Maliki Goes After Rival Governments in Diyala, Wasit and Basra

 

In the last few months Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL) list has been moving against provincial governments in Diyala, Wasit, and Basra that largely excluded them after last year’s elections. The modus operandi has been the same all three governorates: a member of SOL on the provincial council sues the local administration over how the government was put together and the Maliki friendly courts have ruled them unconstitutional. That has led to the creation of two rival governments in Diyala, an attempt is underway to get rid of the one in Wasit, and Basra might be next.

State of Law first made a move against the Diyala provincial government. In October 2013, the Integrity Commission issued an arrest warrant for Governor Omar Humairi on corruption charges. At the same time, the Diyala National Coalition, which was just State of Law by then, went to court saying that how the ruling coalition was formed was illegal. The Diyala government was formed in June 2013 after provincial elections. It was made up of Iraqiya Diyala consisting of Speaker of Parliament Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun and Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, the Kurdish Brotherhood and Coexistence List, and the Sadrists’ Ahrar/Liberal bloc. The Sadrists were originally part of the Diyala National Coalition, but abandoned it to shut State of Law out of the new administration. That was the basis for the SOL lawsuit.

Diyala Governor Humairi was removed by a State of Law initiated lawsuit (Al Masalah)

The court ruled in favor of State of Law, and this led to the creation of two rival administrations. First, Humairi claimed that Maliki didn’t have the authority to remove him. He ended up fleeing to Kurdistan to escape the warrant out for him. At the end of January 2014, his supporters in Iraqiya Diyala, the Sadrists and the Brotherhood and Coexistence List met in Khanaqin, a Kurdish controlled district of the province and re-elected Humairi governor. Just a few days beforehand the other members of the provincial council picked Muthanna al-Tamimi from Badr within the Diyala National Coalition as the new head of council, and Ameer Salman Yacoub as the new governor. The two rival governments condemned each other calling their elections illegal. Since Yacoub and Tamimi are in the provincial seat and have the support of Maliki they will have control of the province, while Humairi will be limited to the Kurdish controlled parts of Diyala. Despite this the premier accomplished his goal. A local government that had shut out his coalition was forced out, and now a friendly one was put in place. This was thanks to the courts, which are Maliki-friendly. With this model in place the prime minister moved on to other governorates.

A similar set of circumstances played out in Wasit. There, the Supreme Council’s Citizen’s Alliance and the Sadrists cooperated to form a ruling coalition of all the winning parties with the exception of State of Law. That gave the governorship to the Supreme Council and the head of council to Ahrar. Again, Maliki’s list sued claiming that the formation process was unconstitutional, and won a favorable ruling on March 3. (1) The provincial police chief was then issued orders to remove the government from office. That hasn’t happened yet, but Maliki has once again relied upon the judiciary to get rid of a provincial authority he did not agree with. Unlike in Diyala where State of Law was completely shut out of the administration, in Wasit it got the 2^nd deputy governor position. That made the court decision all the more questionable, and highlights that the courts are in the pocket of the prime minister.

A third case is now pending against the Basra government. There State of Law won the most seats, 16 of 35 and got the head of council position, while the Citizen’s Alliance won the governorship. It appears SOL was not happy with that and now wants the top job. Just as in Diyala and Wasit a member of SOL has gone to court challenging how the ruling coalition was put together. March 6 the judiciary said that it was postponing the appeal against the Basra administration. Given the other two rulings however if Maliki wants the Basra government removed he will get it.

After the 2013 provincial elections State of Law was excluded from several local governments. This was mostly the work of the Sadrist’s Ahrar. It saw the opportunity to assert itself and take on the prime minister. Diyala and Wasit were two examples. Maliki was obviously not happy with that. He didn’t act immediately after the vote, but he is now taking his revenge by getting the Diyala and Wasit governments ruled illegal by the courts. Basra is a more blatant power play since SOL was part of the ruling coalition and has the head of the council. There it appears Maliki wants the governorship. There is little that these administrations can do since the premier has control of the judiciary, the purse, and the security forces. The rival administration of Humairi in Diyala can do little, and it’s yet to be seen how things will play out in Wasit and Basra. This is a very bad sign for Iraq’s developing democracy. It undermines the will of the voters since only in Basra did State of Law get the most votes. It also makes the whole process of putting together a government meaningless. Maliki’s manipulations of the courts means that even if his party was a minority they can remove any administration that displeases them and take power. Finally it is a foreboding series of events before this year’s election, because it could mean that the prime minister will resort to the courts if things do not go his way as a means to hold onto power.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sotaliraq, “Wasit police chief stripped the governor and members of his bloc of positions,” 3/6/14

SOURCES

AIN, “Diyala National Alliance; Majmayi, formal Governor of Diyala province,” 1/31/14

- “Diyala PC keeps session open till electing new governor,” 1/2/14

- “Diyala PC reveals arrest warrant against Governor,” 10/29/13

- “Urgent…Hameri elected as new governor of Diyala,” 1/30/14

Buratha News, “Choosing Amer Salman Yacoub governor of Diyala, succeeding Humairi winning the majority of votes,” 1/3/14

- “Diyala province announces an order to withdraw the hand of former portfolio,” 1/8/14

Al Forat, “Diyala former Governor escapes to Sulaymaniyah, says official,” 1/18/14

Independent Press Agency, “Iraqiya choose Amer Yacoub governor of Diyala,” 1/3/14

Al Mada, “Diyala administration “article” rejects the results of the session of Khanaqin and stresses: Humairi required judicial,” 1/31/14

- “Diyala governor: people who have lost their positions behind the rumors of the issuance of an arrest warrant for me,” 10/30/13

- “Hakim bloc in Basra confirms “the futility of” challenging the lawfulness of the local government by al-Maliki’s coalition,” 3/10/14

-“Iraqi Diyala provincial council sessions intersection: the new governor was dismissed by presidential decree,” 2/5/14

- “Three blocks in Diyala Council meet next Thursday to choose local government and deputy governor to fill “void,”” 1/28/14

Al Masalah, “Humairi: I am legally the governor of Diyala..The news of the withdrawal of hand untrue,” 1/9/14

- “Humairi: we will resort to court ot challenge the inauguration Nostra governor of Diyala because he is accused of terrorism,” 2/2/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Diyala province council exempts the former governor, and his first deputy, from their posts officially,” 1/21/14

Shafaq News, “Presidency of the Republic ratify assignment of Amer al-Majmaee as Diyala governor,” 2/2/14

- “Source: Governor of Diyala disappears after Tamimi takes office,” 1/18/14

Sotaliraq, “Wasit police chief stripped the governor and members of his bloc of positions,” 3/6/14

Explaining The Political Factors Behind The Increasing Violence In Iraq, An Interview With Maria Fantappie, Iraq Researcher At The International Crisis Group

 

Violence in Iraq has escalated to the worse levels seen since 2008. The insurgency is making a comeback, while the central government is repeating many of the mistakes made by the United States after the 2003 invasion. The cause of this crisis is a breakdown in the country’s politics. Members of the Sunni community feel increasingly alienated from the government, because their national leadership has failed, their local politicians are ignored, Baghdad has focused the security forces upon their areas, and the protest movement has not achieved any tangible results. To help explain how this situation has led to the current security crisis is Maria Fantappie, a former visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center and currently an Iraq researcher for the International Crisis Group. You can follow her on Twitter @Maria Fantappie and the International Crisis Group @CrisisGroup.

(Abdul Raheem Yasir)

1. In 2009, Sunnis went to the polls after largely boycotting the 2005 provincial vote, and helped put a slew of parties into power. In 2010, many of those same voters came out for Iyad Allawi and Iraqiya, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) which won a plurality of seats in the new parliament. How did Allawi and the other members of the INM turn out to be as national leaders, and how did their performance affect their followers’ opinion of participating in politics?

The key for political success in Iraq is to branch out power from Baghdad into the provinces. Iraqyia leaders focused all efforts on the assignment of government positions in Baghdad, neglecting local officials and constituents in the provinces. This was fatal to the future of the list. Starting from early 2011, while Iyad Allawi persisted in claiming the premiership for himself and the implementation of the Irbil agreement in Baghdad, Maliki ingrained power in the provinces: governors were replaced, police chiefs sacked and Sahwa tribal militias deprived of their salaries. Sunni constituents felt disappointed by their national leader and left under the grip of the government security agencies. Their disappointment evolved into distrust towards the political process altogether. In their eyes, Iraqyia leaders appeared not dissimilar from others of different political colors: locked within Baghdad Green Zone walls and far from people’s concerns.

2. In December 2012, Premier Maliki decided to go after then Finance Minister Rafi Issawi of the INM by issuing warrants for some of his guards. Exactly a year before, a similar situation unfolded with Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi who ended up being convicted in absentia for involvement in attacks. Previous to that, selected leaders of the local security forces known as the Sons of Iraq faced detentions as well. How did these events shape Sunni views of the security forces and Maliki’s rule?

These arrests created the premises for conflict, shaping Sunni self-perceptions and their perception of the government. Sunnis started viewing themselves as victims —targeted by the security forces, excluded from state-institutions, persecuted as terrorists or Baathists —and the government as the source of all this injustice. Al-Issawi events brought these feelings to the boil, exacerbating perceptions of the government’s anti-Sunni agenda, serving the Shiite interests within Iraq and the Iranian agenda in the Middle East. Nine-months of political crisis have turned perceptions into reality. Now more than ever, Sunnis are what they feared to be—excluded, discriminated and criminalized —and the government close to the way they had accused it to be: repressive, discriminatory and bound to Iran’s agenda.

3. How did the regional environment and Syria contribute to the escalation of Iraq’s domestic crisis into a conflict?

The regional environment polarized Iraq along sectarian lines, reducing the space for negotiation between the government and protesters. Earlier in 2013, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the prospect of a Sunni power governing Syria nurtured Iraqi Sunnis hopes for a political comeback boosted the Iraqi Islamic Party aspirations to leadership and mobilized Iraqi Sunnis in protests. This, in turn, directly fed Maliki fears’ of the rise of Sunni radicals in the region pushing the government to assume a defensive position, close to Iran and the Shiite crescent in the region.

4. What divisions have emerged within the demonstrators, and have they been able to achieve any meaningful results?

The conflict evolved over a series of missed opportunities for dialogue from both the government’s and the demonstrators’ side. But the demonstrations’ failure to bring about political leadership gave the government one more reason to shun dialogue and persist in its immovable positions. Sunni tribes, clerics, Iraqi Islamic Party members and insurgency militants gathered into demonstrations against the government, because of a shared feeling of injustice. But protest leaders were often concerned with gaining legitimacy as prominent politicians, clerics, tribal chiefs and thus pushed forward parochial agendas rather than lobbying for the protesters’ demands. Among others, the Iraqi Islamic Party project of establishing a Sunni federal region divided the demonstrations square between proponents and opponents of federalism, and challenged the formation of any negotiation committee.

The Sunni protest movement was a symbol of the dissatisfaction with politics, but also allowed militants to gain more supporters as shown in this photo with black Al Qaeda in Iraq flags flying (AP)

5. How has the failure of national parties, arrests of leaders, and the protest movements inability to bring about changes in government played into the hands of extremists and the insurgency?

Above all, the government’s violent response provided Sunni armed groups opportunities to increase their recruitment and safe-heavens. On 23 April, the government’s violent crackdown on Hawija’s protest sit-in empowered the most radical voices among protesters and silenced those calling for dialogue. The government sowed hostility among Sunni tribes as it armed a new Sahwa faction, depriving others of their salaries, as well as among Sunni citizens, policing their neighborhoods and limiting their mobility. Baghdad lost Sunni local support and with that, the human intelligence needed to counter the re-emergence of armed activities in their areas. Insurgency cells who fought against the U.S. troops found fresh recruits among the frustrated Sunni youth and reactivated their operations in the Kirkuk and Salahaddin provinces. For the first time in years al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq, can count again on local support.  Iraq’s al-Qaeda is now operating with impunity in western Anbar, across the Iraq and Syria border as well as in Syria under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, gaining the support in Sunni areas, helping Iraqis and Syrians in their struggle against their respective governments, Baghdad and Damascus and the resurgence of Sunnis in the region. 

6. A major problem faced by the Sunni community since 2003 is the lack of unity. They have been split between armed struggle and participation in the government, between local and national politicians, nationalist and regional agendas, and other issues. Why do you think there have been so many divisions, and how could they start working together more effectively?

Sunnis do not necessarily need their leaders to ally on the basis of their belonging to the Sunni sect. What Sunnis need is what Iraqyia failed to provide them with: representative leaders. I see the existence of different ideological trends (e.g. Sunni secular and Islamist trends) as rather beneficial to the formation of inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic alliances that will help overcome a rather communitarian political system. Whether together or separately, both Sunni secular and Islamist trends should focus their efforts in effectively representing their base, reach out to provincial officials, help to define the demands of their constituents in the provinces and represent them in Baghdad central institutions.

7. These splits have allowed Maliki to play divide and conquer. Could you provide one or two examples of how the premier has been able to use that tactic, and why do you think he could face long-term troubles if he continues down that path?

So far, Maliki’s policy towards the Sunnis has been rather self-damaging.  Al-Issawi events unified Sunnis against the government, crashed the PM’s image as an Iraqi national leader and compelled him to seek even more U.S. and Iranian support to maintain power. The PM’s policy toward Sunni tribes is archetypal of the short-term benefits of a divide-and-conquer strategy. On February 2013, the government dismantled the Sahwa leadership and supported the formation of  new pro-governmental Sahwa corps— the New Sahwa —providing them with weaponry, salaries and privileges, leaving the former one with empty hands. Last May, al-Qaeda could expand its operations across the Iraq-Syrian frontier, mostly counting on co-operation, weaponry supplies and recruits of former Sahwa, now disenfranchised by governmental policies. In the absence of a radical change of approach, the government risks to further alienate Sunnis from the state, bolster Sunni solidarity with the Syrian armed oppositions, pushing them to cooperate with radical armed groups as a way to weaken the government legitimacy. If there is any way to insulate Iraq from the impact of the Syrian conflict and also for Maliki to secure his own power, this consists in an inclusive Iraqi state.

8. Rather than using greater force, what Iraq needs is some serious concessions and reconciliation to pull the Sunni community back to politics and away from the use of force. What kind of reforms should Baghdad consider?

In order to end violence, the government should win Sunnis back to its side. No security improvement will be reached without involving the Sunni population, security forces and tribes in fighting al-Qaeda and insurgency groups. A first step consists in dealing with outstanding issues that have generated the divide between the government and the Sunni population: deployment of security forces in Sunni populated areas, Sunni participation to the security forces, waves of arrests and exclusions upon alleged affiliation to terrorist groups and or Baathist regime. Also, Sahwa should return to be a united corps and ensured with monthly salaries. Any security plan should involve the co-operation with Sunni local officials, locally recruited police forces and Sahwa corps. Considering the number of missed opportunities to solve this conflict, it is legitimate to question whether or not the government ever made a serious effort to avoid reaching to the current level of violence.  

One of the major issues facing PM Maliki is whether he can put aside his immediate concerns and think long-term to hold onto power

9. Maliki would have to start thinking long-term to try to push for those changes. Right now he seems more focused upon looking strong in the face of the increasing violence, and preparing for next year’s parliamentary elections where he will face tough competition. Do you think he’s capable of putting aside those immediate concerns, and thinking big picture, which might assure him of a longer reign, and a more governorable country?

The lack of a legitimate Sunni leadership to ally with might turn into the prime minister’s biggest liability to a third term on power. The recent crisis delegitimized those Sunnis loyal to the prime minister and empowered a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in particular. Last June, the formation of local councils proved that a Shiite anti-Maliki bloc is a winning formula. ISCI and the Sadrists forged an alliance, and together with the Sunnis’ Mutahidun list garnered the majority needed to rule out Maliki’s coalition from Baghdad governorate. An isolated prime minister will hardly succeed for a third term. If, before or after the parliamentary elections, Shiite groups will stand together against the prime minister, only an alliance with a strong Sunni group could ensure Maliki a third term.

SOURCES

Carnegie Paper, “Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq”, February 2013

International Crisis Group, “Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State,” 8/14/13

Understanding Anbar Before And After The Awakening Part IV, Sheikh Wissam Abdul Ibrahim Hardan

Sheikh Abdul Abu Risha and Sheikh Wissam Abdul Ibrahim Hardan were the brains behind the Anbar Awakening. The two met in 2006, and decided to organize the major tribes in the province against the insurgents. The problem was that many of the sheikhs were reluctant at first to join in Abu Risha and Hardan’s scheme. The Awakening also had to convince the Americans of their sincerity, and deal with the Iraqi Islamic Party that controlled Anbar. Once they overcame these difficulties, and were successful in expelling the militants however, the Awakening began breaking up. Those divisions are still apparent today as Hardan has now become an ally of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and opposes his former Anbar brethren. The Awakening experience for Hardan then was a disappointment. He became a hero for fighting militants, but then failed to gain the local and national power that he hoped for.

Sheikh Hardan had his own views on opposing the insurgency before the Awakening was formed. He felt that the militants were using indiscriminate violence. They killed former military officers and sheikhs in Anbar, along with pushing out many of the province’s Shiite residents. Many of these people became refugees in neighboring countries or within Iraq itself. Sheikh Hardan finally had enough, and in 2005 gathered around 500 ex-soldiers to fight the insurgents. He went to then Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi who was a relative of his to ask permission for his fighters to carry weapons, but he was turned down. That put an end to Hardan’s initiative for the time being, because without government support his men could be arrested and killed by the security forces. Hardan’s main motivation was his belief that the insurgents had gone too far in Anbar. His first attempt at challenging them failed, but he did not give up.

In 2006, Hardan was stirred into action again, this time by Sheikh Abdul Abu Risha. The two were connected by marriage, as Hardan’s wife was Abu Risha’s cousin. Abu Risha contacted Hardan to meet with him about an idea to get the sheikhs in Anbar organized against the militants. Hardan was reluctant at first, but they eventually got together and came up with a plan. The first step was that they needed to convince the tribes that the time had come to confront the insurgents. The second was that they had to get popular support. Hardan then went about contacting the clerics in the province such as Abdul Malik al-Saadi and Ahmed al-Kubaysi. Hardan eventually got a fatwa condoning attacks upon the militants. This was the first move towards forming the Awakening. Many American accounts of Anbar stress the tribes, but fail to mention the role of the religious establishment in transforming the province. Abu Risha and Hardan knew their importance, and that was why they went to them first. Their personal relationship was also important, because Abu Risha was a young sheikh from a minor tribe. He came up with the idea of a new tribal revolt, but lacked the standing to convince others of his idea. That was why he reached out to Hardan who was far more prominent to talk to the sheikhs. He became the elder statesman of the Awakening.

Next on the agenda was a trip to Amman, Jordan to convince the sheikhs who had fled the fighting in Anbar to come back and join the revolt. Sheikh Hardan was again at the forefront contacting tribes and their leaders trying to get them to commit 50 fighters each. Many did not want to work with Abu Risha, because he had contacts with the Americans, and was therefore considered a collaborator with the occupation. Others accused Hardan and Abu Risha of not being real sheikhs, and attempting to usurp their power over their tribes. Hardan used the murder of Sheikh Khalid Araq Ataymi from the Albu Aetha tribe by Al Qaeda in Iraq as a rallying point, saying that the other tribes needed to avenge his death. Ataymi was thinking of his own uprising at the time, and was killed as a result. Finally a meeting was set in September 2006, which led to the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council. 41 sheikhs were chosen to be on the council with Abu Risha named governor of Anbar since the group claimed the real one was illegitimate, Hardan was made his deputy, and Sheikh Hamid Farhan al-Hayes was made head of the group. Hardan’s standing in Anbar and the continued violence of the insurgents helped turn opinion in Abu Risha’s favor, and led to the creation of the Awakening. Hardan also claimed that he was given a speech by the Americans to deliver to the sheikhs. If true, that might have convinced some to join as well, because that meant they would get the military support of the U.S.

After several tribes rose up in Anbar, Hardan and Abu Risha tried to acquire government approval for their actions. Hardan contacted his friend Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi from the Ummah Party to get him to be a middleman with Baghdad. Eventually an appointment was made with Prime Minister Maliki, which went very badly. The premier did not want to give the tribes any aid, they in turn threatened him, and it seemed like nothing was achieved. Two days later, National Security Adviser Mowfaq Rubaie announced that the government was backing the Awakening. Hardan gave no explanation for this turn around. One of the goals of the Awakening from the beginning was to gain official recognition, something Hardan had tried and failed at in 2005. The group always wanted to be accepted by the authorities so that they could openly operate, and more importantly it wanted to put their men into the local police and army units, so that they could eventually take over Anbar. By controlling the security forces they would have a monopoly on the use of force a traditional way to power in Iraq. Maliki was weary of them at first, since they were Sunnis, and many had contacts with the insurgency, but they were eventually accepted as an indigenous Iraqi movement. That would later cause divisions in Anbar, as Abu Risha and Hardan were accused of being puppets of Baghdad. Those internal disputes would be the downfall of the Awakening.

Getting the support of the Americans and the Anbar provincial government proved much more difficult and divisive for the Awakening. Abu Risha was always in contact with Americans forces to inform them of his operations so that his units would not be attacked. They went back and forth, but eventually threw their lot in with the tribes. The governor of Anbar at that time was Mamoun Sami Rasheed from the Iraqi Islamic Party. He did not approve of the Awakening seeing it as a threat to his power. Hardan also warned Abu Risha about getting involved with politicians, believing that they could easily manipulate the sheikh. The Americans set up a meeting in Fallujah between Governor Rasheed, Abu Risha, General Richard Zilmer the Marine commander in the province, and a delegation from the U.S. Embassy. After a large argument between Abu Risha and Governor Rasheed, General Zilmer suggested a compromise between the two, which eventually allowed five members of the Awakening to join the provincial council. This deal caused a split between Hardan and Abu Risha and his brother Ahmed Abu Risha. Hardan accused Ahmed Abu Risha of being close to the Islamic Party, and selling out the tribes. Hardan claimed that this divide within the movement increased in the following months, and led to it being infiltrated, and Abdul Abu Risha’s eventual assassination in September 2007. The Americans did finally come around and support the Awakening after a rough start. The outreach to the Islamic Party proved much more difficult, and was perhaps the undoing of the organization. Ahmed Abu Risha continued to make deals with the Islamic Party such as before the 2009 provincial elections. This was condemned by other members of the Awakening such as Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. It also led to the official break-up of the group as Abu Risha, Hayes, and two other prominent members Ali al-Sulaiman and Amer al-Sulaiman all ran separately in the vote. Abu Risha’s party ended up winning the most seats on the Anbar council in 2009, but at a price, the end of the Awakening. Today, the major sheikhs in the movement have all reverted to their own individual agendas. Abu Risha continues his ties with the Islamic Party, and is a major leader in the Anbar protest movement, while Hardan is now allied with Sheikh Hayes and Prime Minister Maliki in opposition. Once the unity of the sheikhs was lost, so were their hopes for greater power within the country. The break-up of the Awakening allowed the Islamic Party, Baghdad, and others to cut deals and play divide and conquer in Anbar. It is these continued splits within the province that help explain why Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, which was backed by Abu Risha and the protesters only won eight out of 30 seats in the 2013 provincial elections. There are simply far too many leaders in Anbar to win a decisive political victory there. From the start, Abdul Abu Risha and Hardan wanted national status. It seemed like they were going to achieve that when both Baghdad and the Americans supported the Awakening, they were able to place their men within the Anbar security forces, and gain seats on the Anbar council. That success however, led to jealousy and bitterness between the sheikhs, which still exist and divides the province.

Sheikh Hardan’s story highlights the rise and fall of the Anbar Awakening. He and Sheikh Abu Risha were the founders of the Awakening, and had a grand vision of turning their tribal revolt in Anbar into a national movement that would lead to influence in Baghdad. Their early success turned to disappointment when they got involved in politics. Hardan warned about cutting deals with the Iraqi Islamic Party, and that led to divisions within the movement, and its eventual break-up. Today there are several different Awakening groups in Anbar all competing with each other. Hardan leads one, and has aligned with Premier Maliki against Abu Risha and the protests. These internal rivalries have weakened the sheikhs, pitted them against each other, and opened the door to outside influence. That explains why the Awakening did not go from a local success story to a national power in Iraq.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed, “The Struggle of the Iraqi Security Forces: 2013 Iraq Update #33,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/21/13

Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09

Habib, Musafa, “govt neglect of anti-al-qaeda movement to blame for iraq’s deadly summer?” Niqash, 8/22/13

Jaffe, Greg, “How Courting Sheikhs Slowed Violence in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 8/8/07

Kazimi, Nibras, “An Initial Look at the Registrants for Provincial Election,” Talisman Gate, 6/12/08

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08

Al-Mada, “Iraq Awakening: Insurgents began infiltrating the residential cities in Anbar to the impunity of the security forces,” 7/8/13

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

National Iraqi News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Tens break away from Sahwa, joint protestors in Anbar,” 5/28/13

Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendancy of Tribes,” Washington Post, 1/25/09

Synovitz, Ron, “Sunni Rivalries Threaten Iraq’s Local Elections,” Radio Free Iraq, 4/7/13

Sadrists Increasing Their Attacks Upon Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki Once Again

Since the results of the 2013 provincial elections were announced, the Sadr Trend has increased its rhetoric against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Sadrists have played this double game before attacking the premier off and on, while taking no substantive measures against him, and holding onto the most ministries within the government. Now it appears the party is increasing its criticism in preparation for the 2014 national vote. Moqtada al-Sadr has always aspired to become the preeminent Shiite leader in Iraq, and with his showing in the 2013 balloting, and the deteriorating security situation he may feel like he has a real chance to surpass Maliki and his State of Law list.

The 2013 governorate level elections inspired the Sadr List to challenge Premier Maliki one more time. The Sadrists gained seven seats in the vote going from 41 to 47 seats across 14 provinces. More importantly, they worked with other parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to shut the premier’s State of Law out of power in places like Baghdad and Basra. That combined with the wave of violence that has swept the country recently has opened cracks in Maliki’s armor, which the Sadrists are now attempting to exploit.

Sadrist lawmaker Shirifi has been one of the premier’s staunchest critics in the last few weeks (AIN)

The result is that every week a Sadr politician issues some type of statement criticizing the premier’s rule. On August 6, lawmaker Hussein al-Shirifi told the press that Maliki should not run again blaming him for the country’s poverty, unemployment, corruption, and lack of security. Two days later Shirifi claimed that the prime minister had allowed Baathists to infiltrate the security forces, and that they were now running the government. Then he condemned State of Law parliamentarian Izzat Shabandar for speaking up against the Najaf clergy. August 9, member of parliament (MP) Awad Awadi said that the latest security operation the Revenge of the Martyrs was launched too late, followed up by Shirifi accusing State of Law of spreading sectarianism in the country. On August 11, MP Hussein Mansouri said that families should sue Maliki for the violence surrounding the Al Qaeda in Iraq raid upon the Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons in Baghdad, and even claimed that the prime minister was somehow behind the operation. Two days later, lawmaker Iqbal Ghurabi stated that the Sadrists put Maliki in office, and therefore did not need to listen to his orders or take his advice. Sadrists then criticized the prime minister for always working alone instead of cooperating with his allies. On August 18, Mansouri told Maliki that he should resign if he cared about the Iraqi people since he was failing to run the country. Then on August 20, Shirifi noted that parliament had passed a law limiting the prime minister to only two terms, which meant Maliki could not run again next year, and that could not be changed, while Ghurabi claimed that Maliki’s Dawa Party was aligning with Washington to keep him in power even if that meant bringing back the occupation of the country. This relentless wave of attacks will likely be the norm for the next several months until the 2014 elections. This follows previous criticisms and threats by Sadr where he pulled his ministers out of the cabinet earlier this year, flirted with the Anbar protests in January, and considered a no confidence vote against Maliki in the summer of 2012. What all these events share in common is that they were all for show. Sadr has taken no real action against the premier even though he could seriously weaken the government if he wanted to. Rather his strategy has been to try to distance himself from Maliki publicly, and paint his rule in the worst possible manner, while maintaining ministries, and keeping the prime minister in office. Sadr basically wants to have his cake and eat it too.

Moqtada al-Sadr may finally be gaining enough confidence to take on Maliki head on. In the past, Sadr has attacked the prime minister to raise his status with the public, while working behind the scenes to gain concessions for a larger role in the government. Now, after the 2013 elections, the Sadrists worked with other parties to push the State of Law out of a few very important provincial governments. The level and intensity of rhetoric against the premier has increased since then as well. The problem with the movement is that it has taken similar steps before only to fall in line behind Maliki after a short period. Sadr definitely would like to surpass Maliki, and obtain the premiership, but right now it appears that the latest wave of criticism is just part of the back and forth that the two sides have taken part in before.

SOURCES

AIN, “Baathists control governance in Iraq again, says Sadrist MP,” 8/8/13

- “Sadr bloc warns Maliki from nominating for 3^rd term,” 8/6/13

- “Sadrist MP accuses DIP of allying with Washington to keep Maliki’s post,” 8/21/13

- “Sadrist MP accuses SLC of adopting sectarian political tendency,” 8/10/13

- “Sadrist MP calls violence victims’ families to sue Maliki,” 8/11/13

- “Sadrist MP describes recent security operation as “late procedure,”” 8/9/13

- “Sadrist MP: Maliki to resign his post, if he cares about citizens’ suffering,” 8/18/13

- “Sadrist MP: Parliament limits PM’s terms to 2,” 8/20/13

- “Sadrist MP: Sadr Trend rejects Maliki’s advices,” 8/13/13

- “Sadrist MP: Statements against Religious Authority to belittle Muslims’ feelings,” 8/8/13

Al-Tamimi, Iyad, “Supreme Council and the Liberals the National Alliance: Maliki boycotted our meeting and Jaafari failed in management,” Al-Mada, 8/14/13

Iraq Experts Give Their Opinions On The 2013 Provincial Elections

Iraq recently completed its 2013 provincial elections. There was a slight delay as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki held off on the voting in Ninewa and Anbar until June for what he claimed were security reasons. Those have now been completed, and all the provinces that cast ballots have new governments. This year’s governorate level vote was quite different than the last ones held in 2009 when the premier’s State of Law swept up most of the south and Baghdad. Now he is being challenged by his erstwhile allies the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrists. The Sunni vote was splintered amongst several different parties as well. Here are the thoughts and opinions of several different Iraq experts on this year’s election.

Harith Hasan al-Qarawee is a scholar of political science. He currently is an editor at the Al-Mutawassit Institution for Reading and Cultural Exchange in Italy. He is the author of Imagining the Nation: Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-political Conflict in Iraq. He tweets at @harith_hasan

The vote and the subsequent process of provincial administrations formation indicate that Maliki is facing strong Shi’a rivals who are ready to go as far as creating cross-sectarian alliances to limit his power. The fact that his party was excluded from the administrations in Baghdad and Basra, two strategically and demographically important provinces, is very telling. If this pattern will continue in the general election, next year, his chances to secure a third term are very limited. Unlike the pre-voting predictions and despite the mobilization process in their areas, Sunni voters are still divided on regional, tribal, and ideological lines. [Speaker Osama Nujafi’s] Mutahidun did not emerge as the dominant Sunni list, although it is now the most powerful coalition. While sectarian factors will be more prominent in the general election, the fact that Nujafi and other powerful Sunni leaders need to maintain good relations with Sadr and Hakim to oust Maliki, could de-escalate sectarian discourse. This very much depends on whether Sadr and Hakim would keep their alliance (I think they would) and whether Maliki would consolidate his convergence with Deputy Premier Mutlaq, Karbouli [head of the Solution Movement], and some Sunni tribal leaders, entering the election in a united cross-sectarian slate. There are some good indicators that the general election would not be merely a Sunni-Shi’a competition but, instead, a new dynamic of Pro-Maliki vs. Anti-Maliki (not necessarily before the election) forces would emerge.  

Kamal Chomani is a columnist for the Kurdistan Tribune who previously was an editor for Lvin Magazine. He tweets at @KamalChomani

Iraq's provincial elections showed some new coalitions, especially the Ammar Hakim-Moqtada al-Sadr coalition, which was a strong blow to the face of Maliki, yet Maliki appears the winner. The Hakim-Sadr coalition couldn't satisfy the Kurds to put an end to Maliki's dreams. The Kurds rescued Maliki from the scenarios that Hakim and Sadr had in mind. Now that Maliki and [Kurdish President] Barzani’s relations are getting better, in addition to his very good relations with Talabani, and the KDP-PUK refusal to enter into a Hakim-Sadr coalition against Maliki, Maliki is as successful as he was before. Losing some local governments, Baghdad for example, hurt Maliki but it doesn't change anything for now until the Provincial Law that was recently passed by parliament is put into practice. The local governments do not have sufficient power now to enable the political parties to use them in political conflicts, that's why Maliki doesn't seem happy with the new provincial law. One interesting outcome of the provincial elections was forming local government in which most of them were either pro-Maliki in a majoritarian vote or anti-Maliki in coalitions of different blocs. Forming local government in majority votes should be taken as a new development. Though losing Basra and Baghdad cannot be compensated by Maliki, keeping control of the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala has symbolic importance. All in all, the provincial elections showed that Maliki cannot be easily defeated. He will be the one in the upcoming general elections that can continue his popularity in the major cities. For the Kurds in the KRG, it is also important to question the KRG's local government's legitimacy. It has been years since the local governments of Irbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniya have expired. The two ruling parties have delayed election there 5 times. Ultimately the provincial elections were supposed to be held along with parliamentarian elections in September 21, 2013, but again it was delayed. The KRG always proudly talks about its democracy and stability in the region, but having no provincial elections without having any serious reasons, is an obvious violation of democratic principles.

Ramzy Mardini is an adjunct fellow at the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies in Lebanon. He was previously a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and the Jamestown Foundation.

Politics remains the coin of the realm in Iraq, and while sectarianism may be the dominant brand of contemporary political fashion, the machinations that have underlined the post-electoral deal making process in 2013 appears to have followed a balance-of-power logic. It is important to note that pragmatism and change ought never be underrated from occurring; anything is possible and nothing can ever be entirely discounted in Iraq. Structures and systems are not destined to remain constant, and the reiteration of the electoral process will output different political configurations over time. The most important feature is that counter-balancing behavior, not bandwagoning, appears to be dominating the political saga within Shi’a circles -- thus infusing an incentive structure for cross-sectarian alliances to emerge down the road. Indeed, should diverging political interests within the majority sect continue to harden, its spillover onto the national scene is more likely to occur. In other words, the more inward and the more intense intra-sect competition is, the better hope that Iraq’s politics will evolve in a more positive, inclusionary direction. But intra-Shi’a politics sets the national tone, and there remains powerful regional forces, both agents (e.g. Iran) and structure (e.g. Syria’s civil war) that will work to keep the Shi’a united, and thus, Iraq divided.

Reidar Visser is a historian who has studied federalism and regionalism in southern Iraq and Iraqi nationalism. He has authored Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq, A Responsible End? The United States and the Iraqi Transition, 2005-2010, and co-edited An Iraq of its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? He runs the blog Iraq and Gulf Analysis and tweets at @reidarvisser

The Iraqi provincial elections held on 20 April produced two important windows on the state of affairs in Iraqi politics. First, there are the election results themselves. Prominent features include Maliki’s relative decline, ISCI’s comeback, and the relatively modest performance of the Nujafi brothers establishing themselves as leading Sunni/secular force from Bara to Diyala, and effectively replacing Iraqiya, but losing votes spectacularly on their home turf in Ninewa when compared to the last elections in 2009. The strong decline in numbers of seats for the Maliki bloc was so marked that it prompted them to criticize the recent change from the largest remainder principle to the Sainte Lague method for allocating seats under Iraq’s proportional election system. Then there was the process of forming new local governments. During the course of that process, Maliki lost out further, showing a lack of talent for negotiating even from positions of relative strength. The most spectacular example is Basra where Maliki emerged with 16 out of 35 seats, and yet with all the advantages of incumbency did not manage to secure the mere two extra councilor votes required to secure the governorship. Other potentially ominous developments for Maliki include the formation of majority governments against him in places like Baghdad, Diyala, and Wasit, with the two first featuring Sunnis and Shiites joining against him (Nujafi, Sadr and ISCI). Recent council formations in Anbar and Ninewa seem to restore some of the prestige the Nujafi brothers lost in the vote count since they are now a key player in coalition governments in both places. Finally, it is worth noting that despite the conflagration of tensions in the region, the general atmosphere of these elections was decidedly Iraqi, often removed from regional tensions altogether. The last months have featured Iraqi Shiites quarreling among themselves, and Sunnis talking about the need to distance themselves from the Syrian situation. This reality marks a clear contrast to punditry on the region, which cannot seem to get enough of the theme of transnational Sunni-Shiite confrontation.

Ahmed Ali is an Iraq research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Before he was a Middle East analyst at Georgetown University, and a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He tweets at @IraqShamel

The provincial elections were more than a rehearsal for the national elections. They proved that local issues and local figures are as important, and in some cases even more critical in deciding voters' choices than national issues and figures. The outcomes of the elections represent a challenge for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki given the under-performance of his State of Law Alliance. In light of the results, he is now calculating his options for the national elections. Meanwhile, his main rivals, the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, consolidated gains that will be important as they contemplate challenging a third Maliki term. Government-formation in Baghdad and in Diyala offer clues about how an anti-Maliki movement can materialize. Moreover, the results showed that the political leadership of the Iraqi Shi'a and Iraqi Sunnis is still contested despite Prime Minister Maliki's consolidation of power, and the ongoing protests by the Iraqi Sunnis. Political groups tested their popularity in the elections, and now they are self-evaluating their performance in preparation for the 2014 elections.

Stephen Wicken is a Middle East research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. He was previously a teaching fellow in comparative foreign policy at Yale. He tweets at @skwicken

There were a number of surprises that emerged from the provincial elections: ISCI's resurgence, the rebuff to Maliki, and the failure of Mutahidun to capitalize on the momentum of the anti-government protests, to name but a few. Above any single development, to me the elections were a reminder that Iraqi politics tends to reward pragmatism more than ideology. The results of the voting are really only half the story: the ability to make governmental alliances is almost as important as appealing to, or organizing, voters. The political balance is very much in flux as a result of some shrewd moves by some experienced figures. The next year will be fascinating to watch.

Complete 2013 Iraq Provincial Elections Results

Iraq’s provincial elections are a bit of a paradox. First, there have been three successful transfers of powers since 2005 when Iraq regained its sovereignty, which is a positive step for the country’s developing democracy. However, Iraq’s governorate councils have only limited power. They rely upon the central government for their budgets and services, and have to go through the various ministries and agencies to get anything done such as development plans. This creates a never-ending stream of complaints from the periphery about the center. In the last several years, these problems have also led to protests over the inability of Baghdad to provide things such as electricity and other services. In June 2013, parliament amended the 2008 Provincial Powers Law, which if implemented would dramatically decentralize power to the local governments. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki didn’t pay attention to the original law, and its unlikely that his centralizing tendencies will allow him to follow through on the new one. The ministries share the premier’s opinion as well. For instance, the Municipalities and Public Works Ministry is already claiming that the councils have no decision-making powers over development projects as the legislation provides. That means that while there has been a tremendous amount of political capital expended by Iraq’s elites to form the new governorate authorities they are really only negotiating over positions, which have limited influence, and are probably much more important to the parties to dole out patronage. Many analysts have also pointed out that the 2013 vote could be a harbinger for the 2014 parliamentary elections, but that may not play out. The 2009 provincial balloting for example was all about local issues like the economy and services, but that did not really carry over into 2010. That year Maliki’s State of Law and the Iraqi National Movement started off pushing nationalist issues, but then soon devolved into whether candidates should be banned for their alleged ties to the Baath Party. More importantly Maliki's sweeping victory in 2009 only translated into a second place finish in 2010. Next year’s vote is a long ways away, and anything could happen between then and now, so the trends that evolved during the 2013 balloting may not apply.

As for the actual results, 2013 was a setback for Maliki’s State of Law. The list was much larger this year including the Fadhila Party, the Badr Organization, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party. In 2009, State of Law had a sweeping victory in southern Iraq and Baghdad winning 126 seats, playing upon the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) failure at developing those provinces. Fadhila won 5, and Jaafari’s National Reform Party pulled in 23. All together that was 154 seats, and that did not include what Badr won when it was part of ISCI. In comparison, in 2013 the expanded State of Law only won 109 seats, a loss of at least 45 seats. Like the Supreme Council beforehand, Maliki’s list suffered the fate of being the incumbents, and the inability to develop the provinces they ruled. ISCI’s Citizen’s Alliance and the Sadrists’ Liberal Coalition were the beneficiaries going from 55 to 61 seats and 41 to 47 seats respectively. The Sunni vote was similarly divided with Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun coming out with the most seats, 30, compared to his rivals, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arab Iraqiya, at 10 seats, and Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya, 16 seats. All together, those lists lost over 40 seats however as many voters decided to throw in their lot with smaller parties. That shows continued lack of leadership in the Sunni community, and the inability of both those aligned with the protest movement, Mutahidun, and those willing to work with the prime minister, Mutlaq, gaining much traction with the public. The Kurdish parties also saw a decline going from 20 seats in 2009 to 15 in 2013. They seemed to have suffered from voter dissatisfaction as well. When it came to new ruling coalitions, Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Muthanna, and Wasit all switched hands with State of Law losing control of three of those, most importantly the capital Baghdad and the economic capital Basra, but also gaining Babil and Muthanna. The other eight governorates had the same parties holding onto the governorships. Overall, State of Law could falter in 2014 as well. Being the incumbent might be only one of their problems however. Today, Premier Maliki is also being blamed for the deteriorating security situation, which was not really an issue in this year’s election. Again, only so much can be discerned about Iraq’s future from this year’s vote as the country is still in a very fluid situation where things are always changing in unexpected ways.

Total Seats By List 2013

List	Total Seats	Leader
State of Law	109	PM Maliki
Citizen’s Alliance	61	Ammar Hakim
Liberal Coalition	47	Moqtada al-Sadr
Mutahidun	30	Speaker Nujafi
Iraqiya	16	Iyad Allawi
Brotherhood and Coexistence	15	KDP-PUK
Iraqiya Babil/Diyala	11	Speaker Nujafi/Dep PM Mutlaq
Arab Iraqiya	10	Dep PM Mutlaq
Loyalty to Najaf	9	Adnan Abdul Khudayr Zurfi
Equitable State Movement	8	Habib Nour Mahdi Nehme
Alliance of Iraqi People	7	Salahaddin Gov. Ahmed Abdullah
Dawa-Internal Organization	7	Hashem Musawi
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	7	Hamid Ahmed Aboud Radi
National Partnership Gathering	6	Mohammed Fadel Obeid Omran
Abirun	5	Anbar Gov. Fahadawi
Dignity Alliance of Iraq	5
Alliance of Independent People of Diwaniya	4
Loyalty to Ninewa	4	Ghanim Baso/Dep PM Mutlaq
Anbar Patriotic Alliance	3
Constitution and Justice	3
Hope for Mesopotamia	3
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity List	3	Dr. Rushdi Said
Al Liwa	3	Yousef Majid al-Habboubi
National Independent Elite Movement	3
Solidarity With Iraq	3
Unified Ninewa	3
Babil Civil Alliance/Communists	2
Basra Independent Coalition	2
Citizenship State Bloc	2
Fayli Kurds Brotherhood List	2
Gathering of Muthanna	2
Iraq National Alliance	2
Iraqi Justice and Democracy Alliance	2
Just State	2
Loyal Hands’ Gathering	2
Muthanna Alliance for Change & Reconstruction	2
National Moderation Front	2
National White Bloc	2
Popular Will Project	2
Salahaddin Unified Coalition	2
State of Social Justice	2
Alternative Movement	1
Al Amin Coalition	1
Amiroun Alliance	1
Assyrian and Chaldean Assembly	1
Baghdad Turkmen List	1
Basra’s Civil Alliance	1
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Gathering	1
Civil Democratic Alliance in Wasit	1
Civil Democrats	1
Determined to Build	1
Diyala’s New Coalition	1
Diwaniya Civil Alliance	1
Free Iraqi Coalition	1
Free Shabak	1
Gathering of Justice and Unity	1
Integrity and Efficiency	1
Iraq’s Advocates for State Support	1
Iraq’s Affluents	1
Iraq’s National Coalition	1
Iraqi Masses Gathering	1
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition	1
Najaf Province’s Change Coalition	1
National Flag Gathering	1
Ninewa Patriotic Alliance	1
Ninewa’s Bravery Coalition	1
Oum Rabih Ninewa Tribes	1
Raed Jabbar Salah	1
Renaissance and Building Gathering	1
Salahaddin Turkmen’s List	1
Valiants of Iraq	1
Will of Iraq Movement	1
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress	1
Total	447

Comparison of Governors By Party 2009 vs. 2013

Province	2009	2013
Anbar	Awakening of Iraq	Mutahidun
Babil	Liberal Coalition/Sadr	State of Law
Baghdad	State of Law	Liberal Coalition/Sadr
Basra	State of Law	Citizen’s Alliance/ISCI
Dhi Qar	State of Law	State of Law
Diyala	Accordance Front	Iraqiya Diyala/ Accordance Front
Karbala	State of Law	State of Law
Maysan	Liberal Coalition/Sadr	Liberal Coalition/Sadr
Muthanna	Citizen’s Alliance	State of Law
Najaf	Loyalty to Najaf	Loyalty to Najaf
Ninewa	Al Hadbaa	Al-Hadbaa/Mutahidun
Qadisiyah	State of Law	State of Law
Salahaddin	Independent	Independent
Wasit	State of Law	Citizen’s Alliance/ISCI

Seat Comparison By Party 2005 vs. 2009 vs. 2013 Across 14 Provinces (Excluding Tamim & KRG)

Party	2005	2009	2013	Difference 2009 vs 2013
Dawa/State of Law	25	126	109 (Plus Badr)	-45+
Fadhila	49	5	State of Law
Islamic Dawa – Iraq	17	0	State of Law
National Reform Party/Jaafari	-	23	State of Law
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala (Dawa & ISCI)	24	-	-
ISCI	163	55	61 (Minus Badr)	+6
Sadrists	23	41	47	+6
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front	45	32	Mutahidun
Al-Hadbaa/Mutahidun	-	19	30	-21
Iraqi National List/Iraqiya	18	26	16	-10
Iraqi National Project/Mutlaq & National Movement for Development and Reform/Karbuli	-	22	10	-12
Kurds	46	20	15	-5

Election Results By Province 2013

Anbar

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Mutahidun	115,605	8
Abirun	62,581	5
Arab Iraqiya	57,332	4
Iraqiya	39,500	3
Anbar Patriotic Alliance	35,214	3
Iraqi National Alliance	32,718	2
Popular Will Project	25,210	2
Iraq’s Affluents	10,785	1
Amiroun Alliance	10.785	1
Valiants of Iraq	8,932	1
Other Parties	17,457
Total	414,554	30
Mutahidun	Governor
Arab Iraqiya	Head of Council

Babil

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	142,568	8
Citizen’s Alliance	115,188	7
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	69,087	4
Liberal Coalition	51,869	4
Babil Civil Alliance/Communists	30,578	2
Iraqiya	20.755	1
Iraq’s National Coalition	20,755	1
Dawa Internal Organization	19,527	1
National Partnership Gathering	18,565	1
Al Amin Coalition	16,865	1
Iraqiya Babil	12.754	1
Other Parties	26,688
Total	548,671	31
State of Law	Governor
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	Head of Council

Baghdad

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	569,178	20
Mutahidun	183,716	7
Citizen’s Alliance	163,022	6
Liberal Coalition	137,808	4
Iraqiya	80,066	3
National Independent Elite Movement	78,429	3
Arab Iraqiya	70,644	3
Citizenship State Bloc	48,605	2
National Partnership Gathering	31,889	1
Dawa Internal Organization	24,339	1
Iraqi Justice and Democracy Alliance	23,388	1
Free Iraqi Coalition	15,957	1
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity List	15,162	1
Fayli Kurds Brotherhood List	8,675	1
Baghdad Turkmen List	1,947	1
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Gathering Coalition	1,513	1
Raed Jabbar Salah	781	1
Other Parties	112,580
Total	1,567,699	58
Liberal Coalition	Governor
Mutahidun	Head of Council

Basra

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	292,658	16
Citizen’s Alliance	121,875	6
Liberal Coalition	58,312	3
Basra Independent Coalition	29,384	2
Gathering of Justice and Unity	24,513	1
Basra’s Civil Alliance	17,541	1
Alternative Movement	15,643	1
Dawa Internal Organization	15,493	1
Will of Iraq Movement	13,940	1
Iraqiya	13,319	1
Mutahidun	10,386	1
Other Parties	34,873
Total	647,937	35
Citizen’s Alliance	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Dhi Qar

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	176,861	10
Citizen’s Alliance	122,088	7
Liberal Coalition	81,338	5
Solidarity With Iraq	50,363	3
Equitable State Movement	43,369	3
National Partnership Gathering	26,670	2
Civil Democrats	17,906	1
Total		31
State of Law	Governor
State of Law	Head of council

Diyala

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Diyala’s National Coalition	170,292	12 (State of Law 10, Liberal Coalition 2)
Iraqiya Diyala	149,535	10
Brotherhood and Coexistence List	49,415	3
Iraqiya	27,670	2
Determined to Build	17,935	1
Diyala’s New Coalition	13,980	1
Total		29
Iraqiya Diyala	Governor
Liberal Coalition	Head of Council

Karbala

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	84,447	7
Liberal Coalition	43,945	4
Al Liwa	33,614	3
Citizen’s Alliance	33,362	3
Hope for Mesopotamia	32,527	3
Equitable State Movement	32,454	3
National Moderation Front	18,501	2
Iraq’s Advocates for State Support	13,102	1
Iraqi Justice and Democracy Alliance	8,559	1
Total		27
State of Law	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Maysan

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Liberal Coalition	89,906	9
State of Law	77,917	8
Citizen’s Alliance	63,060	6
Integrity and Efficiency	11,605	1
National Partnership Gathering	10.771	1
National Flag Gathering	9,814	1
Dawa Internal Organization	5,615	1
Others	3,665	-
Total	272,353	27
Liberal Coalition	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Muthanna

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	76,777	9
Citizen’s Alliance	67,203	7
Liberal Coalition	31,290	3
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	27,065	3
Gathering of Muthanna	24,931	2
Muthanna Alliance for Change & Reconstruction	17,561	2
Others	6,029
Total	250,856	26
State of Law	Governor
Citizen’s Alliance	Head of Council

Najaf

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Loyalty to Najaf	118,310	9
Citizens’ Alliance	82,020	6
State of Law	76,519	5
Liberal Coalition	45,167	3
Just State	25,889	2
Najaf Province’s Change Coalition	14,464	1
National Partnership Gathering	14,314	1
Renaissance and Building Gathering	8,521	1
Dawa Internal Organization	7,571	1
Others	10,546	-
Total		29
Loyalty to Najaf	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Ninewa

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Brotherhood and Coexistence	173,687	11 (KDP 8, PUK 3)
Mutahidun	129,556	8
Loyalty to Ninewa	66,517	4
Unified Ninewa	45,971	3
Constitution and Justice	39,126	3
Iraqiya	31,276	2
Ninewa’s Bravery Coalition	23,361	1
Ninewa Patriotic Alliance	22,734	1
Oum Rabih Ninewa Tribes	21,349	1
Free Shabak	12,689	1 (quota)
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress	10,397	1 (quota)
Iraqi Masses Gathering	8,633	1
Assyrian and Chaldean Assembly	8,635	1 (quota)
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity	8,076	1
Total	581,449	39
Mutahidun	Governor
Brotherhood and Coexistence	Head of Council

Qadisiyah

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	114,697	8
Citizen’s Alliance	66,691	5
Liberal Coalition	50,544	4
Alliance of Independent People of Diwaniya	49,831	4
National White Bloc	33,092	2
Dawa Internal Organization	29,517	2
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition	11,207	1
Diwaniya Civil Alliance	9,472	1
Equitable State Movement	8,141	1
Total		28
State of Law	Governor
Citizen’s Alliance	Head of Council

Salahaddin

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Alliance of Iraqi People	95,338	7
Mutahidun	79,705	5
Dignity Alliance of Iraq	66,549	5
Iraqiya	46,287	3
National Coalition in Salahaddin	39,447	3 (State of Law 1, Citizen’s Alliance 1, Liberal Coalition 1)
Arab Iraqiya	24,167	2
Salahaddin Unified Coalition	23,497	2
Brotherhood and Coexistence List	21,373	1
Salahaddin Turkmen’s List	18,395	1
Total		29
Alliance of Iraqi People	Governor
National Coalition in Salahaddin	Head of Council

Wasit

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	96,664	7
Citizen’s Alliance	86,403	7
Liberal Coalition	63,584	5
Loyal Hands’ Gathering	29,969	2
State of Social Justice	28,446	2
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity List	13,678	1
Iraqiya	13,055	1
Equitable State Movement	8,447	1
Civil Democratic Alliance in Wasit	8,420	1
Fayli Kurds Brotherhood List	2,212	1
Total		28
Citizen’s Coalition	Governor
Liberal Coalition	Head of council

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “Iraqi Provincial Law Renews Debate Over Centralization,” Al-Monitor, 7/8/13

Abdullah, Ali, “Citizen coalition and the Liberals on the mechanism of choosing the head of the provincial council in Najaf,” Buratha News, 6/13/13

AIN, “Breaking news…Diyala National Alliance tops elections results in Diyala,” 5/4/13

- “Breaking News…Iraqiya Masses 1^st in Salah il-Din,” 5/4/13

- “IHEC announces results of Anbar PC elections,” 6/25/13

- “Nasiri nominated as Thi-Qar Governor, Sahlani as its Chairman,” 6/16/13

- “SLC, Citizen, Ahrar forefront electoral slates in Basra,” 5/4/13

- “SLC, Citizen Coalition top results of Babel PC slates,” 5/4/13

- “SLC tops electoral slates in Diwaniya,” 5/4/13

- “Thiyab nominated as new Anbar Governor, Halbousi as its PC Chairman,” 7/31/13

- “Urgent…Brotherhood & Coexistence (Ta’akhi) Slate tops results of Nineveh local elections,” 6/26/13

- “Urgent…Muthana PC nominates Mayali as Muthana Governor, Yasiri as its Chairman,” 6/17/13

- “URGENT…SLC wins 7 seats among 27 in Karbala,” 5/4/13

- “Urgent….Timimi designated as Baghdad Governor, Adhadh as Baghdad PC chairman,” 6/15/13

Alsumaria, “Alliance Kurdish brotherhood and coexistence first and second united Nineveh elections,” 6/26/13

- “Raad Hamza capacity as Chairman of the Board of Babylon and honest meaning conservative law,” 6/15/13

Buratha News, “Given the position of first deputy governor of Diyala province to the Kurdistan Alliance,” 6/19/13

- “The rule of law in Karbala loses one of its members because of the position of the Governor,” 6/18/13

Al-Mada, “Diwaniyah terminate the distribution of positions on file members,” 6/17/13

- “Interior inspector general governor of Karbala and Iraqi partnership take Diyala,” 6/20/13

- “Maliki wraps Sadr and Hakim alliance in Dhi Qar, Najaf .. and gets 5 committees of the Government of Wasit,” 6/15/13

- “Maliki’s bloc announces the formation of a coalition (the sons of Dhi Qar) to win the leadership of the provincial council and exclude the Liberals the Citizen’s Alliance,” 6/13/13

- “Maysan, Salahuddin keep on Lazem .. Samad assisted tribes to get a second term,” 6/8/13

- “Minister of Municipalities: No local governments have the right to make decisions on projects ministries articulated,” 7/9/13

- “The new governor of Wasit province offers promise I: activation of services and accounting firms lagging and genuine partnership,” 6/17/13

- “Uniters progressing in Anbar, according to 85% of the results and then Mutlaq and Allawi,” 6/22/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Breaking News—Ethel al-Nujaifi keeps his position as governor of Nineveh,” 7/31/13

- “BREAKING NEWS Majid Nasrawi elected Governor of Basra,” 6/12/13

Radio Nawa, “Election Aqeel Turaihi conservative Karbala and Nassif Jassem president of council of State of Law,” 6/19/13

Shafaq News, “KDP wins 14 seats in Nineveh and Shafaq News publishes the winners’ names,” 6/22/13

- “KDP wins quota of Shabak and Yazidis in Nineveh,” 6/22/13

- “Kurds win 11 seats and 8 for Mutahedoun in Nineveh council,” 6/26/13

Sotaliraq, “Commission announces preliminary results of the elections of Nineveh and Anbar .. Uniters in the lead,” 6/22/13

Visser, Reidar, “As the Deadline for Forming Coalitions Expires, Maliki Creates Monster Sectarian Alliance for Iraq’s Local Elections in April 2013,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/21/12

- “Final Results of the Iraqi Provincial Elections 2013,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/4/13

- “The First Batch of New Iraqi Provincial Governments,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 6/17/13

Wikipedia, “Iraqi Governorate Elections 2013”