to form federal regions, and retired General Abboud Qanbar the deputy chief of staff of operations and General Ali Ghidan the ground forces commander, both of which were known as Maliki loyalists, and were blamed for the fall of Mosul. Iraq is beset by a number of structural problems and deep divisions. Abadi knew that without addressing these issues Iraq would never be put right. These early moves were attempts to reach out to the country’s Sunnis, and get rid of some of the politicized and incompetent security leaders. This immediately set Abadi apart from his predecessors who would often talk about reform, and then do nothing substantive about it. The replacement of Maliki might have been the biggest story of 2014, even more so than the fall of Mosul, because it opened hope that Iraq’s long standing problems might finally be addressed, starting with the end of Maliki’s destructive politics.

OCTOBER

By October the economic effects of the insurgency were beginning to emerge. Foreign investors were pulling out of the country, the real estate and car markets collapsed, hundreds of acres of farmland were now under militant control, and imports were down 60-70% with many of the trade routes to Jordan, Syria and Turkey having been cut off. 2 million people were also displaced and out of work, and putting major burdens on the provinces that they now resided in. Iraq was also facing a financial crisis as the 2014 budget was never passed due to Maliki using it against his opponents during the elections. The prime minister had also used money from the general budget and Development Fund for Iraq to pay for the war and the running of the government depriving the country of much of its ready cash. The economic costs of the war were likely the least reported story of 2014. Iraq was one of the fast growing economies in the Middle East after the civil war ended in 2008. Now that was all threatened.

The Islamic State made another big surge in Anbar from September to October. At the end of September it took Camp Saqlawiya, and then proceeded to take most of the center of the province the following month. This was being led by IS commander Abu Omar al-Shishani, who is a Chechen, and who excelled at insurgent tactics. In response the United States sent advisers to Al Taqadum base outside of Habaniya and Al-Assad base in Baghdadi. The Americans were hoping to train a new tribal force in the governorate to oppose the insurgents much like it did with the Awakening previously. Premier Abadi said he supported this idea, but was unwilling to commit any real assets to the province’s defense. The governor, the local council, and sheikhs have consistently complained that their pleas for assistance have been ignored by Baghdad, and that has resulted in 85% of Anbar falling to the Islamic State. The government is more concerned with Salahaddin, which plays a central role in the insurgency throughout central Iraq, and has largely written off Anbar for now.

In Salahaddin’s eastern Tuz Kharmato district the Islamic State was forced out by a combined ISF, militia and peshmerga offensive. This opened the door to a new set of problems as the Kurds and militias began confronting each other for control of the area. This was later repeated in Jalawla and Sadiya in Diyala after they were freed in November. All of these areas are part of the disputed territories the Kurdistan Regional Government lays claim to. The militias not only want them to remain under central control, but are being used by Iran to push the Kurds not to think that they can annex them and then declare independence. Tehran has warned Kurdistan that it opposes the break up of Iraq at this time.

NOVEMBER

Prime Minister Abadi took another stab at reforming the security forces when he forced out another 200 officers. This included several top commanders who were in charge of the regional operations commands. He also replaced deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi who was known as a Maliki man. The premier showed once again that he was committed to addressing the politicization of and corruption within the security forces. Many of these officers such as General Rasheed Flayh formerly of the Anbar Operations Command were known for stealing supplies from their men. These were the first moves in a long process to root out these elements and make the ISF a professional force.

DECEMBER

Abadi’s final move of 2014 was to demand that due process be carried out within Iraq’s Justice System. He ordered that all arrests be recorded, that suspects go to trial within the assigned time, and that anyone acquitted or held without charges be released. Iraq’s prisons and courts have not worked for decades dating back to the Saddam era. The system is also notorious for abuse as confessions are the basis of cases and they are often beaten out of people. The prime minister was again attempting to tackle the nation’s structural problems, which were long overdue.

On the security front, the year ended with the government forces going on the offensive. Starting at the end of the summer the siege of Amerli in Salahaddin was ended, followed by the re-taking of the Tuz Kharmato district. The longtime IS base in northeastern Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhr was cleared out disrupting the group’s southern networks leading to no car bombings there for the last two months of the year. In Salahaddin the Baiji Refinery was relieved, while the southern Balad district was cleared. The Kurds also helped free Diyala’s Sadiya and Jalawla, while re-entering the Sinjar area. On the other hand, militants were still on the offensive in Anbar trying to take the provincial capital of Ramadi and other towns in the center of the province. Despite its setbacks in Salahaddin, IS was able to move back into Baiji, and continued attacks throughout the governorate. Most importantly it had been able to co-opt many smaller insurgent groups like Ansar al-Islam, while pushing out others such as the Baathist Naqshibandi. When the summer offensive began in June IS was the largest of the insurgent groups and made local deals with other factions to carry out joint operations against the government. By the end of 2014, it dominated the insurgency like never before. This poses a risk to the group however as its new recruits’ loyalty is largely based upon the success it has had in Syria and Iraq. If it faces more setbacks, especially if it were to lose a large city such as Tikrit, which will be the focus of the ISF and militias this year, IS could start facing desertions. There are already reports of it executing members who have left their posts. It still controls huge swaths of the country however. More importantly, the loss of territory in no way means the end of the insurgency. In 2004 militants launched a huge summer offensive in several cities. They were turned back, but that simply dispersed the fighters over a larger swath of territory, and the fighting went on. Until the government finds a way to turn Sunnis away from violence, something that was actually achieved from 2008-2009, but thrown away in 2010, the insurgency will continue.