Early Election Results Show 56% Voter Turnout In Iraq

 

November 11 Iraq held its seventh parliamentary elections. Despite widespread worries about apathy amongst the public there was an increase in voters and the highest participation rate since 2014.

US Army In The Iraq War Volume 2 Chapter 13 Toward The Defeat Of AQI, August 2009-July 2010

Chapter 13 in the U.S. Army’s second volume on the Iraq war covers the end of 2009 to the start of 2010. The Islamic State of Iraq reached a nadir during that period losing most of its leadership and manpower. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continued to be an incompetent war time leader while plotting to hold onto power after he lost an election. That meant Iraq couldn’t take advantage of the decline of the insurgency.

Iran’s Role In Forming Iraq’s Next Govt

Iran's Quds Force Commander Gen Qani Has Repeatedly Met With Iraqi Parties During Govt Formation Process (Twitter)

 

It’s been five months since elections were held in Iraq and the ruling parties are no closer to forming a government. Iran has actively been involved in the negotiations but has not been able to convince the two main groups, its allies in the Coordination Framework and the Moqtada al-Sadr led Tripartite Alliance, to come to an agreement.

Review The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, New York: Pantheon, 2012

The Endgame, The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama is an expensive history of the U.S. involvement in Iraq from the 2003 Invasion to the military withdrawal in 2011. Authors Michael Gordon and retired General Bernard Trainor said they would cover the political and military battles the Americans fought in Iraq and why they happened. Their argument was that both the Bush and Obama administrations made a series of strategic mistakes throughout the war. The problem was the explanations were lost in all the minutia.

Review The Unraveling, High Hopes And Missed Opportunity In Iraq

Sky, Emma, The Unraveling, High Hopes And Missed Opportunity In Iraq, New York: Public Affairs, 2015

The Unraveling, High Hopes And Missed Opportunity In Iraq is the story of Emma Sky’s time serving in Iraq. Sky was a British activist who answered a call from London in 2003 for people to run postwar Iraq. She ended up being the governor for Kirkuk under the Coalition Provisional Authority. Later she returned to be the adviser to General Ray Odierno during the Surge in 2007, and then she went back a third time to be help Odierno again during the American military withdrawal. Her story is about the struggles of the early U.S. occupation of Iraq, then the success of the Surge, which was then undone when the U.S. pulled out.

Iraq’s Troubles Fighting Corruption Interview With Vincent Foulk Former US Anti-Graft Official

Vincent Foulk served in Iraq from 2003-12 in all types of capacities. He started as an Army Civil Affairs officer in 2003, then worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority, and assisting Iraq’s courts. He then returned as a legal adviser to the Iraqi police, moved onto helping Iraq with anti-corruption activities, and finished with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. He is also the author of The Battle for Fallujah, Operation, Resistance and Stalemate in the War in Iraq. This interview focuses upon Foulk’s time trying to combat fraud and graft in Iraq.

Allawi Iraq’s Absent Prime Minister

Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi took power in June 2004 as the Coalition Provisional Authority closed up shop. He had the support of both the United States and the United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. The Americans quickly found several issues with the new premier. One of them was Allawi’s constant trips outside of the country. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for example, noted that the prime minister was always flying around the region, and could not always be contacted. Rice asked, “Are we worried that Allawi is spending ten to eleven days [a month] outside the country?” Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers agreed with Rice that Allawi’s constant foreign travel was an issue. The next year when Allawi was replaced as prime minister he left Iraq for nearly four years even though he was elected as a member of parliament. When his Iraqiya list won first place in the 2010 elections he again decided to take extended tours around the region thinking that would help his chance to become the prime minister once again, but that only backfired against him. Allawi’s Iraqi National List was created in 1990 with the help of the intelligence agencies of Turkey, the Gulf States, and the west. He has maintained those ties ever since hoping they would help his political career. Given most of those states antagonistic stance towards the new Iraq they have not served him well.

SOURCES

Allawi, Ali, The Occupation of Iraq, Winning The War, Losing the Peace, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007

BBC, “Profile: Iyad Allawi,” 3/27/10

Galbraith, Peter, “Iraq: The Bungled Transition,” New York Review of Books, 9/23/04

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL VIDEO: The Unraveling Emma Sky

Former Ambassador Robert Ford Reflects On U.S. Policy Towards Iraq And Syria

Robert Ford was one of the State Department’s leading Middle East experts. He joined the Foreign Service in the 1980s serving across the Arab world including appointments to Bahrain, Egypt and Algeria . During the 2000s he served three tours in Iraq as  a political adviser and Deputy Ambassador before going on to be the Ambassador to Syria from 2011-2014. Ford is now a resident scholar at the Middle East Institute . This is an interview with Ford about his time in Iraq and Syria and some lessons learned for American foreign policy.

How Did The Unites States Do In Iraq? An Interview With Emma Sky

Emma Sky recently published a book The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq about her time serving in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, during the Surge, and then while the United States was drawing down its forces for the 2011 withdrawal. What follows is an interview with Sky about her time in Iraq and what she thought about U.S. policies and Iraqi politicians.

LBC VIDEO: Emma Sky on Iraq , Syria & Why We've Got It So Wrong

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Emma Sky On Iraq After The Surge

Pressure Grows On Iraq’s Premier Maliki To Give Up On A Third Term

 

Iraq’s politicians have taken some important steps towards forming a new government. A speaker of parliament and a new president were elected in July 2014. Now President Fuad Masum must pick a candidate for prime minister from the largest bloc in parliament, which is the National Alliance (NA) made up of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL), the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s Citizen’s Alliance, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. That’s the last major barrier as Premier Maliki has refused to step aside despite opposition from within the NA, his own State of Law, the religious establishment in Najaf, and Iran.

New Iraqi President Masum is waiting for the National Alliance to name its candidate for premier. Will it be Maliki, another figure from State of Law or a politician from another list within the coalition? (Al Arabiya)

In mid-July a new speaker of parliament and president of Iraq were elected. On July 15, Salim Jabouri of Mutahidun was elected the new speaker, with Haidar Abadi of State of Law his first deputy and Aram Sheikh Mohammed of the Change List his second deputy. It took two rounds of balloting to select Abadi as he was challenged by Ahmed Chalabi who was elected to parliament as part of the Citizen’s Alliance. Chalabi did not actually desire the position, but wanted to make a point that Maliki could be stopped from being elected to a third term by his opponents. Then after some internal divisions within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were overcome Fuad Masum was elected the new president of Iraq on July 24. This was a break from former elections when the speaker, president and premier were all part of a package deal worked out by the winning lists. That was impossible this year since Maliki insisted that he be the candidate for prime minister, while his critics within the NA could not agree upon an alternative. What did hold was the ethnosectarian quota system with a Sunni becoming speaker and a Kurd being president. Likewise the premiership will remain with the Shiite parties.

Maliki is trying to wait out his opponents like he did in 2010, but there is more writing on the wall each week that he will not be able to hold onto power. Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme Council’s Citizen’s Alliance ran against the prime minister and have continued to demand that his State of Law replace him. Both Ahrar and Citizen’s said they had their own candidates such as former vice president Adel Abdul Mahdi, Ahmed Chalabi, and ex-Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and that State of Law had alternatives like Maliki adviser Tariq Najm, Deputy Premier Hussein Shahristani and Transportation Minister Hadi Ameri, but could not move forward as long as Maliki demanded to remain in office showing the divisions within the National Alliance. The Najaf clergy has become more and more vocal against the prime minister. July 16 Sheikh Ali Najafi the spokesman for his father Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi said that a new government needed to be formed quickly without Maliki to solve the on going crisis in the country. July 25 during Friday prayers Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani released a statement that Iraq’s leaders should not “cling” to power obviously referring to Maliki. Third, Iran has apparently come out against the premier’s third term. According to the Associate Press, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force General Qasim Suleimani talked with Maliki about stepping down, but he refused. Last splits have arisen within State of Law as well. After Sistani’s remarks the prime minister’s own Dawa Party said that it would follow the Ayatollah’s guidance. July 28 ISCI’s Buratha News reported that the Badr Organization left State of Law because of Maliki’s obstinacy. SOL has responded to all of these attacks by claiming that since it won the most seats it therefore has the right to pick the next premier. Maliki even went to the courts trying to get them to declare State of Law not the National Alliance as the largest bloc in parliament and thus giving it the sole right to name the premiership, but he was turned down. In 2010 the victorious parties took ten months to put together a new ruling coalition. Maliki dragged out the process and brought the courts, Tehran, and Washington eventually to his side. The Supreme Court for example ruled that the party that was able to put together the largest alliance after the election not the one that won the most votes had the right to name the candidate for premier. This has now come back to haunt Maliki as it makes his claim that the SOL’s victory in the polls gives him the right to stay in office invalid. Instead it is up to the divided NA to make that decision. His opponents within the coalition now have the backing of Najaf and Tehran if the AP story is correct. The latter was instrumental in ensuring Maliki a 2^nd term after the last elections, but the Iranians may now seem him as a source of instability and want him out. Finally State of Law has lost its internal cohesion. The report about Badr leaving SOL may not be true, but there is definitely dissension within its ranks. The Iraqi elite is still not following the timetable laid out in the law to form a new government, but it is making slow progress as the election of Jabouri and Masum show. That means the final step of naming a candidate for prime minister may occur sooner rather than later as Maliki’s support is being worn down.

Nouri al-Maliki was the resounding winner in the 2014 elections, but that does not assure him staying in power. Ibrahim Jaafari became premier in 2005 not because his Dawa party won the most votes, but because it was part of the largest bloc the United Iraqi Alliance. Maliki was named prime minister in 2006, because the U.S. and others had lost confidence in Jaafari with the escalating civil war. Again, his Dawa was not the largest party, but he was chosen within the United Alliance as a compromise candidate. In 2010 the Iraqi National Movement won the most seats, but thanks to the Supreme Court ruling Maliki was able to put together the largest coalition after the voting and win a 2^nd term. Coming out victorious in 2014 was therefore an important step for Maliki, but not the final word. Immediately after the election it looked like he had the momentum, but then the insurgent summer offensive came and most of northern Iraq fell, and the prime minister’s star began to fall as more and more groups from Najaf to Iran added their voices calling for him to step down. This whole process still has minutes left on the clock, but they are counting down for Maliki.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraqi Shiite cleric tells AFP: PM Maliki must go,” Agence France Presse, 7/16/14

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim Salama, Vivian, “Talabani ally is Iraqi Kurds presidential choice,” Associated Press, 7/23/14

Associated Press, “Iraq elects new president as attacks kill dozens,” 7/24/14

- “Iraqi cleric urges leaders not to ‘cling’ to power,” 7/25/14

Buratha News, “After news of its withdrawal from the state of law coalition….Badr Organization declares its commitment to the decision of the National Alliance for the prime minister post,” 7/28/14

- “Ibrahim al-Jaafari:: National Alliance is the largest parliamentary bloc, not the rule of law we have all started and announced that,” 7/27/14

Independent Press Agency, “Bayraktar: deny the issuance of a new resolution concerning the largest parliamentary bloc,” 7/24/14

Al Mada, “Differences within Maliki’s bloc: Will the call bring together more than one candidate for premier?” 7/19/14

- “Liberals and the Council: our deal with al-Maliki to withdraw and his replacement a condition that has been accepted by National Alliance,” 7/17/14

Al Masalah, “Dawa Party renews its commitment under the guidance of reference and timings of the constitution on forming of government,” 7/26/14

- “State of Law: Maliki, the only candidate for prime minister,” 7/17/14

Visser, Reidar, “The Iraqi Parliament Elects Its New Speakership,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 7/15/14

Inside The Surge An Interview With Prof Peter Mansoor Former Executive Officer To Gen Petraeus

The Surge in Iraq created a huge controversy in American politics when it started in 2007. There were arguments about whether the U.S. should send in more troops or withdraw its forces to solve Iraq’s increasing chaos. Since then there has been a lively discussion about how much of a factor the Surge was in combination with other events such as the sectarian cleansing of Baghdad, the Anbar Awakening, the Sons of Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease fire, and more in reducing the violence in the country. To provide an inside view of the Surge is Professor Peter Mansoor the General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair of Military History at Ohio State University and General David Petraeus’ former Executive Officer from 2007-2008. He recently published a book about his experience during that time entitled Surge, My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War.

1. The Surge was proposed out of a sense of desperation in Washington about the situation in Iraq. In 2005 sectarian fighting had broken out, but after the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra shrine things quickly descended into a full-scale civil war. President Bush heard several proposals about what to do and decided upon the Surge. He said he was “doubling down” and not only changed the military approach but his own handling of Iraq. Can you explain how the president dealt with Iraq before 2007 and its consequences?

President Bush believed that his subordinate commanders should be given wide leeway to prosecute the war as they saw fit. In my view, he believed this was a proper reading of the lessons of the Vietnam, a conflict in which President Lyndon B. Johnson was accused of running the war from the White House. Bush erred in the other direction by supporting his commanders with inadequate supervision from above and nearly suffered defeat in Iraq as a result. The civilian and military leaders in Baghdad developed a strategy and operational concept—focused on killing and capturing terrorist and insurgent operatives while transitioning security responsibilities to the nascent Iraqi security forces as quickly as possible—that allowed the insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to embed themselves among the Iraqi people, while creating a security vacuum that nearly caused Iraq to break apart in 2006. By mid-2006, President Bush sensed that something was wrong and he sought a way to reverse the downward spiral in violence. The result was the Surge.

2. On the ground in Iraq General George Casey ordered Operation Together Forward in 2006 try to secure Baghdad. How was the plan executed and what were its faults?   

There were two iterations of Operation Together Forward, which were cordon and search operations in the heart of Baghdad intended to clear the city of insurgents. In these two large scale operations a significant number of buildings were searched, weapons caches confiscated, and suspects detained. The problem was that once complete, there were not enough forces left behind to secure the areas ostensibly cleared of insurgents. In time the insurgents and terrorists returned, and the security situation continued its downward spiral.

3. Around that same time you were called to the Pentagon to join the Council of Colonels, which was originally organized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the War on Terror, but eventually came to focus upon the Iraq War. What did that group come to see as the main problems in Iraq, and what were its recommendations to solve it?

“We are losing because we are not winning, and time is not on our side,” is how the Council of Colonels announced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States and its allies were losing the Iraq War. This was a revelation and a shock to them. The main problem in Iraq that we saw was an ethno-sectarian competition for power and resources, exacerbated by the intervention of outside powers such as Iran and the injection of jihadists into the conflict. In our view, the United States had three options: Go Big (mobilize its military power to overwhelm the insurgency), Go Long (configure its support to Iraq to prevail over the long haul), or Go Home (withdraw from Iraq and manage the consequences). President Bush chose a combination of Go Big and Go Long, resulting in the Surge.

(AP)

4. The Iraq Study Group suggested that the U.S. gradually withdraw its forces while reaching out to Iraq’s neighbors as the best way to stabilize things in the country. Why did you disagree with that approach?

Iraq’s neighbors were part of the problem. As long as states such as Iran thought that they could achieve their aims in Iraq through proxy warfare, negotiations with them were a dead end. We proved this during the Surge when the United States and Iran held three negotiations in Baghdad (Ambassador Ryan Crocker was the U.S. representative) that went nowhere. Furthermore, outside powers could not solve the fundamental issues inside Iraq, which were ethno-sectarian in nature and required a resolution from within.

5. Retired General Jack Keane and the American Enterprise Institute argued for an alternative strategy of a population centered counterinsurgency campaign. Why do you think that approach won over President Bush?

President Bush wanted to win the war in Iraq. Not lose. Not tie. Not exit the conflict gracefully. I don’t think General George Casey, General John Abizaid, or the Joint Chiefs ever understood the determination of the president in this regard. As the situation in Iraq worsened, President Bush understood that something had to change, but as he pressed his commanders for solutions, the same stock answers came back. Stay the course. Transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The strategy is working, but will take more time. As 2006 progressed, the president realized something had to change. The surge seemed the only viable alternative strategy, and he adopted it as his own.

6. Even before the Surge started in December 2006 a raid upon an Al Qaeda safe house discovered a treasure trove of documents about the group’s strategy for Baghdad. What did those papers reveal about the organization, and what kinds of plans were made to counter it when the Surge began?

The raid revealed the importance of the “Baghdad Belts,” or the regions around Baghdad that were in effect insurgent and terrorist sanctuaries. From these regions the insurgents and terrorists could inject violence into the capital city at will. As the document made clear, to control Baghdad, we had to control the Baghdad Belts. As a result, more than fifty percent of the extra combat power provided by the surge ended up being deployed outside Baghdad in al-Anbar Province and the Baghdad Belts.

7. Many have tried to simplify the Surge down to a troop increase, counterinsurgency tactics, and a dynamic leader in General Petraeus. In fact the new strategy was made up of many different elements. Can you go through what those were and how they worked together?

General Petraeus has done a wonderful job of describing the new strategy in his Foreword to my book, adapted as an article in Foreign Policy, which can be accessed at here. The surge was a holistic strategy to change the war in Iraq. It featured a new (or at least, one evenly applied across the force) operational concept that stressed the overriding need to protect the Iraqi people from insurgent, militia, and terrorist violence. More forces were needed to realize this goal. Gen. Petraeus also realized that to contain the violence in Iraq, the reconcilable elements of the insurgent and militia opposition (including detainees in coalition custody) needed to be brought into support of the Iraqi government, so outreach to these groups was part of the strategy—bringing the Awakening into play and resulting in the creation of the Sons of Iraq. Targeted strikes to kill or capture irreconcilables were also part of the surge—to eliminate from the equation those who refused to be part of the solution to the conflict. To give the Iraqi people hope for the future, nation building aspects to improve the economy, provide jobs, and deliver essential services were also stressed. If strategy is defined as the provision of ways and means to secure an end, then the Surge was most definitely a new strategy.

PM Maliki was fine with the Awakening as long as it stayed in Anbar but when the US started the Sons of Iraq program he was opposed (AP)

8. After General Petraeus found out about the Awakening in Anbar, he decided to try to replicate it throughout the country with the Sons of Iraq (SOI). He was hoping that this would lead to local reconciliation and eventually be connected to the central government. A major barrier to that was Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. What were some of the struggles Coalition officials went through trying to convince Maliki of the advocacy of the SOI, and did he ever seem to fully accept the program?

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki welcomed the Awakening as long as it was confined to al-Anbar Province, a region of little concern to his government and the Shi’a constituency which he represented. When the Awakening and its offspring, the Sons of Iraq, approached areas of greater concern to Shi’a Iraqis, such as Diyala Province or Baghdad, then Prime Minister Maliki and his administration were reluctant to embrace the movement. Gen. Petraeus attempted to assuage Prime Minister Maliki’s concerns by pointing out that it was better to have former insurgents inside the tent, as opposed to outside the tent trying to tear it down. Furthermore, we could gather biometric identification (fingerprints, retina scans) of the Sons of Iraq, along with their personal information, which would make them vulnerable to reprisals should they backslide. Gen. Petraeus also realized that whoever paid the SOI would have control over them. Initially, the paymaster was Multi-National Force-Iraq, but later it was the Iraqi government. This gave Maliki great control over the Sons of Iraq. Despite these certainties, he never warmed to the program, although he is probably now regretting his decision not to do so.

9. One reason that Sunnis seemed willing to join the Sons of Iraq was that they realized that they were losing the civil war. You quoted one U.S. Army Colonel that worked on reconciliation that said, “The Sunnis recognize that they’ve lost, and they’re coming to the table.” The Anbar Awakening also expanded at this time from its start in Ramadi to across the province. Moqtada al-Sadr announced a cease-fire in the middle of 2007, and Premier Maliki eventually went after his militia with the 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign in Basra, Maysan, and Baghdad. This has created a debate within the United States over whether the Surge was the main catalyst for security improving in Iraq or whether it was a combination of the Surge and those other developments in Iraq. What are your thoughts on the matter?

The Surge was the catalyst that brought to fruition a number of factors that influenced the outcome of the war in Iraq. Without the Surge, the Awakening would have remained a local movement confined to Ramadi or, at most, al-Anbar Province. Without the improved security conditions in Baghdad created by the Surge, Muqtada al-Sadr would never have offered a cease-fire after the gun battle between his militia and the shrine guards in Karbala in August 2007.  Without the Surge, Prime Minister Maliki would not have felt emboldened to confront the Jaish al-Mahdi in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan Province. On the other hand, the Surge would not have had the same results had it been attempted earlier in the war. It needed the other elements at play in Iraq in 2007 to succeed.

10. President Bush went from delegating Iraq policy to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Pentagon from 2003-2006 to being hands on during the Surge. Why did you believe this was the proper approach for all presidents to take when it comes to conducting a war?

In his book Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen analyzes the war leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion, and concludes that hands-on executive leadership is required to ensure success in war. President Bush read Cohen’s book early in his presidency, but didn’t internalize its lessons regarding what kind of leadership was required in difficult endeavors. For the first six years of his presidency, President Bush empowered his key subordinates to wage the war in Iraq without a lot of supervision from the White House. Finally in 2006, Bush realized that he needed to take a hands-on approach to fashioning a strategy to win the war. The resulting concept, the Surge, would not have succeeded without his involvement and support. This example, along with many others, shows the need for presidents to be intimately involved in the details of the strategy for waging war.

11. From late-2007 into 2008 Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) started concentrating more and more on Shiite militias and Special Groups that were run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force commander General Sulaiman. There have been many stories about these operations and some of the interactions between Sulaiman and General Petraeus. Can you speak about what MNF-I’s strategy was to counter the Iranians and whether it was effective or not?

MNF-I realized that Iranian support of Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups was a destabilizing factor in Iraq. Part of Gen. Petraeus’ Surge concept was the even-handed treatment of Sunni insurgents and Shi’a militia operatives. Petraeus pushed very hard to ensure the targeting of extremists of all sects, with excellent results. After the capture of a number of Iranian Qods Force operatives in Iraq, Iran withdrew most of its personnel from the country and moved the training of proxy forces back to Iran. Although MNF-I was able to reduce the effectiveness of Iranian backed operatives, it could not eliminate Iranian influence on the war in Iraq.

12. Throughout the entire Surge there was great skepticism about its effectiveness. That was seen when General Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker had to testify before the American Congress. Less well known was the fact that sectors of the military such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral William Fallon who was commander of the Central Command at that time were opposed to the new strategy as well. What were their concerns, and how did they attempt to affect policy?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that the provision of the Surge forces to Iraq would cause deterioration in the readiness of U.S. ground forces due to the excessive strain put on the Army and Marine Corps by the Iraq War. President Bush gave an excellent reply to these concerns in his meeting with the Joint Chiefs in the Tank in the Pentagon in December 2006 by pointing out that the worst thing that could happen to the U.S. military would be to lose the war in Iraq. All other considerations, in the president’s mind, were secondary. But the Joint Chiefs were lukewarm at best about the Surge, a mindset bolstered by the elevation of General George Casey, the former commander of MNF-I, to be the Army chief of staff in February 2007. Casey didn’t believe the Surge was the right strategy for Iraq, and his presence on the Joint Chiefs dampened what little enthusiasm they had for the new way forward.

Admiral Fallon likewise did not believe the Surge was the right strategy for Iraq. Like Casey, Fallon believed that U.S. forces should slowly withdraw from the conflict and allow the Iraqis to fight it out among themselves. He put sand in the gears of the process of providing reinforcements to Iraq to slow it down, much to the consternation of General Petraeus.

13. One of the main goals of the United States from 2007-2008 was to reduce violence so that Iraq’s elite could focus upon politics. Do you think that was achieved by the end of the Surge, and if so what were some examples you saw?

The Surge accomplished its goal of enabling the competition for power and resources in Iraq to move back into the realm of politics, at least the kind of politics that doesn’t use bombs and bullets to make its point. In the winter of 2008 the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a number of laws, such as amnesty legislation, de-Ba’athification reform, and an annual budget, that showed that Iraqi legislators could make deals with one another. After the Charge of the Knights operation in Basra and the clearing of Sadr City in the spring of 2008, all but one of the political parties in Iraq gave a vote of support to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The provincial elections of 2009 brought a large majority of Iraqis of all sects and political persuasions to the polls and brought the Sunnis back into the political process. The wheels started to come off the bus after the presidential election of 2010, when the United States backed Maliki’s candidacy for another term as prime minister instead of supporting the winner of the elections, Ayad Allawi. After that election the Sunnis lost faith in the political process and the jihadists were once again able to make inroads among them. The current violence in Iraq dates to that ill-considered decision, not to the outcome of the Surge, which ended in July 2008.

UNIV OF CHICAGO VIDEO: Lessons From The US War In Iraq: 10 Years After Invasion

Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Commander General Suleimani And His Role In Iraq, An Interview With The New Yorker’s Dexter Filkins

 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force Commander General Qasim Suleimani is a rather infamous figure in Iraq and the Middle East. The general has been blamed for organizing attacks upon American forces when they were in Iraq, helping to put together new governments in Baghdad, and now he’s running Iraqi fighters into Syria. The man is a jack of all trades involved in espionage, covert operations, and power politics. He’s rarely talked about in public however, which was why Dexter Filkins’ recent article for the New Yorker profiling the general was quite revealing. Here now is an interview with Filkins about General Suleimani’s role in Iraq.

Recent image made by the Badr's militia showing Gen. Suleimani and American coffins in the background (via Phillip Smyth)

1. General Qasim Suleimani was an early supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini, which led him to join the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1979. The next year he was fighting in the Iran-Iraq War where he eventually rose to be a division commander. He witnessed hundreds of his friends and comrades die in that conflict. Do you think that gave him a life long interest in Iraq, and a desire to not see that country become a threat again?

I think that’s right. Suleimani, but Iran more broadly, were deeply traumatized by the Iran-Iraq war, and they vowed never to allow anything like that to repeat itself.

2. Suleimani seemed to follow a two-track policy in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Overall, what did he want to do to the American occupation, and what were his goals with the new Iraqi government?

I think Suliemani—after concluding the Americans were not going to invade Iran—decide to bleed the Americans as much as he could. At the same time, he worked to ensure that the Shiites succeeded in Iraq. I think this made for a sort of yin-yang policy that was sometimes at war with itself. But I think it’s safe to say that Suleimani helped kill a lot of Americans.

3. One example of his political strategy was his involvement in the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). After the Coalition Provisional Authority took over responsibility for Iraq in 2003 it created the IGC. You discovered that it was actually put together through negotiations between the State Department’s Ryan Cocker and Suleimani. How did the two work out the Council members, and what was each hoping to achieve?

It’s pretty amazing; the IGC was essentially the product of a joint American-Iranian negotiation. Ryan Crocker was at the center of it; he told me never gave the Suliemani veto power; for instance, the Iranians didn’t want Ayad Alawi. But he sometimes agreed to Iranian requests if their objections involved someone the Americans regarded as non-essential. 

4. On the military front, the Qods Force began supporting a number of Shiite militias against the Americans. Many in the U.S. believed that Moqtada al-Sadr was Iran’s main proxy, but Suleimani actually didn’t like working with him. Can you explain his dislike for Sadr and what alternatives that led the Qods Force Commander to search out to confront the Americans?

This one’s pretty easy, I think. Muqtada is a very independent leader, and I think this frustrated Suleimani. The result were what the Americans called “Special Groups,” i.e., militias that were under more direct Iranian control.

5. One tactic that Suleimani unsuccessfully employed to undermine the U.S. occupation was to encourage the flow of Islamist militants into Iraq via Syria. This seemed to blowback upon the general in two ways. First, what did the Islamists end up doing in Iraq, and what are they doing in Syria now?

Well, I think the real crazies started blowing up Shiite mosques and the like—the very people the Iranians were supporting. They made a sectarian war in Iraq. They are now doing the same in Syria.

6. Washington knew about all of the general’s machinations in Iraq, and finally decided to retaliate starting in December 2006. What kind of operations did the U.S. forces launch against the Qods Force, and how did Suleimani retaliate?

U.S. Special Forces captured five Quds Force officers in Erbil. I think the evidence suggests pretty conclusively that Suleimani retaliated by ordering an Iraqi militia (a Special Group) to kidnap and kill five Americans in Karbala less than a week later.

7. That was quite an escalation form arresting Qods Force membersto them killing U.S. soldiers. Did the Americans consider raising the stakes after that, perhaps a cross border raid into Iran or anything like that?

Yes, they did. But they figured in the end that it would be too easy for the Iranians to escalate the war, which they didn’t need.

8. General Suleimani seemed to like the overt and covert battle with the U.S. in Iraq, and there was some indirect communication between the two via intermediaries and text messages. What were some of the more notorious comments the general made to the Americans?

Well, I think the most colorful one came in 2006, when Sulimani appears to have sent a note to the American command, following the war between Israel and Hezbollah: He said: “I hope you have been enjoying the peace and quiet in Baghdad. I’ve been busy in Beirut!” A sense of humor, you might say.

9. Many Iraqis believe that Suleimani is involved in all the major negotiations between the ruling parties in the country. That actually seemed to be true after the 2010 parliamentary elections. The winning lists were deadlocked for months in talks over whether Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki would return for a second term. What role did the general play in breaking this stalemate?

Suleimani himself broke the stalemate between the Iraqis, by persuading Muqtada al-Sadr’s coalition to join Maliki’s government. That clinched it.

Suleimani helped convince Sadr to support Maliki after the 2010 elections assuring him of a 2nd term (AP)

10. Now that the American military has withdrawn from Iraq many in the West believe that Iraq has fallen in with Tehran. That’s not quite true as shown in the relationship between Premier Maliki and Suleimani. What do the two think of each other?

I think they do not like each other, but at the same time I think Maliki feels compelled to do many things the Iranians tell him to do.

11. Today the general’s main concern is Syria. You wrote that he has a command post set up in Damascus where he orchestrates part of the war. He has drawn on his ties in Iraq to varying degrees of success to help with this. One major project is ferrying weapons and supplies from Iran to Syria through Iraq. Who did Suleimani contact in Iraq to help him, and who answered his call?

Good question. I am not sure. Essentially, the Maliki government allows the Iranian planes to fly over Iraqi airspace unimpeded. One crucial figure in all this is the Transportation Minister, Hadi Al-Ameri. For years, Ameri was the head of the Badr Brigade, a Shiite militia with very close ties to Iran—so close that Badr fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq war.

12. Just as important is that Iran is bringing in its allies to support the Assad regime, which includes Iraqis. What kind of command and control does Suleimani exercise over them, and what are they doing in the war?

The exact command relationship is not clear, but it is quite clear that Iran is instrumental in the recruiting, training and moving of the militias into Syria. So I think the Iranian role is substantial.

SOURCES

Filkins, Dexter, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, 9/30/13

Explaining The Political Factors Behind The Increasing Violence In Iraq, An Interview With Maria Fantappie, Iraq Researcher At The International Crisis Group

 

Violence in Iraq has escalated to the worse levels seen since 2008. The insurgency is making a comeback, while the central government is repeating many of the mistakes made by the United States after the 2003 invasion. The cause of this crisis is a breakdown in the country’s politics. Members of the Sunni community feel increasingly alienated from the government, because their national leadership has failed, their local politicians are ignored, Baghdad has focused the security forces upon their areas, and the protest movement has not achieved any tangible results. To help explain how this situation has led to the current security crisis is Maria Fantappie, a former visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center and currently an Iraq researcher for the International Crisis Group. You can follow her on Twitter @Maria Fantappie and the International Crisis Group @CrisisGroup.

(Abdul Raheem Yasir)

1. In 2009, Sunnis went to the polls after largely boycotting the 2005 provincial vote, and helped put a slew of parties into power. In 2010, many of those same voters came out for Iyad Allawi and Iraqiya, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) which won a plurality of seats in the new parliament. How did Allawi and the other members of the INM turn out to be as national leaders, and how did their performance affect their followers’ opinion of participating in politics?

The key for political success in Iraq is to branch out power from Baghdad into the provinces. Iraqyia leaders focused all efforts on the assignment of government positions in Baghdad, neglecting local officials and constituents in the provinces. This was fatal to the future of the list. Starting from early 2011, while Iyad Allawi persisted in claiming the premiership for himself and the implementation of the Irbil agreement in Baghdad, Maliki ingrained power in the provinces: governors were replaced, police chiefs sacked and Sahwa tribal militias deprived of their salaries. Sunni constituents felt disappointed by their national leader and left under the grip of the government security agencies. Their disappointment evolved into distrust towards the political process altogether. In their eyes, Iraqyia leaders appeared not dissimilar from others of different political colors: locked within Baghdad Green Zone walls and far from people’s concerns.

2. In December 2012, Premier Maliki decided to go after then Finance Minister Rafi Issawi of the INM by issuing warrants for some of his guards. Exactly a year before, a similar situation unfolded with Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi who ended up being convicted in absentia for involvement in attacks. Previous to that, selected leaders of the local security forces known as the Sons of Iraq faced detentions as well. How did these events shape Sunni views of the security forces and Maliki’s rule?

These arrests created the premises for conflict, shaping Sunni self-perceptions and their perception of the government. Sunnis started viewing themselves as victims —targeted by the security forces, excluded from state-institutions, persecuted as terrorists or Baathists —and the government as the source of all this injustice. Al-Issawi events brought these feelings to the boil, exacerbating perceptions of the government’s anti-Sunni agenda, serving the Shiite interests within Iraq and the Iranian agenda in the Middle East. Nine-months of political crisis have turned perceptions into reality. Now more than ever, Sunnis are what they feared to be—excluded, discriminated and criminalized —and the government close to the way they had accused it to be: repressive, discriminatory and bound to Iran’s agenda.

3. How did the regional environment and Syria contribute to the escalation of Iraq’s domestic crisis into a conflict?

The regional environment polarized Iraq along sectarian lines, reducing the space for negotiation between the government and protesters. Earlier in 2013, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the prospect of a Sunni power governing Syria nurtured Iraqi Sunnis hopes for a political comeback boosted the Iraqi Islamic Party aspirations to leadership and mobilized Iraqi Sunnis in protests. This, in turn, directly fed Maliki fears’ of the rise of Sunni radicals in the region pushing the government to assume a defensive position, close to Iran and the Shiite crescent in the region.

4. What divisions have emerged within the demonstrators, and have they been able to achieve any meaningful results?

The conflict evolved over a series of missed opportunities for dialogue from both the government’s and the demonstrators’ side. But the demonstrations’ failure to bring about political leadership gave the government one more reason to shun dialogue and persist in its immovable positions. Sunni tribes, clerics, Iraqi Islamic Party members and insurgency militants gathered into demonstrations against the government, because of a shared feeling of injustice. But protest leaders were often concerned with gaining legitimacy as prominent politicians, clerics, tribal chiefs and thus pushed forward parochial agendas rather than lobbying for the protesters’ demands. Among others, the Iraqi Islamic Party project of establishing a Sunni federal region divided the demonstrations square between proponents and opponents of federalism, and challenged the formation of any negotiation committee.

The Sunni protest movement was a symbol of the dissatisfaction with politics, but also allowed militants to gain more supporters as shown in this photo with black Al Qaeda in Iraq flags flying (AP)

5. How has the failure of national parties, arrests of leaders, and the protest movements inability to bring about changes in government played into the hands of extremists and the insurgency?

Above all, the government’s violent response provided Sunni armed groups opportunities to increase their recruitment and safe-heavens. On 23 April, the government’s violent crackdown on Hawija’s protest sit-in empowered the most radical voices among protesters and silenced those calling for dialogue. The government sowed hostility among Sunni tribes as it armed a new Sahwa faction, depriving others of their salaries, as well as among Sunni citizens, policing their neighborhoods and limiting their mobility. Baghdad lost Sunni local support and with that, the human intelligence needed to counter the re-emergence of armed activities in their areas. Insurgency cells who fought against the U.S. troops found fresh recruits among the frustrated Sunni youth and reactivated their operations in the Kirkuk and Salahaddin provinces. For the first time in years al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq, can count again on local support.  Iraq’s al-Qaeda is now operating with impunity in western Anbar, across the Iraq and Syria border as well as in Syria under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, gaining the support in Sunni areas, helping Iraqis and Syrians in their struggle against their respective governments, Baghdad and Damascus and the resurgence of Sunnis in the region. 

6. A major problem faced by the Sunni community since 2003 is the lack of unity. They have been split between armed struggle and participation in the government, between local and national politicians, nationalist and regional agendas, and other issues. Why do you think there have been so many divisions, and how could they start working together more effectively?

Sunnis do not necessarily need their leaders to ally on the basis of their belonging to the Sunni sect. What Sunnis need is what Iraqyia failed to provide them with: representative leaders. I see the existence of different ideological trends (e.g. Sunni secular and Islamist trends) as rather beneficial to the formation of inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic alliances that will help overcome a rather communitarian political system. Whether together or separately, both Sunni secular and Islamist trends should focus their efforts in effectively representing their base, reach out to provincial officials, help to define the demands of their constituents in the provinces and represent them in Baghdad central institutions.

7. These splits have allowed Maliki to play divide and conquer. Could you provide one or two examples of how the premier has been able to use that tactic, and why do you think he could face long-term troubles if he continues down that path?

So far, Maliki’s policy towards the Sunnis has been rather self-damaging.  Al-Issawi events unified Sunnis against the government, crashed the PM’s image as an Iraqi national leader and compelled him to seek even more U.S. and Iranian support to maintain power. The PM’s policy toward Sunni tribes is archetypal of the short-term benefits of a divide-and-conquer strategy. On February 2013, the government dismantled the Sahwa leadership and supported the formation of  new pro-governmental Sahwa corps— the New Sahwa —providing them with weaponry, salaries and privileges, leaving the former one with empty hands. Last May, al-Qaeda could expand its operations across the Iraq-Syrian frontier, mostly counting on co-operation, weaponry supplies and recruits of former Sahwa, now disenfranchised by governmental policies. In the absence of a radical change of approach, the government risks to further alienate Sunnis from the state, bolster Sunni solidarity with the Syrian armed oppositions, pushing them to cooperate with radical armed groups as a way to weaken the government legitimacy. If there is any way to insulate Iraq from the impact of the Syrian conflict and also for Maliki to secure his own power, this consists in an inclusive Iraqi state.

8. Rather than using greater force, what Iraq needs is some serious concessions and reconciliation to pull the Sunni community back to politics and away from the use of force. What kind of reforms should Baghdad consider?

In order to end violence, the government should win Sunnis back to its side. No security improvement will be reached without involving the Sunni population, security forces and tribes in fighting al-Qaeda and insurgency groups. A first step consists in dealing with outstanding issues that have generated the divide between the government and the Sunni population: deployment of security forces in Sunni populated areas, Sunni participation to the security forces, waves of arrests and exclusions upon alleged affiliation to terrorist groups and or Baathist regime. Also, Sahwa should return to be a united corps and ensured with monthly salaries. Any security plan should involve the co-operation with Sunni local officials, locally recruited police forces and Sahwa corps. Considering the number of missed opportunities to solve this conflict, it is legitimate to question whether or not the government ever made a serious effort to avoid reaching to the current level of violence.  

One of the major issues facing PM Maliki is whether he can put aside his immediate concerns and think long-term to hold onto power

9. Maliki would have to start thinking long-term to try to push for those changes. Right now he seems more focused upon looking strong in the face of the increasing violence, and preparing for next year’s parliamentary elections where he will face tough competition. Do you think he’s capable of putting aside those immediate concerns, and thinking big picture, which might assure him of a longer reign, and a more governorable country?

The lack of a legitimate Sunni leadership to ally with might turn into the prime minister’s biggest liability to a third term on power. The recent crisis delegitimized those Sunnis loyal to the prime minister and empowered a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in particular. Last June, the formation of local councils proved that a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc is a winning formula. ISCI and the Sadrists forged an alliance, and together with the Sunnis’ Mutahidun list garnered the majority needed to rule out Maliki’s coalition from Baghdad governorate. An isolated prime minister will hardly succeed for a third term. If, before or after the parliamentary elections, Shiite groups will stand together against the prime minister, only an alliance with a strong Sunni group could ensure Maliki a third term.

SOURCES

Carnegie Paper, “Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq”, February 2013

International Crisis Group, “Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State,” 8/14/13

Understanding Anbar Before And After The Awakening Part III, Sheikh Ahmed Sattar Al-Rishawi Abu Risha

 

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was not the first in Anbar to challenge Al Qaeda in Iraq’s hold upon the province, but he was the most successful at it. He proposed the Anbar Awakening in 2006, which eventually helped re-take the governorate away from the militants. It was a dramatic transformation for a place that the American forces had almost written off. Abu Risha had far more goals than that, but he wasn’t able to see them come to fruition as he was assassinated a year after he formed the Awakening. His brother, Ahmed Sattar al-Rishawi Abu Risha took over the movement after his brother’s death. He followed through with Abdul’s plans and transformed the movement into a political organization. To Ahmed Abu Risha the Awakening was an initiative that only Iraqis could have come up with, as only they had the ability to sway others away from the insurgency and transform Anbar.

Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha foresaw his Awakening movement as a way to enter Iraqi politics (AP)

Anbar went from good to bad in Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s view after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In 2003, sheikhs negotiated a deal for U.S. forces to enter the province, and they set up a new local government. Abu Risha claimed that things were going fine, until some started talking about fighting the Americans. They condemned those who cooperated with the occupation, and slowly but surely gained more followers as the insurgency began. It quickly moved from attacking the Americans to the Iraqi government and police. Eventually Al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters arrived, and they intensified the violence by going after schools and teachers and anyone involved in politics. Many professionals ended up fleeing the province as a result going to places like Jordan and Syria. Eventually the militants had free reign in Anbar, and seized control of institutions such as the Ramadi hospital, the governorate’s Education Department, universities, and others. Abu Risha claimed that his tribe was not involved in any of these activities at this time, but there are plenty of other accounts that would say otherwise. Most claimed that Abdul Abu Risha cooperated with Al Qaeda in Iraq, and even tried establishing his own nationalist armed group in 2005, but failed. Either way, his account is a common one where Anbar became a hotbed of anti-American and anti-government sentiment, which quickly turned violent. Al Qaeda and other foreign groups took advantage of this situation, and eventually gained control of large sections of the province. The hope for a normal life ceased as a result.

The tribes in Anbar went from accepting this situation to challenging it. According to Ahmed Abu Risha many sheikhs set up their own local security around their compounds, but did little else as their province went up in flames. The insurgency then began challenging the tribes to usurp their power. This affected Abu Risha personally as his father and three brothers were all killed by Al Qaeda in Iraq for disagreeing with it. The tribes were split over what to do. At first, they blamed each other, but then some decided to stand up to the militants. Abu Risha acknowledged that the Albu Mahal tribe had risen up against Al Qaeda before the Awakening in 2005, but there were several others. Those included the Albu Nimr who fought the Islamists along the Syrian border in, and elements of the Dulaimi tribe in Ramadi. The Abu Rishas like to take credit for the tribal revolt, but they were following in the footsteps of several others who had made a decision to challenge the militants the year before. They each had their own motivations ranging from coming under attack by the Islamists to having their businesses taken over to disagreeing with their extremist views, but the point was by 2005 there was a steady change in opinion amongst some sheikhs and clerics that they had enough of the chaos in their governorate, and they needed to do something about it.

Abdul Abu Risha decided to lead his own revolt against Al Qaeda in 2006. Abdul had run a construction and import-export business, but he was also involved in criminal activities such as smuggling. In the fall of 2006, he decided to talk to other tribes to get them organized against the insurgents. In September several sheikhs held a meeting where they announced the formation of the Anbar Awakening. It included 25 of the 31 tribes in Anbar, with around 30,000 armed men. The main plan was to take on the militants, gain American assistance, be accepted by the central government, and then assume power in Anbar through control of the local security forces and the provincial council. These bold ideas showed that Abdul Abu Risha was thinking far ahead of just securing Anbar, and had aspirations to become a national leader in Iraq.

The Awakening started operating in Abu Risha’s home of Ramadi, but then spread across central Iraq. By November 2006, the group had gained control of much of Ramadi. By the summer of 2007 it was sending units to Salahaddin, Diyala, Babil, and Baghdad to organize groups there, as well as the south as many Iraqi tribes have both Shiite and Sunni members. The U.S. began pushing the government to accept the tribesmen in the army and police, and made sure they were trained, armed, and paid on time. In Ramadi for example, the number of police went from around 150 before the Awakening to 1,500 by December 2006, to 3,000 by February 2007. The Awakening eventually broke the back of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar, which was one of its main bases in the country. They played upon the public’s increasingly hostile view of the Islamists who were pushing their foreign ideas and using violence against anyone that opposed them.

When security was restored in Anbar, the Awakening then moved to become a political party. First, Abdul Abu Risha tried to prove his bona fides with Baghdad by meeting with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki three times, and getting the premier to visit Anbar and see the success of the Awakening. They then began challenging Anbar Governor Mamoum Sami Rasheed al-Alwani and the Islamic Party that ran the province, claiming that it was working with the insurgents. By 2007, Abu Risha got some of his followers onto the provincial council, started considering candidates to run in the next elections, set up offices across the country, and registered 400,000 members. Unfortunately, Abdul Abu Risha was killed in September 2007 by Al Qaeda, and was succeeded by his brother Ahmed. In the 2009 vote, he led his party to victory, winning the most seats in Anbar. By that time, the Awakening had men throughout the local security forces, was recognized by both the Americans and Baghdad, and now had control of its home governorate. This was all part of Abdul Abu Risha’s vision to assume power, and spread his influence throughout Iraq. Unlike the Sons of Iraq, which the Americans put together during the Surge, the Awakening was accepted by the central government, because it was seen as an indigenous movement. Baghdad had no problem with them joining the security forces or running in elections. The Abu Rishas emerged as a success story in Iraq, rising up from a minor tribe to being a force in politics.

Ahmed Abu Risha told the Americans that the Awakening could have only come from Iraqis. He rejected the idea that it could have originated with the U.S., because it would not have been accepted. Only locals in Anbar understood the situation, how the tribes and insurgents worked, and could convince others to join them in challenging the militants for power. Abdul Abu Risha also had an expansive vision. He did not just want to rid Anbar of Al Qaeda in Iraq, he wanted that to be his springboard to gain national acceptance into the country’s elite. The Abu Rishas were able to gain power in Anbar, but only found a small voice in Baghdad. In the 2010 elections he joined the Iraqi Unity List along with former Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party. It only won four seats in parliament, and eventually joined with the Iraq Accordance Front in the Centrist Alliance, which then became part of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement (INM) in 2011. That series of events showed that the Awakening had lost much of its standing after the 2009 vote. Its alliance with the INM didn’t work out either as it came out on the losing end of its long running battle with Premier Maliki. By 2012 Ahmed Abu Risha joined the Anbar protests, and became one of its main leaders. That has now run its course with few results, so Abu Risha will have to find a new way to fulfill his aspirations of transforming his local movement into a national one.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Marine-led Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,” Knight Ridder, 5/17/05

Al-Ansary, Khalid and Adeeb, Ali, “Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite Against Insurgents,” New York Times, 9/18/06

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