Iraq’s Parliamentary Elections Set For May 12, 2018

There was some debate about whether Iraq would hold its next national elections on time. Some Sunni parties wanted a delay. A Federal Court decision sealed the deal and voting will happen as planned on May 12, 2018. The alliances were set beforehand, although there were several attempts at moves after the fact. Prime Minister Haidar Abadi heads into the vote with the upper hand, but there are always twists and turns in Iraqi politics.

Alliances Announced For Iraq’s 2018 Elections

Iraq’s Election Commission announced that January 11 was the deadline to register alliances for the 2018 balloting. As usual, there were several new coalitions, largely based upon the latest rivalries.

Iraq Fires Its Defense Minister

In August 2016 Iraq’s Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi was dismissed by parliament. Nouri al-Maliki’s faction of State of Law had been trying to get rid of him for almost a year to undermine Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, but never had the votes to do it. That changed when at the start of the month Obeidi attacked the Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri and several other parliamentarians over corrupt defense deals. Obeidi’s move backfired and created enough opposition to ensure his removal.

The Defense Minister’s problems started when he was called before parliament on August 1, 2016. Obeidi was to answer questions about corrupt deals at his ministry, but instead went on the attack and accused Speaker Salim al-Jabouri, Mohammed Karbuli, the head of the Solution bloc, and others of being involved in crooked deals for military equipment. To back up his accusations Obeidi went to the anti-corruption Integrity Commission on August 4. He was then hit with a lawsuit by Jabouri for slandering his name. In near record time, the Federal Court acquitted Jabouri of any charges on August 9, claiming there was a lack of evidence against him. There was more bad news for Obeidi when on August 24 the Supreme Judicial Council said that it closed the investigation of corruption charges made by the Defense Minister. Obeidi’s accusations made headlines throughout the Iraqi and international press. Many Iraqis’ praised his stance claiming that he was a hero against the corrupt ruling class even though he had been brought in before the legislature to answer questions about illegality going on under him. It didn’t appear he had much to back up his claims though as two courts found he didn’t have any hard facts. His attacks also turned Speaker Jabouri and his Iraqi Islamic Party against the Defense Minister, which would come back on Obeidi.

Events moved quickly and on August 25 parliament held a no confidence vote removing Obeidi from his post. 142 MPs were for removing Obeidi versus 102 against, with the rest abstaining. The move against the Defense Minister was led by Nouri al-Maliki and the anti-Abadi Reform bloc that he is part of. That grouping also includes Iyad Allawi’s Nationalist Coalition, and some Kurdish MPs. Maliki’s faction had been trying to oust Obeidi since 2015 to weaken the prime minister, but was unable to gather enough backing. The Defense Minister accusing Jabouri and Karbuli meant that the Islamic Party and Solution Bloc provided the numbers necessary to remove Obeidi. On the other hand, Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar, and Ammar Hakim’s Muwatin were all for retaining the minister. Nujafi and Jabouri have become bitter rivals with the former trying to remove the speaker from office. Sadr and Hakim didn’t want to back any move made by Maliki that might aid his plans to return to power. Those two walked out of parliament on August 23 to block the first attempt to hold the no confidence vote against Obeidi. If the Defense Minister had not gone after Speaker Jabouri he would probably still have his job. Most ministers when appearing before parliament either don’t show up or don’t give any substantive responses, especially when they get accused of corruption. Instead, Obeidi chose to go on the offensive against some of his critics. That backfired. First, Jabouri and company could have very well been involved in all the corrupt deals Obeidi accused them of, but the minister couldn’t get any traction against them in the courts. Second, Maliki had been trying to get rid of Obeidi for almost a year, but got nowhere. Now that the minister had angered the speaker though, he threw his weight behind the no confidence vote and Obeidi was out.

SOURCES

Adnan, Sinan, “Iraq’s Prime Minister comes under Attack by Political Rivals,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/28/15

Agence France Presse, “Iraq judiciary drops corruption case against speaker,” 8/9/16

- “Iraq minister accuses parliament speaker of corruption,” 8/1/16

- “Iraq prosecutor files complaint against graft accused,” 8/3/16

Buratha News, “Judiciary challenged the defense minister and the head of the Integrity Commission on the issue of Jabouri,” 8/24/16

Iraq News Network, “Obeidi: Salim al-Jabouri demanded role in arms deals and Haider Mulla asked me for two million dollars,” 8/1/16

Al Mada, “Deal within the Coalition Forces to speed up dropping charges against al-Jabouri and lifting his immunity,” 8/9/16

- “Jabouri included withdrawal of confidence from al-Obeidi to next

Tuesday’s agenda,” 8/15/16

- “Obeidi turned the table on his interrogation and made embarrassing accusations against the Speaker of Parliament,” 8/3/16

- “Obeidi’s fate hung in parliament session..Jubouri faces a campaign for his dismissal with 100 signatures,” 8/8/16

- “Parliament postpones vote on the withdrawal of confidence from al-Obeidi to Thursday,” 8/23/16

Mamouri, Ali, “Iraq’s political leaders on quicksand as alliances fracture,” Al Monitor, 8/12/16

Martin, Patrick, “Iraq’s Parliament Ousts Defense Minister,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/25/16

Morris, Loveday, “Iraqi parliament ousts defense minister as Mosul operation looms,” Washington Post, 8/25/16

New Sabah, “Abadi: I was against the interrogation of al-Obeidi at the current time because of the security situation,” 8/5/16

- “Mutahidun declares that it will appeal the dismissal of Defense Minister,” 8/26/16

NINA, “Al-Fatlawi clarified her position on the accusations of the Defense Minister in the parliament session today,” 8/1/16

Rudaw, “Iraqi defense minister accuses parliament speaker of corruption,” 8/1/16

Sotaliraq, “Alloizi: the dismissal of al-Obeidi a kind of regulatory recovery of Parliament,” 8/25/16

- “Corruption charges triggered by Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi in the House of Representatives,” 8/1/16

Political Re-Alignment In Iraq

Iraq is currently facing deep ceded political divisions. Old alliances are being torn apart, while long-time rivalries are coming to the fore again. This is happening within all three major alliances amongst the Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. This will lead to increased instability and political stalemate until the parties re-align themselves into new coalitions.

The Kurdish parties used to have a rough consensus and acted as a unified bloc in Baghdad, but that is now breaking down. For years the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) divided up the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and positions in Baghdad between them. Then in 2009 the emergence of Gorran (Change), which broke away from the PUK promoting a reformist agenda, disrupted that power sharing. That year Gorran would come in second in Kurdish elections behind the KDP. This obviously caused huge problems for the PUK, but it and the KDP eventually attempted to co-opt Gorran into the Kurdish administration. That in turn broke down in 2015 when President Massoud Barzani’s term as Kurdish president expired. He had already been extended in office once before, but this time Gorran wanted changes in the KRG political system in return for Barzani to stay in power. That set off a huge political dispute topped off by the KDP removing Gorran’s ministers from the KRG and refusing the speaker of parliament, a Gorran member from entering Irbil in October 2015. The KDP took over all of Gorran’s positions and the Kurdish parliament has not met since then. Eventually that brought the PUK and Gorran back together in a recently agreed upon alliance to oppose Barzani who they accuse of acting unilaterally on major decisions such as independence, and portraying himself as the only Kurdish leader. Barzani has also written off cooperation with the central government because he does not believe it ever follows through with any of its agreements with the KRG. The PUK and Gorran however are more open to accommodation with Baghdad marking the possible end of the Kurds united front in the capital. This crisis has left Kurdistan with no parliament, and an illegal presidency.

Iraq’s Sunnis have always been divided, but they are even more so now. In 2010 they coalesced around Iraqiya and Iyad Allawi and came in first in national elections that year. They were quickly torn apart by the maneuverings of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Today all of those coalition members are acting independently of each other. The Nujafi brothers’ Mutahidun are pushing Sunni federalism and victimization at the hands of the government’s forces. Allawi’s new Wataniya is part of the reform bloc in parliament that includes some Kurdish parliamentarians and ironically Maliki’s followers who together are trying to undermine Prime Minister Haidar Abadi. The Iraqi Islamic Party on the other hand has thrown in its lot with the premier thinking that aligning with the central government is the only way to gain concessions. Other leaders like Salah al-Mutlaq are still around, but with much less influence than they once had. This means Sunnis remain leaderless and still carry out contradictory policies towards Baghdad.

Finally, the Shiite parties are coming apart and facing future challenges as well. The election of Abadi split the Dawa Party in two between his faction and that of Nouri al-Maliki. The latter is constantly attempting to undermine the prime minister and has aligned himself with Iran and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and others to plot his comeback. Moqtada al-Sadr attempted to strong arm Abadi and the entire political class to follow his lead by threatening them with mob rule if they didn’t listen when his movement co-opted the anti-corruption, pro-services protest movement and took over the Green Zone twice. Not only was no one willing to listen to Sadr, but it blew up parliament as a result, which did not meet for several months afterward. Sadr also stands opposed to Maliki’s return and his allies, many of which broke away from the Sadr movement. They all have a long history of not only competing for votes amongst the same constituency but armed confrontations as well. That’s only likely to increase as many of those Hashd groups want to turn their prowess on the battlefield against the Islamic State and the high esteem they have amongst the Shiite community into political power in the next round of elections. Ammar Hakim and his Supreme Council at one time threw their lot behind Abadi, but then became frustrated by his announcing major decisions like merging ministries and appointing technocrats without consulting with them. They along with Sadr are also worried about their potential loss at the ballot box to the Hashd. The Shiite parties were never a monolithic force, and these differences existed for years. However, they often came together on major issues. Now they are all competing with each other. Not only that, but there is growing fear that these arguments could lead to political violence as happened before between Sadr and Badr and the Sadrists and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq.

This period of political upheaval came be traced back to two events, the concentration of power amongst Iraq’s leaders and the return of the Islamic State. First, when Maliki was premier he played divide and conquer and split the Sunni alliance behind Iraqiya, and they have never recovered since then. That’s actually not new as they were not that unified beforehand. Second, Maliki went after so many of his rivals amongst all the political factions that he ended up splitting his own Dawa party. His removal from power opened the door for the other leaders such as Sadr to make a play for leadership. Third, the war with IS has led to political aspirations amongst factions of the Hashd that threaten the established Shiite parties. Finally, Barzani’s unwillingness to make any concessions over his maintenance of the Kurdish presidency has brought the rival PUK and Gorran together to oppose him. All of these struggles along with the threat of future violence puts Iraqi politics in a dangerous place. There will likely be a long period of instability in both Baghdad and Irbil until the elite work out new alliances. That will make Iraqi politics even more fractious and dysfunctional than it already was.

SOURCES

Hassan, Hayman, “To Baghdad, Or Not To Baghdad? Bad Relationship With Central Govt. Threatens To Split Iraqi Kurdistan,” Niqash, 7/7/16

Al Mada, “Secret meetings to form new alliances to isolate the Sadrists and end the paralysis in parliament and the government,” 5/7/16

Rudaw, “Calls for resignation of parliament speaker still strong, Iraqi MP says,” 7/13/16

Salih, Mohammed, “How new alliance among Iraq’s Kurds might actually deepen divisions,” Al Monitor, 7/5/16

Sowell, Kirk, “Iraq’s Fake Populism and Anti-sectarianism,” Sada, 6/9/16

Complaints About Iraq PM Abadi Undermine His Cabinet Reshuffle

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi finally presented his new cabinet of technocrats to parliament. It now has a little over a week to discuss the nominees. The whole process to come up with the ministers has been fraught with problems with the majority of the ruling parties opposing Abadi’s plans. The main problem is that Abadi’s cabinet threatens the ruling parties hold on the government. What has made the situation worse is Abadi’s unwillingness to consult with others and to present a clear plan. The premier is already facing a difficult situation, and his alienating the other lists is only making the situation worse.

On March 31, 2016 a list was presented of Premier Abadi’s nominees for his new cabinet. That led Moqtada al-Sadr to call off his protests at Baghdad’s Green Zone, which had annoyed the prime minister, but it created more problems in the process. First, the nominee for Oil Minister Nizar Salim withdrew his candidacy claiming there was no agreement amongst the ruling blocs over the new cabinet. Salim was correct. Sadr is the only national leader who seemed to agree with Abadi’s move. It was reported that the Sadrists, the Supreme Council and Dawa Iraq Organization were the only ones to submit candidates to Abadi. All the others refused to go along with the move. First, the Kurdish Alliance complained that Abadi never explained how their ministers had failed, why they should be replaced, that the nominees don’t represent the political parties, and that the prime minister was ignoring the right of the Kurd to choose their own representatives. In turn, they claimed they would not vote on the new minister in parliament. The Solution List, which is part of the Sunni alliance, said that the cabinet was a way to exclude some parties from power. Beforehand, Iyad Allawi and Mutahidun stated that they would not give up their ministries. The Supreme Council countered Abadi’s reforms by saying that if the government were to be technocratic and non-partisan than Abadi should resign as well. Needless to say, Abadi’s program has angered almost everyone. The ministries are how the ruling parties control the government. Each one is run like a private fiefdom, and allows the parties to hand out patronage via jobs and steal via corrupt contracts. It would be expected that if the technocrats were to be approved they would move to get rid of all the political hacks that occupy the director generals, the managers, etc. That is a major threat, which none of the parties are willing to agree to as of now.

What has made the whole process worse for the prime minister is his apparent inability or unwillingness to consult with others. Since Abadi first started talking about reforms last year, he has never offered a clear or coherent program. It was a surprise to all when he first came out with his proposals. Since then the complaints have mounted into a chorus. Members from within his own Dawa and State of Law wanted him to talk to them before making major decisions, but he didn’t. Abadi’s two main allies, the Supreme Council’s Ammar Hakim and Moqtada al-Sadr have repeatedly made similar statements. The National Alliance, which all those parties belong to said that it would not follow Abadi’s program if they didn’t know about the details. Members of the Kurdish Alliance have told the press that Abadi’s plan has never been made clear to them. Finally, Allawi’s bloc complained about the lack of transparency in Abadi’s decisions. There is no way the premier can be successful unless he builds consensus. None exists right now. A major reason why so many parties turned on Maliki was that he only talked with his small core of advisers when making policy. Abadi, who was supposed to be the anti-Maliki, and came in talking about repairing relations with the other parties, has instead followed in his predecessor’s footsteps. That makes a successful transition with the cabinet all the more difficult.

SOURCES

AIN, “Solution: afraid new technocratic government is an attempt exclude,” 4/1/16

International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Conflict Alert,” 8/24/15

Kazimi, Nibras, “What is happening in Iraq?” Talisman Gate, Again, 10/29/15

Al Mada, “Abadi staggering to present his cabinet to parliament for fear of his government being overthrown,” 3/26/16

- “Citizen and Kurdish MPs criticize ambiguity of Ministerial Committee,” 3/27/16

- “”Commander of necessity” and not cooperating with the quartet raise the wrath of State of Law against the Prime Minister,” 10/28/15

- “Kurds and Sunnis are waiting for clarification of the Prime Minister: We reject the removal of our ministers without justification,” 3/30/16

- “Large blocs reluctant..and small ones send their candidates to the ministerial committee,” 3/24/16

- “The new government is in a closed envelop until next week pending parliamentary vote,” 4/1/16

- “Sayadi: 45 deputies from the State of Law withdraw authority from Abadi,” 10/28/15

- “Shiite parties leave presidencies commission … the Kurds and Sunnis hold the balance,” 3/24/16

Mamouri, Ali, “Will Abadi put his money where his mouth is?” Al Monitor, 3/1/16

Mardini, Ramzy, “No Authority: Shiite Minimization in a Fragmented Iraq,” World Politics Review, 12/8/15

Martin, Patrick with Anagnostos, Emily, Bessette, Rachel and Werman, Hannah, “Warning: Iraq’s Shi’a Parties Split Over Cabinet Reshuffle Amidst Protests,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/25/16

New Sabah, “Abadi identifies two paths of reform and choice of ministers reached an advanced stage,” 2/29/16

- “Kurdistan objects to Abadi’s list and calls on the government to obtain its representation,” 4/1/16

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Premier To Elevate Technocrats, Demote Politicos In Cabinet,” 2/10/16

Rasheed, Ahmed, “Iraq’s coalition members press PM to consult before ordering reforms,” Reuters, 10/28/15

Rudaw, “Kurdish ministerial nominee withdraws from new Iraqi cabinet,” 4/1/16

Sotaliraq, “Kurds threaten to withdraw from the government, will not vote on any candidate in the new cabinet,” 4/2/16

Xinhua, “Iraqi parliament says Abadi’s reforms should comply with constitution,” 11/2/15

Passing Of Iraq’s Sunni Old Guard Politicians? Interview With Inside Iraqi Politics’ Kirk Sowell

The post-Saddam generation of Sunni politicians in Iraq have faced one setback after another. Their latest is the loss of power as many of the top leaders have either been dismissed or run out of office on criminal charges such as Tariq Hashemi, Osama and Atheel Nujafi, Rafi Issawi and Salah al-Mutlaq. Does this constitute a sea change in Iraqi politics or will the old guard hold onto power in the next round of elections? To help shed light on this subject is Kirk Sowell editor of Inside Iraqi Politics. He can followed on Twitter at @UticaRisk.

Ninewa’s Governor Nujafi Dismissed By Iraq’s Parliament

Ninewa’s Governor Atheel Nujafi was dismissed from office at the end of May 2015. Parliament voted him out using the provincial powers law over a number of issues including his recent trip to the United States, corruption, and alleged ties to the insurgency. Nujafi first came into office in 2009 when his al-Hadbaa party swept into power. Since then he has steadily lost support topped off by him having to flee Mosul in the face of the Islamic State’s 2014 onslaught. His fall from grave was due to his unpopular policies, opposition to Prime Minister Haider Abadi, and a declining base.

On May 28, 2015 the Iraqi parliament voted to dismiss Ninewa Governor Atheel Nujafi. That was approved by Prime Minister Haider Abadi who originally requested the move. The premier’s office gave several reasons why Nujafi was voted out. That included corruption charges, visiting the United States without telling the provincial council, telling the council to cut ties with Baghdad, threatening council members who did not agree with him, sectarian comments to the media, and advocating working with the insurgency. Nujafi’s main foreign patron Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan talked with Speaker of Parliament Salim Jabouri and Vice President Osama Nujafi, while the governor responded by saying that he would not give up his post until he got an official letter announcing his removal. He added that State of Law plotted against him because he would not agree to allow the Hashd al-Shaabi join the plan to free Mosul, but also mentioned his trip to the United States was also a cause. Nujafi was right, it was Prime Minister Abadi from State of Law that pushed his dismissal, and his visit to America did play a major role along with other issues.

Governor Nujafi’s policies were the main reason for his fall. Earlier in May he went to Washington D.C. where he advocated for turning Ninewa into a region, and that the United States should directly arm Sunnis in the provinces. Back in Baghdad Atheel along with his brother Osama have been using their Mutahidun party to block passage of the National Guard and Accountability and Justice bills. On the former Mutahidun wants the new forces to be under local control rather than the prime minister and on the latter they claim the reforms to the deBaathification process do not go far enough. Finally, the governor is seen as being dependent upon Turkey and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has cost it support in Baghdad and with other Sunni parties. President Erdogan was an opponent of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki leading Ankara to push Sunni federalism via Mutahidun and the KDP’s Kurdish independence drive both of which raised opposition from Shiite parties. Finally, Nujafi originally came to power in 2009 with his anti-Kurdish and Arab nationalist al-Hadbaa party. By 2013 his position within Ninewa had deteriorated so much that he was forced to cut a deal with the KDP to stay in office for a second term. This again angered many of the people he originally appealed to back in 2009. Finally, the governor’s brother Vice President Najafi talked about working with the Naqshibandi and Army of the Mujahedeen to help retake Mosul from the Islamic State back in 2014 giving rise to charges that the Nujafi’s had connections to the insurgency. All together the governor had become widely unpopular both within Ninewa and in Baghdad for the stances that he took and the alliances that he made. That increasingly raised the ire of the prime minister with the visit to America probably being the last straw leading to the dismissal request.

Governor Nujafi’s faltering standing in Iraq was what led to him losing his position. At one time the governor appeared to be a rising star as a new Sunni leader after this 2009 victory in Ninewa. Since then he has become increasingly marginalized due to his policies. Going to the United States sealed Nujafi’s fate. There was no way that Abadi was going to allow a governor to go to one of Iraq’s prime allies to lobby for policies that undercut Baghdad’s. Nujafi has not stepped down yet so this drama may drag on for a while, but his time appears to be up.

SOURCES

AIN, “Atheel sticks to Nineveh Governor’s post, rejects involving PMF in liberating Nineveh,” 5/29/15

- “Erdogan has extensive contacts with al-Jubouri and Najafi to reverse the sacking of the governor of Nineveh,” 5/28/15

Al Forat, “PM approves dismissing Governor of Nineveh,” 5/28/15

Al Masalah, “Najafi, leader of Mosul to expel Daash from the city,” 8/1/14

- “What are the reasons for the dismissal of Ethel Nujaifi?” 5/29/15

Sotaliraq, “Najafi attributes the reason for his dismissal to “refusing to engage the popular crowd” in the liberation of Mosul,” 5/28/15

Stein, Aaron, “Turkey’s Weakness in Iraq Tied to Weakness in Nujaifi,” Atlantic Council, 5/26/15

Taylor, Guy, “U.S. must alter arms flow to retake Mosul from Islamic Tate, Sunni lawmaker warns,” Washington Times, 5/13/15

War Media, “Nujaifi urges US to convert Nineveh to region,” 5/12/15

Replacing Maliki No Panacea For Iraq

 

As the Obama administration is about to send military advisers to assist Iraq’s government there are growing reports that Washington wants Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to be replaced. The argument is that the premier is a divisive figure and that by getting rid of him the country’s politics can move forward, which will in turn help counter the insurgency. Finding a new prime minister could definitely improve the atmosphere in Baghdad in the short term, but it is no panacea for the deep structural problems facing Iraq.

Pres Obama wants PM Maliki to carry out reforms, which some Iraqi parties are taking for a call for his replacement (Defenselink)

President Barak Obama has called for a more inclusive government in Iraq as a caveat of receiving American military aid. The New York Times reported that some Iraqi politicians are taking this to mean that Washington is opposed to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki returning for a third term. The Guardian wrote that even Iran might be tiring of Maliki’s rule, although that is contradicted by other stories. The argument is that the premier has caused so much distrust within the country’s establishment that he must go if Iraq is to create a new government that includes the three major ethnosectarian groups the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. Together this new ruling coalition is supposed to reach out to Sunnis so that they will not give at least passive support to the insurgency and help unite the country overall in the face of the growing violence.

A new premier from Ammar Hakim's ISCI (left) could lead to better relations with Kurdish Premier Nechirvan Barzani (right) and the KRG (KRG)

A new premier could help Iraq with some of its short-term problems. For instance a new premier from say the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraqi (ISCI) would have a much better relationship with the Kurds who have lost complete trust in Maliki. ISCI and the ruling Kurdish parties have had a good relationship dating back to the 1980s when both were supported by Iran and fought on Tehran’s side in the Iran-Iraq War. Those lists could work together and come to an oil export agreement that would actually be followed through with rather than the last two where Maliki refused to pay the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) all the money that it was owed. There also would not such heated rhetoric between Baghdad and Irbil the capital of Kurdistan. Parties like Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun might be more willing to join a coalition as well since it currently opposes Maliki returning to office. A new national unity government could therefore be put together based upon the shared animosity towards the premier and make some deals between the lists.  

Those short-term gains however would not overcome Iraq’s deep-seated institutional problems. For instance, any new coalition would still be based upon ethnosectarian quotas where ministers and other officials are named not by their competence, but rather by their party being Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish. The endemic corruption would not end as this has become a means of governance where every winning party gets to steal part of the government pie to enrich itself and maintain its patronage networks. The economy would still be the most oil dependent in the world, and the parliament would be no closer to passing an oil law as the Sadrists and ISCI both want central control over the industry, while the Kurds want autonomy. Other reforms that have been called on for years such as ending deBaathification are unlikely to come about since parties like the Sadrists are ardent supporters of it. The competence of the Iraqi Security Forces would not suddenly improve, and neither would its counter productive tactics either. The new premier would likely follow the same types of coup proofing tactics that Maliki and every other leader in the Middle East has done, which is to put loyalists in top positions and maintain Maliki's separate chain of command over the army and police. Finally, every government since 2005 has been a national unity one. The simple inclusion of parties from each group did not stop the insurgency back then and will not deter it now. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the Baathist Naqshibandi, and others are not interested in being included the government, but rather want to overthrow it. Sunni votes were spread across several different parties as well who do not agree with each other showing that at least those who voted would not suddenly unite either, because there is no agreement upon which party or individual should be the leader. Without solving these long-term issues Iraq’s future would still appear dim.

The talk of replacing Maliki is a popular one, but it provides no real solutions to Iraq’s deep seated problems and divisions. The greater cooperation amongst the major lists that might emerge in the aftermath of Maliki not be re-elected premier would likely fade with time, and all the internal political divisions over centralism versus federalism, the oil industry, etc. would re-emerge. Not only that, but the appearance of a new united front amongst the elite is not going to suddenly lead to a Sunni consensus to try politics again or more importantly end the insurgency. Therefore any short-term gains from Maliki being replaced will not pan out over time leaving Iraq still a very divided and violent country.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Obama says Iraq’s government cannot resolve the country’s crisis unless it is more inclusive,” 6/19/14

Chulov, Martin and Ackerman, Spencer, “How Nouri al-Maliki fell out of favour with the US,” Guardian, 6/19/14

Habib, Mustafa, “let the post election horse trading begin: iraqi politicians playing the long game,” Niqash, 5/22/14

Al Mada, “Eight blocks, most notably united and the nationalists form union and endorse any candidate from the Shiite alliance,” 5/29/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “An informed source reveals Iran’s agreement on Maliki’s nomination for third term,” 6/4/14

New Sabah, “”Citizens” and “Liberals” talking about “strong government” and Erbil raise the ceiling demands: annexation of Kirkuk and Khanaqin,” 5/22/14

Rubin, Alissa and Nordland, Rod, “Iraqi Factions Jockey to Oust Maliki, Citing U.S. Support,” New York Times, 6/19/14

Shafaq News, “Nujaifi , Allawi and al-Mutlaq agree to work as a unified team,” 5/26/14

A Look At Iraq’s 2014 Election, Interview With Reidar Visser

In April 2014 Iraq held its latest parliamentary elections. The vote was all about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His State of Law walked away with by far the most seats, 95 in total, while his rivals only got around 20-30 seats each. In the months that follow Maliki and his supporters and detractors will hold a series of protracted negotiations to form a new Iraqi government. To help explain the results and the possible outcomes of the balloting is Reidar Visser, a noted Iraq historian. He runs two blogs Iraq and Gulf Analysis and historiae.org, and has written and co-authored three books, Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq, An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?, and A Responsible End?: The United States and the Iraqi Transition, 2005-2010. He can be followed on Twitter @reidarvisser.

Maliki's State of Law came away as the big winner in the 2014 elections (BBC)

1. Maliki’s State of Law walked away with 95 seats in this year’s election. Approximately how many other parties are aligned with him right now and around how many seats will that give him?

Maliki’s potential support base outside State of Law can be conceptualized as a set of concentric circles with increasingly weaker loyalty to him. Immediately outside State of Law with 95 seats, and with good chances of future loyalty, is a stratum of a couple of deputies with a history of close ties to the State of Law, who have continued to maintain friendly relations with Maliki despite running separately. They include Haytham al-Jibburi of the Kafaat & Jamahir movement and Ali Taleb Abd al-Hasan of the Solidarity in Iraq movement, a party affiliated with the Dhi Qar cleric Muhammad Mahdi al-Nasiri who is considered pro-Maliki, and Ali Subhi al-Maliki of the Just State movement (who had Maliki’s picture on his own election poster). Subsequent to the publication of the results, politicians from the two first of these movements went on to claim they had formally enrolled in the State of Law alliance, as did two deputies from a local list in Najaf with a somewhat more secular profile. This segment also includes one seat for the Sadiqun party considered close to the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, although it is noteworthy that this movement, despite much hype about it in Western media, failed to make much of an impression on the Iraqi electorate. Nothing is set in stone, though. Another deputy from Kafaat & Jamahir, former interior minister Jawad al-Bolani, first reportedly joined the pro-[Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq] ISCI Muwatin bloc before subsequently joining Maliki, bringing the total of his State of Law bloc to around 101 seats plus the 1 Asaib Ahl al-Haq seat (which probably no one else will have anything to do with anyway).

Beyond these 102 deputies, I think the loyalties of the parties considered close or potentially close to Maliki is far more open to negotiation. Despite some points of contact in the past, there has also been periods of friction with Maliki. This includes the 6 seats of the Shia Islamist Fadhila, the one seat of the Tanzim al-Dakhil branch of the Daawa (they broke acrimoniously with Maliki in August 2009 when they joined [Iraqi National Alliance] INA ahead of the 2010 general election), and the 6 seats of Ibrahim al-Jaafari (whose role as unofficial PM candidate of INA and thus a challenger to Maliki in 2010 is often forgotten). That’s 15 extra seats, but their alliance with Maliki is no more of a foregone conclusion than the case is with respect to some of the smaller secular and religious minority parties such as the Iraq Coalition (5 seats) or the two Anbar lists (3 plus 2 seats) often cited as potential Maliki allies.

2. There was some talk before the vote about how many seats the prime minister would need to win to give him the upper hand in the government formation talks. Do you believe there was such a tipping point and if so did he achieve that amount?

Maliki would have needed closer to 120 seats in order to truly achieve the upper hand. With the results that materialized, Maliki will need to compromise with at least one (and probably two) of his main opponents – the Kurds, Sadr, Hakim, Nujafi or Allawi.

3. For the last several years Prime Minister Maliki has talked about forming a majority government. Do you think that’s possible after the 2014 elections, and would it make a more effective administration?

I think the concept of a political majority would be good for Iraq if it was attainable. In 2010, Allawi and Maliki could have achieved it if they hadn’t been strong personal enemies. This year, I don’t think the numbers will add up but they are tantalizingly close to the required majority and I fear Maliki’s hubris will make him expend a lot of energy trying to reach such a majority anyway. It should be remembered that even in the previous Iraqi parliament, State of Law deputies would frequently talk about a “political majority” in contexts when they were very far from achieving this. One potential variation of the theme would be Maliki joining with the Kurds, which could be sufficient basis for a majority. The only thing that would keep them united, though, would be agreement on a third Maliki term. Indeed, most of Maliki’s rhetoric in favor of a political majority has focused on criticism of Kurdish independent oil policy. Still, the possibility of Maliki turning around and offering some concessions for a guarantee of a third term should not be ruled out.

4. Maliki’s stated opponents, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar/Liberals, Ammar Hakim’s Mowatin/Citizen’s Alliance, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun/Uniters, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya/Nationalist Coalition won 138 seats between them. That would seem to give them the advantage over the prime minister, but as ever their main problem is keeping a unified stance. Do you think they have any better chance to achieve that than in 2012 when some of these same parties attempted a no confidence vote against Maliki?

The relative numerical strength of these parties vis a vis Maliki is less now than in 2012, where it may have been close to 160 out of 325 at its height – before Iran ordered the Sadrists to back down. When it comes to manipulating the segment of parties in the range from 1 to 3 deputies, Maliki probably has an advantage of incumbency compared to his enemies.

Allawi (left), Speaker Nujafi (center), Dep PM Mutlaq (right) are trying to create a Sunni Alliance (Shafaq News)

5. As a follow up to that Speaker Nujafi is talking about creating a grand Sunni alliance consisting of him, Allawi and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq. What chance does that have of working out?

I think the chances of it working out are limited, not least because they have spent a good deal energy splitting up from the 2010 alliance. Additionally, it is unlikely to become politically relevant since Maliki’s interest in these groups mainly relates to the prospect of one of them breaking ranks with the others and then joining Maliki.

6. In a similar vein, Sadr and Hakim seem to be focusing upon reforming the National Alliance that they were part of in 2010. What do you think they hope to achieve with that?

Sadr and Hakim may have been hoping to reconstitute the Shiite alliance and then have Maliki replaced with someone they like better personally. That plan lost some of its momentum because of Maliki’s relative success in term of a good personal vote and an increase of his share of the parliament seats despite the Najaf clergy clearly sending signals about the desirability of replacing him with someone else. At the time of the election there was much talk of Tareq Najm [parliamentarian from State of Law] as a possible substitute for Maliki. Already that kind of talk has faded somewhat.

7. With every vote in Iraq there come complaints about the winners cheating. Maliki’s opponents are all claiming that he fixed the balloting one way or another, while most of the Kurdish parties are accusing the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of fraud as well. Do you think there is any merit to these charges, and more importantly could they change the results if the Iraqi Election Commission takes any of them up?

A couple of points on this. I think if IHEC was as corrupt as some claim, Maliki would have got a bigger win and he would not have lost so many key allies and friends (who lost out in the personal vote). It is still unclear which way IHEC’s decision will go with respect to the complaints. They have released data from the special vote for the security forces as well as the “Baghdad belt” (where accusations of ballot-stuffing to Maliki’s advantage materialized). Questions still remain after these attempts at creating enhanced transparency. For example, in the security force vote, the Maliki vote in Diyala and the PUK vote in Sulaymaniya seem artificially high. Similarly, with respect to the “Baghdad belt” vote, IHEC has released data that show suspiciously high participation at some stations, but it has released results only at the aggregate level of the counting centers. To allay fears about ballot stuffing, it should release results for individual stations in the “Baghdad belt”, and in particular those with participation rates in the 80-95% range.

8. Quite a few prominent Iraqi parliamentarians were defeated in this year’s balloting. Can you name some of them, and do you think this points to some accountability being established in the country?

Deputies who lost their seats include Hassan al-Sunayd, Ali Shalah, Khalid al-Attiya, Yasin Majid, Walid al-Hilli, Ihsan al-Awwadi, Sami al-Askari and Izzat al-Shabandar from the Maliki camp. Similarly Nassar al-Rubayyie and Maha al-Duri, from the Sadrist list, lost their seats.

This is the beauty of the personal vote in Iraq, and, incidentally, I think, an indication of the integrity of what IHEC is doing. Using the personal vote has become the norm with 80-90% of all voters expressing a candidate preference in the materials that I have been working with. In the big cities, in particular, personal votes radically affect the ranking of the candidates, with people far down on the lists promoted to top positions through the actions of the electorates in places like Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.

9. Internal issues are only part of the picture when it comes to Iraqi politics. The United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran all have tried to play a role in the country. How might each attempt to influence the government formation process?

I think there is a real difference between these regional powers as regards their ability to micro-manage the government formation process. Iran may want to see the next Iraqi PM emerge as the result of a decision by a united Shiite alliance. It can exercise leverage to have that alliance reconstituted and in turn influence the process of PM candidate selection within the alliance. Turkey may influence the preferences of the Iraqi Kurdish parties, though it is noteworthy that in theory the Shiites can form a government without Kurdish support this time. This fact somewhat reduces Turkish leverage. Finally, the influence of Saudi Arabia is much less than the two others, and primarily relates to the precise level, intensity and sourness of discontent expressed by its friends among Iraqi Sunnis and seculars.

Will Iraq’s Prime Minister Gain A 3rd Term?

Iraq’s 2014 parliamentary elections were all about Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Most of the major lists explicitly ran against the premier. Those included Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar/Liberals, the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) Mowatin/Citizen’s Alliance, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun/Uniters, Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya/Nationalist Coalition. Since the vote on April 30 all of those parties have said Maliki staying in office was a redline, and have talked about forming a government of their own. The problem is that these parties have never been able to stay united opening opportunities for the prime minister to split them apart.

Maliki’s State of Law (SOL) was the undisputed winner of the 2014 balloting. His list came away with 95 seats, up from 89 in 2010. Given all the opposition he was facing it was notable that he was able to make a slight gain. After that Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar, and his two other parties he ran received 34 seats down from 39 in 2010. ISCI won 31 up from 20, Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun got 27, President Massoud Barzani’s KDP’s finished with 25 down from 28, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) got 21 up from 14, Iyad Allawi’s Wataniya had 21 down from 31, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiya got 11, a six seat increase. Goran/Change won 9 up from 7, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend finished with 6 up from 1, Fadhila/Virtue got 6 seats down from 7. The new Iraq Coalition and Civilian Democratic Alliance won 5 and 4 seats respectively. Finally the Kurdish Islamist parties the Kurdistan Islamic Union got 4 seats and the Kurdistan Islamic Group 3, with the latter losing one seat from 2010.

Parliamentary Election Results 2010 vs 2014

	2010	2014
State of Law	89	95
Sadrists/Ahrar	39	34
ISCI + Iraqi National Congress/Mowatin	20 + 1	31
Mutaihudin/Uniters	-	27
KDP	28	25
PUK	14	21
Wataniya/Nationalists	31	21
Arabiya	5	11
Goran/Change	7	9
National Reform Trend	1	6
Fadhila/Virtue	7	6
Iraq Coalition	-	5
Civil Democratic Alliance	-	4
Kurdistan Islamic Union	4	4
Kurdistan Islamic Group	2	3
Others	69	18
Minorities	8	8
Total	325	328

(2014 results Via Akiko Yoshioka, Senior Researcher at Institute of Energy Economics Japan)

Maliki’s opponents have all said they would not allow him another term. May 21 for example, President Barzani allegedly hosted a meeting with Iyad Allawi and the Supreme Council’s Adel Abdul Mahdi to discuss forming an alliance against the premier. If all the opponents actually came together they would have 170 seats, five more than is required to form a new government. The problem as ever is that this is a loose and fractious coalition. Mutahidun for example is proposing a grand Sunni alliance made up of itself, Allawi’s Nationalists and Mutlaq’s Arabiya. The problem is that Mutlaq has been open to working with Maliki in the past and may be so in the future. Another issue is that the only thing holding these parties together is their hatred of the prime minister. Otherwise they have different views on policy. For example, the Sadrists and Supreme Council believe in the central government controlling oil exports, while the Kurdish parties want to be able to export on their own while still agreeing to revenue sharing with Baghdad. This time around however, Maliki might have made these parties so mad at him that they may be able to overcome their differences and maintain their unity enough to push him out. That will be far in the future as the government formation process may take up to a year. In the meantime the lists are stuck in the complaints phase with most of the anti-Maliki factions claiming that he cheated. After the Election Commission deals with each of these accusations, the lists will then move into the negotiation phase. That provides plenty of time for Maliki to persuade and cajole these lists to join him instead.

While many Iraq observers believe that the prime minister’s 90 plus seats has guaranteed him another term it doesn’t appear as clear-cut as that. His opponents have enough seats to make a government. Iraqi politics is never that easy however. There are still months of talks lying ahead during which Maliki’s opposition will have to show staying power otherwise he will play divide and conquer with them as he has done in the past. In 2012 for instance there was a no confidence move against the premier, but the Sadrists pulled out and the effort failed. In those two years the dislike and distrust in the prime minister has grown. The question is, is that enough to make a new government? Only time will tell.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “The uncertain prospects for an Iraqi ‘Sunni Alliance,’” Al Monitor, 5/13/14

Al Rafidayn, “Barzani sponsors a secret meeting with Allawi and paints a role for the dagger to finance front against state of law,” 5/21/14