My article on why Ramadi fell was reprinted by Iraq’s Al
Mada. I was quoted in "The U.S. Ignored Ramadi, Now It's Bombing the Hell Out of It" by Robert Beckhusen in the War is Boring blog, which was later republished in Real Clear Defense.
Saturday, May 30, 2015
Friday, May 29, 2015
Thursday, May 28, 2015
How The Islamic State’s Caliphate In Iraq Was Originally Ignored
In June 2014 the Islamic State (IS) swept into Mosul taking
Iraq’s second largest city. Afterward IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gave a
public sermon in a Mosul mosque declaring the return of the caliphate. That
sent shock waves through the international community, but was in fact a long term
goal of the group. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who founded the organization that would
become IS wanted to form an Islamic state long before the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. After he was killed in 2006 his successors began forming a state, but
that was largely ignored until their replacement Baghdadi began making it a
reality.
Restoring the caliphate was a major goal of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi. That started in the early
1990s when he began working with Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi. Together they
criticized the west and the Jordanian government, and called for jihad and the formation
of an Islamic state. In 2001, Zarqawi and Al Qaeda commander Saif Adl
allegedly talked
about how the impending invasion of Iraq might provide the opportunity to
restore the caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood largely inspired these ideas. It
talked about the caliphate when it was founded in the 1920s, and later in the
1950s its ideologue Sayid Qutb called for radical revolutionary activism, which
inspired many groups in the following decades. Zarqawi came from this line of
Salafi-Jihadist thought, and tried to implement it in Iraq.
Throughout Zarqawi’s time in Iraq he stated that his goal
was to form an Islamic state. In May 2004 for example, he said he was in Iraq
to wage jihad and create a state. Two months later he stated that an Islamic
state was emerging in Iraq, and in August he claimed he was fighting to launch
the caliphate. The next year he issued a strategy document, which concluded
with a state. Then in 2006 Al Qaeda in Iraq created the Mujahedeen Shura
Council with five other groups, which it said was the start of a new Islamic
nation. Zarqawi was killed a few months later, but it was evident from these
statements and more that he believed the vacuum created by the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein and the subsequent war was just the opportunity he had been waiting
for to return the caliphate. He thought starting a civil war in Iraq would
rally the Sunni population to his side in a jihad against the west and Shiites.
The ensuing victory would open the door to a new Islamic era.
After the passing of Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq would
continue on with his vision. Abu Hamza Muhajir also known as Abu Ayub Masri replaced
Zarqawi as the head of Al Qaeda in Iraq. He named Abu Omar al-Baghdad as
the official leader of the organization. In October
2006 they announced the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was to follow in
the footsteps of the Prophet Mohammed. It claimed it controlled an area about
the size of Medina under the Prophet. That included provinces in Baghdad,
Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and parts of Babil and Wasit. In
turn, Muhajir called for Muslims to give baya or allegiance to Baghdadi. This was
generally welcomed
by jihadis such as Al Qaeda initially, but caused controversy within the
Iraqi insurgency. The Islamic Army for example, criticized the idea in 2007.
The United States on the other hand didn’t pay much attention, focusing instead
upon calling Baghdadi a
fake. The Islamic State of Iraq was actually the start of the caliphate,
but was almost completely missed in the west. Muhajir and Baghdadi were
fulfilling Zarqawi’s plan. The problem was that ISI didn’t have the power in
Iraq to actually create a state on the ground. By 2007 for example, it was
suffering major setbacks. It also lacked the standing in the jihadist community
to convince many others that the caliphate was returning.
It wasn’t until the Syrian war, and the revival of IS that the
Islamic state would really gain ground. The conflict in Syria allowed IS to
gain new recruits, find new sources of income, and expand into another country.
That led to the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in
April 2013. In Iraq, the decline of politics for Sunnis after the 2010
elections, the U.S. military withdrawal in 2011, Sunni protests, and Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s hallowing out of the Iraqi Security Forces all
contributed to the return of IS. By 2014 IS was able to seize Mosul and
declared the caliphate on June 29 resulting in the name change from ISIS to simply
the Islamic State. This time the announcement was taken much more seriously and
gained headlines around the world. IS had proved itself an effective insurgent
group seizing huge tracts of land in both Syria and Iraq. That didn’t mean
there was universal agreement upon the caliphate within the jihadi community as
there were still plenty of dissenters, but IS had made gains like few other Salafists
had done before giving an air of legitimacy to the new Islamic state.
The restoration of the caliphate was a long time coming for
the Islamic State. Zarqawi had talked about it years before he even entered
Iraq. He wasn’t able to declare it; that was left to his successors Muhajir and
Baghdadi. Their announcement was barely even noticed at the time with many
either ignoring it or just taking it as a name change for Al Qaeda in Iraq. It
wasn’t until IS seized territory in both Syria and Iraq that the caliphate was
taken as a reality. IS not only had the power to enforce its pronouncements,
but started acting like a state as it always talked about. It has civil
servants, provides services, runs schools, etc. It also demanded the loyalty of
not only all the other insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq, but of all Muslims
around the world. This has gained widespread support from many young jihadis. Now
the question is whether IS has the resources to maintain and expand its state.
SOURCES
Bunzel, Cole, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology
of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic
World, March 2015
Fishman, Brian, “The Imaginary Emir: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s
Strategic Mistake,” Combating Terrorism Center, 7/18/07
Kagan, Kimberly, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda
from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,” Institute For The Study of War and Weekly
Standard, 8/21/06-3/30/07
Kazimi, Nibras, “Al-Qaeda Declares Government, Islamic State
in Iraq,” Talisman Gate, 10/15/06
Myers, Steven Lee, “Arrest Led to Strike on Two Top Iraq
Qaeda Leaders,” New York Times, 4/22/10
Roggio, Bill, “The Awakening, al Qaeda clash in Iraq,” Long
War Journal, 12/17/07
Symon, Fiona, “The devil America knows,” Financial Times,
9/24/04
Weiss, Michael Hassan, Hassan, ISIS, Inside the Army of Terror, New York: Regan Arts, 2015
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
Categorizing The Iraq Insurgency
Today, the Islamic State (IS) dominates the Iraqi
insurgency. It has swallowed up opposing factions and forced others off the
battlefield. Up to 2014 however there was a range of militant groups operating
in the country. In 2005, Nicholas Haussler attempted to categorize the
insurgency into three broad groups. Those were local level actors that were usually
based upon kinship. The next were larger enterprises that had access to
weapons, independent funding, and connections to international groups and
markets. The last was the transnational Al Qaeda in Iraq that networked with Iraqis
and others across the region. These groups all interacted and competed with
each other at the local to international levels to create the country’s
insurgency. Today these different levels still exist, they just operating under
the auspices of the Islamic State.
The core of the insurgency was the local chapters. These
were usually organized along kinships, clans, occupations, mosques, etc. For
example, a person might be a former member of the secret police, be part of a
clan and tribe, and go to a specific mosque and draw
upon all of those connections to find like minded people who were willing
to fight the U.S. and Iraqi government. Ansar al-Islam for example was an
Islamist group in Kurdistan that was formed before the 2003 invasion. Most of
its core was said to come from one Kurdish clan. These groups were intimately
connected to their communities who provided them the space to operate in,
recruits, intelligence, and a means of communication. They were responsible for
the majority of killings, information gathering, and security for networks. These
groups were small and often competed with each other as much as cooperated.
They posed a serious challenge to the state with its large bureaucratic
structures that made it hard and slow to respond to this threat.
The next type of group was the enterprise. They were usually
based upon extended families and clans. Many became criminal rings during the
sanctions period. In the 1990s, the government encouraged certain officials and
preferred tribes to smuggle goods to get around the international sanctions
imposed on the country after its invasion of Kuwait. This allowed them to build
up networks into Syria, Turkey and Jordan. These groups were able to expand
with the power vacuum after the 2003 invasion. Their activities gave them
access to communications, supplies, resources, and accesses to global markets. They
also had links to institutions such as political parties, the Iraqi Security
Forces, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy through infiltration, intimidation,
and bribery. That meant these enterprises could tap into government wages,
equipment, weapons, etc. Many of these groups later joined the insurgency
providing supply networks and independent financing. They would contract out
work to the local level actors to carry out operations.
The last type of organization was the transnational, which
was represented by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal Jihad, which later became
Al Qaeda in Iraq. It was made up mostly of foreign fighters, and had networks
across the Middle East. The group was organized into cells, many of which acted
autonomously. Zarqawi would bring the smaller groups together for large
operations. He would also cooperate with local Iraqi groups and enterprises out
of their shared interests in overthrowing the government and expelling the
Americans. The local groups could cooperate on attacks, while enterprises could
launder money or procure weapons. At the same time there was plenty of
competition and rivalry, which would often break out into open fighting between
them. Eventually Tawhid wal Jihad’s successor the Islamic State would subsume
almost all of the other Iraqi groups from the local level to the enterprises
after the summer of 2014.
Today the situation in Iraq has changed as the diversity of insurgent
groups has largely disappeared due to the power of the Islamic State. Up to the
summer of 2014 there was a plethora of organizations active in Iraq, but they
have mostly left the battlefield or been integrated within IS. Still elements
of these different types of organizations exist, but largely under the umbrella
of IS. There are still local Iraqi groups that provide foot soldiers for the
Islamic State. Members of certain tribes for example have sided with IS and are
likely organized along kinship lines. IS has appropriated many of the crime
rings of central and northern Iraq that were once run by independent enterprises.
Where the group was strong such as in Mosul, this happened years ago. IS has
now expanded these activities after its seizure of so much territory in Syria
and Iraq to sustain itself. It has exploited its connections across the region
to smuggle oil and antiquities amongst other illegal activities. Finally, IS
still acts as the transnational actor coordinating these smaller groups and
providing leadership. Haussler’s categories are helpful in understanding how
the insurgency was organized as it was never one monolithic group, but rather a
conglomeration of like minded people united in their opposition to the new
Iraq. It still proves useful today to breakdown the components of the Islamic
State.
SOURCES
Haussler, Nicholas, “Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The
Iraq Insurgency,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, September 2005
McGrath, John, “An Army at War: Change in the Midst of
Conflict,” Combat Studies Institute Press, 8/2-4/05
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Will The Hashd Al-Shaabi Change The Face Of Iraqi Politics? Interview With Fanar Haddad
Fanar Haddad is one of the pre-eminent scholars on
sectarianism in Iraq. His 2011 book Sectarianism in Iraq, Antagonistic Visions
of Unity was a ground breaking work on the topic. Recently Haddad wrote
“The
Hashd: Redrawing the Military and Political Map of Iraq” for the Middle
East institute. That spurred this interview about what impact the Hashd
al-Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) might have on the future of
Iraqi politics. Haddad can be followed on Twitter at @fanarhaddad.
Monday, May 25, 2015
Aftermath Of The Fall Of Ramadi In Iraq
The third week of May 2015 was marked by the fall of Ramadi
in Iraq’s Anbar province. The fighting for the city caused huge casualties
amongst the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), tribes and civilians, especially as
the Islamic State (IS) carried out executions during the entire operation. The
battle for Ramadi showed the limits of reporting in Iraq as most of the papers
were caught up in Anbar and dramatically reduced their coverage of the rest of
the country.
There were 123 security incidents in the media from May
15-21. That was the lowest since the 121 reported the first week of April. That
wasn’t because violence suddenly decreased, but rather was the result of the
press being fixated upon the fight for Ramadi. The Iraqi papers barely covered
the rest of the country during that period. Much more was going on in the rest
of Iraq, it just wasn’t mentioned.
While attacks were way down the number of casualties was
quite high due to Ramadi. 961 people died and 380 were wounded during the week.
Most of those were in the Anbar provincial capital where IS executed over 500
ISF, sahwa and civilians during and after its capture. In total 848 were killed
in Anbar, followed by 51 in Baghdad, 19 in Salahaddin, 16 in Kirkuk, 12 in
Ninewa, 7 in Basra, 5 in Diyala, and 3 in Babil. The dead consisted of 1 Hashd
al-Shaabi, 43 sahwa, 334 ISF, and 583 civilians, while the injured were made up
of 3 sahwa, 11 Hashd, 162 ISF, and 204 civilians. Like attacks the real numbers
were surely higher.
Violence
In Iraq By Week 2015
Date
|
Incidents
|
Dead
|
Wounded
|
Jan 1-7
|
184
|
434
|
464
|
Jan 8-14
|
170
|
730
|
493
|
Jan 15-21
|
182
|
390
|
515
|
Jan 22-28
|
189
|
466
|
894
|
Jan 29-31
|
90
|
288
|
529
|
JAN
|
815
|
2,308
|
2,895
|
Feb 1-7
|
155
|
380
|
688
|
Feb 8-14
|
170
|
406
|
559
|
Feb 15-21
|
165
|
573
|
364
|
Feb 22-28
|
165
|
371
|
687
+ 386
|
FEB
|
655
|
1,730
|
2,683
|
Mar 1-7
|
172
|
372
|
587
|
Mar 8-14
|
133
|
348
|
656
|
Mar 15-21
|
142
|
1,299
|
503
|
Mar 22-28
|
170
|
235
|
406
|
Mar 29-31
|
72
|
205
|
219
|
MAR
|
689
|
2,459 + 4
|
2,371 + 150
|
Apr 1-7
|
121
|
212
|
422
|
Apr 8-14
|
133
|
626
|
525
|
Apr 15-21
|
169
|
722
|
714
|
Apr 22-28
|
160
|
483
|
483
|
Apr 29-30
|
50
|
162
+ 7
|
182
+ 299
|
APR
|
633
|
2,212
|
2,625
|
May 1-7
|
154
|
626
|
450
|
May 8-14
|
154
|
419
|
549
|
May 15-21
|
123
|
961
|
380
|
Violence
In Iraq By Province May 2015
Province
|
May
1-7
|
May
8-14
|
Anbar
|
34 Incidents
75 Killed: 21 ISF, 30 Hashd, 24
Civilians
103 Wounded: 54 ISF, 49 Civilians
15 Shootings
19 IEDs
1 Suicide Bomber
2 Suicide Car Bombs
2 Mortars
2 Rockets
|
36 Incidents
74 Killed: 16 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 9
Hashd, 47 Civilians
176 Wounded: 62 ISF, 7 Hashd, 26
Sahwa, 81 Civilians
26 Shootings
14 Suicide Car Bombs
4 Mortars
|
Babil
|
-
|
8 Incidents
5 Killed: 5 Civilians
20 Wounded: 5 Hashd, 15 Civilians
1 Shooting
3 IEDs
2 Sticky Bombs
1 Sound Bomb
|
Baghdad
|
68 Incidents
105 Killed: 3 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 101
Civilians
234 Wounded: 7 ISF, 5 Sahwa, 222
Civilians
28 Shootings
28 IEDs
4 Sticky Bombs
1 Suicide Car Bomb
2 Car Bombs
1 Rockets
|
46 Incidents
99 Killed: 2 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 94
Civilians
218 Wounded: 9 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 207
Civilians
15 Shootings
22 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
1 Suicide Car Bomb
3 Car Bombs
1 Mortar
|
Basra
|
1 Incident
1 Shooting
|
-
|
Diyala
|
9 Incidents
23 Killed: 3 ISF, 1 Asayesh, 19
Civilians
23 Wounded: 8 ISF, 3 Asayesh, 12
Civilians
4 Shootings
2 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
|
18 Incidents
89 Killed: 10 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 78
Civilians
66 Wounded: 7 ISF, 59 Civilians
7 Shootings
5 IEDs
1 Suicide Bomber
2 Suicide Car Bombs
|
Kirkuk
|
9 Incidents
10 Killed: 1 Peshmerga, 1 Hashd, 8
Civilians
17 Wounded: 4 Peshmerga, 13
Civilians
4 Shootings
3 IEDs
1 Mortar
|
7 Incidents
13 Killed: 4 Peshmerga, 9
Civilians
6 Wounded: 5 Peshmerga, 1 Civilian
4 Shootings
1 IED
|
Ninewa
|
11 Incidents
342 Killed: 324 Civilians
5 Shootings
25 IEDs
|
17 Incidents
26 Killed: 2 ISF, 24 Civilians
2 Wounded: 2 Peshmerga
8 Shootings
20 IEDs
1 Sticky Bomb
|
Salahaddin
|
22 Incidents
89 Killed: 79 ISF, 8 Hashd, 2
Civilians
73 Wounded: 54 ISF, 10 Hashd, 9
Civilians
|
22 Incidents
113 Killed: 61 ISF, 52 Civilians
61 Wounded: 32 ISF, 8 Hashd, 21
Civilians
13 Shootings
1 IED
1 Suicide Car Bomb
1 Car Bomb
1 Mortar
|
Province
|
May
15-21
|
Anbar
|
46 Incidents
848 Killed: 321 ISF, 40 Sahwa, 488
Civilians
186 Wounded: 129 ISF, 57 Civilians
30 Shootings
8 IEDs
19 Suicide Car Bombs
2 Car Bombs
5 Mortars
2 Rockets
|
Babil
|
2 Incidents
3 Killed: 3 Civilians
11 Wounded: 11 Civilians
2 IEDs
|
Baghdad
|
44 Incidents
51 Killed: 4 ISF, 1 Hashd, 3
Sahwa, 43 Civilians
108 Wounded: 20 ISF, 3 Hashd, 3
Sahwa, 82 Civilians
17 Shootings
18 IEDs
7 Sticky Bobs
1 Suicide Car Bomb
1 Car Bomb
1 Mortar
|
Basra
|
2 Incidents
7 Killed: 7 Civilians
4 Wounded: 4 Civilians
2 Shootings
|
Diyala
|
5 Incidents
5 Killed: 5 Civilians
6 Wounded: 6 Civilians
1 Shooting
3 IEDs
|
Kirkuk
|
4 Incidents
16 Killed: 16 Civilians
1 Sticky Bomb
|
Ninewa
|
8 Incidents
12 Killed: 12 Civilians
3 Shootings
|
Salahaddin
|
12 Incidents
19 Killed: 10 ISF, 9 Civilians
65 Wounded: 13 ISF, 8 Hashd, 44
Civilians
3 Shootings
6 IEDs
1 Suicide Car Bomb
1 Mortar
1 Rockets
|
Car
Bombs In Iraq May 2015
Date
|
Location
|
Dead
|
Wounded
|
May 1
|
|||
May 2
|
Garma,
Anbar
Karrada
x2, Baghdad
|
29
|
66
|
May 3
|
|||
May 4
|
Baiji
Refinery, Salahaddin
|
3
|
5
|
May 5
|
Garma,
Anbar
Karrada,
Baghdad
|
6
|
13
|
May 6
|
|||
May 7
|
Baiji
x2, Dour, Hamrin x2, Salahaddin
|
57
|
39
|
Totals
|
11
|
95
|
123
|
May 8
|
Baladrooz
& Kanaan, Diyala
|
22
|
59
|
May 9
|
Karrada,
Baghdad
|
8
|
30
|
May 10
|
Fallujah
x3, Anbar
Shaab,
Baghdad
Taji
& Tarmiya, Salahaddin
|
23
|
26
|
May 11
|
|||
May 12
|
Sadoun
St & Tahrir Sq, Baghdad
|
14
|
37
|
May 13
|
|||
May 14
|
Dulab
x9 & Jubba x2, Anbar
|
6
|
54
|
Totals
|
22
|
73
|
206
|
May 15
|
Ramadi
x11, Anbar
|
10
|
7
|
May 16
|
Fallujah
& Ramadi, Anbar
Baiji
Refinery, Salahaddin
|
8
|
|
May 17
|
Ramadi
x7, Anbar
Shurta,
Baghdad
|
17
|
35
|
May 18
|
|||
May 19
|
Haswar,
Anbar
Abu
Ghraib, Baghdad
|
8
|
14
|
May 20
|
|||
May 21
|
|||
Totals
|
24
|
43
|
56
|
IS upped the number of vehicle borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs) for the third week in a row. In the first week of May there
were 11 VBIEDs, followed by 22 the second, and 24 the third week. 21 were in
Anbar alone showing the heavy fighting there. Many more were destroyed before
reaching their intended targets. 43 people were reported killed in these
attacks and another 56 wounded. Again, the actual figures are far higher as
many casualties were not reported for the car bombings in Anbar.
Anbar was obviously the major focus in Iraq during the third
week of May. IS successfully took
Ramadi after 17 months of trying. Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey told
the press that the ISF commander in the city ordered a withdrawal out of
fear that the bad weather in the area would prevent coalition air support from
being called him. The use of ten Oklahoma City size truck bombs also helped
break down the defenses throughout Ramadi. From the very start, IS also executed
over 500 civilians, sahwa and ISF members. It was reported that IS had hit
lists of people they wanted to kill, and were going door to door looking
for them. The militants weren’t done either as they continued to push east into
Husaiba
and Khalidiya.
Back in Baghdad the fall of Ramadi has led to a series of
recriminations. Sheikhs
in Anbar
have accused the ISF of abandoning them during the fighting. A State of Law
parliamentarian said
that Ramadi showed that the Iraqi government should only rely upon the Iranians
rather than the U.S who was accused of helping IS. Dawa members also went
after ISF officers in Anbar claiming that they had fled without consulting
with the prime minister, were lying about the strength of their units, and some
had contacts with the Islamic State. Finally, a spokesman for Asaib Ahl Al-Haq said
that the fall of Ramadi was due to Prime Minister Abadi listening to the
Americans to keep the Hashd out of the fight. Abadi and the Americans had
gained strength from the victory in Tikrit over Iran and its friends within the
Hashd after their attack stalled, but now were put back on the defensive due to
the events in Anbar. This back and forth political battle will continue into
the future.
Baghdad continued to be a major target, but casualties
dropped there compared to the previous week. From May 15-21 there were 44
incidents just around the 46 from the week before, and way down from the 68 seen
during the first week. There were 51 fatalities and 108 injured during the
third week, down from the 99 deaths and 218 from the previous one. There were
two car bombs during the week, one at an army base in Abu
Ghraib, and another on a market in Shurta.
There were also 19 IEDs and 7 sticky bombs, which led to the majority of the
dead and wounded. The number of extra judicial killings in the province
continued at a high pace. There were twelve bodies discovered across Baghdad,
which was just around the fifteen found the week before. So Far there have been
51 bodies dumped in parts of the governorate this month compared to 38 during
April. The return of mass casualty car bombs and displaced Anbaris who have
been blamed for these terrorist acts has apparently prompted Hashd and other
Shiite elements to pick up the pace of these murders, although some are also
the work of insurgents.
Violence in southern Iraq is dreadfully under reported, but
during the week Asaib Ahl Al-Haq got caught up in a tribal conflict in Basra
leading to a shoot out that killed six and wounded four on May
18. The removal of much of the security forces from the southern provinces
to fight the insurgency has given rise to an increasing number of lawless acts
such as gang activity, tribal conflicts, and deadly political rivalries
throughout the region. The media is catching only a small portion of this.
In Salahaddin the effort to relieve the Baiji refinery
continued. Throughout the week government forces made steady progress towards
the area, finally reaching the complex by the last day of the week. The
fighting for Baiji highlights the manpower shortages Baghdad is facing as the
region was cleared in October-November, January, February, and April. Whenever
the area is attacked, reinforcements are sent in, but they then withdraw
allowing IS to move back in. This has occurred throughout the country again and
again. Unless there are strong local actors such as in Amerli and Alam in
Salahaddin or the place was totally emptied such as Jalawla in Diyala, Jurf
al-Sakhr in Babil and Tikrit the government has not been able to hold many areas
after clearing operations. They simply lack the manpower to do so. That means
Baiji will likely come under threat once again in the coming weeks.
SOURCES
AIN,
"Car bomb explodes on Al-Tameem bridge, western Ramadi," 5/16/15
Associated
Press, "Amid battles with ISIS, suicide attacks kill 10 people in
Iraq," 5/15/15
-
"Iraqi premier: Don't abandon Anbar to Islamic State group," 5/17/15
-
"Iraqi troops repel ISIS attack on Anbar town," 5/19/15
-
"Suicide car bombs kill 10 Iraqi troops in besieged Ramadi," 5/17/15
BBC,
"Islamic State crisis: Militants seize Ramadi stronghold," 5/15/15
Daragahi, Borzou and Solomon, Erika, “Ramadi’s fall casts
doubt on al-Abadi’s control of Iraq war,” Financial Times, 5/19/15
Al
Forat, "2 citizens killed, 8 others wounded by car bomb southeast
Baghdad," 5/17/15
Al
Jazeera, "State patrolling perimeter of Abu Ghraib and the government
mobilized to retake Ramadi," 5/19/15
Al Mada, “Albu Fahd committed to the Battle of Ramadi: we
were betrayed by the army,” 5/22/15
- “Dawa Party fall of Ramadi: the disappearance of 15,000
troops and Daash captured enough weapons to fight for a whole year,” 5/20/15
Al
Masalah, "Tribal conflict in Basra," 5/18/15
NINA,
"8/ members of the Federal Police killed near the Baiji refinery,"
5/16/15
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Shi’ite Fighters Mass For
Counterattack On IS-Held Ramadi,” 5/19/15
Radio
Free Iraq, "18 May 2015," Daily Updates from Anbar, 5/18/15
Al
Rafiydan, "Hezbollah Brigades regain control of army headquarters in
Fallujah," 5/16/15
Shafaq News, “Maliki’s coalition calls government to rely on
Iranian advisers rather than Americans,” 5/19/15
Stars and Stripes, “Dempsey Says Iraqis Weren’t Driven Out
of Ramadi, They Drove,” 5/22/15
Xinhua,
"IS militants capture government compound in Iraq's Ramadi," 5/15/15
Yacoub
Sameer, "Islamic State militants seize government compound in the capital
of western Anbar province," 5/15/15
Youssef, Nancy, “Iraqis Now Blaming U.S. for Losing Ramadi
to ISIS,” Daily Beast, 5/21/15
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