US Army In The Iraq War Volume 2 Ch 3 “The New Way Forward, February 2007-April 2007”

The third chapter of the U.S. army’s history of the Iraq War covers the start of the Surge in February 2007. There were two main issues. First, there were still differences over the new strategy. Second, the Americans looked to the Iraqi government to be a partner but it was an actor in the civil war trying to establish Shiite supremacy over Baghdad.

US Army In The Iraq War Volume 2 Ch 2 “The Eve Of The Surge, December 2006-February 2007”

Chapter 2 of the U.S. Army’s second volume on the Iraq War covers the period after President Bush decided to surge troops into Iraq but before it was actually implemented. It showed more dysfunction within the U.S. government, while inside Iraq the warring factions were preparing for a final confrontation.

Review The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite

Gulmohamad, Zana, The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite, London, New York, Oxford, New Delhi, Sydney: I.B. Tauris, 2021

 

Zana Gulmohamad set out to try to explain the complicated story of how Iraq formulates its foreign policy in The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite. His thesis was that Iraq’s foreign affairs are shaped by each ethnosectarian group, political party, and leading officials in Iraq under the influence and interference of foreign nations. That leads to a contradictory stance as each actor follows its own path to the detriment of the country.

Review From Dictatorship to Democracy: An Insider’s Account of the Iraqi Opposition to Saddam

Al-Bayati, Hamid, From Dictatorship to Democracy: An Insider’s Account of the Iraqi Opposition to Saddam, Philadelphia Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011

 

Hamid al-Bayati was the London representative of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). His From Dictatorship to Democracy: An Insider’s Account of the Iraqi Opposition to Saddam is about what SCIRI did from the 1990s to the start of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The book is one of omission because what he doesn’t say is sometimes more important than what he does. His main concern was to portray SCIRI in a good light as an organization that pushed for a democratic Iraq while he never mentions important facts like it was created and funded by Iran. On the other hand he does cover what the Iraqi opposition was doing during the 1990s and 2000s which is a story rarely told.

Review Volatile Landscape, Iraq and Its Insurgent Movements

Mardini, Ramzy, Editor, Volatile Landscape, Iraq and Its Insurgent Movements, Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2010

 

Full disclosure, I wrote a chapter for this book

 

Volatile Landscape, Iraq and Its Insurgent Movements is a collection of reports from the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor written by various authors. Like any anthology it is very inconsistent. The first half is about the Iraqi insurgency and has the most problems. The second part is much better about Iraqi politics.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 11 The Gathering Storm

The eleventh chapter of the U.S. Army history of the Iraq War covers the events at the start of 2004. The American military thought the insurgency was waning and that it could withdraw as soon as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were rebuilt, while the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was forced to bring in the United Nations to settle its dispute with Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani over elections. The U.S. was operating in a vacuum as it missed the maturation of the insurgency and was ignoring Iran’s growing influence in Iraq.

US Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 7 Muqawama Wa Intiqaam (Resistance And Reprisals), May-August 2003

As soon as the U.S. invasion ended in April 2003 a struggle for power broke out amongst Iraq’s political parties and armed groups. The U.S. military failed to see the bigger picture of what was going on in the country after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This is the topic of the seventh chapter in the U.S. Army’s history of the Iraq War.

Review The Triumph of the Martyrs, A Reporter’s Journey into Occupied Iraq

Rosen, Nir, The Triumph of the Martyrs, A Reporter’s Journey into Occupied Iraq, Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc, 2008

 

The Triumph of the Martyrs, A Reporter’s Journey into Occupied Iraq by Nir Rosen tries to explain the fracturing of Iraq during the first two years of the U.S. occupation. Journalist Rosen spent most of his time in the country talking with Iraqis from all different groups from Sunni and Shiite clerics to members of the Kurdish parties to Turkmen to insurgent groups. He found during the first few months after the invasion Arab Iraqis were united in their opposition to the Americans but this quickly came apart. That was replaced by communal demands for power and violence by insurgents and militias. Rosen’s argument is that the Bush administration came to Iraq claiming it was going to bring democracy but instead it spit the nation.

U.S. Army History Of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 5 – We’re Here, Now What?

Chapter 5 of the U.S. Army’s history of the Iraq War has a fitting title, “We’re Here, Now What?” That was the exact situation the Americans found themselves after a lightning quick war against Iraq. Neither the military nor the Defense Department that had responsibility for postwar Iraq cared about the day after Saddam fell. The Bush administration also believed in a set of false assumptions that Iraq would be peaceful and stable. There were absolutely no plans for what the U.S. was about to face.

How Iraq’s Ruling Parties Took Control of the State and Its Resources

(London School of Economics and Political Science)

In March the London School of Economics and Political Science published an academic paper by Alexander Hamilton on the political economy of Iraq. He argued that Iraq’s ruling parties have emphasized short term planning that benefits themselves over investment and diversifying the economy. Their main priority has been to increase public sector jobs which were then distributed in patronage networks to maintain their political base.

Review Iraq After America, Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance

Rayburn, Joel, Iraq After America, Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2014

Iraq After America is one of the best books to help understand post-Saddam Iraqi politics. Retired Colonel Joel Rayburn broke up the country’s political groups into three categories: authoritarians, sectarians, and the resistance. He starts with Nouri al-Maliki as the authoritarian who used his position as prime minister to centralize power and divide, conquer and arrest his opponents. The sectarians were split between the Shiite supremacists who wanted to assure the Shiite majority dominated the state, Sunni chauvinists that rejected the new Iraq, and Kurdish maximalists that hoped to expand Kurdistan. Finally, there was the resistance that was made up of Iranian backed militias and Al Qaeda in Iraq. Rayburn was notable for not only coming up with a broad basis for evaluating Iraq, but he was also very prescient predicting many events that occurred after the book was published. His thesis was that all these groups increased the divisions in Iraq and might have caused irreparable damage.

Iraq’s Parliamentary Elections Set For May 12, 2018

There was some debate about whether Iraq would hold its next national elections on time. Some Sunni parties wanted a delay. A Federal Court decision sealed the deal and voting will happen as planned on May 12, 2018. The alliances were set beforehand, although there were several attempts at moves after the fact. Prime Minister Haidar Abadi heads into the vote with the upper hand, but there are always twists and turns in Iraqi politics.

Alliances Announced For Iraq’s 2018 Elections

Iraq’s Election Commission announced that January 11 was the deadline to register alliances for the 2018 balloting. As usual, there were several new coalitions, largely based upon the latest rivalries.

Political Re-Alignment In Iraq

Iraq is currently facing deep ceded political divisions. Old alliances are being torn apart, while long-time rivalries are coming to the fore again. This is happening within all three major alliances amongst the Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. This will lead to increased instability and political stalemate until the parties re-align themselves into new coalitions.

The Kurdish parties used to have a rough consensus and acted as a unified bloc in Baghdad, but that is now breaking down. For years the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) divided up the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and positions in Baghdad between them. Then in 2009 the emergence of Gorran (Change), which broke away from the PUK promoting a reformist agenda, disrupted that power sharing. That year Gorran would come in second in Kurdish elections behind the KDP. This obviously caused huge problems for the PUK, but it and the KDP eventually attempted to co-opt Gorran into the Kurdish administration. That in turn broke down in 2015 when President Massoud Barzani’s term as Kurdish president expired. He had already been extended in office once before, but this time Gorran wanted changes in the KRG political system in return for Barzani to stay in power. That set off a huge political dispute topped off by the KDP removing Gorran’s ministers from the KRG and refusing the speaker of parliament, a Gorran member from entering Irbil in October 2015. The KDP took over all of Gorran’s positions and the Kurdish parliament has not met since then. Eventually that brought the PUK and Gorran back together in a recently agreed upon alliance to oppose Barzani who they accuse of acting unilaterally on major decisions such as independence, and portraying himself as the only Kurdish leader. Barzani has also written off cooperation with the central government because he does not believe it ever follows through with any of its agreements with the KRG. The PUK and Gorran however are more open to accommodation with Baghdad marking the possible end of the Kurds united front in the capital. This crisis has left Kurdistan with no parliament, and an illegal presidency.

Iraq’s Sunnis have always been divided, but they are even more so now. In 2010 they coalesced around Iraqiya and Iyad Allawi and came in first in national elections that year. They were quickly torn apart by the maneuverings of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Today all of those coalition members are acting independently of each other. The Nujafi brothers’ Mutahidun are pushing Sunni federalism and victimization at the hands of the government’s forces. Allawi’s new Wataniya is part of the reform bloc in parliament that includes some Kurdish parliamentarians and ironically Maliki’s followers who together are trying to undermine Prime Minister Haidar Abadi. The Iraqi Islamic Party on the other hand has thrown in its lot with the premier thinking that aligning with the central government is the only way to gain concessions. Other leaders like Salah al-Mutlaq are still around, but with much less influence than they once had. This means Sunnis remain leaderless and still carry out contradictory policies towards Baghdad.

Finally, the Shiite parties are coming apart and facing future challenges as well. The election of Abadi split the Dawa Party in two between his faction and that of Nouri al-Maliki. The latter is constantly attempting to undermine the prime minister and has aligned himself with Iran and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and others to plot his comeback. Moqtada al-Sadr attempted to strong arm Abadi and the entire political class to follow his lead by threatening them with mob rule if they didn’t listen when his movement co-opted the anti-corruption, pro-services protest movement and took over the Green Zone twice. Not only was no one willing to listen to Sadr, but it blew up parliament as a result, which did not meet for several months afterward. Sadr also stands opposed to Maliki’s return and his allies, many of which broke away from the Sadr movement. They all have a long history of not only competing for votes amongst the same constituency but armed confrontations as well. That’s only likely to increase as many of those Hashd groups want to turn their prowess on the battlefield against the Islamic State and the high esteem they have amongst the Shiite community into political power in the next round of elections. Ammar Hakim and his Supreme Council at one time threw their lot behind Abadi, but then became frustrated by his announcing major decisions like merging ministries and appointing technocrats without consulting with them. They along with Sadr are also worried about their potential loss at the ballot box to the Hashd. The Shiite parties were never a monolithic force, and these differences existed for years. However, they often came together on major issues. Now they are all competing with each other. Not only that, but there is growing fear that these arguments could lead to political violence as happened before between Sadr and Badr and the Sadrists and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq.

This period of political upheaval came be traced back to two events, the concentration of power amongst Iraq’s leaders and the return of the Islamic State. First, when Maliki was premier he played divide and conquer and split the Sunni alliance behind Iraqiya, and they have never recovered since then. That’s actually not new as they were not that unified beforehand. Second, Maliki went after so many of his rivals amongst all the political factions that he ended up splitting his own Dawa party. His removal from power opened the door for the other leaders such as Sadr to make a play for leadership. Third, the war with IS has led to political aspirations amongst factions of the Hashd that threaten the established Shiite parties. Finally, Barzani’s unwillingness to make any concessions over his maintenance of the Kurdish presidency has brought the rival PUK and Gorran together to oppose him. All of these struggles along with the threat of future violence puts Iraqi politics in a dangerous place. There will likely be a long period of instability in both Baghdad and Irbil until the elite work out new alliances. That will make Iraqi politics even more fractious and dysfunctional than it already was.

SOURCES

Hassan, Hayman, “To Baghdad, Or Not To Baghdad? Bad Relationship With Central Govt. Threatens To Split Iraqi Kurdistan,” Niqash, 7/7/16

Al Mada, “Secret meetings to form new alliances to isolate the Sadrists and end the paralysis in parliament and the government,” 5/7/16

Rudaw, “Calls for resignation of parliament speaker still strong, Iraqi MP says,” 7/13/16

Salih, Mohammed, “How new alliance among Iraq’s Kurds might actually deepen divisions,” Al Monitor, 7/5/16

Sowell, Kirk, “Iraq’s Fake Populism and Anti-sectarianism,” Sada, 6/9/16

Power Struggles Amongst Iraq’s Ruling Shiite Parties

Iraq’s ruling Shiite parties are already thinking about the day after the war with the Islamic State. They are positioning themselves for future political battles, which are breaking down old alliances and playing upon existing rivalries. There are growing signs of these divisions, and worries that they could turn violent. That happened in June when Sadrist protesters began attacking offices of rival parties raising tensions almost to the breaking point.

One sign that tempers were running high occurred when Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers stormed the Green Zone of the first time. On May 20, 2016 protesters went into the government section of Baghdad. In turn some Hashd groups put their men on the streets of the capital causing fears that their might be armed confrontations, but that didn’t happen. Sadr was attempting to establish himself as the new king maker in Iraq with this action. He wanted Prime Minister Haidar Abadi to become dependent upon him to push through his reform program, while also intimidating the other ruling parties of the consequences, public protests right in the seat of power, if they didn’t go along. Things only escalated from there.

In June, Sadrists upped the ante attacking rival parties’ offices in southern Iraq. On June 9, Dawa’s office in Najaf was sacked and burned. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ended up shooting into the crowd to disperse them wounding three. The next day protesters broke into and shut down Dawa, Supreme Council, Reform Movement, and Badr offices in Basra city, Amarah in Maysan, Kut in Wasit, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, Najaf city, Karbala City, and Samawa in Muthanna. At first, a member of Sadr’s Ahrar bloc in parliament denied the movement was responsible, but that was quickly contradicted by Sadr himself who told his followers to stop, and said that anyone that used violence should be punished. Sadr had gone from taking over the government in Baghdad to challenging the other ruling parties. The Green Zone takeover was already verging on mob rule, but Sadr’s move in southern Iraq was exactly that as offices were ransacked as a political threat to his rivals. It also showed the changing political landscape amongst the Shiite parties. Sadr had long running disputes with Badr and Maliki’s faction of Dawa, but had given his nominal support to Abadi’s part of the latter. Now the Sadrists were taking on the Supreme Council and Reform Movement as well, which it had good relations with before and even an alliance with the former.

The response by the other Shiite parties verged on stern warnings to the threat of violence. The National Alliance, which is made up of the Sadrists, the Supreme Council, Fadhila, and the Reform Movement held a meeting at the home of Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and came out condemning Sadr’s actions. Premier Abadi warned demonstrators to stay away from the offices of his Dawa party. Nouri al-Maliki compared the mobs to the Republican Guard and Fedayeen Saddam, while Badr’s Hadi Ameri claimed they were like the Islamic State and Baathists. Ameri and a Dawa parliamentarian went on to say that Badr and Dawa had the right to self-defense if any more of its offices were attacked. Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, who are aligned with Maliki also gave a warning to Sadr. It seemed like the Shiite parties were on the brink of armed conflict. Taking the Green Zone was one thing, but assaulting their offices was something they wouldn’t stand for. If there had been another day of demonstrations things could have quickly got out of hand.

Sadr played his hand, but warned that more could come. On June 11, Sadr said his followers would hold off on any more demonstrations until after Ramadan. At the same time he threatened a million man march in Baghdad afterward. That could very well go to the Green Zone once again. The second time the Sadrists took over that area the ISF ended up killing four people. There could be another such deadly incident if Sadr followed through with his announcement. The Shiite parties and Hashd elements could decide to get involved as well leading to an even bigger crisis.

Sadr is walking a dangerous line. He is using his popular movement to push the Shiite elite to follow his lead or suffer the consequences of an angry mob. That threat has escalated from the Green Zone to attacking the parties in their base in the south. The problem is Sadr’s strategy has no chance of succeeding. Parliament is so divided right now that it can barely hold sessions. Neither Abadi nor the other lists will give into Sadr, and his protests are only adding to the political crisis. Sadr’s threats could quickly spiral out of control, and other parties have already warned that they will use force against the Sadrists. This is the war for power that many are afraid will break out after the war with the Islamic State is over. It may even start before the insurgents are defeated.

SOURCES

AIN, “Sadr orders to hold accountable anyone who attacks the headquarters or public and private property,” 6/11/16

- “Saraya Jihad: The assault on the headquarters of the Mujahideen will not deter their resolve to fight terrorism,” 6/9/16

- “Urgent Sadr refuses to encroach upon the headquarters of political parties and emphasizes peaceful demonstrations,” 6/10/16

Face Iraq, “Hadi al-Amiri orders to deal with aggressors on the Badr Organization headquarters Calls them Baathists and Daash,” 6/10/16

Al Forat, “Injuring three demonstrators during protest outside Dawa Party headquarters in Najaf,” 6/9/16

Hameed, Saif and Mohammed, Aref, “Iraqi cleric Sadr asks followers to stop attacks on rivals’ offices,” Reuters, 6/11/16

Iraq News Network, “Abadi: the headquarters of the Dawa Party, a red line,” 6/10/16

Iraq Times, “Ameri warns followers of Muqtada al-Sadr to not assault the headquarters of his organization and describes them as Baathists and Daash,” 6/9/16

- “Citizens Coalition Moqtada and his followers want to ignite a Shiite-Shiite war,” 6/9/16

- “Al-Maliki: Muqtada’s attacks on the headquarters of political parties reminiscent of the Republican Guard and Fedayeen Saddam,” 6/9/16

Al Mada, “Closing party offices puts Sayid in a confrontation with the National Alliance parties,” 6/11/16

NINA, “Angry demonstrators closed the Dawa Party Offices in Babylon,” 6/10/16

- “Sadrists demonstrators attacking the Dawa party’s headquarters in Najaf,” 6/10/16

Shafaq News, “Iraq’s Sadr warns of ‘million-man’ demo after Ramadan pause,” 6/12/16

Iraq’s Parliament Confirms Some Of Abadi’s New Cabinet

The deadlock in parliament between opponents and supporters of Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was temporarily overcome when lawmakers were able to create a quorum and vote on a partial list of the premier’s new cabinet. On April 26, 170-180 members of parliament met, confirmed that Salim Jabouri was still the speaker, and approved five new ministers submitted by Abadi. Those were Ali Ghani al-Mubarak for Health, Hassan al-Janabi for Water, Wafa Jaffar al-Mahadawi for Labor, Abdul Razaq Al-Aysa for Higher Education, and Ali Dishar for Electricity. Over one hundred MPs had been conducting a sit in, and voted out Jabouri earlier, but the Speaker has claimed that was illegal. They tried to disrupt the session shouting and throwing water bottles, which was led by members of former Premier Nouri al-Maliki’s wing of State of Law. They were successful in driving the other lawmakers out of the main parliament room into an alternate location, but they could not stop the proceedings. There was talk about the opposition lawmakers trying to form a permanent block, and they were also going to court over legality of the session. The fact that they were not able to stop the vote however was a major defeat for them after they had been able to disrupt the government for several days. As for the rest of the new cabinet there are still talks going on amongst the ruling parties, and disagreements. On the other hand, Moqtada al-Sadr called off his demonstrations outside the Green Zone with a spokesman saying that the vote on the ministers was a positive first step, but more was needed.

Abadi’s changes have threatened the entire political system in Iraq. As Mustafa Habib pointed out in Niqash, Abadi’s proposal for new ministers has caused all kinds of splits within the government, especially amongst the Shiite parties. State of Law was divided between pro-Badi and pro-Maliki factions, and Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme Council’s Mutawin came down on different sides of the vote against Speaker Jabouri even though they were in an alliance beforehand. More importantly, the premier’s suggestion of a technocratic set of ministers threatens not only the quotas that determine who gets what public offices, but the elites’ control over the government. The ministries are the main way the parties rule by doling out patronage and stealing from the public coffers to enrich themselves. The new cabinet would be loyal to Abadi instead of the lists, which would dramatically change the power dynamic in Baghdad. It was quite an accomplishment then to get five ministers approved, although the way talks are progressing other cabinet members maybe partisan in order to get approved.

SOURCES

AIN, “Deputy of the session: Maliki wing stirred chaos to prevent the passing of ministerial cabinet,” 4/26/16

- “Fatlawi Sayadi squatting and throwing bottles of water to disrupt the cabinet reshuffle,” 4/26/16

- “Urgent Jabouri threatening legal action against the deputies that violated the majority rules of procedure,” 4/26/16

Habib, Mustafa, “Chaos in Baghdad: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly Reasons Why Real political Reform Is Impossible In Iraq,” Niqash, 4/21/16

Iraq News Network, “Parliament sit-ins offer an appeal to the Federal Court for Parliament’s session yesterday,” 4/27/16

Iraq Oil Report, “UPDATE: Chaotic Parliament confirms five new ministers,” 4/26/16

Al Mada, “Abadi flirts with coalition with Allawi to pass his plans for list of ministries,” 4/22/16

- “House sit-ins resort to reference after the withdrawal of some of their colleagues following threats by the blocs,” 4/17/16

- “Parliament ends session and votes on closed envelope ministers .. And Abadi promises more changes in two days,” 4/26/16

Morris, Loveday and Salim, Mustafa, “Thousands of protesters threaten to storm Iraq’s parliament,” Washington Post, 4/26/16

National Iraqi News Agency, “A Parliamentary Source: Some MPs Tried To Attack Abadi When Attending To Parliament,” 4/26/16

New Sabah, “Opposition front forming in parliament with about 120 deputies to change the performance of the legislature,” 4/27/16

Complaints About Iraq PM Abadi Undermine His Cabinet Reshuffle

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi finally presented his new cabinet of technocrats to parliament. It now has a little over a week to discuss the nominees. The whole process to come up with the ministers has been fraught with problems with the majority of the ruling parties opposing Abadi’s plans. The main problem is that Abadi’s cabinet threatens the ruling parties hold on the government. What has made the situation worse is Abadi’s unwillingness to consult with others and to present a clear plan. The premier is already facing a difficult situation, and his alienating the other lists is only making the situation worse.

On March 31, 2016 a list was presented of Premier Abadi’s nominees for his new cabinet. That led Moqtada al-Sadr to call off his protests at Baghdad’s Green Zone, which had annoyed the prime minister, but it created more problems in the process. First, the nominee for Oil Minister Nizar Salim withdrew his candidacy claiming there was no agreement amongst the ruling blocs over the new cabinet. Salim was correct. Sadr is the only national leader who seemed to agree with Abadi’s move. It was reported that the Sadrists, the Supreme Council and Dawa Iraq Organization were the only ones to submit candidates to Abadi. All the others refused to go along with the move. First, the Kurdish Alliance complained that Abadi never explained how their ministers had failed, why they should be replaced, that the nominees don’t represent the political parties, and that the prime minister was ignoring the right of the Kurd to choose their own representatives. In turn, they claimed they would not vote on the new minister in parliament. The Solution List, which is part of the Sunni alliance, said that the cabinet was a way to exclude some parties from power. Beforehand, Iyad Allawi and Mutahidun stated that they would not give up their ministries. The Supreme Council countered Abadi’s reforms by saying that if the government were to be technocratic and non-partisan than Abadi should resign as well. Needless to say, Abadi’s program has angered almost everyone. The ministries are how the ruling parties control the government. Each one is run like a private fiefdom, and allows the parties to hand out patronage via jobs and steal via corrupt contracts. It would be expected that if the technocrats were to be approved they would move to get rid of all the political hacks that occupy the director generals, the managers, etc. That is a major threat, which none of the parties are willing to agree to as of now.

What has made the whole process worse for the prime minister is his apparent inability or unwillingness to consult with others. Since Abadi first started talking about reforms last year, he has never offered a clear or coherent program. It was a surprise to all when he first came out with his proposals. Since then the complaints have mounted into a chorus. Members from within his own Dawa and State of Law wanted him to talk to them before making major decisions, but he didn’t. Abadi’s two main allies, the Supreme Council’s Ammar Hakim and Moqtada al-Sadr have repeatedly made similar statements. The National Alliance, which all those parties belong to said that it would not follow Abadi’s program if they didn’t know about the details. Members of the Kurdish Alliance have told the press that Abadi’s plan has never been made clear to them. Finally, Allawi’s bloc complained about the lack of transparency in Abadi’s decisions. There is no way the premier can be successful unless he builds consensus. None exists right now. A major reason why so many parties turned on Maliki was that he only talked with his small core of advisers when making policy. Abadi, who was supposed to be the anti-Maliki, and came in talking about repairing relations with the other parties, has instead followed in his predecessor’s footsteps. That makes a successful transition with the cabinet all the more difficult.

SOURCES

AIN, “Solution: afraid new technocratic government is an attempt exclude,” 4/1/16

International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Conflict Alert,” 8/24/15

Kazimi, Nibras, “What is happening in Iraq?” Talisman Gate, Again, 10/29/15

Al Mada, “Abadi staggering to present his cabinet to parliament for fear of his government being overthrown,” 3/26/16

- “Citizen and Kurdish MPs criticize ambiguity of Ministerial Committee,” 3/27/16

- “”Commander of necessity” and not cooperating with the quartet raise the wrath of State of Law against the Prime Minister,” 10/28/15

- “Kurds and Sunnis are waiting for clarification of the Prime Minister: We reject the removal of our ministers without justification,” 3/30/16

- “Large blocs reluctant..and small ones send their candidates to the ministerial committee,” 3/24/16

- “The new government is in a closed envelop until next week pending parliamentary vote,” 4/1/16

- “Sayadi: 45 deputies from the State of Law withdraw authority from Abadi,” 10/28/15

- “Shiite parties leave presidencies commission … the Kurds and Sunnis hold the balance,” 3/24/16

Mamouri, Ali, “Will Abadi put his money where his mouth is?” Al Monitor, 3/1/16

Mardini, Ramzy, “No Authority: Shiite Minimization in a Fragmented Iraq,” World Politics Review, 12/8/15

Martin, Patrick with Anagnostos, Emily, Bessette, Rachel and Werman, Hannah, “Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/25/16

New Sabah, “Abadi identifies two paths of reform and choice of ministers reached an advanced stage,” 2/29/16

- “Kurdistan objects to Abadi’s list and calls on the government to obtain its representation,” 4/1/16

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Premier To Elevate Technocrats, Demote Politicos In Cabinet,” 2/10/16

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s coalition members press PM to consult before ordering reforms,” Reuters, 10/28/15

Rudaw, “Kurdish ministerial nominee withdraws from new Iraqi cabinet,” 4/1/16

Sotaliraq, “Kurds threaten to withdraw from the government, will not vote on any candidate in the new cabinet,” 4/2/16

Xinhua, “Iraqi parliament says Abadi’s reforms should comply with constitution,” 11/2/15

Will The Hashd Al-Shaabi Change The Face Of Iraqi Politics? Interview With Fanar Haddad

Fanar Haddad is one of the pre-eminent scholars on sectarianism in Iraq. His 2011 book Sectarianism in Iraq, Antagonistic Visions of Unity was a ground breaking work on the topic. Recently Haddad wrote “The Hashd: Redrawing the Military and Political Map of Iraq” for the Middle East institute. That spurred this interview about what impact the Hashd al-Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) might have on the future of Iraqi politics. Haddad can be followed on Twitter at @fanarhaddad.

Intra-Shiite Rivalries In Iraq As Kataib Hezbollah Raids ISCI Office

While much of the reporting on the Iraq focuses upon the sectarian dimension within the country, mostly overlooked are the internal Shiite divisions. This might actually be more important as these parties rule the country. The rise of the Hashd al-Shaabi poses a long-term threat to the Shiite establishment due to their widespread popularity. Recently Kataib Hezbollah (KH) raided an office of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in Basra, leading the latter to issue a blistering condemnation. More of these confrontations are likely to happen in the future as these groups jockey for position in post-Islamic State Iraq.

At the start of May 2015 Kataib Hezbollah and the Supreme Council got into a spat that showed the intra-Shiite rivalries in Iraq. KH raided an ISCI office in Basra, looting it and destroying equipment. KH had been attacking a local Supreme Council official in Basra for corruption, which seemed to be the precipitating factor. KH also used a friendly media outlet to critique the head of the Supreme Council Ammar Hakim accusing him of denying the terrorist charges against former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. In return, ISCI attacked KH for attempting to undermine reconciliation and the National Alliance, which is the coalition that includes the Supreme Council and the Sadrists. A source within the Supreme Council said that Kataib Hezbollah wanted to turn its battlefield success into political power afterward, which would usurp the National Alliance. The ISCI response was apt, because it laid bare the fear that some Shiite parties are feeling about the Hashd. They are immensely popular with the Iraqi street because of their fighting forte. They could easily use this to promote themselves in upcoming elections. The parties that would lose votes in the process would be the established Shiite religious parties.

ISCI joins Moqtada al-Sadr as two political groups, which have begun criticizing the Hashd. Sadr has attacked what he calls “brazen militias” who have carried out killings of civilians, undermined the government and do not follow the orders of the Iraqi Security Forces. He has made these statements several times. This is due to his long time rivalry with groups such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, but also because he like ISCI see the dilemma the Hashd could pose to his movement. All of these groups are religiously based and therefore are competing for the same constituency. The Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq ran in the last parliamentary elections, and whose to say how many of the new Hashd groups may decide to join the political process after the insurgency is defeated. As a result it is likely that more of these incidents will occur, and verbal spats will increase in frequency as these organizations continue to fight the Islamic State on the battlefield, while vying for support on the home front.

SOURCES

Al Arabiya, “Iraqi Hezbollah storm the headquarters of the Supreme Council in Basra,” 5/11/15

Habib, Mustafa, “Whose Side Are They On?” Niqash, 5/14/15

Iraq News Network, “Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous challenge sedition in Iraq,” 5/12/15

Iraq’s Politics And Its Discontents An Interview With Col. Joel Rayburn

Post-2003 Iraq has been known for its deep divisions. In his book Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance Col. Joel Rayburn tried to describe the different groups that have been struggling for power in the country through both participating in the government and violently trying to overthrow it. Rayburn worked in Iraq as an intelligence officer before going on to becoming a senior military fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Hoover Institution Working Group on Islamism and the International Order. He can be followed on Twitter @joel_rayburn. Below is an interview with Rayburn where he explains what he termed authoritarianism, sectarianism, maximalism, and resistance in Iraq.