08 Diyala Raid When Maliki Used Iraq’s Special Forces For Political Gain

On August 18, 2008 the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) were ordered to arrest Hussein Zubeidi, the head of the security committee on the Diyala council, and Nazar Khafaji, the head of Diyala University. The U.S. Special Forces advisers with the ISOF refused to support the operation saying that they had no intelligence against Zubeidi. The raid turned into a disaster. The ISOF ended up killing the Diyala governor’s secretary, (1) and beat the deputy governor (2) and Zubeidi. Then, as they were leaving, they got into a firefight with local police, four of which plus a civilian were injured in the ensuing gun battle. The U.S. sent 2 Apache helicopters to check on the situation and came under fire from the Iraqi forces. The fighting only ended when the ISOF called Iraq’s ground forces commander General Ali Ghaidan who ordered the police to stand down. The ISOF finished their mission by arresting Nazar Khafji. Baghdad claimed that Zubeidi and Khafji were helping the Islamic State of Iraq. Those charges were later dropped and new ones brought up that they took part in sectarian killings. However, the man that made those accusations later said he made up them up. Still, Zubeidi was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. The head of the Counter Terrorism Service General Dhai Kanani ordered the operation on behalf of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The premier had just launched the Omens of Prosperity Campaign in Diyala, that was supposed to go after the insurgency, but instead targeted the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sahwa, which were attempting to make an alliance before the 2009 provincial elections. Maliki was determined to break that up. The Americans were infuriated by the raid, and warned that Omens of Prosperity was turning into a sectarian campaign by the prime minister against Sunnis. This was one of many moves made by Maliki in 2008 where he would use the security forces against his opponents to strengthen his political position.

FOOTNOTES

1. Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08

2. Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “2 Iraqi officials accused of aiding al-Qaida,” Associated Press, 8/27/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “PM forms ministerial committee to investigate Diala incidents,” 8/19/08

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Mardini, Ramzy, “Iraqi Military Operation in Diyala Province Risks Renewal of Kurdish-Arab Conflict,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 9/18/08

Murray, Bill, “Bungled raid in Diyala threatens political developments, military operations,” Long War Journal, 8/20/08

Parker, Ned, “Diyala struggles to overcome sectarian bad blood,” Los Angeles Times, 10/25/10

Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama, 8/20/08

Roggio, Bill, “Operation Omens of Prosperity begins in Diyala,” Long War Journal, 7/29/08

Russo, Claire, “Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09

- “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War, 9/23/08

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Police: Iraqi troops raid Diyala governor’s office,” Associated Press, 8/19/08

Inside The Surge An Interview With Prof Peter Mansoor Former Executive Officer To Gen Petraeus

The Surge in Iraq created a huge controversy in American politics when it started in 2007. There were arguments about whether the U.S. should send in more troops or withdraw its forces to solve Iraq’s increasing chaos. Since then there has been a lively discussion about how much of a factor the Surge was in combination with other events such as the sectarian cleansing of Baghdad, the Anbar Awakening, the Sons of Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease fire, and more in reducing the violence in the country. To provide an inside view of the Surge is Professor Peter Mansoor the General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair of Military History at Ohio State University and General David Petraeus’ former Executive Officer from 2007-2008. He recently published a book about his experience during that time entitled Surge, My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War.

1. The Surge was proposed out of a sense of desperation in Washington about the situation in Iraq. In 2005 sectarian fighting had broken out, but after the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra shrine things quickly descended into a full-scale civil war. President Bush heard several proposals about what to do and decided upon the Surge. He said he was “doubling down” and not only changed the military approach but his own handling of Iraq. Can you explain how the president dealt with Iraq before 2007 and its consequences?

President Bush believed that his subordinate commanders should be given wide leeway to prosecute the war as they saw fit. In my view, he believed this was a proper reading of the lessons of the Vietnam, a conflict in which President Lyndon B. Johnson was accused of running the war from the White House. Bush erred in the other direction by supporting his commanders with inadequate supervision from above and nearly suffered defeat in Iraq as a result. The civilian and military leaders in Baghdad developed a strategy and operational concept—focused on killing and capturing terrorist and insurgent operatives while transitioning security responsibilities to the nascent Iraqi security forces as quickly as possible—that allowed the insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to embed themselves among the Iraqi people, while creating a security vacuum that nearly caused Iraq to break apart in 2006. By mid-2006, President Bush sensed that something was wrong and he sought a way to reverse the downward spiral in violence. The result was the Surge.

2. On the ground in Iraq General George Casey ordered Operation Together Forward in 2006 try to secure Baghdad. How was the plan executed and what were its faults?   

There were two iterations of Operation Together Forward, which were cordon and search operations in the heart of Baghdad intended to clear the city of insurgents. In these two large scale operations a significant number of buildings were searched, weapons caches confiscated, and suspects detained. The problem was that once complete, there were not enough forces left behind to secure the areas ostensibly cleared of insurgents. In time the insurgents and terrorists returned, and the security situation continued its downward spiral.

3. Around that same time you were called to the Pentagon to join the Council of Colonels, which was originally organized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the War on Terror, but eventually came to focus upon the Iraq War. What did that group come to see as the main problems in Iraq, and what were its recommendations to solve it?

“We are losing because we are not winning, and time is not on our side,” is how the Council of Colonels announced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States and its allies were losing the Iraq War. This was a revelation and a shock to them. The main problem in Iraq that we saw was an ethno-sectarian competition for power and resources, exacerbated by the intervention of outside powers such as Iran and the injection of jihadists into the conflict. In our view, the United States had three options: Go Big (mobilize its military power to overwhelm the insurgency), Go Long (configure its support to Iraq to prevail over the long haul), or Go Home (withdraw from Iraq and manage the consequences). President Bush chose a combination of Go Big and Go Long, resulting in the Surge.

(AP)

4. The Iraq Study Group suggested that the U.S. gradually withdraw its forces while reaching out to Iraq’s neighbors as the best way to stabilize things in the country. Why did you disagree with that approach?

Iraq’s neighbors were part of the problem. As long as states such as Iran thought that they could achieve their aims in Iraq through proxy warfare, negotiations with them were a dead end. We proved this during the Surge when the United States and Iran held three negotiations in Baghdad (Ambassador Ryan Crocker was the U.S. representative) that went nowhere. Furthermore, outside powers could not solve the fundamental issues inside Iraq, which were ethno-sectarian in nature and required a resolution from within.

5. Retired General Jack Keane and the American Enterprise Institute argued for an alternative strategy of a population centered counterinsurgency campaign. Why do you think that approach won over President Bush?

President Bush wanted to win the war in Iraq. Not lose. Not tie. Not exit the conflict gracefully. I don’t think General George Casey, General John Abizaid, or the Joint Chiefs ever understood the determination of the president in this regard. As the situation in Iraq worsened, President Bush understood that something had to change, but as he pressed his commanders for solutions, the same stock answers came back. Stay the course. Transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The strategy is working, but will take more time. As 2006 progressed, the president realized something had to change. The surge seemed the only viable alternative strategy, and he adopted it as his own.

6. Even before the Surge started in December 2006 a raid upon an Al Qaeda safe house discovered a treasure trove of documents about the group’s strategy for Baghdad. What did those papers reveal about the organization, and what kinds of plans were made to counter it when the Surge began?

The raid revealed the importance of the “Baghdad Belts,” or the regions around Baghdad that were in effect insurgent and terrorist sanctuaries. From these regions the insurgents and terrorists could inject violence into the capital city at will. As the document made clear, to control Baghdad, we had to control the Baghdad Belts. As a result, more than fifty percent of the extra combat power provided by the surge ended up being deployed outside Baghdad in al-Anbar Province and the Baghdad Belts.

7. Many have tried to simplify the Surge down to a troop increase, counterinsurgency tactics, and a dynamic leader in General Petraeus. In fact the new strategy was made up of many different elements. Can you go through what those were and how they worked together?

General Petraeus has done a wonderful job of describing the new strategy in his Foreword to my book, adapted as an article in Foreign Policy, which can be accessed at here. The surge was a holistic strategy to change the war in Iraq. It featured a new (or at least, one evenly applied across the force) operational concept that stressed the overriding need to protect the Iraqi people from insurgent, militia, and terrorist violence. More forces were needed to realize this goal. Gen. Petraeus also realized that to contain the violence in Iraq, the reconcilable elements of the insurgent and militia opposition (including detainees in coalition custody) needed to be brought into support of the Iraqi government, so outreach to these groups was part of the strategy—bringing the Awakening into play and resulting in the creation of the Sons of Iraq. Targeted strikes to kill or capture irreconcilables were also part of the surge—to eliminate from the equation those who refused to be part of the solution to the conflict. To give the Iraqi people hope for the future, nation building aspects to improve the economy, provide jobs, and deliver essential services were also stressed. If strategy is defined as the provision of ways and means to secure an end, then the Surge was most definitely a new strategy.

PM Maliki was fine with the Awakening as long as it stayed in Anbar but when the US started the Sons of Iraq program he was opposed (AP)

8. After General Petraeus found out about the Awakening in Anbar, he decided to try to replicate it throughout the country with the Sons of Iraq (SOI). He was hoping that this would lead to local reconciliation and eventually be connected to the central government. A major barrier to that was Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. What were some of the struggles Coalition officials went through trying to convince Maliki of the advocacy of the SOI, and did he ever seem to fully accept the program?

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki welcomed the Awakening as long as it was confined to al-Anbar Province, a region of little concern to his government and the Shi’a constituency which he represented. When the Awakening and its offspring, the Sons of Iraq, approached areas of greater concern to Shi’a Iraqis, such as Diyala Province or Baghdad, then Prime Minister Maliki and his administration were reluctant to embrace the movement. Gen. Petraeus attempted to assuage Prime Minister Maliki’s concerns by pointing out that it was better to have former insurgents inside the tent, as opposed to outside the tent trying to tear it down. Furthermore, we could gather biometric identification (fingerprints, retina scans) of the Sons of Iraq, along with their personal information, which would make them vulnerable to reprisals should they backslide. Gen. Petraeus also realized that whoever paid the SOI would have control over them. Initially, the paymaster was Multi-National Force-Iraq, but later it was the Iraqi government. This gave Maliki great control over the Sons of Iraq. Despite these certainties, he never warmed to the program, although he is probably now regretting his decision not to do so.

9. One reason that Sunnis seemed willing to join the Sons of Iraq was that they realized that they were losing the civil war. You quoted one U.S. Army Colonel that worked on reconciliation that said, “The Sunnis recognize that they’ve lost, and they’re coming to the table.” The Anbar Awakening also expanded at this time from its start in Ramadi to across the province. Moqtada al-Sadr announced a cease-fire in the middle of 2007, and Premier Maliki eventually went after his militia with the 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign in Basra, Maysan, and Baghdad. This has created a debate within the United States over whether the Surge was the main catalyst for security improving in Iraq or whether it was a combination of the Surge and those other developments in Iraq. What are your thoughts on the matter?

The Surge was the catalyst that brought to fruition a number of factors that influenced the outcome of the war in Iraq. Without the Surge, the Awakening would have remained a local movement confined to Ramadi or, at most, al-Anbar Province. Without the improved security conditions in Baghdad created by the Surge, Muqtada al-Sadr would never have offered a cease-fire after the gun battle between his militia and the shrine guards in Karbala in August 2007.  Without the Surge, Prime Minister Maliki would not have felt emboldened to confront the Jaish al-Mahdi in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan Province. On the other hand, the Surge would not have had the same results had it been attempted earlier in the war. It needed the other elements at play in Iraq in 2007 to succeed.

10. President Bush went from delegating Iraq policy to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Pentagon from 2003-2006 to being hands on during the Surge. Why did you believe this was the proper approach for all presidents to take when it comes to conducting a war?

In his book Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen analyzes the war leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion, and concludes that hands-on executive leadership is required to ensure success in war. President Bush read Cohen’s book early in his presidency, but didn’t internalize its lessons regarding what kind of leadership was required in difficult endeavors. For the first six years of his presidency, President Bush empowered his key subordinates to wage the war in Iraq without a lot of supervision from the White House. Finally in 2006, Bush realized that he needed to take a hands-on approach to fashioning a strategy to win the war. The resulting concept, the Surge, would not have succeeded without his involvement and support. This example, along with many others, shows the need for presidents to be intimately involved in the details of the strategy for waging war.

11. From late-2007 into 2008 Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) started concentrating more and more on Shiite militias and Special Groups that were run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force commander General Sulaiman. There have been many stories about these operations and some of the interactions between Sulaiman and General Petraeus. Can you speak about what MNF-I’s strategy was to counter the Iranians and whether it was effective or not?

MNF-I realized that Iranian support of Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups was a destabilizing factor in Iraq. Part of Gen. Petraeus’ Surge concept was the even-handed treatment of Sunni insurgents and Shi’a militia operatives. Petraeus pushed very hard to ensure the targeting of extremists of all sects, with excellent results. After the capture of a number of Iranian Qods Force operatives in Iraq, Iran withdrew most of its personnel from the country and moved the training of proxy forces back to Iran. Although MNF-I was able to reduce the effectiveness of Iranian backed operatives, it could not eliminate Iranian influence on the war in Iraq.

12. Throughout the entire Surge there was great skepticism about its effectiveness. That was seen when General Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker had to testify before the American Congress. Less well known was the fact that sectors of the military such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral William Fallon who was commander of the Central Command at that time were opposed to the new strategy as well. What were their concerns, and how did they attempt to affect policy?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that the provision of the Surge forces to Iraq would cause deterioration in the readiness of U.S. ground forces due to the excessive strain put on the Army and Marine Corps by the Iraq War. President Bush gave an excellent reply to these concerns in his meeting with the Joint Chiefs in the Tank in the Pentagon in December 2006 by pointing out that the worst thing that could happen to the U.S. military would be to lose the war in Iraq. All other considerations, in the president’s mind, were secondary. But the Joint Chiefs were lukewarm at best about the Surge, a mindset bolstered by the elevation of General George Casey, the former commander of MNF-I, to be the Army chief of staff in February 2007. Casey didn’t believe the Surge was the right strategy for Iraq, and his presence on the Joint Chiefs dampened what little enthusiasm they had for the new way forward.

Admiral Fallon likewise did not believe the Surge was the right strategy for Iraq. Like Casey, Fallon believed that U.S. forces should slowly withdraw from the conflict and allow the Iraqis to fight it out among themselves. He put sand in the gears of the process of providing reinforcements to Iraq to slow it down, much to the consternation of General Petraeus.

13. One of the main goals of the United States from 2007-2008 was to reduce violence so that Iraq’s elite could focus upon politics. Do you think that was achieved by the end of the Surge, and if so what were some examples you saw?

The Surge accomplished its goal of enabling the competition for power and resources in Iraq to move back into the realm of politics, at least the kind of politics that doesn’t use bombs and bullets to make its point. In the winter of 2008 the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a number of laws, such as amnesty legislation, de-Ba’athification reform, and an annual budget, that showed that Iraqi legislators could make deals with one another. After the Charge of the Knights operation in Basra and the clearing of Sadr City in the spring of 2008, all but one of the political parties in Iraq gave a vote of support to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The provincial elections of 2009 brought a large majority of Iraqis of all sects and political persuasions to the polls and brought the Sunnis back into the political process. The wheels started to come off the bus after the presidential election of 2010, when the United States backed Maliki’s candidacy for another term as prime minister instead of supporting the winner of the elections, Ayad Allawi. After that election the Sunnis lost faith in the political process and the jihadists were once again able to make inroads among them. The current violence in Iraq dates to that ill-considered decision, not to the outcome of the Surge, which ended in July 2008.

HEBREW UNIVERSITY VIDEO: Sectarianism And Politics: The Cases of Iraq and Lebanon 2009

Understanding Anbar Before And After The Awakening Part IV, Sheikh Wissam Abdul Ibrahim Hardan

Sheikh Abdul Abu Risha and Sheikh Wissam Abdul Ibrahim Hardan were the brains behind the Anbar Awakening. The two met in 2006, and decided to organize the major tribes in the province against the insurgents. The problem was that many of the sheikhs were reluctant at first to join in Abu Risha and Hardan’s scheme. The Awakening also had to convince the Americans of their sincerity, and deal with the Iraqi Islamic Party that controlled Anbar. Once they overcame these difficulties, and were successful in expelling the militants however, the Awakening began breaking up. Those divisions are still apparent today as Hardan has now become an ally of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and opposes his former Anbar brethren. The Awakening experience for Hardan then was a disappointment. He became a hero for fighting militants, but then failed to gain the local and national power that he hoped for.

Sheikh Hardan had his own views on opposing the insurgency before the Awakening was formed. He felt that the militants were using indiscriminate violence. They killed former military officers and sheikhs in Anbar, along with pushing out many of the province’s Shiite residents. Many of these people became refugees in neighboring countries or within Iraq itself. Sheikh Hardan finally had enough, and in 2005 gathered around 500 ex-soldiers to fight the insurgents. He went to then Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi who was a relative of his to ask permission for his fighters to carry weapons, but he was turned down. That put an end to Hardan’s initiative for the time being, because without government support his men could be arrested and killed by the security forces. Hardan’s main motivation was his belief that the insurgents had gone too far in Anbar. His first attempt at challenging them failed, but he did not give up.

In 2006, Hardan was stirred into action again, this time by Sheikh Abdul Abu Risha. The two were connected by marriage, as Hardan’s wife was Abu Risha’s cousin. Abu Risha contacted Hardan to meet with him about an idea to get the sheikhs in Anbar organized against the militants. Hardan was reluctant at first, but they eventually got together and came up with a plan. The first step was that they needed to convince the tribes that the time had come to confront the insurgents. The second was that they had to get popular support. Hardan then went about contacting the clerics in the province such as Abdul Malik al-Saadi and Ahmed al-Kubaysi. Hardan eventually got a fatwa condoning attacks upon the militants. This was the first move towards forming the Awakening. Many American accounts of Anbar stress the tribes, but fail to mention the role of the religious establishment in transforming the province. Abu Risha and Hardan knew their importance, and that was why they went to them first. Their personal relationship was also important, because Abu Risha was a young sheikh from a minor tribe. He came up with the idea of a new tribal revolt, but lacked the standing to convince others of his idea. That was why he reached out to Hardan who was far more prominent to talk to the sheikhs. He became the elder statesman of the Awakening.

Next on the agenda was a trip to Amman, Jordan to convince the sheikhs who had fled the fighting in Anbar to come back and join the revolt. Sheikh Hardan was again at the forefront contacting tribes and their leaders trying to get them to commit 50 fighters each. Many did not want to work with Abu Risha, because he had contacts with the Americans, and was therefore considered a collaborator with the occupation. Others accused Hardan and Abu Risha of not being real sheikhs, and attempting to usurp their power over their tribes. Hardan used the murder of Sheikh Khalid Araq Ataymi from the Albu Aetha tribe by Al Qaeda in Iraq as a rallying point, saying that the other tribes needed to avenge his death. Ataymi was thinking of his own uprising at the time, and was killed as a result. Finally a meeting was set in September 2006, which led to the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council. 41 sheikhs were chosen to be on the council with Abu Risha named governor of Anbar since the group claimed the real one was illegitimate, Hardan was made his deputy, and Sheikh Hamid Farhan al-Hayes was made head of the group. Hardan’s standing in Anbar and the continued violence of the insurgents helped turn opinion in Abu Risha’s favor, and led to the creation of the Awakening. Hardan also claimed that he was given a speech by the Americans to deliver to the sheikhs. If true, that might have convinced some to join as well, because that meant they would get the military support of the U.S.

After several tribes rose up in Anbar, Hardan and Abu Risha tried to acquire government approval for their actions. Hardan contacted his friend Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi from the Ummah Party to get him to be a middleman with Baghdad. Eventually an appointment was made with Prime Minister Maliki, which went very badly. The premier did not want to give the tribes any aid, they in turn threatened him, and it seemed like nothing was achieved. Two days later, National Security Adviser Mowfaq Rubaie announced that the government was backing the Awakening. Hardan gave no explanation for this turn around. One of the goals of the Awakening from the beginning was to gain official recognition, something Hardan had tried and failed at in 2005. The group always wanted to be accepted by the authorities so that they could openly operate, and more importantly it wanted to put their men into the local police and army units, so that they could eventually take over Anbar. By controlling the security forces they would have a monopoly on the use of force a traditional way to power in Iraq. Maliki was weary of them at first, since they were Sunnis, and many had contacts with the insurgency, but they were eventually accepted as an indigenous Iraqi movement. That would later cause divisions in Anbar, as Abu Risha and Hardan were accused of being puppets of Baghdad. Those internal disputes would be the downfall of the Awakening.

Getting the support of the Americans and the Anbar provincial government proved much more difficult and divisive for the Awakening. Abu Risha was always in contact with Americans forces to inform them of his operations so that his units would not be attacked. They went back and forth, but eventually threw their lot in with the tribes. The governor of Anbar at that time was Mamoun Sami Rasheed from the Iraqi Islamic Party. He did not approve of the Awakening seeing it as a threat to his power. Hardan also warned Abu Risha about getting involved with politicians, believing that they could easily manipulate the sheikh. The Americans set up a meeting in Fallujah between Governor Rasheed, Abu Risha, General Richard Zilmer the Marine commander in the province, and a delegation from the U.S. Embassy. After a large argument between Abu Risha and Governor Rasheed, General Zilmer suggested a compromise between the two, which eventually allowed five members of the Awakening to join the provincial council. This deal caused a split between Hardan and Abu Risha and his brother Ahmed Abu Risha. Hardan accused Ahmed Abu Risha of being close to the Islamic Party, and selling out the tribes. Hardan claimed that this divide within the movement increased in the following months, and led to it being infiltrated, and Abdul Abu Risha’s eventual assassination in September 2007. The Americans did finally come around and support the Awakening after a rough start. The outreach to the Islamic Party proved much more difficult, and was perhaps the undoing of the organization. Ahmed Abu Risha continued to make deals with the Islamic Party such as before the 2009 provincial elections. This was condemned by other members of the Awakening such as Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes. It also led to the official break-up of the group as Abu Risha, Hayes, and two other prominent members Ali al-Sulaiman and Amer al-Sulaiman all ran separately in the vote. Abu Risha’s party ended up winning the most seats on the Anbar council in 2009, but at a price, the end of the Awakening. Today, the major sheikhs in the movement have all reverted to their own individual agendas. Abu Risha continues his ties with the Islamic Party, and is a major leader in the Anbar protest movement, while Hardan is now allied with Sheikh Hayes and Prime Minister Maliki in opposition. Once the unity of the sheikhs was lost, so were their hopes for greater power within the country. The break-up of the Awakening allowed the Islamic Party, Baghdad, and others to cut deals and play divide and conquer in Anbar. It is these continued splits within the province that help explain why Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun, which was backed by Abu Risha and the protesters only won eight out of 30 seats in the 2013 provincial elections. There are simply far too many leaders in Anbar to win a decisive political victory there. From the start, Abdul Abu Risha and Hardan wanted national status. It seemed like they were going to achieve that when both Baghdad and the Americans supported the Awakening, they were able to place their men within the Anbar security forces, and gain seats on the Anbar council. That success however, led to jealousy and bitterness between the sheikhs, which still exist and divides the province.

Sheikh Hardan’s story highlights the rise and fall of the Anbar Awakening. He and Sheikh Abu Risha were the founders of the Awakening, and had a grand vision of turning their tribal revolt in Anbar into a national movement that would lead to influence in Baghdad. Their early success turned to disappointment when they got involved in politics. Hardan warned about cutting deals with the Iraqi Islamic Party, and that led to divisions within the movement, and its eventual break-up. Today there are several different Awakening groups in Anbar all competing with each other. Hardan leads one, and has aligned with Premier Maliki against Abu Risha and the protests. These internal rivalries have weakened the sheikhs, pitted them against each other, and opened the door to outside influence. That explains why the Awakening did not go from a local success story to a national power in Iraq.

SOURCES

Ali, Ahmed, “The Struggle of the Iraqi Security Forces: 2013 Iraq Update #33,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/21/13

Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09

Habib, Musafa, “govt neglect of anti-al-qaeda movement to blame for iraq’s deadly summer?” Niqash, 8/22/13

Jaffe, Greg, “How Courting Sheikhs Slowed Violence in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 8/8/07

Kazimi, Nibras, “An Initial Look at the Registrants for Provincial Election,” Talisman Gate, 6/12/08

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08

Al-Mada, “Iraq Awakening: Insurgents began infiltrating the residential cities in Anbar to the impunity of the security forces,” 7/8/13

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

National Iraqi News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Tens break away from Sahwa, joint protestors in Anbar,” 5/28/13

Shadid, Anthony, “Iraq Election Highlights Ascendancy of Tribes,” Washington Post, 1/25/09

Synovitz, Ron, “Sunni Rivalries Threaten Iraq’s Local Elections,” Radio Free Iraq, 4/7/13

Understanding Anbar Before And After The Awakening Part III, Sheikh Ahmed Sattar Al-Rishawi Abu Risha

 

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was not the first in Anbar to challenge Al Qaeda in Iraq’s hold upon the province, but he was the most successful at it. He proposed the Anbar Awakening in 2006, which eventually helped re-take the governorate away from the militants. It was a dramatic transformation for a place that the American forces had almost written off. Abu Risha had far more goals than that, but he wasn’t able to see them come to fruition as he was assassinated a year after he formed the Awakening. His brother, Ahmed Sattar al-Rishawi Abu Risha took over the movement after his brother’s death. He followed through with Abdul’s plans and transformed the movement into a political organization. To Ahmed Abu Risha the Awakening was an initiative that only Iraqis could have come up with, as only they had the ability to sway others away from the insurgency and transform Anbar.

Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha foresaw his Awakening movement as a way to enter Iraqi politics (AP)

Anbar went from good to bad in Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s view after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In 2003, sheikhs negotiated a deal for U.S. forces to enter the province, and they set up a new local government. Abu Risha claimed that things were going fine, until some started talking about fighting the Americans. They condemned those who cooperated with the occupation, and slowly but surely gained more followers as the insurgency began. It quickly moved from attacking the Americans to the Iraqi government and police. Eventually Al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters arrived, and they intensified the violence by going after schools and teachers and anyone involved in politics. Many professionals ended up fleeing the province as a result going to places like Jordan and Syria. Eventually the militants had free reign in Anbar, and seized control of institutions such as the Ramadi hospital, the governorate’s Education Department, universities, and others. Abu Risha claimed that his tribe was not involved in any of these activities at this time, but there are plenty of other accounts that would say otherwise. Most claimed that Abdul Abu Risha cooperated with Al Qaeda in Iraq, and even tried establishing his own nationalist armed group in 2005, but failed. Either way, his account is a common one where Anbar became a hotbed of anti-American and anti-government sentiment, which quickly turned violent. Al Qaeda and other foreign groups took advantage of this situation, and eventually gained control of large sections of the province. The hope for a normal life ceased as a result.

The tribes in Anbar went from accepting this situation to challenging it. According to Ahmed Abu Risha many sheikhs set up their own local security around their compounds, but did little else as their province went up in flames. The insurgency then began challenging the tribes to usurp their power. This affected Abu Risha personally as his father and three brothers were all killed by Al Qaeda in Iraq for disagreeing with it. The tribes were split over what to do. At first, they blamed each other, but then some decided to stand up to the militants. Abu Risha acknowledged that the Albu Mahal tribe had risen up against Al Qaeda before the Awakening in 2005, but there were several others. Those included the Albu Nimr who fought the Islamists along the Syrian border in, and elements of the Dulaimi tribe in Ramadi. The Abu Rishas like to take credit for the tribal revolt, but they were following in the footsteps of several others who had made a decision to challenge the militants the year before. They each had their own motivations ranging from coming under attack by the Islamists to having their businesses taken over to disagreeing with their extremist views, but the point was by 2005 there was a steady change in opinion amongst some sheikhs and clerics that they had enough of the chaos in their governorate, and they needed to do something about it.

Abdul Abu Risha decided to lead his own revolt against Al Qaeda in 2006. Abdul had run a construction and import-export business, but he was also involved in criminal activities such as smuggling. In the fall of 2006, he decided to talk to other tribes to get them organized against the insurgents. In September several sheikhs held a meeting where they announced the formation of the Anbar Awakening. It included 25 of the 31 tribes in Anbar, with around 30,000 armed men. The main plan was to take on the militants, gain American assistance, be accepted by the central government, and then assume power in Anbar through control of the local security forces and the provincial council. These bold ideas showed that Abdul Abu Risha was thinking far ahead of just securing Anbar, and had aspirations to become a national leader in Iraq.

The Awakening started operating in Abu Risha’s home of Ramadi, but then spread across central Iraq. By November 2006, the group had gained control of much of Ramadi. By the summer of 2007 it was sending units to Salahaddin, Diyala, Babil, and Baghdad to organize groups there, as well as the south as many Iraqi tribes have both Shiite and Sunni members. The U.S. began pushing the government to accept the tribesmen in the army and police, and made sure they were trained, armed, and paid on time. In Ramadi for example, the number of police went from around 150 before the Awakening to 1,500 by December 2006, to 3,000 by February 2007. The Awakening eventually broke the back of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar, which was one of its main bases in the country. They played upon the public’s increasingly hostile view of the Islamists who were pushing their foreign ideas and using violence against anyone that opposed them.

When security was restored in Anbar, the Awakening then moved to become a political party. First, Abdul Abu Risha tried to prove his bona fides with Baghdad by meeting with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki three times, and getting the premier to visit Anbar and see the success of the Awakening. They then began challenging Anbar Governor Mamoum Sami Rasheed al-Alwani and the Islamic Party that ran the province, claiming that it was working with the insurgents. By 2007, Abu Risha got some of his followers onto the provincial council, started considering candidates to run in the next elections, set up offices across the country, and registered 400,000 members. Unfortunately, Abdul Abu Risha was killed in September 2007 by Al Qaeda, and was succeeded by his brother Ahmed. In the 2009 vote, he led his party to victory, winning the most seats in Anbar. By that time, the Awakening had men throughout the local security forces, was recognized by both the Americans and Baghdad, and now had control of its home governorate. This was all part of Abdul Abu Risha’s vision to assume power, and spread his influence throughout Iraq. Unlike the Sons of Iraq, which the Americans put together during the Surge, the Awakening was accepted by the central government, because it was seen as an indigenous movement. Baghdad had no problem with them joining the security forces or running in elections. The Abu Rishas emerged as a success story in Iraq, rising up from a minor tribe to being a force in politics.

Ahmed Abu Risha told the Americans that the Awakening could have only come from Iraqis. He rejected the idea that it could have originated with the U.S., because it would not have been accepted. Only locals in Anbar understood the situation, how the tribes and insurgents worked, and could convince others to join them in challenging the militants for power. Abdul Abu Risha also had an expansive vision. He did not just want to rid Anbar of Al Qaeda in Iraq, he wanted that to be his springboard to gain national acceptance into the country’s elite. The Abu Rishas were able to gain power in Anbar, but only found a small voice in Baghdad. In the 2010 elections he joined the Iraqi Unity List along with former Interior Minister Jawad Bolani’s Constitution Party. It only won four seats in parliament, and eventually joined with the Iraq Accordance Front in the Centrist Alliance, which then became part of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement (INM) in 2011. That series of events showed that the Awakening had lost much of its standing after the 2009 vote. Its alliance with the INM didn’t work out either as it came out on the losing end of its long running battle with Premier Maliki. By 2012 Ahmed Abu Risha joined the Anbar protests, and became one of its main leaders. That has now run its course with few results, so Abu Risha will have to find a new way to fulfill his aspirations of transforming his local movement into a national one.

SOURCES

Allam, Hannah and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Marine-led Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,” Knight Ridder, 5/17/05

Al-Ansary, Khalid and Adeeb, Ali, “Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite Against Insurgents,” New York Times, 9/18/06

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq’s Middle Alliance joins al-Iraqiya Coalition to form powerful Parliamentary opposition bloc, its MP says,” 8/2/11

- “Iraqi Accordance, Iraq Unity blocs form new alliance,” 10/10/10

BBC, “Obituary: Abdul Sattar Abu Risha,” 9/13/07

Carroll, Rory, “Al-Qaida in Iraq seizes border town as it mobilises against poll,” Guardian, 9/7/05

Eisenstadt, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, “Iraq Tribal engagement Lessons Learned,” Military Review, September-October 2007

Fairweather, Jack, “Leader’s ambitions worry Baghdad elite,” Financial Times, 4/18/08

Gordon, Michael, “Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,” New York Times, 10/28/07

Inside Iraq, “Iraq’s Elections Results,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/18/10

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections And Beyond,” 2/25/10

Knickmeyer, Ellen and Finer, Jonathan, “Iraqi Sunnis Battle To Defend Shiites,” Washington Post, 8/14/05

Kraul, Chris, “Sunni chiefs in Anbar join mainstream,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/20/07

Kukis, Mark, “Turning Iraq’s Tribes Against Al-Qaeda,” Time, 12/26/06

McCary, John, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly, January 2009

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume I, American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

- Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

Michaels, Jim, “An Army colonel’s gamble pays off in Iraq,” USA Today, 4/30/07

Partlow, Joshua, “Sheiks Help Curb Violence in Iraq’s West, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, 1/27/07

Raghavan, Sudarasan, “Maliki, Petraeus Visit Insurgent Hotbed,” Washington Post, 3/14/07

Roads To Iraq, “Iraq pre-election political map – The Sunni scene,” 9/19/09

Roggio, Bill, “1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,” Long War Journal, 6/12/07

- “Anbar Rising,” Long War Journal, 5/11/07

- “The Anbar Salvation Council goes expeditionary,” Long War Journal, 5/2/07

- “The Anbar Tribes vs. al Qaeda, Continued,” Long War Journal, 11/22/06

Sanders, Edmund, “Draft charter leaves many tough issues unsettled,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/31/05

Schneider, Howard and Wright, Robin, “Sheik Risha Killed in Bomb Attack in Iraq,” Washington Post, 9/13/07

Tavernise, Sabrina, “Marines See Signs Iraq Rebels Are Battling Foreign Fighters,” New York Times, 6/21/05

Wong, Edward, “An Iraqi Tribal Chief Opposes the Jihadists, and Prays,” New York Times, 3/3/07

Understanding Anbar Before And After The Awakening Part II, Sheikh Abdullah Jalal Mukhif Faraji

The Anbar Awakening, which emerged in 2006 was a mix of sheikhs, clerics, and tribesmen, many of which were involved with the insurgency. Each was driven by their own motivation to give up the struggle against the Americans and the Iraqi government, and instead turn their weapons on their former compatriots. Sheikh Abdullah Jalal Mukhif Faraji was one such individual. He was the deputy head of the Sunni Endowment in Anbar, and a member of the Ramadi city council that later helped lead the Anbar Salvation Council along with Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and others. To Faraji it was the extremism of Al Qaeda in Iraq that led to the formation of the Awakening, which later became a political force in Anbar.

Sheikh Faraji noted some early mistakes by the Americans, which allowed for the insurgency to begin in Anbar. One was leaving the border unattended after the invasion, which let foreign fighters flow into Iraq. The other was the Coalition Provisional Authority’s decision to disband the military in May 2003. The third was the heavy-handed military tactics used by the Americans that did not distinguish between the militants and regular Iraqis. That turned many people against the occupation. To Faraji, Al Qaeda and other outsiders came to fight the Americans, and unfortunately Iraq was their battlefield. The people in Anbar were the victims, as they had to suffer through the indiscriminate killings of both the insurgents and the U.S. That view tends to absolve Iraqis of much of the responsibility for the violence in the country, and puts the onus on foreigners.

In 2006, things began to change when Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha proposed the Awakening. It brought together the religious establishment and the tribes in Anbar, an issue that’s usually overlooked in American accounts that just stress the role of the sheikhs. The main motivation for the Awakening according to Faraji was the extremism of Al Qaeda in Iraq. He said that they were too dogmatic, and abused religion for their own goals, which was to take over and kill everyone who was not with them. The Awakening was also able to cut deals with other insurgents. Faraji for example was sent to Oman by Abu Risha to see Harith Dhari the head of the Association of Muslim Scholars. Dhari was working with the insurgency and giving anti-government and anti-Coalition speeches. Faraji convinced him that Iraqis would eventually rule their country again after the Americans left, and that therefore he should stop his remarks about the army and police. This was important for the Awakening, because they were getting their fighters to join the local security forces in places like Ramadi and Fallujah at the time. That was one sign of the importance of the clerics in the Awakening movement. Faraji also believed that it was the religious backing that the group received that made it popular in Anbar. Finally, the Americans came around, and learned how to work with the Anbaris. Together the two fought the insurgency, and turned around the security situation in the province. In Faraji’s view the murderous ways of Al Qaeda turned the people in Anbar against them. The Islamists were uncompromising and foreign led, like an alien body in the province. That eventually united the Anbaris, and got them to cooperate with the Americans.

The next big change was turning the Awakening into a political movement. Faraji pointed to the 2009 provincial elections as a turning point for Anbar. In the January 2005 governorate vote 58% of the electorate turned out nationally, but only 2% in Anbar. Four years later, the Awakening was demanding elections, and wanted to take power. This time there was a 40% participation rate in the province, and Abu Risha’s party took the most seats on the provincial council. This transition from boycotting the political system to taking part in it was a dramatic change not only in Anbar, but the entire country. By 2009, Sunnis had largely given up the gun, and were looking towards the ballot as a way to further their cause. The Awakening was one example of this transformation in thinking, and was another cause for a large decrease in violence across the country.

The Marines interviewed Sheikh Faraji with Thamir al-Asafi, both of the Sunni Endowment at the same time, but they had divergent views of what happened in Anbar. Asafi emphasized that Iraqis were caught in the middle between foreign fighters and the Americans. Stuck in that precarious situation Anbaris decided to form the Awakening to control their own destiny. Faraji had a similar view, but stressed that it was Al Qaeda and their foreign ideas and violence, which was the turning point that helped create the Awakening. Asafi also consistently blamed the U.S. for their misrule of Iraq, while Faraji praised the Americans for working with the Iraqis to fight the insurgents. Finally, Asafi said that the U.S. left nothing behind for Iraq after their occupation, while Faraji wanted a long relationship between the two countries, which he was hoping would help develop and modernize Iraq. Faraji turned out to be much more optimistic than Asafi. The former thought that the clerics provided an important leadership role in Anbar that not only helped decrease the violence there, but then led to political power. Unfortunately that has not worked out as Faraji hoped. Today, Anbar feels sidelined by Baghdad, and that has created not only the protests there, which Faraji is involved with, but the return of Al Qaeda in Iraq. That is making the province a battlefield once again both politically and militarily.

SOURCES

Burns, John and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Shiites Win, but Margin Is less Than Projection,” New York Times, 2/14/05

Daragahi, Borzou, “Shiite alliance appears to hold slight majority in new assembly,” San Francisco Chronicle, 2/14/05

Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau, New York Times, 2/1/09

Fletcher, Martin, “Fighting back: the city determined not to become al-Qaeda’s capital,” Times of London, 11/20/06

Jaffe, Greg, “How Courting Sheikhs Slowed Violence in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 8/8/07

Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, “Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,” Center for American Progress, February 2008

Klein, Joe, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, 9/26/05

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume I, American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

- Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

Michaels, Jim, “An Army colonel’s gamble pays off in Iraq,” USA Today, 4/30/07

Ware, Michael, “The Enemy With Many Faces,” Time, 9/27/04

Political Background To Iraq’s Current Descent Into Violence

Iraq's insurgency is making a comeback. The number of attacks and deaths has gone up dramatically this year with almost weekly mass casualty bombings. The security forces have proven incapable of preventing any of these operations. The April 2013 raid upon the Hawija protest site in Tamim province is widely regarded as the spark that ignited the current unrest. There were larger political issues however, dating back several years, which led to the current deterioration in security. 

2010 marked the breakdown of Iraq’s fragile post-sectarian war politics. In 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki went after Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, the insurgency, and confronted the Kurds in Diyala. He also accepted the Anbar Awakening as an indigenous Iraqi group, and was forced to take on the Sons of Iraq put together by the Americans. Then in 2009, the prime minister broke with the United Iraqi Alliance, the umbrella Shiite list, and formed his own State of Law for that year’s provincial elections. That vote was a game changer as well as Sunnis decided to participate in large numbers including some insurgent groups, after boycotting in 2005. All together, these events helped change the image of the government. The premier was no longer seen as a sectarian Shiite leader, but an Arab nationalist one. The government appeared willing to accept Sunnis into the security forces, and the 2009 elections showed that the community could gain positions of power, and have their voices heard. In the 2010 parliamentary vote that all came apart as the main topic became whether candidates mostly from Sunni and secular parties, should be banned for their alleged ties to the Baath Party. Not wanting to be outdone by his Shiite rivals, Maliki took up this cause as well. When the final election results were released, the prime minister came in second to the Iraqi National Movement (INM) led by Iyad Allawi. The premier called foul, and got the courts to rule that it wasn’t the list with the most votes that could form the new government, but who could form the largest coalition afterward. The prime minister then outmaneuvered Allawi, and formed a new government based upon the Irbil power sharing agreement, which he promptly ignored. That was only possible because the Sunni and Kurdish parties gave up their objections to Maliki in return for ministries in the new administration. Sunnis took this as an affront to their votes and choices. It appeared to them that the National Movement should have formed the government, but instead Maliki manipulated the system to stay in power. Not only that, but the leaders the Sunnis voted for like Iyad Allawi appeared weak. In just two years, Sunnis went from feeling like Baghdad was less sectarian, and they could find a place in the new order, to the government being controlled by Shiites, and their ballots not counting. That was the beginning of the post civil war politics starting to unravel.

The 2011 U.S. military withdrawal undermined the security situation. The Americans wanted to maintain an advisory force, but the nationalist mood in Baghdad, meant the parliament was unwilling to grant them that. A small U.S. contingent could have only done so much anyway. What was more important was that the Iraqis lost the American intelligence capabilities, (1) their patrolling of the border, and their oversight of the logistics system for the Iraqi security forces (ISF). The U.S. released thousands of prisoners as well who could not be held or charged by the Iraqi courts. Many of these detainees rejoined the insurgency. Finally, the Iraqi forces stopped conducting counterinsurgency operations, and became more concerned with becoming a traditional military force with tanks and jet fighters. As a result, they no longer manned neighborhood combat posts, preferring to stay in large bases instead. They then resorted to raids and mass arrests to deal with militants, just as the Americans had unsuccessfully done before the Surge. That meant when the insurgency started making a comeback in late 2012, the ISF was not only unprepared to deal with them, but made the situation worse with their repressive tactics. Many Sunnis came to believe that the security forces were an arm of the Shiite led government, targeting them specifically for sectarian reasons. Stories of secret prisons and the well-known abuse of prisoners further alienated Sunnis from the authorities.

By the end of 2011, this anger was at a boiling point. First, a deBaathification drive by Baghdad along with general neglect of the provinces by the central government led places like Anbar, Diyala, and Salahaddin to consider forming federal regions. Maliki stamped out this drive by ignoring their requests, and then using carrots and sticks to threaten and cajole the local councils. Then in December 2012, the prime minister had arrest warrants issued for several bodyguards of then Finance Minister Rafi Issawi. Unlike Vice President Tariq Hashemi who went through a similar process a year earlier, Issawi had a large popular base in his home of Anbar, and they immediately began protesting. This quickly spread to other areas across Ninewa, Salahaddin, Diyala, Tamim, and Baghdad. The demonstrations eventually turned not only sectarian with constant rhetoric about Shiites being Persians, waiving Saddam era flags, and accusations of militias being behind all the violence in the country, but some sites became connected to the insurgency such as Hawija, which was run by the Baathist Naqshibandi group. Baghdad offered some concessions to the protestors such as passing an amnesty law and changing deBaathification, but Shiite and Sunni parties held them up either because they did not support the reforms or did not want to hand Maliki any victories before the 2014 parliamentary elections. Then the government made a major misstep by ordering the raid upon the Hawija site, and ended up using excessive force. That allowed the militants to argue that Baghdad was not interested in negotiations, and would eventually smash all of the demonstrations. This successfully convinced many to turn to force as not only Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Naqshibandi, and other insurgent groups carried out retaliatory attacks following Hawija, but so did tribes. That was the culmination of all the political and military missteps that occurred after 2009. Again, the government appeared to not care about the demands of Sunnis. Federalism for example, has never been a popular topic with Sunnis, yet they saw Maliki’s clamp down on Anbar and the other provinces as another example of him using extra judicial means to ignore their plight. By the time the arrest warrants came down for Issawi’s men, many Sunnis had enough, and took their frustration out into the streets. The government’s mishandling of that situation led some protesters to turn away from peaceful means, and provided the opportunity the insurgency was looking for to garner more followers.

Today’s rising levels of violence were the result of specific political moves and mistakes made by the central government and Prime Minister Maliki, along with the American withdrawal. Just a few years ago, the premier had completely changed his image from a sectarian Shiite ruler to an Arab nationalist one. Then he gave that up when he felt threatened by his rivals. Now Sunnis believe that their national leaders have either been discredited like Allawi or are persecuted like Issawi, and that the Shiite parties will do anything to hold onto office. To add to that, the U.S. military pulling out of Iraq deprived the country of resources, and direction that left the security forces incapable of dealing with the insurgency. Iraq’s security situation only stabilized when political breakthroughs were made such as the 2009 elections. Those same types of changes are necessary today. Unfortunately, the parties are only thinking short-term, and trying to position themselves for the 2014 vote. They are therefore unwilling to compromise or make any deals right now, which was already difficult when violence was down. That means sectarian tensions will continue, as there is a lack of national dialogue that could bring groups together, and draw people away from backing the insurgency. The result is that Iraq will get a lot worse, before anything gets better.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dar Addustour, “Officers are busy imposing royalties to the owners of restaurants and garages and amusements – suffers a lack of funding intelligence information ..and most of its leaders are linked to third-hostile,” 3/19/13

SOURCES

Al-Ali, Zaid, “Iraqi regionalism and its discontents,” Open Democracy, 12/3/11

Dar Addustour, “Officers are busy imposing royalties to the owners of restaurants and garages and amusements – suffers a lack of funding intelligence information ..and most of its leaders are linked to third-hostile,” 3/19/13

Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 4/1/08

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “Notes From The Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2013

Salman Pax, “Sunni Side Down? .. I think not,” 2/2/09

Sky, Emma, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011

World Politics Review, “Global Insider: Iraq’s Prisons Incubate Islamist Ideology,” 7/29/13

Complete 2013 Iraq Provincial Elections Results

Iraq’s provincial elections are a bit of a paradox. First, there have been three successful transfers of powers since 2005 when Iraq regained its sovereignty, which is a positive step for the country’s developing democracy. However, Iraq’s governorate councils have only limited power. They rely upon the central government for their budgets and services, and have to go through the various ministries and agencies to get anything done such as development plans. This creates a never-ending stream of complaints from the periphery about the center. In the last several years, these problems have also led to protests over the inability of Baghdad to provide things such as electricity and other services. In June 2013, parliament amended the 2008 Provincial Powers Law, which if implemented would dramatically decentralize power to the local governments. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki didn’t pay attention to the original law, and its unlikely that his centralizing tendencies will allow him to follow through on the new one. The ministries share the premier’s opinion as well. For instance, the Municipalities and Public Works Ministry is already claiming that the councils have no decision-making powers over development projects as the legislation provides. That means that while there has been a tremendous amount of political capital expended by Iraq’s elites to form the new governorate authorities they are really only negotiating over positions, which have limited influence, and are probably much more important to the parties to dole out patronage. Many analysts have also pointed out that the 2013 vote could be a harbinger for the 2014 parliamentary elections, but that may not play out. The 2009 provincial balloting for example was all about local issues like the economy and services, but that did not really carry over into 2010. That year Maliki’s State of Law and the Iraqi National Movement started off pushing nationalist issues, but then soon devolved into whether candidates should be banned for their alleged ties to the Baath Party. More importantly Maliki's sweeping victory in 2009 only translated into a second place finish in 2010. Next year’s vote is a long ways away, and anything could happen between then and now, so the trends that evolved during the 2013 balloting may not apply.

As for the actual results, 2013 was a setback for Maliki’s State of Law. The list was much larger this year including the Fadhila Party, the Badr Organization, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party. In 2009, State of Law had a sweeping victory in southern Iraq and Baghdad winning 126 seats, playing upon the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) failure at developing those provinces. Fadhila won 5, and Jaafari’s National Reform Party pulled in 23. All together that was 154 seats, and that did not include what Badr won when it was part of ISCI. In comparison, in 2013 the expanded State of Law only won 109 seats, a loss of at least 45 seats. Like the Supreme Council beforehand, Maliki’s list suffered the fate of being the incumbents, and the inability to develop the provinces they ruled. ISCI’s Citizen’s Alliance and the Sadrists’ Liberal Coalition were the beneficiaries going from 55 to 61 seats and 41 to 47 seats respectively. The Sunni vote was similarly divided with Speaker Osama Nujafi’s Mutahidun coming out with the most seats, 30, compared to his rivals, Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arab Iraqiya, at 10 seats, and Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya, 16 seats. All together, those lists lost over 40 seats however as many voters decided to throw in their lot with smaller parties. That shows continued lack of leadership in the Sunni community, and the inability of both those aligned with the protest movement, Mutahidun, and those willing to work with the prime minister, Mutlaq, gaining much traction with the public. The Kurdish parties also saw a decline going from 20 seats in 2009 to 15 in 2013. They seemed to have suffered from voter dissatisfaction as well. When it came to new ruling coalitions, Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Muthanna, and Wasit all switched hands with State of Law losing control of three of those, most importantly the capital Baghdad and the economic capital Basra, but also gaining Babil and Muthanna. The other eight governorates had the same parties holding onto the governorships. Overall, State of Law could falter in 2014 as well. Being the incumbent might be only one of their problems however. Today, Premier Maliki is also being blamed for the deteriorating security situation, which was not really an issue in this year’s election. Again, only so much can be discerned about Iraq’s future from this year’s vote as the country is still in a very fluid situation where things are always changing in unexpected ways.

Total Seats By List 2013

List	Total Seats	Leader
State of Law	109	PM Maliki
Citizen’s Alliance	61	Ammar Hakim
Liberal Coalition	47	Moqtada al-Sadr
Mutahidun	30	Speaker Nujafi
Iraqiya	16	Iyad Allawi
Brotherhood and Coexistence	15	KDP-PUK
Iraqiya Babil/Diyala	11	Speaker Nujafi/Dep PM Mutlaq
Arab Iraqiya	10	Dep PM Mutlaq
Loyalty to Najaf	9	Adnan Abdul Khudayr Zurfi
Equitable State Movement	8	Habib Nour Mahdi Nehme
Alliance of Iraqi People	7	Salahaddin Gov. Ahmed Abdullah
Dawa-Internal Organization	7	Hashem Musawi
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	7	Hamid Ahmed Aboud Radi
National Partnership Gathering	6	Mohammed Fadel Obeid Omran
Abirun	5	Anbar Gov. Fahadawi
Dignity Alliance of Iraq	5
Alliance of Independent People of Diwaniya	4
Loyalty to Ninewa	4	Ghanim Baso/Dep PM Mutlaq
Anbar Patriotic Alliance	3
Constitution and Justice	3
Hope for Mesopotamia	3
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity List	3	Dr. Rushdi Said
Al Liwa	3	Yousef Majid al-Habboubi
National Independent Elite Movement	3
Solidarity With Iraq	3
Unified Ninewa	3
Babil Civil Alliance/Communists	2
Basra Independent Coalition	2
Citizenship State Bloc	2
Fayli Kurds Brotherhood List	2
Gathering of Muthanna	2
Iraq National Alliance	2
Iraqi Justice and Democracy Alliance	2
Just State	2
Loyal Hands’ Gathering	2
Muthanna Alliance for Change & Reconstruction	2
National Moderation Front	2
National White Bloc	2
Popular Will Project	2
Salahaddin Unified Coalition	2
State of Social Justice	2
Alternative Movement	1
Al Amin Coalition	1
Amiroun Alliance	1
Assyrian and Chaldean Assembly	1
Baghdad Turkmen List	1
Basra’s Civil Alliance	1
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Gathering	1
Civil Democratic Alliance in Wasit	1
Civil Democrats	1
Determined to Build	1
Diyala’s New Coalition	1
Diwaniya Civil Alliance	1
Free Iraqi Coalition	1
Free Shabak	1
Gathering of Justice and Unity	1
Integrity and Efficiency	1
Iraq’s Advocates for State Support	1
Iraq’s Affluents	1
Iraq’s National Coalition	1
Iraqi Masses Gathering	1
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition	1
Najaf Province’s Change Coalition	1
National Flag Gathering	1
Ninewa Patriotic Alliance	1
Ninewa’s Bravery Coalition	1
Oum Rabih Ninewa Tribes	1
Raed Jabbar Salah	1
Renaissance and Building Gathering	1
Salahaddin Turkmen’s List	1
Valiants of Iraq	1
Will of Iraq Movement	1
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress	1
Total	447

Comparison of Governors By Party 2009 vs. 2013

Province	2009	2013
Anbar	Awakening of Iraq	Mutahidun
Babil	Liberal Coalition/Sadr	State of Law
Baghdad	State of Law	Liberal Coalition/Sadr
Basra	State of Law	Citizen’s Alliance/ISCI
Dhi Qar	State of Law	State of Law
Diyala	Accordance Front	Iraqiya Diyala/ Accordance Front
Karbala	State of Law	State of Law
Maysan	Liberal Coalition/Sadr	Liberal Coalition/Sadr
Muthanna	Citizen’s Alliance	State of Law
Najaf	Loyalty to Najaf	Loyalty to Najaf
Ninewa	Al Hadbaa	Al-Hadbaa/Mutahidun
Qadisiyah	State of Law	State of Law
Salahaddin	Independent	Independent
Wasit	State of Law	Citizen’s Alliance/ISCI

Seat Comparison By Party 2005 vs. 2009 vs. 2013 Across 14 Provinces (Excluding Tamim & KRG)

Party	2005	2009	2013	Difference 2009 vs 2013
Dawa/State of Law	25	126	109 (Plus Badr)	-45+
Fadhila	49	5	State of Law
Islamic Dawa – Iraq	17	0	State of Law
National Reform Party/Jaafari	-	23	State of Law
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala (Dawa & ISCI)	24	-	-
ISCI	163	55	61 (Minus Badr)	+6
Sadrists	23	41	47	+6
Iraqi Islamic Party/Iraqi Accordance Front	45	32	Mutahidun
Al-Hadbaa/Mutahidun	-	19	30	-21
Iraqi National List/Iraqiya	18	26	16	-10
Iraqi National Project/Mutlaq & National Movement for Development and Reform/Karbuli	-	22	10	-12
Kurds	46	20	15	-5

Election Results By Province 2013

Anbar

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Mutahidun	115,605	8
Abirun	62,581	5
Arab Iraqiya	57,332	4
Iraqiya	39,500	3
Anbar Patriotic Alliance	35,214	3
Iraqi National Alliance	32,718	2
Popular Will Project	25,210	2
Iraq’s Affluents	10,785	1
Amiroun Alliance	10.785	1
Valiants of Iraq	8,932	1
Other Parties	17,457
Total	414,554	30
Mutahidun	Governor
Arab Iraqiya	Head of Council

Babil

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	142,568	8
Citizen’s Alliance	115,188	7
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	69,087	4
Liberal Coalition	51,869	4
Babil Civil Alliance/Communists	30,578	2
Iraqiya	20.755	1
Iraq’s National Coalition	20,755	1
Dawa Internal Organization	19,527	1
National Partnership Gathering	18,565	1
Al Amin Coalition	16,865	1
Iraqiya Babil	12.754	1
Other Parties	26,688
Total	548,671	31
State of Law	Governor
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	Head of Council

Baghdad

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	569,178	20
Mutahidun	183,716	7
Citizen’s Alliance	163,022	6
Liberal Coalition	137,808	4
Iraqiya	80,066	3
National Independent Elite Movement	78,429	3
Arab Iraqiya	70,644	3
Citizenship State Bloc	48,605	2
National Partnership Gathering	31,889	1
Dawa Internal Organization	24,339	1
Iraqi Justice and Democracy Alliance	23,388	1
Free Iraqi Coalition	15,957	1
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity List	15,162	1
Fayli Kurds Brotherhood List	8,675	1
Baghdad Turkmen List	1,947	1
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Gathering Coalition	1,513	1
Raed Jabbar Salah	781	1
Other Parties	112,580
Total	1,567,699	58
Liberal Coalition	Governor
Mutahidun	Head of Council

Basra

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	292,658	16
Citizen’s Alliance	121,875	6
Liberal Coalition	58,312	3
Basra Independent Coalition	29,384	2
Gathering of Justice and Unity	24,513	1
Basra’s Civil Alliance	17,541	1
Alternative Movement	15,643	1
Dawa Internal Organization	15,493	1
Will of Iraq Movement	13,940	1
Iraqiya	13,319	1
Mutahidun	10,386	1
Other Parties	34,873
Total	647,937	35
Citizen’s Alliance	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Dhi Qar

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	176,861	10
Citizen’s Alliance	122,088	7
Liberal Coalition	81,338	5
Solidarity With Iraq	50,363	3
Equitable State Movement	43,369	3
National Partnership Gathering	26,670	2
Civil Democrats	17,906	1
Total		31
State of Law	Governor
State of Law	Head of council

Diyala

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Diyala’s National Coalition	170,292	12 (State of Law 10, Liberal Coalition 2)
Iraqiya Diyala	149,535	10
Brotherhood and Coexistence List	49,415	3
Iraqiya	27,670	2
Determined to Build	17,935	1
Diyala’s New Coalition	13,980	1
Total		29
Iraqiya Diyala	Governor
Liberal Coalition	Head of Council

Karbala

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	84,447	7
Liberal Coalition	43,945	4
Al Liwa	33,614	3
Citizen’s Alliance	33,362	3
Hope for Mesopotamia	32,527	3
Equitable State Movement	32,454	3
National Moderation Front	18,501	2
Iraq’s Advocates for State Support	13,102	1
Iraqi Justice and Democracy Alliance	8,559	1
Total		27
State of Law	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Maysan

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Liberal Coalition	89,906	9
State of Law	77,917	8
Citizen’s Alliance	63,060	6
Integrity and Efficiency	11,605	1
National Partnership Gathering	10.771	1
National Flag Gathering	9,814	1
Dawa Internal Organization	5,615	1
Others	3,665	-
Total	272,353	27
Liberal Coalition	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Muthanna

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	76,777	9
Citizen’s Alliance	67,203	7
Liberal Coalition	31,290	3
Iraq Independent Professionals Group	27,065	3
Gathering of Muthanna	24,931	2
Muthanna Alliance for Change & Reconstruction	17,561	2
Others	6,029
Total	250,856	26
State of Law	Governor
Citizen’s Alliance	Head of Council

Najaf

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Loyalty to Najaf	118,310	9
Citizens’ Alliance	82,020	6
State of Law	76,519	5
Liberal Coalition	45,167	3
Just State	25,889	2
Najaf Province’s Change Coalition	14,464	1
National Partnership Gathering	14,314	1
Renaissance and Building Gathering	8,521	1
Dawa Internal Organization	7,571	1
Others	10,546	-
Total		29
Loyalty to Najaf	Governor
State of Law	Head of Council

Ninewa

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Brotherhood and Coexistence	173,687	11 (KDP 8, PUK 3)
Mutahidun	129,556	8
Loyalty to Ninewa	66,517	4
Unified Ninewa	45,971	3
Constitution and Justice	39,126	3
Iraqiya	31,276	2
Ninewa’s Bravery Coalition	23,361	1
Ninewa Patriotic Alliance	22,734	1
Oum Rabih Ninewa Tribes	21,349	1
Free Shabak	12,689	1 (quota)
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress	10,397	1 (quota)
Iraqi Masses Gathering	8,633	1
Assyrian and Chaldean Assembly	8,635	1 (quota)
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity	8,076	1
Total	581,449	39
Mutahidun	Governor
Brotherhood and Coexistence	Head of Council

Qadisiyah

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	114,697	8
Citizen’s Alliance	66,691	5
Liberal Coalition	50,544	4
Alliance of Independent People of Diwaniya	49,831	4
National White Bloc	33,092	2
Dawa Internal Organization	29,517	2
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition	11,207	1
Diwaniya Civil Alliance	9,472	1
Equitable State Movement	8,141	1
Total		28
State of Law	Governor
Citizen’s Alliance	Head of Council

Salahaddin

Party	Total Votes	Seats
Alliance of Iraqi People	95,338	7
Mutahidun	79,705	5
Dignity Alliance of Iraq	66,549	5
Iraqiya	46,287	3
National Coalition in Salahaddin	39,447	3 (State of Law 1, Citizen’s Alliance 1, Liberal Coalition 1)
Arab Iraqiya	24,167	2
Salahaddin Unified Coalition	23,497	2
Brotherhood and Coexistence List	21,373	1
Salahaddin Turkmen’s List	18,395	1
Total		29
Alliance of Iraqi People	Governor
National Coalition in Salahaddin	Head of Council

Wasit

Party	Total Votes	Seats
State of Law	96,664	7
Citizen’s Alliance	86,403	7
Liberal Coalition	63,584	5
Loyal Hands’ Gathering	29,969	2
State of Social Justice	28,446	2
Iraq’s Benevolence and Generosity List	13,678	1
Iraqiya	13,055	1
Equitable State Movement	8,447	1
Civil Democratic Alliance in Wasit	8,420	1
Fayli Kurds Brotherhood List	2,212	1
Total		28
Citizen’s Coalition	Governor
Liberal Coalition	Head of council

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “Iraqi Provincial Law Renews Debate Over Centralization,” Al-Monitor, 7/8/13

Abdullah, Ali, “Citizen coalition and the Liberals on the mechanism of choosing the head of the provincial council in Najaf,” Buratha News, 6/13/13

AIN, “Breaking news…Diyala National Alliance tops elections results in Diyala,” 5/4/13

- “Breaking News…Iraqiya Masses 1^st in Salah il-Din,” 5/4/13

- “IHEC announces results of Anbar PC elections,” 6/25/13

- “Nasiri nominated as Thi-Qar Governor, Sahlani as its Chairman,” 6/16/13

- “SLC, Citizen, Ahrar forefront electoral slates in Basra,” 5/4/13

- “SLC, Citizen Coalition top results of Babel PC slates,” 5/4/13

- “SLC tops electoral slates in Diwaniya,” 5/4/13

- “Thiyab nominated as new Anbar Governor, Halbousi as its PC Chairman,” 7/31/13

- “Urgent…Brotherhood & Coexistence (Ta’akhi) Slate tops results of Nineveh local elections,” 6/26/13

- “Urgent…Muthana PC nominates Mayali as Muthana Governor, Yasiri as its Chairman,” 6/17/13

- “URGENT…SLC wins 7 seats among 27 in Karbala,” 5/4/13

- “Urgent….Timimi designated as Baghdad Governor, Adhadh as Baghdad PC chairman,” 6/15/13

Alsumaria, “Alliance Kurdish brotherhood and coexistence first and second united Nineveh elections,” 6/26/13

- “Raad Hamza capacity as Chairman of the Board of Babylon and honest meaning conservative law,” 6/15/13

Buratha News, “Given the position of first deputy governor of Diyala province to the Kurdistan Alliance,” 6/19/13

- “The rule of law in Karbala loses one of its members because of the position of the Governor,” 6/18/13

Al-Mada, “Diwaniyah terminate the distribution of positions on file members,” 6/17/13

- “Interior inspector general governor of Karbala and Iraqi partnership take Diyala,” 6/20/13

- “Maliki wraps Sadr and Hakim alliance in Dhi Qar, Najaf .. and gets 5 committees of the Government of Wasit,” 6/15/13

- “Maliki’s bloc announces the formation of a coalition (the sons of Dhi Qar) to win the leadership of the provincial council and exclude the Liberals the Citizen’s Alliance,” 6/13/13

- “Maysan, Salahuddin keep on Lazem .. Samad assisted tribes to get a second term,” 6/8/13

- “Minister of Municipalities: No local governments have the right to make decisions on projects ministries articulated,” 7/9/13

- “The new governor of Wasit province offers promise I: activation of services and accounting firms lagging and genuine partnership,” 6/17/13

- “Uniters progressing in Anbar, according to 85% of the results and then Mutlaq and Allawi,” 6/22/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Breaking News—Ethel al-Nujaifi keeps his position as governor of Nineveh,” 7/31/13

- “BREAKING NEWS Majid Nasrawi elected Governor of Basra,” 6/12/13

Radio Nawa, “Election Aqeel Turaihi conservative Karbala and Nassif Jassem president of council of State of Law,” 6/19/13

Shafaq News, “KDP wins 14 seats in Nineveh and Shafaq News publishes the winners’ names,” 6/22/13

- “KDP wins quota of Shabak and Yazidis in Nineveh,” 6/22/13

- “Kurds win 11 seats and 8 for Mutahedoun in Nineveh council,” 6/26/13

Sotaliraq, “Commission announces preliminary results of the elections of Nineveh and Anbar .. Uniters in the lead,” 6/22/13

Visser, Reidar, “As the Deadline for Forming Coalitions Expires, Maliki Creates Monster Sectarian Alliance for Iraq’s Local Elections in April 2013,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 12/21/12

- “Final Results of the Iraqi Provincial Elections 2013,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/4/13

- “The First Batch of New Iraqi Provincial Governments,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 6/17/13

Wikipedia, “Iraqi Governorate Elections 2013”