Review The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite

Gulmohamad, Zana, The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite, London, New York, Oxford, New Delhi, Sydney: I.B. Tauris, 2021

 

Zana Gulmohamad set out to try to explain the complicated story of how Iraq formulates its foreign policy in The Making of Foreign Policy in Iraq, Political Factions and the Ruling Elite. His thesis was that Iraq’s foreign affairs are shaped by each ethnosectarian group, political party, and leading officials in Iraq under the influence and interference of foreign nations. That leads to a contradictory stance as each actor follows its own path to the detriment of the country.

Review Transnational Shia Politics, Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf

Louer, Laurence, Transnational Shia Politics, Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008

 

Laurence Louer in Transnational Shia Politics, Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf is a history of the Shiite movements in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait and their relations to Iraq and Iran. The author argues that networks were formed between clerics and political parties in Iraq and Iran with the Gulf States. At first, these were followers but eventually the clergy and movements in the Gulf formed their own agendas.

2021 Election Reshuffles Iraq’s Political Deck

(AP)

Iraq’s 2021 election had some predictable winners mixed in with unexpected results. The main take away was that Sadr’s movement is the strongest political force in the country right now. Others did better than expected while some long standing parties faced crushing defeats. Two new parties won seats in parliament as well and will likely form the country’s first opposition.

Review Shi’ism and Social Protest

Cole, Juan and Keddie, Nikki, edited by, Shi’ism and Social Protest, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986

 

Shi’ism and Social Protest is an anthology edited by Juan Cole and Nikkie Keddie. Its purpose was to try to fill the gap in academia about Shiite activism across Asia, which was dominated by the Iranian Revolution and little else. Like any collection the book has its ups and downs. There are good chapters on Shiism across the Middle East, Iran and Lebanon. Those are contrasted with a chapter on Egypt that doesn’t have to do with Shiites and another on how Soviet scholars viewed Shiite movements both of which seemed out of place. There’s also a selection on the Dawa party of Iraq which gets a lot of the details about the group wrong. Shi’ism and Social Protest was also published in 1986 which means it can provide some background, but some of it is also out of date.

Review Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, And The Struggle For Iraq

Cockburn, Patrick, Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, And The Struggle For Iraq, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Scribner, 2008

Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, And The Struggle For Iraq by journalist Patrick Cockburn is one of those rare Western books about post-Saddam Iraq that focuses upon Iraqis instead of the Americans. The author tries to place Moqtada al-Sadr’s rise as a leading Iraqi political figure after 2003 in the context of the growth of identity and religious politics within the Shiite community. The first half of the book is all history about the formation of the first Shiite religious party, the repression under Baathist rule, the 1991 uprising after the Gulf War, and the two great ayatollahs of the Sadr family Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr who was the father in law of Moqtada and then his father Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. Cockburn’s argument is that Moqtada al-Sadr was a product of the repression and activism during the Baathist era, and that he was consistently underestimated by the Americans post-03.

Review The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq

Jabar, Faleh, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, London: SAQI, 2003

 

Faleh Jabar was one of the top Iraqi scholars on his home country. He was inspired to write The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq because of the dearth of research on Shiite activism outside of Iran. His main influence was Hanna Batatu’s intense research that led to his The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq laid out the background that led to the emergence of Shiite reform and revolutionary groups, their leadership, their philosophy, and how they changed over time from the 1950s to the 1990s. Jabar’s thesis was that these parties were beset by divisions, mistakes, and defeats.

How Iraq’s Ruling Parties Took Control of the State and Its Resources

(London School of Economics and Political Science)

In March the London School of Economics and Political Science published an academic paper by Alexander Hamilton on the political economy of Iraq. He argued that Iraq’s ruling parties have emphasized short term planning that benefits themselves over investment and diversifying the economy. Their main priority has been to increase public sector jobs which were then distributed in patronage networks to maintain their political base.

Protests Grow Deadlier In Iraq

(Al Hurra)

Protests entered their tenth day in Iraq and grew deadlier on July 15. There were demonstrations across 9 provinces with several people being killed by the police, while more government and political party officers were occupied and destroyed.

Iraq Election Results All 18 Provinces

Iraq’s Election Commission finished reporting its early returns for all 18 provinces. Sadr’s Sairoon list remained in the lead with 6 first place finishes and 4 2^nd place ones. The pro-Iran Hashd list Fatah had five 1^st place finishes and now has 8 second place ones adding Kirkuk. (There is a recount going on in that province so the standings could change). Prime Minister Haidar Abadi’s Nasr only won Ninewa, but otherwise finished third in seven governorates. Vice President Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya could only pull three 2^nd places and two 3^rd places. The two main Kurdish parties the KDP and PUK took Dohuk, Irbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya. Change’s best showing was 2^nd in Sulaymaniya, while the New Generation came in 3^rd in Irbil and Sulaymaniya. Vice President Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya finished 2^nd three times and 3^rd twice. Vice President Osama Nujafi’s Qarar won Diyala, but otherwise did poorly. Vice President Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law and Ammar Hakim’s Hikma didn’t do well either finishing 3^rd in Baghdad and Maysan and Muthanna respectively.

(CNN)

It’s Official PM Abadi and VP Maliki Will Run Separately In 2018 Elections

The Dawa Party officially announced what many were expecting the last month or so. The party said that it would not run in the 2018 elections, thus allowing its members to run separately. That meant that Prime Minister Haidar Abadi could run on his Nasr list and Vice President Nouri al-Maliki could maintain his State of Law. The party made this decision rather than break apart. As Harith Hasan al-Qarawee pointed out, Dawa feels that it needs to maintain control of the premiership to remain relevant. It therefore thought it best to keep the façade of unity despite the deep divide between those two figures.

Alliances Announced For Iraq’s 2018 Elections

Iraq’s Election Commission announced that January 11 was the deadline to register alliances for the 2018 balloting. As usual, there were several new coalitions, largely based upon the latest rivalries.

Iraq Sacks Its Finance Minister

For the second time in two months Iraq’s parliament has sacked a minister. On September 21, 2016 Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari was dismissed after 158 parliamentarians voted to remove him versus 77 against. Zebari was called before parliament several weeks earlier for questioning over corruption charges. His responses were considered inadequate leading to his no confidence vote. Leading the charge to get rid of him was MP Haitham al-Jabouri of the Dawa Party. This was part of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s attempt to undermine Premier Haidar Abadi’s government.

Maliki was able to play upon divisions within the Kurdish alliance and dislike of the list to get rid of Zebari. First, President Massoud Barzani has stayed in office after his term expired causing dissension in Kurdistan. The Change party demanded reforms in return for extending Barzani’s term. The president responded by unilaterally dismissing Change’s ministers and barring the speaker of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s parliament from entering Irbil who was also a member of Change. That led Change and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to form a new political alliance. The Kurdish Islamic parties have been unhappy with Barzani’s moves as well. That led those groups to vote against Zebari in parliament. Second, as Kirk Sowell of Inside Iraqi Politics pointed out President Barzani is one of the most unpopular politicians in Iraq. Unhappiness with Maliki’s time in office led Barzani to write off relations with Baghdad. Since then he has increasingly talked about Kurdish independence, his party has called Iraq a failed state, has moved towards independent oil exports, while at the same time complaining that the central government has not shared international military aid with the KRG and demanded its share of the budget. These moves and others have all angered many Arab politicians. Zebari is not only a member of Barzani’s KDP, but the president’s uncle as well making him a prime target. Together this allowed Maliki’s operatives to garner enough votes to oust the finance minister.

This is another big victory for Maliki and a hit for Abadi. In August Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi failed a no confidence vote over corruption charges. Both the defense and finance ministers were important to Abadi’s government. When Maliki was in office he was masterful at playing divide and conquer allowing him to take on nearly every faction in Iraq. He is doing the same now. Maliki’s group was able to play upon the divisions within the two main Sunni parties, the Iraqi Islamic Party and Mutahidun to sack Obeidi. He now played upon the Kurds new splits to do the same to Zebari. That doesn’t mean that Maliki will be able to put the numbers together to get rid of other ministers, but it does open the door to it. Abadi already came into office in a weak position, and now his legs are being further cut out from under him.

SOURCES

AIN, “The formation of a coalition featuring a unified Kurdish Patriotic Union and Change,” 9/10/16

Anagnostos, Emily, “Iraq’s Parliament Ousts Kurdish Finance Minister,” Institute for the Study of War, 9/21/16

Iraq News Network, “Zebari accused al-Maliki of moving interrogations to hit Abadi,” 8/30/16

Iraq Oil Report, “Uncertainty after Parliament ousts Iraq’s finance minister,” 9/21/16

Al Mada, “Zebari: personal targeting misleading statements adopted,” 8/25/16

Rudaw, “Iraq’s finance minister likely to face confidence vote in parliament,” 8/28/16

Sotaliraq, “Image..Al-Jabouri after the dismissal of Zebari,” 9/21/16

Iraq Fires Its Defense Minister

In August 2016 Iraq’s Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi was dismissed by parliament. Nouri al-Maliki’s faction of State of Law had been trying to get rid of him for almost a year to undermine Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, but never had the votes to do it. That changed when at the start of the month Obeidi attacked the Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri and several other parliamentarians over corrupt defense deals. Obeidi’s move backfired and created enough opposition to ensure his removal.

The Defense Minister’s problems started when he was called before parliament on August 1, 2016. Obeidi was to answer questions about corrupt deals at his ministry, but instead went on the attack and accused Speaker Salim al-Jabouri, Mohammed Karbuli, the head of the Solution bloc, and others of being involved in crooked deals for military equipment. To back up his accusations Obeidi went to the anti-corruption Integrity Commission on August 4. He was then hit with a lawsuit by Jabouri for slandering his name. In near record time, the Federal Court acquitted Jabouri of any charges on August 9, claiming there was a lack of evidence against him. There was more bad news for Obeidi when on August 24 the Supreme Judicial Council said that it closed the investigation of corruption charges made by the Defense Minister. Obeidi’s accusations made headlines throughout the Iraqi and international press. Many Iraqis’ praised his stance claiming that he was a hero against the corrupt ruling class even though he had been brought in before the legislature to answer questions about illegality going on under him. It didn’t appear he had much to back up his claims though as two courts found he didn’t have any hard facts. His attacks also turned Speaker Jabouri and his Iraqi Islamic Party against the Defense Minister, which would come back on Obeidi.

Events moved quickly and on August 25 parliament held a no confidence vote removing Obeidi from his post. 142 MPs were for removing Obeidi versus 102 against, with the rest abstaining. The move against the Defense Minister was led by Nouri al-Maliki and the anti-Abadi Reform bloc that he is part of. That grouping also includes Iyad Allawi’s Nationalist Coalition, and some Kurdish MPs. Maliki’s faction had been trying to oust Obeidi since 2015 to weaken the prime minister, but was unable to gather enough backing. The Defense Minister accusing Jabouri and Karbuli meant that the Islamic Party and Solution Bloc provided the numbers necessary to remove Obeidi. On the other hand, Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar, and Ammar Hakim’s Muwatin were all for retaining the minister. Nujafi and Jabouri have become bitter rivals with the former trying to remove the speaker from office. Sadr and Hakim didn’t want to back any move made by Maliki that might aid his plans to return to power. Those two walked out of parliament on August 23 to block the first attempt to hold the no confidence vote against Obeidi. If the Defense Minister had not gone after Speaker Jabouri he would probably still have his job. Most ministers when appearing before parliament either don’t show up or don’t give any substantive responses, especially when they get accused of corruption. Instead, Obeidi chose to go on the offensive against some of his critics. That backfired. First, Jabouri and company could have very well been involved in all the corrupt deals Obeidi accused them of, but the minister couldn’t get any traction against them in the courts. Second, Maliki had been trying to get rid of Obeidi for almost a year, but got nowhere. Now that the minister had angered the speaker though, he threw his weight behind the no confidence vote and Obeidi was out.

SOURCES

Adnan, Sinan, “Iraq’s Prime Minister comes under Attack by Political Rivals,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/15

Agence France Presse, “Iraq judiciary drops corruption case against speaker,” 8/9/16

- “Iraq minister accuses parliament speaker of corruption,” 8/1/16

- “Iraq prosecutor files complaint against graft accused,” 8/3/16

Buratha News, “Judiciary challenged the defense minister and the head of the Integrity Commission on the issue of Jabouri,” 8/24/16

Iraq News Network, “Obeidi: Salim al-Jabouri demanded role in arms deals and Haider Mulla asked me for two million dollars,” 8/1/16

Al Mada, “Deal within the Coalition Forces to speed up dropping charges against al-Jabouri and lifting his immunity,” 8/9/16

- “Jabouri included withdrawal of confidence from al-Obeidi to next

Tuesday’s agenda,” 8/15/16

- “Obeidi turned the table on his interrogation and made embarrassing accusations against the Speaker of Parliament,” 8/3/16

- “Obeidi’s fate hung in parliament session..Jubouri faces a campaign for his dismissal with 100 signatures,” 8/8/16

- “Parliament postpones vote on the withdrawal of confidence from al-Obeidi to Thursday,” 8/23/16

Mamouri, Ali, “Iraq’s political leaders on quicksand as alliances fracture,” Al Monitor, 8/12/16

Martin, Patrick, “Iraq’s Parliament Ousts Defense Minister,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/25/16

Morris, Loveday, “Iraqi parliament ousts defense minister as Mosul operation looms,” Washington Post, 8/25/16

New Sabah, “Abadi: I was against the interrogation of al-Obeidi at the current time because of the security situation,” 8/5/16

- “Mutahidun declares that it will appeal the dismissal of Defense Minister,” 8/26/16

NINA, “Al-Fatlawi clarified her position on the accusations of the Defense Minister in the parliament session today,” 8/1/16

Rudaw, “Iraqi defense minister accuses parliament speaker of corruption,” 8/1/16

Sotaliraq, “Alloizi: the dismissal of al-Obeidi a kind of regulatory recovery of Parliament,” 8/25/16

- “Corruption charges triggered by Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi in the House of Representatives,” 8/1/16

Political Re-Alignment In Iraq

Iraq is currently facing deep ceded political divisions. Old alliances are being torn apart, while long-time rivalries are coming to the fore again. This is happening within all three major alliances amongst the Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. This will lead to increased instability and political stalemate until the parties re-align themselves into new coalitions.

The Kurdish parties used to have a rough consensus and acted as a unified bloc in Baghdad, but that is now breaking down. For years the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) divided up the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and positions in Baghdad between them. Then in 2009 the emergence of Gorran (Change), which broke away from the PUK promoting a reformist agenda, disrupted that power sharing. That year Gorran would come in second in Kurdish elections behind the KDP. This obviously caused huge problems for the PUK, but it and the KDP eventually attempted to co-opt Gorran into the Kurdish administration. That in turn broke down in 2015 when President Massoud Barzani’s term as Kurdish president expired. He had already been extended in office once before, but this time Gorran wanted changes in the KRG political system in return for Barzani to stay in power. That set off a huge political dispute topped off by the KDP removing Gorran’s ministers from the KRG and refusing the speaker of parliament, a Gorran member from entering Irbil in October 2015. The KDP took over all of Gorran’s positions and the Kurdish parliament has not met since then. Eventually that brought the PUK and Gorran back together in a recently agreed upon alliance to oppose Barzani who they accuse of acting unilaterally on major decisions such as independence, and portraying himself as the only Kurdish leader. Barzani has also written off cooperation with the central government because he does not believe it ever follows through with any of its agreements with the KRG. The PUK and Gorran however are more open to accommodation with Baghdad marking the possible end of the Kurds united front in the capital. This crisis has left Kurdistan with no parliament, and an illegal presidency.

Iraq’s Sunnis have always been divided, but they are even more so now. In 2010 they coalesced around Iraqiya and Iyad Allawi and came in first in national elections that year. They were quickly torn apart by the maneuverings of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Today all of those coalition members are acting independently of each other. The Nujafi brothers’ Mutahidun are pushing Sunni federalism and victimization at the hands of the government’s forces. Allawi’s new Wataniya is part of the reform bloc in parliament that includes some Kurdish parliamentarians and ironically Maliki’s followers who together are trying to undermine Prime Minister Haidar Abadi. The Iraqi Islamic Party on the other hand has thrown in its lot with the premier thinking that aligning with the central government is the only way to gain concessions. Other leaders like Salah al-Mutlaq are still around, but with much less influence than they once had. This means Sunnis remain leaderless and still carry out contradictory policies towards Baghdad.

Finally, the Shiite parties are coming apart and facing future challenges as well. The election of Abadi split the Dawa Party in two between his faction and that of Nouri al-Maliki. The latter is constantly attempting to undermine the prime minister and has aligned himself with Iran and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and others to plot his comeback. Moqtada al-Sadr attempted to strong arm Abadi and the entire political class to follow his lead by threatening them with mob rule if they didn’t listen when his movement co-opted the anti-corruption, pro-services protest movement and took over the Green Zone twice. Not only was no one willing to listen to Sadr, but it blew up parliament as a result, which did not meet for several months afterward. Sadr also stands opposed to Maliki’s return and his allies, many of which broke away from the Sadr movement. They all have a long history of not only competing for votes amongst the same constituency but armed confrontations as well. That’s only likely to increase as many of those Hashd groups want to turn their prowess on the battlefield against the Islamic State and the high esteem they have amongst the Shiite community into political power in the next round of elections. Ammar Hakim and his Supreme Council at one time threw their lot behind Abadi, but then became frustrated by his announcing major decisions like merging ministries and appointing technocrats without consulting with them. They along with Sadr are also worried about their potential loss at the ballot box to the Hashd. The Shiite parties were never a monolithic force, and these differences existed for years. However, they often came together on major issues. Now they are all competing with each other. Not only that, but there is growing fear that these arguments could lead to political violence as happened before between Sadr and Badr and the Sadrists and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq.

This period of political upheaval came be traced back to two events, the concentration of power amongst Iraq’s leaders and the return of the Islamic State. First, when Maliki was premier he played divide and conquer and split the Sunni alliance behind Iraqiya, and they have never recovered since then. That’s actually not new as they were not that unified beforehand. Second, Maliki went after so many of his rivals amongst all the political factions that he ended up splitting his own Dawa party. His removal from power opened the door for the other leaders such as Sadr to make a play for leadership. Third, the war with IS has led to political aspirations amongst factions of the Hashd that threaten the established Shiite parties. Finally, Barzani’s unwillingness to make any concessions over his maintenance of the Kurdish presidency has brought the rival PUK and Gorran together to oppose him. All of these struggles along with the threat of future violence puts Iraqi politics in a dangerous place. There will likely be a long period of instability in both Baghdad and Irbil until the elite work out new alliances. That will make Iraqi politics even more fractious and dysfunctional than it already was.

SOURCES

Hassan, Hayman, “To Baghdad, Or Not To Baghdad? Bad Relationship With Central Govt. Threatens To Split Iraqi Kurdistan,” Niqash, 7/7/16

Al Mada, “Secret meetings to form new alliances to isolate the Sadrists and end the paralysis in parliament and the government,” 5/7/16

Rudaw, “Calls for resignation of parliament speaker still strong, Iraqi MP says,” 7/13/16

Salih, Mohammed, “How new alliance among Iraq’s Kurds might actually deepen divisions,” Al Monitor, 7/5/16

Sowell, Kirk, “Iraq’s Fake Populism and Anti-sectarianism,” Sada, 6/9/16

Power Struggles Amongst Iraq’s Ruling Shiite Parties

Iraq’s ruling Shiite parties are already thinking about the day after the war with the Islamic State. They are positioning themselves for future political battles, which are breaking down old alliances and playing upon existing rivalries. There are growing signs of these divisions, and worries that they could turn violent. That happened in June when Sadrist protesters began attacking offices of rival parties raising tensions almost to the breaking point.

One sign that tempers were running high occurred when Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers stormed the Green Zone of the first time. On May 20, 2016 protesters went into the government section of Baghdad. In turn some Hashd groups put their men on the streets of the capital causing fears that their might be armed confrontations, but that didn’t happen. Sadr was attempting to establish himself as the new king maker in Iraq with this action. He wanted Prime Minister Haidar Abadi to become dependent upon him to push through his reform program, while also intimidating the other ruling parties of the consequences, public protests right in the seat of power, if they didn’t go along. Things only escalated from there.

In June, Sadrists upped the ante attacking rival parties’ offices in southern Iraq. On June 9, Dawa’s office in Najaf was sacked and burned. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ended up shooting into the crowd to disperse them wounding three. The next day protesters broke into and shut down Dawa, Supreme Council, Reform Movement, and Badr offices in Basra city, Amarah in Maysan, Kut in Wasit, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, Najaf city, Karbala City, and Samawa in Muthanna. At first, a member of Sadr’s Ahrar bloc in parliament denied the movement was responsible, but that was quickly contradicted by Sadr himself who told his followers to stop, and said that anyone that used violence should be punished. Sadr had gone from taking over the government in Baghdad to challenging the other ruling parties. The Green Zone takeover was already verging on mob rule, but Sadr’s move in southern Iraq was exactly that as offices were ransacked as a political threat to his rivals. It also showed the changing political landscape amongst the Shiite parties. Sadr had long running disputes with Badr and Maliki’s faction of Dawa, but had given his nominal support to Abadi’s part of the latter. Now the Sadrists were taking on the Supreme Council and Reform Movement as well, which it had good relations with before and even an alliance with the former.

The response by the other Shiite parties verged on stern warnings to the threat of violence. The National Alliance, which is made up of the Sadrists, the Supreme Council, Fadhila, and the Reform Movement held a meeting at the home of Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and came out condemning Sadr’s actions. Premier Abadi warned demonstrators to stay away from the offices of his Dawa party. Nouri al-Maliki compared the mobs to the Republican Guard and Fedayeen Saddam, while Badr’s Hadi Ameri claimed they were like the Islamic State and Baathists. Ameri and a Dawa parliamentarian went on to say that Badr and Dawa had the right to self-defense if any more of its offices were attacked. Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, who are aligned with Maliki also gave a warning to Sadr. It seemed like the Shiite parties were on the brink of armed conflict. Taking the Green Zone was one thing, but assaulting their offices was something they wouldn’t stand for. If there had been another day of demonstrations things could have quickly got out of hand.

Sadr played his hand, but warned that more could come. On June 11, Sadr said his followers would hold off on any more demonstrations until after Ramadan. At the same time he threatened a million man march in Baghdad afterward. That could very well go to the Green Zone once again. The second time the Sadrists took over that area the ISF ended up killing four people. There could be another such deadly incident if Sadr followed through with his announcement. The Shiite parties and Hashd elements could decide to get involved as well leading to an even bigger crisis.

Sadr is walking a dangerous line. He is using his popular movement to push the Shiite elite to follow his lead or suffer the consequences of an angry mob. That threat has escalated from the Green Zone to attacking the parties in their base in the south. The problem is Sadr’s strategy has no chance of succeeding. Parliament is so divided right now that it can barely hold sessions. Neither Abadi nor the other lists will give into Sadr, and his protests are only adding to the political crisis. Sadr’s threats could quickly spiral out of control, and other parties have already warned that they will use force against the Sadrists. This is the war for power that many are afraid will break out after the war with the Islamic State is over. It may even start before the insurgents are defeated.

SOURCES

AIN, “Sadr orders to hold accountable anyone who attacks the headquarters or public and private property,” 6/11/16

- “Saraya Jihad: The assault on the headquarters of the Mujahideen will not deter their resolve to fight terrorism,” 6/9/16

- “Urgent Sadr refuses to encroach upon the headquarters of political parties and emphasizes peaceful demonstrations,” 6/10/16

Face Iraq, “Hadi al-Amiri orders to deal with aggressors on the Badr Organization headquarters Calls them Baathists and Daash,” 6/10/16

Al Forat, “Injuring three demonstrators during protest outside Dawa Party headquarters in Najaf,” 6/9/16

Hameed, Saif and Mohammed, Aref, “Iraqi cleric Sadr asks followers to stop attacks on rivals’ offices,” Reuters, 6/11/16

Iraq News Network, “Abadi: the headquarters of the Dawa Party, a red line,” 6/10/16

Iraq Times, “Ameri warns followers of Muqtada al-Sadr to not assault the headquarters of his organization and describes them as Baathists and Daash,” 6/9/16

- “Citizens Coalition Moqtada and his followers want to ignite a Shiite-Shiite war,” 6/9/16

- “Al-Maliki: Muqtada’s attacks on the headquarters of political parties reminiscent of the Republican Guard and Fedayeen Saddam,” 6/9/16

Al Mada, “Closing party offices puts Sayid in a confrontation with the National Alliance parties,” 6/11/16

NINA, “Angry demonstrators closed the Dawa Party Offices in Babylon,” 6/10/16

- “Sadrists demonstrators attacking the Dawa party’s headquarters in Najaf,” 6/10/16

Shafaq News, “Iraq’s Sadr warns of ‘million-man’ demo after Ramadan pause,” 6/12/16

Iraq’s Parliament Confirms Some Of Abadi’s New Cabinet

The deadlock in parliament between opponents and supporters of Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was temporarily overcome when lawmakers were able to create a quorum and vote on a partial list of the premier’s new cabinet. On April 26, 170-180 members of parliament met, confirmed that Salim Jabouri was still the speaker, and approved five new ministers submitted by Abadi. Those were Ali Ghani al-Mubarak for Health, Hassan al-Janabi for Water, Wafa Jaffar al-Mahadawi for Labor, Abdul Razaq Al-Aysa for Higher Education, and Ali Dishar for Electricity. Over one hundred MPs had been conducting a sit in, and voted out Jabouri earlier, but the Speaker has claimed that was illegal. They tried to disrupt the session shouting and throwing water bottles, which was led by members of former Premier Nouri al-Maliki’s wing of State of Law. They were successful in driving the other lawmakers out of the main parliament room into an alternate location, but they could not stop the proceedings. There was talk about the opposition lawmakers trying to form a permanent block, and they were also going to court over legality of the session. The fact that they were not able to stop the vote however was a major defeat for them after they had been able to disrupt the government for several days. As for the rest of the new cabinet there are still talks going on amongst the ruling parties, and disagreements. On the other hand, Moqtada al-Sadr called off his demonstrations outside the Green Zone with a spokesman saying that the vote on the ministers was a positive first step, but more was needed.

Abadi’s changes have threatened the entire political system in Iraq. As Mustafa Habib pointed out in Niqash, Abadi’s proposal for new ministers has caused all kinds of splits within the government, especially amongst the Shiite parties. State of Law was divided between pro-Badi and pro-Maliki factions, and Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme Council’s Mutawin came down on different sides of the vote against Speaker Jabouri even though they were in an alliance beforehand. More importantly, the premier’s suggestion of a technocratic set of ministers threatens not only the quotas that determine who gets what public offices, but the elites’ control over the government. The ministries are the main way the parties rule by doling out patronage and stealing from the public coffers to enrich themselves. The new cabinet would be loyal to Abadi instead of the lists, which would dramatically change the power dynamic in Baghdad. It was quite an accomplishment then to get five ministers approved, although the way talks are progressing other cabinet members maybe partisan in order to get approved.

SOURCES

AIN, “Deputy of the session: Maliki wing stirred chaos to prevent the passing of ministerial cabinet,” 4/26/16

- “Fatlawi Sayadi squatting and throwing bottles of water to disrupt the cabinet reshuffle,” 4/26/16

- “Urgent Jabouri threatening legal action against the deputies that violated the majority rules of procedure,” 4/26/16

Habib, Mustafa, “Chaos in Baghdad: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly Reasons Why Real political Reform Is Impossible In Iraq,” Niqash, 4/21/16

Iraq News Network, “Parliament sit-ins offer an appeal to the Federal Court for Parliament’s session yesterday,” 4/27/16

Iraq Oil Report, “UPDATE: Chaotic Parliament confirms five new ministers,” 4/26/16

Al Mada, “Abadi flirts with coalition with Allawi to pass his plans for list of ministries,” 4/22/16

- “House sit-ins resort to reference after the withdrawal of some of their colleagues following threats by the blocs,” 4/17/16

- “Parliament ends session and votes on closed envelope ministers .. And Abadi promises more changes in two days,” 4/26/16

Morris, Loveday and Salim, Mustafa, “Thousands of protesters threaten to storm Iraq’s parliament,” Washington Post, 4/26/16

National Iraqi News Agency, “A Parliamentary Source: Some MPs Tried To Attack Abadi When Attending To Parliament,” 4/26/16

New Sabah, “Opposition front forming in parliament with about 120 deputies to change the performance of the legislature,” 4/27/16

A Review Of Iraq Premier Abadi’s Reform Program, Interview With Reidar Visser

Starting in August 2015 Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider Abadi began announcing a series of reforms to meet the demands of the street, which was full of demonstrators. He gained the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that gave him added standing to move forward with his program. Now he finds himself attacked on all sides by his political opponents that are rejecting any change and the protesters and other parties who don’t think the premier has gone far enough. To help explain PM Abadi’s position is Norwegian Iraq analyst and historian Reidar Visser who runs the blog Iraq and Gulf Analysis and is the author and co-author of Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq, An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? and A Responsible End?: The United States and The Iraqi Transition, 2005-2010. He can be followed on Twitter @reidarvisser.

Iraq’s Politics And Its Discontents An Interview With Col. Joel Rayburn

Post-2003 Iraq has been known for its deep divisions. In his book Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance Col. Joel Rayburn tried to describe the different groups that have been struggling for power in the country through both participating in the government and violently trying to overthrow it. Rayburn worked in Iraq as an intelligence officer before going on to becoming a senior military fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Hoover Institution Working Group on Islamism and the International Order. He can be followed on Twitter @joel_rayburn. Below is an interview with Rayburn where he explains what he termed authoritarianism, sectarianism, maximalism, and resistance in Iraq.

Ayatollah Sistani’s Role In Post-Saddam Iraq Interview With Fadel Reda Al-Kifaee

 

(LA Times)

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. Although he comes from what is known as the quietist school of thought that is supposed to mean staying out of politics he played an active role in shaping the post-Saddam government in the early years of the U.S. occupation. Since then he has not been so publicly involved in affairs, but he did try to quell the violence during the civil war, and today has become a critic of the poor governance in the country. To help explain the Ayatollah’s role in Iraqi society since 2003 is Fadel Reda al-Kifaee a senior adviser at Management Systems International who has extensively studied the Hawza, the Shiite religious establishment.

1. Ayatollah Sistani was a vocal critic of the U.S. occupation under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Paul Bremer came into the country with his own vision of how he wanted the new Iraq to develop that included a two-year transition to put together a constitution, develop democratic principals amongst the society, and then eventually hold elections for a new government. What problems did Sistani have with Bremer’s plans, and who won this battle of wills?

I think the main concern on the part of Ayatollah Sistani regarding the CPA's approach was the Islamic identity of the Iraqi people. The Ayatollah feared Americans would engineer the constitution in such a way that fixed the western style of liberal freedoms. I think he also feared that the CPA would ignore, or marginalize, the role of Islam in the judiciary and legislation. Ayatollah Sistani was sure that the Shi'a would revive even with the CPA's original plans realized. Sistani also seemed to worry about the American presence in Iraq. He may have feared that having a political process based on the American roadmap would produce governments that legitimized a long military presence, which in turn was likely to compromise the social identity of Iraq.

It seemed that both sides, the CPA and the supreme Marji', ended up with a deal that secured, or so they thought, their respective minimum level of demands. The result constitution’s Article 2 states that, "Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source of legislation," and it prohibits enacting laws that violate one of Islam's pillars. At the same time, it mentions that no law is passed if it violates democratic principles or the rights and freedoms mentioned in the constitution. In the same article, it comes back to emphasize that "the constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people…". No doubt that Sistani won the battle over having a direct-elected constitutional assembly, but it turned out that it was a battle within a war of wills.

2. After the CPA seemed to give in to Sistani’s demands it went ahead and drafted the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that acted as the constitution until a new one was drafted by the Iraqis. Why do you think the Americans went ahead with this move, and what was the Ayatollah’s reaction?

The TAL represented the CPA's counter attack to Sistani's moves, if we continued calling it a war. Bremer made use of his relations with Iraqi politicians, including the Shi'a, in his Iraqi Governing Council in passing this dangerous legal document. The Americans were trying to make sure that they would end up with a constitution that led to a 'liberal state' that didn’t threaten its neighbors even if that came at the expense of its internal cohesion. The Americans also feared that Sistani would urge his followers to ask for a sort of religious constitution, one that didn’t embrace the Iranian style of vilayat al-faqih but granted the religious establishment a considerable role over state institutions.

Sistani immediately realized that the TAL was formulated to be a blueprint for the permanent constitution. His stance over this move was one of his most powerful positions. In addition to issuing many communiqués condemning the TAL, the Ayatollah warned the Security Council not to mention the TAL in its then prospective resolution on Iraq and the council respected Sistani's will. Sistani's main objection was that the TAL would threaten Iraq's unity by promoting sectarian politics and racist divisions.

A man kisses a Jan. 2005 election poster featuring the image of Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf (AP)

3. Iraq held two elections in 2005. The first was to put together a temporary parliament that would draft a new constitution, and the second was to create a permanent government. Sistani was largely responsible for putting together the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which was made up of the largest Shiite Islamist parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Dawa Party, the Fadhila Party, some Sadrists, and others. In turn, the UIA used Sistani’s image in its campaigning. What was the Ayatollah’s thinking behind putting together this list?

Formulating the UIA seemed controversial considering the Ayatollah's anti-sectarian methodology. I think Ayatollah Sistani was mainly trying to have a major block in the constitutional assembly that would be able to embed the principles Sistani had long advocated, some of which were mentioned above, in the permanent constitution as well as preventing the attempts of transferring some of the TAL's articles into the constitution. What happened after winning the election was that Sistani seemed to lose control over the leadership of the UIA. Although the UIA's leaders pressed and managed to include some of Sistani's major demands in the constitution, they began acting independently in many political fronts. Their control over the state's resources after forming the government led by Ibrahim al-Ja'afari made them feel confident to the extent that they built the second UIA, formed prior to the December 2005 elections, basically without consulting the supreme Marji' ! Eventually, some controversial articles of the TAL were copied to the constitution; for instance, the condition that the constitution could be vetoed once three provinces voted against it, a matter, which Sistani openly opposed.

The apparent outcome of formulating the UIA was avoiding the dispersal of Iraqi Shi'as' votes by the one list-one constituency electoral system that helped the Shi'i political parties consolidating power inside the first elected parliament. If this was what Ayatollah Sistani envisaged, then this would be a contradiction to his many fatwas that called for a government based on a political majority rather than a sectarian one. I think the main goal on the part of Sistani on the UIA matter was to draft a constitution away from the TAL and the American influence.

Another factor may have been trying to help these Shi'i parties to sit together and practice dialogue because Sistani sensed the high level of hostility among some of them, one that might have risked the security of holy Shi'a cities and that was what happened latter on in some occasions.

By formulating the UIA, I don't think Ayatollah Sistani was planning to have those Shi'ite Islamist parties permanently ruling the country for a simple reason; those parties believed in versions of vilayat al-faqih, and that methodologically contradicted the school of thought of Sistani.

4. Sistani’s role in putting together the constitution and Iraqi government brought up questions about what his position was towards democracy. Did he just want elections so that Shiite Islamists could come to power, did he believe in some kind of compromise between Islam and constitutional rule, etc. What are your thoughts on Sistani’s views?

Although the Grand Ayatolah avoids directly announcing his stance towards democracy, I can say that he at least believes that the people should be a source of political legitimacy. The tone of his fatwas and statements dealing with elections and related issues uncovers a methodological tendency rather than mere pragmatic tactics to help Shi'ite Islamists winning. Ayatollah Sistani went further than many other Shiite Ulama in this regard as he frequently emphasized that parliament whether being a constitutional assembly or not must be directly elected by the people underscoring the issue of representativeness. In short, he not only accepts but also adopts democracy. At the same time, he makes sure that the religious authority has the right to dictate a democracy's outcomes should this process produce something the marji' believes threatens the Islamic social identity or the well being of society. The subject marji' should use his social powers to practice this dictation.

5. In 2006 the Shiite shrine in Samarra was bombed and Iraq moved towards full-scale civil war. What was Sistani’s response, and was he able to stem the violence at all?

The Ayatollah’s response was issuing a statement asking believers to peacefully protest the action asking not to involve in any retaliatory reactions. This fatwa and all the meetings the Supreme Marji' had with various political and social players was not enough to prevent the violence. It seems that all Sistani's efforts to stem the anger of Shi'a during the 2004-2005 escalating violence were gone with the wind. One important factor was the role of the Sadrist militia. Without this role, I think the country wouldn't have gone to full-scale civil war. The issue was that Moqtada al-Sadr's followers didn’t emulate Sistani and so were not religiously bound by his fatwas.

6. You mentioned how Sistani has had a mixed relationship with the Shiite religious parties that took power after 2005. Moqtada al-Sadr for example has fluctuated between trying to usurp Sistani’s position, sometimes through violence, while relying upon the Ayatollah to save him from crises like the August 2004 uprising and Premier Maliki’s 2008 Charge of the Knights offensive against the Mahdi Army. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq claimed Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei as their spiritual leaders, but then claimed they switched to Sistani. The Dawa Party on the other hand, has consulted with Sistani, but do not claim to emulate him. In recent years, Sistani’s representatives have issued a steady stream of criticisms of the ruling parties in Baghdad about the lack of services, the deadlock in parliament, etc., and he has refused to meet with politicians. Why hasn’t he been more influential over these parties that he helped put into office?

The relationship with the Da'wa Party has been relatively impacted by historic complications. The traditional current in Hawza has been basically against having clerics involved in politics. There is also the fact that the Hawza's clerics have felt uncomfortable towards persons with western style outfits let alone having those same gentlemen specialize in Shari'a. The early leadership of the Da'wa was composed of both kinds of men; clerics involved in politics and suited men educated in Islamic jurisprudence. However, Ayatollah Sistani positively interacted with Da'wa leaders after they came back from exile as part of his openness to the exile opposition.

Sistani has been known to have a warm relationship with the Al-Hakim family, which introduced prestigious religious figures to the community of Hawza. The late Ayatollah Mohamed-Baqir al-Hakim, who led the ISCI since 1982 until his death in a bombing in Najaf in 2004, made use of this relationship and so did his brother Sayed Abdul-Aziz who succeeded him at the top of the ISCI.

Regarding the Sadrist Current, there has been clear alienation between them and the Grand Ayatollah. This current represents a Shiite social class of mostly poor and uneducated persons who feel they are discriminated against by other Shi'a especially the traditional Hawza.

Away from the Sadrists, the relationship between Sistani and both ISCI and Da'wa has gone through many phases. The constitutional phase that lasted from 2003 to late 2005 witnessed relatively positive interactions. As shown above, Sistani helped those parties rise to power aiming at influencing the process of drafting the constitution. Since 2010 this relationship has been damaged with the Grand Ayatollah refusing to host leaders of those parties at his office. Sistani sounds fed up with the leadership of these parties, which has begun to openly disobey his guidance. The Ayatollah also may feel that they let him down for what the country ended up with in terms of corruption, public services, and security.

In 2012 there was talk that Iran was promoting Ayatollah Shahroudi as Sistani’s replacement (Reuters)

7. In 2012 there was a tidal wave of articles about Iran trying to find a successor to Sistani, specifically with Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi. Was there any basis for these reports, and overall what role will Tehran play in determining who becomes the head cleric after Sistani passes?

I acknowledge that promoting Shahroudi to Marji'iya (the Hawza's supreme leadership) is implausible, in the foreseen future at least, considering the well-established doctrine of quietism in Najaf. The move of opening an office for Shahroudi in Najaf came as a part of integrated, well-organized efforts to influence the Hawza. The Iranians seemed to have long-term plans in Najaf. They are building socio-religious networks in mid and southern Iraq in general and in Najaf in particular, a matter that they envisage using at a later stage to influence the process of having a new supreme marji' in Najaf. Such a process is too unofficial in Shi'ism and so the post-Sistani era will witness a transition in which no clear candidate will rise to the supremacy. Tehran will use its networks of institutions, students, teachers and scholars at the Hawza to promote publicity their desired candidate. The effectiveness of such efforts will partly depend on whether the camp of the traditional Hawza of Najaf has formed a consensus over whom to succeed Sistani.

8. The conventional wisdom about Ayatollah Sistani is that he comes from the quietest school of Shiite clerics as opposed to the activists such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, and Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who believed in some form of direct clerical rule over society. There are all kinds of interpretations of Sistani’s stance towards politics ranging from the quietist school doesn’t mean complete absence from social affairs, to the Ayatollah having his own form of activism or that he has developed a middle road between the two. What’s your theory on Sistani’s stance towards involvement in politics?

In a previous publication I called Ayatollah Sistani a 'neo-quietist' marji''. I know these classifications may be confusing, but they are generally valid. Sistani still adheres to the mainstream of quietism; having clerics abstaining from directly involving in politics unless a sociopolitical threat emerges. Meantime, the development Ayatollah has brought in to quietism has been in two integrated aspects; one is political and the other is social. Political wise, the Ayatollah advocates a principle according to which the religious establishment must act as the guardian of the society's Islamic identity. What he differs in from those Shiite constitutional clerics (Na'ini and clerics of Iran's 1906 constitutional revolution) and others is that he believes that the marji' must practice this guardianship using his social powers within the community of believers and must practice that from outside the government's apparatus. The ulama that supported the 1906 revolt in Iran demanded having a quota for clerics in parliament mandated to observe the accordance of laws with Shari'a. In short, Sistani accepts democracy but with having an uncodified veto over its outcomes in exceptional occasions.

In the social dimension of Sistani's neo-quietism, I think the Grand Ayatollah is in favor of a principle in which the Islamic authority, the supreme marji' in Shi'ism, must have the society's 'authorization' to intervene to impose a social, or political, measure. By authorization I mean the readiness of the subject society to socially and politically accept this measure.  I think that this approach on the part of Sistani is in accordance with his approach that a reform must be a bottom-up process that starts from society. The Ayatollah is a strong opponent of the Khomainian style of imposing Islamic virtues by state forces because according to the quietist doctrine the government has no legitimacy to impose Islamic measures in the age of occultation (Shi'as call the current age as the time of the hidden Imam).

These two political and social aspects are integrated. Sistani encourages civil society to facilitate government reforms. The Ayatollah supports competent civil society organizations that try to be a partner in the public policy making process through communicating with policy makers and encouraging them to meet the real needs of citizens as the Grand Ayatollah sees them. These organizations are well-funded and employ prominent figures.

In the long run, Grand Ayatollah Sistani seems to be preparing society in a way that would make the outputs of democracy in accordance with Islam's core values and so the incidents of religious intervention in politics would be considerably minimized. This future condition would eliminate, if realized, the pretexts that a society needs the vilayat al-faqih system to preserve its Islamic identity.

SOURCES

Arango, Tim, “Iran Presses for Official to Be Next Leader of Shiites,” New York Times, 5/11/12

Baram, Amatzia, “The Iraqi Shi’i Community: Between Sistani, Muqtada, the IGC, and the CPA, Testimony by Amatzia Baram, senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee,” United Sates Institute for Peace, 4/21/04

Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,” 2/7/08

Al-Khoei, Hayder, “why iran-sponsored cleric can’t become iraq’s next religious leader,” Niqash, 6/28/12

Al-Kifaee, Fadel Reda, “The Role of the Hawza of Najaf and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Restructuring the Iraqi Governance System in Post-Ba’athist Iraq,” Masters Thesis American University of Cairo, May 2010

McGeough, Paul, “Speculation grows Iranian cleric may lead Iraq’s Shiites,” Newcastle Herald, 4/28/12

- “The Struggle to Succeed Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani,” Foreign Affairs, 5/23/12

Rizvi, Sajjad, “Political mobilization and the Shi’i religious establishment (marja’iyya),” International Affairs, November 2010

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Could Sistani Be Iraq’s Last Hope?” Al-Monitor, 5/2/13