2007 Political Kidnappings In Iraq Involving Asaib Ahl Al-Haq

In 2007 there were three series of political kidnappings surrounding Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), the League of the Righteous, a splinter group from the Sadr movement. Starting on January 20, a group of a dozen AAH fighters in five SUVs claiming to be commandos from Baghdad entered the Karbala provincial council compound. After gaining entry they began shooting and throwing grenades as they made their way to the command center. When they left they had killed one U.S. soldiers, wounded three, and kidnapped four more. As they were chased by the Iraqi forces they ended up ditching their vehicles and escaping. Three of the kidnapped Americans were found executed, while the fourth was mortally wounded and died soon afterward. Asaib Ahl Al-Haq was formed in 2006 by Moqtada al-Sadr, one of his lieutenants Qaiz Khazali, and Iran to carry out attacks upon the Americans, while denying Sadr’s involvement. This was their most dramatic act since they were formed and would set in motion a series of other kidnappings.

First, the leaders of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq were captured and revealed not only their role in the Karbala operation, but Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah’s as well. On March 20 the head of AAH Qais Khazali, his brother Laith Khazali, and Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq were captured in Basra by the British and turned over to the Americans. The Khazali brothers along with information captured with them showed that they were behind the Karbala raid, which was planned and assisted by Iran’s Quds Force and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The Iranians for example had collected extensive intelligence on the Karbala center. Daqduq was the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s Department 2800, which carried out foreign operations for the group, and was assigned by the Quds Force as a liaison between it and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. After the arrests AAH halted all their operations in Iraq for several weeks as they attempted to deal with the loss of their leadership. Iran tried to come to its aid with another kidnapping.

On March 23, Iran stopped a British frigate in the Shatt al-Arab waterway in Basra claiming that the vessel had crossed into its territory. The Iranians took 15 British Marines into custody and brought them to Tehran. It then let it be known that they would release the Brits in return for Qais Khazali. That failed, so a third round of kidnappings was carried out.

On May 29 around 100 men from Asaib Ahl Al-Haq rolled up to the Finance Ministry in Baghdad wearing Interior Ministry uniforms and driving the ubiquitous black SUVs. They entered the building and grabbed British IT technician Peter Moore, and his four bodyguards, Jason Swindlehurst, Jason Creswell, Alec MacLachlan, and Alan McMenemy. They were taken to Sadr City, and then to Iran where the bodyguards were all eventually killed. Like the Karbala raid, the Quds Force planned the operation, and likely took custody of the five Brits. AAH used their offices in Qom, Iran to negotiate with the British Foreign Office demanding the release of Qais and Lais Khaali. That eventually happened in 2009. In March the U.S. released ten AAH leaders, which set in motion the freeing of Laith Khazali at the start of June, and then the bodies of Swindlehurst and Creswell were given to the British at the end of the month. 300 more AAH members were let go starting in August, and in return MacLachlan’s body was returned in September. Finally Peter Moore was let go in December, Qais Khazali in January 2010, while McMenemy’s body wasn’t turned over until January 2012. Eventually almost all of the AAH fighters were released by the Americans in what they called a reconciliation effort as the group claimed it would give up its arms and enter politics. After Qais was released Asaib Ahl Al-Haq reneged on that first promise, and would take up attacks on the Americans until its military withdrew in 2011. Today AAH remains opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and is still one of Iran’s main proxies in the country.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “US Forces release 2 Asaib Ahl Al Haq members,” 7/30/09

August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09

BBC, “Alan McMenemy ‘brutally murdered’ by kidnappers in Iraq, inquest finds,” 11/28/12

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09

Cockburn, Patrick, “Revealed: why UK hostages were killed,” Independent, 7/10/09

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/16/10

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Mahmood, Mona, O’Kane, Maggie, Grandjean, Guy, “Why Iran’s kidnap squad struck,” Guardian, 12/31/09

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Musings On Iraq In The News

My article on Kataib Hezbollah was reprinted by Business Insider, and I was cited in "Coalition Airstrike Destroy A Massive ISIS Truck Bomb in Iraq" by Armin Rosen in that same publication. I was also cited in "Australia In America's Third Iraq War" by Richard Tanter for Global Research. I was quoted in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's "What's Next For Islamic State?"

Iranian Mobilization In Iraq In The Face Of The Insurgent Surge

Iran was caught off guard by the fall of Mosul just like the rest of the world was. Iraq immediately asked for foreign aid, and Iran was one of the few that responded. It mobilized its Shiite militia allies to provide more boots on the ground to combat the militants, it sent in several hundred advisers and enlisted Lebanese Hezbollah to do the same, delivered weapons including Su-25 jets, and is supposedly directing part of Baghdad’s security strategy. Tehran stepped into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and has assumed an ever greater presence within the government since then.

Quds Force Commander Gen Suleimani has taken over part of the security portfolio for Baghdad since the fall of Mosul (PBS)

In June after insurgents took Mosul Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that Iran was ready to defend Iraq. The first reports of that assistance was the arrival of anywhere from 150 to 2,000 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds Force in the country. Two of them have already been killed. The first was reported in June when Ali Reza Moshajari of the IRGC had a funeral. Iranian papers said he died in Karbala. Later in the month Colonel Kamal Shirkhani died in a mortar attack in Samarra, Salahaddin. Moshajari’s death had a bit of obfuscation surrounding it at first, likely because Iran did not want to admit that its men were fighting and dying in Iraq. Shirkhani’s funeral however showed that IRGC advisers were right at the frontlines with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). More important was the arrival of Quds Force commander General Qassim Suleimani who was said to have come to Iraq right after the Mosul debacle. Reports had him organizing a defensive strategy for Baghdad, based upon tactics he deployed in Syria where it’s said he played a similar role running part of the security portfolio for the Assad regime. The insurgent surge during the summer was a surprise to Tehran who immediately offered and began supplying assistance to Baghdad. The fact that Russia was the only other country willing to help at that time by selling weapons meant that Iran had a lot of space to operate in. The poor performance of the ISF probably meant that the Iraqi government was happy to receive Gen. Suleimani and his Quds Force.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards' pilots are likely flying the small batch of Su-25 jets Tehran delivered to Iraq (Aviationist)

Iran not only provided personnel, but equipment and intelligence as well. By mid-June Iran had drones flying out of Baghdad airport. The New York Times claimed that a control center was established at the Rasheed Air Base in the capital as well, while the IRGC was monitoring the insurgents’ communications. A steady stream of weapons and ammunition was being flown into Iraq at the same time. At the beginning of July a small batch of Su-25 attack jets was delivered. Iran tried to conceal their origins by sending them to Iraq at the same time a few were coming from Russia. The planes were actually Iraqi as Saddam Hussein had them flown to Iran in 1991 to try to save them during the Gulf War. Iran kept them and incorporated them into the IRGC’s air force. In fact, it was likely Iranians were flying the planes, as the Iraqis did not have the pilots for them. This was partially confirmed by the funeral for Colonel Shojaat Alamdari Mourjani on July 4. He was an Iranian pilot who died in Samarra. It’s not clear whether he was killed flying a mission or was just caught in a ground attack, but again it pointed to Iran’s presence at the front.

Funeral for IRGC pilot Col Mourjani who died in Samarra (AFP)

Tehran not only sent in its own men, but called on its Iraqi allies as well. That was the militias it helped create in Iraq and Syria. By June Hezbollah Brigades, the League of the Righteous, the Badr Organization, Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Njaba, Kataib Sayid al-Shuhada, Saraya Tali al-Khurasani, Afwaj al-Kafi and others were all fighting alongside the ISF across central Iraq. Many of these brought their fighters back from Syria to Iraq. Just like in Syria as well, these groups are operating under the orders of Gen. Suleimani. Quite a few of these groups had been fighting in Anbar and other parts of the country since January. Mosul increased their re-deployment. They helped bolster the ranks of the army and police after so many were lost in northern Iraq.

Finally, Iran brought in Lebanese Hezbollah to advise the Iraqi forces. Like Pres. Rouhani, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah offered to send fighters to Iraq after Mosul. He brought up defending the various Shiite shrines in the country from the Islamists, an argument made by other Iranian aligned groups for their intervention in Syria. The Christian Science Monitor had around 250 Lebanese advisers in Iraq by July. That month a Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Mohammed al-Haj died near Mosul. A deployment that far north showed that the Hezbollah advisers were taking part in the fighting just like their IRGC brethren. Iran used Hezbollah in Iraq before right after the U.S. invasion to help arm and train militias.

In Iraq’s time of need Iran was one of the few that answered the call for help. It provided men, material, intelligence, and its Iraqi and Lebanese allies to fight. Most importantly Gen Suleimani took over part of the security file for Baghdad. This follows the same pattern that occurred in Syria when the rebellion started there and Iran moved in to assist President Assad. The question is how much will this foreign aid help, and at what cost. In Syria the Iranians have stabilized the fighting and assured Assad stays in power, but there are large swaths of the country outside of the government’s control. This would not be satisfactory outcome for Iraq. Iran’s influence has exponentially increased in the country as well. Tehran has never wanted to directly rule Iraq, but it has always sought to take advantage of the opportunities provided it. The security collapse has presented just such a situation where it can expand its reach throughout the state’s apparatus something it will not likely give up when all things are said and done.

SOURCES

ABC/AP, “Hezbollah Commander who triggered the 2006 war Killed in Iraq,” 8/1/14

Abdullah, Dlashad, “Elite Iranian force enters Iraq via Kurdistan: official,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 7/31/14

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Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq trains volunteers to fight Isis but many seen as ill-prepared,” Financial Times, 7/11/14

Dehghanpisheh, Babak, “Iran’s elite Guards fighting in Iraq to push back Islamic State,” Reuters, 8/3/14

Dempsey, Joseph, “Joseph Dempsey: Iraqi’s latest Su-25s come from Iran,” Military Balance Online, 7/2/14

Detmer, Jamie, “Hezbollah’s Widening War Spreads to Iraq,” Daily Beast, 8/1/14

Faqie, Nuwar, “Iranian forces arrive in Kirkuk,” Bas News, 6/22/14

Filkins, Dexter, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, 9/30/13

Fox News, “Iran reportedly sent military advisers, head of Quds Force to Iraq,” 6/26/14

Gordon, Michael and Schmitt, Eric, “Iran Secretly Sending Drones and Supplies Into Iraq, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, 6/25/14

Kakayi, Bestun, “Iranian Quds Force Opens Private Center to send Soldiers to Iraq,” Bas News, 6/20/14

Karim, Shaho, “BasNews gives detail about Iranian forces in Iraq,” Bas News, 6/15/14

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Naharanet Newsdesk, “Iranian Pilot Killed Fighting in Iraq,” 7/5/14

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Rosen, Armin, “Iraq Official Says Iran’s Military Mastermind Is In Charge,” Business Insider, 6/18/14

Salih, Hemin, “Iranian forces enter Kurdistan Region,” Bas News, 6/14/14

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Tomlinson, Hugh, “Iran’s special forces rush in to help floundering ally,” Times of London, 6/11/14

Militia Mobilization Started In 2013 Due To Renewed Iraq Insurgency

 

As the security situation has worsened in Iraq Baghdad has turned to militias more and more. Some point to the fall of Mosul in June 2014 as the turning point in this trend, but in fact armed Shiite groups started operating again in early 2013 in response to the renewed insurgency. Today they are working with the security forces on all major fronts, and have been accused of kidnapping and killing civilians. The majority of them are beholden to Iran increasing Tehran’s influence on the ground. The militias highlight the weakness of the state. It can’t protect its people, it is letting its neighbor come in and direct part of its security portfolio, and most importantly it will be harder then ever to remove the militia influence because they are being integrated into the government apparatus more every day.

Members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq on parade in Karbala March 2014 It's gunmen like these that the Iraqi government has become more dependent on to face the insurgency (Reuters)

In the spring of 2013 there were anecdotal stories of militias operating in Baghdad. In May for example Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) the League of the Righteous denied that it was running checkpoints in the capital. That same month Reuters interviewed a man in Baghdad who claimed he was kidnapped by militias, Al Mada reported that three former Baathists were killed in Babil, which was blamed on Shiite groups, and finally Moqtada al-Sadr accused the League of being back on the streets. This was the first appearance in U.S. and Iraqi sources of militias attacking Sunnis once again. It’s not like groups such as AAH had ever disappeared, but they seemed to be involved in other activities. In 2012 they went to Syria to defend the Assad regime under the leadership of Iran. The League also turned to politics becoming an ally of Premier Nouri al-Maliki in his attempt to cut into the Sadr’s base. In 2013 the insurgency started making a major comeback and that seemed to focus the militias back on fighting them.

Claims of militia violence only increased in the second half of 2013. In September an AAH leader said that the organizations had contacts within the security forces (ISF) and then the next month its leader Qais Khazali announced that he was creating popular committees in the capital to assist the ISF. According to the New York Times this involved getting badges and weapons from the government. Another group the Badr Organization said it would help the security forces with the growing insurgency in Baghdad and Diyala at that same time. This was a major change, because Badr had focused upon being a political party in the last several years after being a major militia in the country. The armed factions were not just active in central Iraq, but the south as well. In September 20 men were found shot and killed in Basra. Some came with notes saying that they had been executed in retaliation for bombings by the Islamic State (IS). This was exactly how the civil war took off in 2005. Constant insurgent attacks upon Shiite targets, especially with mass casualty bombings led to militias taking the matters into their own hands, because they didn’t believe the ISF were up to the task. They used elements that had been integrated into the security forces along with their gunmen in the streets to carry out attacks, including kidnapping people, killing them, and then dumping their bodies.

The major growth in the Shiite groups occurred in 2014. By January the League was operating in Anbar after open fighting started there. A militia commander Anwar al-Bahadil for example, who had been deployed to Syria previously was killed in Anbar that month. That represented a larger trend of all the militias bringing their fighters back from Syria to Iraq to confront the insurgency. They justified this re-deployment the same way they did in Syria, saying they were there to protect the country’s shrines. In February, militias were said to be working in Diyala when the town of Mukhisa was taken by IS, and then Shiite fighters and the ISF moved in killing a number of civilians and burning some homes. The next month, militias helped retake Buhriz, killing around two dozen civilians, and burning three mosques in the process, and were charged with driving families out of Qara Tapa as well. In Baghdad, there were stories of militiamen wearing ISF uniforms and executing people. For example, in April 50 bodies showed up in the capital’s morgue handcuffed and shot in the head. In Madain, which is in the southern portion of the province 16 men were killed in drive by shootings or were taken away by men with security badges who were later found dead. These were all hallmarks of Shiite militiamen. The fall of most of Anbar in January became a major rallying cry for the militias. The growing insurgent threat at home was important enough for them to move their focus from Syria back to the homeland, and that was welcomed by the Baghdad government.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki openly welcomed the militias. According to Reuters, on April 7 the premier held a meeting with politicians about the Shiite groups. He said he was frustrated with the inability of the security forces to subdue the insurgency, and was turning to the militias for their battle experience. He created a special directorate under his office of commander and chief to direct their activities. This included their integration into the ISF, which was how they received uniforms, manned checkpoints, and why they were fighting in Anbar, Diyala, and Babil.

This official backing led to an expansion of the armed groups. April marked major recruiting drives by many groups starting with the Hezbollah Brigades who formed Popular Defense Brigades. The Badr Organization and AAH followed its lead creating similar units. Militias that were in Syria also started operating in Iraq such as Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas and Afwaj al-Kafi. The latter has close links to SWAT and the Special Operations Forces and was fighting in Abu Ghraib in western Baghdad governorate. Again the movement of Syrian militias to Iraq showed where their focus was by 2014.

In another sign of the growing power of the militias within the government Transportation Minister Ameri and head of Badr was given control of security in Diyala by Maliki (AFP)

Since the fall of Mosul in June the militias have increased their presence and activities, and so have their Iranian allies. The groups said to be working across Iraq from Salahaddin to Ninewa to Kirkuk to Diyala to Anbar to Salahaddin to Babil included the Hezbollah Brigades, the League of the Righteous, the Badr Organization, Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayid al-Shuhada, Saraya Tali al-Khurasani, Kataib al-Zahra, Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, Afwaj al-Kafi, Sadr’s new Peace Brigades, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) militia. Transportation Minister Hadi Ameri who heads Badr was even given control of security in his home province of Diyala by Maliki. The stories of abuses continue as well. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International found evidence of their collaboration with the ISF to execute around 250 prisoners in five separate incidents. AAH was blamed for 50 blinded folded and shot bodies being found in Babil in July. It was so emboldened that it was accused of kidnapping the head of the Baghdad province council and his bodyguards that month. The council head’s security was beaten in an attempt to garner an admission that they were all supporters of the insurgency. In August, Baghdad’s governor accused militias of kidnapping and terrorizing innocent people. With the exception of the Sadrists all of these groups were receiving money, training, weapons, and leadership from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) who helped create most of them in the first place. AAH for instance was said to receive $1-$2 million a year from Tehran, while there were various reports of IRGC advisers being in Iraq helping to direct security operations. The loss of Mosul only accelerated the return and inclusion of the militias within the government security apparatus that started a year beforehand. The government’s desperation, and Iran’s shock at the advance of the insurgency across northern Iraq put an emphasis upon putting as many gunmen in the field as quickly as possible to confront the threat, and that was accomplished by calling out the Shiite groups.

Hezbollah Brigades marching with image of Ayatollah Khomeini showing where their loyalties lie (BBC)

Baghdad’s weakness in the face of the new insurgency is increasing it reliance upon the militias and Iran. This happened long before the current offensive, and goes back to 2013 when there was a dramatic increase in militant attacks and civilian casualties. When that eventually exploded in Anbar in January 2014 Iran and the militias were ready as it began moving men and material from Syria to Iraq. Now they are all working together across the central part of the country. This is leading to long-term divisions and breakdowns of the state. First, a new wave of sectarian killing has started, and could eventually become cleansing of Sunnis from major cities as occurred during the last civil war. Baghdad shows no concern over this matter either because it thinks it is collateral damage in the war against the insurgency or worse sees them as legitimate attacks because Sunnis are considered supporters of the militants. Second, the use of militias plays into the hands of the insurgency who have long claimed the government is using them to terrorize Sunnis and is nothing but an Iranian stooge. It will be hard to win over Sunnis to the government’s side and join the security forces if they know there are militia elements embedded throughout them and Iranian advisers are out in the field. Third, it will be nearly impossible for the state to rid itself of the militias once the fighting ends. They were never disarmed nor disbanded and now some of them such as the Badr Organization and the League of the Righteous have become allies of the prime minister. Thousands of Badr and Mahdi Army fighters were taken into the armed forces and police and remained there after the U.S. invasion. They now have plenty more of their brethren joining up too, and are considered one of the backbones of the ISF. Finally, Iran’s influence is growing with this increasing use of militias. All of them but the Sadrists are beholden to Tehran. That has allowed it to move from just providing assistance to its allies and the security forces to actually running part of the security portfolio. IRGC General Qassim Suleimani is said to be in Iraq quite often in recent months visiting the front and directing operations based upon his strategy and experience in Syria. Iraq was desperate for foreign assistance when the insurgency restarted, and there little was coming. That vacuum allowed Iran to step in and its unlikely it will give up this increased power within the country. Some Iraqis have welcomed the return of the militias for helping to bring the country back from the brink after insurgents charged south from Mosul towards Baghdad. What they don’t realize is that these militias will not go away when the fighting is over, and neither will Iran keeping the government weak, which was why it couldn’t stand up to the militants in the first place.

SOURCES

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Moqtada al-Sadr’s Difficult Relationship With Iran Interview With Subaltern Research Services’ Dr. Nicholas Krohley

For many years during the U.S. occupation of Iraq Moqtada al-Sadr was considered an Iranian proxy. Iran gave military assistance to Sadr’s Mahdi Army and during the Surge Moqtada left Iraq and went to Qom for religious training. The truth of the matter was that Tehran never really trusted Sadr to do its bidding, while he expressed strong nationalist ideas. In more recent times Iran got many of its Iraqi allies to send fighters to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, while Sadr did not. Today Iran is mobilizing militias to confront the insurgency in Iraq and Sadr has brought out his new Peace Brigades to join the fight. That doesn’t mean that he is any more open to Iran’s plans for Iraq as he has attacked the other militias as “foreigners” referring to their funding and direction from Tehran. To help explain the ebb and flow of Sadr’s ties with Iran is Dr. Nicholas Krohley, founder of Subaltern Research Services and author of The Death of the Mehdi Army: Insurgency and Civil Society In Occupied Baghdad.

Sadr always had a difficult relationship with Iran having to balance his nationalist rhetoric with his need for assistance to arm his militia against the Americans (Reuters)

 

1. Immediately after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 it appeared that Moqtada al-Sadr was moving towards Iran’s orbit. In June Sadr travelled to Iran to talk with officials there and Ayatollah Haeri. Upon his return Sadr said that he believed in Iranian style clerical rule except that the leader had to be an Iraqi. Then in July he started criticizing Haeri for not staying in Iraq during the Saddam period like he did. It seemed like Sadr was willing to receive support from Tehran, but he wanted it to be on his terms. Was that a fair characterization of how Sadr saw Iraq’s neighbor?

Muqtada’s relationship with Iran was, and remains, necessarily complex. For context, it’s critical to emphasize the anti-Iranian rhetoric of his father, Mohammed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who created the Sadrist Movement during the 1990s. The elder Sadr was an ardent Iraqi nationalist who placed enormous emphasis on Arabism and tribalism as defining attributes for Iraqi Shi’a. His most important scholarly/clerical work was an attempt to reconcile Arab tribal customs with Sharia law. Central to his life’s work was the message that Iraq’s Arab Shi’a are the rightful leaders of the Hawza, and that Persian ‘interlopers’ like Sistani (who was his contemporary and bitter rival) have no business dominating Najaf. Likewise, the (largely underclass) Shi’a followers of the elder Sadr were generally hostile to Iran, due in significant measure to their having played a central role in the brutal 8-year war between the two countries. A strong case can be made that the elder Sadr’s populist anti-Iranianism was a key reason that Saddam Hussein allowed the Sadrist movement to develop as it did, because it helped distance Iraq’s Shi’a from Iran’s influence and promoted nationalist/Arabist sentiments at a time of intense sectarian insecurity for the regime.

 

Sadr's father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr was an ardent Iraqi nationalist who argued that Iraq's Arab Shiite should run the Hawza (Al Sadr office)

It’s an issue that deserves deeper discussion – but the short of it is that a partnership between Iran and Muqtada was by no means natural, nor was it easily reconciled with the ideological foundations of the popular movement that Muqtada inherited from his father. Similarly, Muqtada’s advocacy of clerical rule for Iraq – with Iraqi/Arab leadership – was entirely consistent with the teachings of his father, and a direct challenge to the Iranian government.

That said, the political landscape of the post-Saddam era created strong incentives for cooperation. Muqtada and the newly rekindled Sadrist movement were positioning themselves as the premier Shi’a opponents of the US and its Iraqi allies (some of whom were prominent former rivals of Muqtada’s father), and they needed funding, training, weapons, etc. The tactical weakness of the Mehdi Army in the ’04 battles with the Americans in Najaf underscored the urgency of this. Iran, for its part, wanted to establish as much influence as possible in the new Iraq to advance its own interests, and was prepared to form working relationships with just about anyone (to include Sunni militants) to that end. So I would argue that the relationship was viewed with intense pragmatism on both sides – it wasn’t a partnership between friends or natural allies, but rather an alliance of mutual convenience, in which each side was attempting to use the other to achieve their own (at times contradictory) goals.

2. In 2004 there were the Sadrist uprisings against the Americans. There were Iranian advisers amongst his Mahdi Army in Najaf. At the same time, Iran pushed for a negotiated settlement because it was more interested in the 2005 elections, which would usher into power some of its long time allies such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). What was Iran’s view of Sadr as a militia leader and Iraqi politician?

I couldn’t say how Iranian leaders viewed Muqtada on personal terms. A good answer to that question would require intimate access to key decision-makers in Tehran – people like Qassim Suleimani. What does seem clear to me, however, is that the Iranian government treated Muqtada, the Sadrist movement, and the Mehdi Army as a set of tools to be used in pursuit of their national interests. No more, no less. And the Iranians always kept their options open, and were quick to reposition when it suited them. In the run-up to the 2005 elections, I would assume Iran’s overriding goal was to cement strong influence within a religiously-defined Shi’a government of Iraq that would be (at worst) friendly to Iran, if not actually subservient. This required forging a measure of unity among Iraq’s Shi’a factions (something that is by no means a naturally occurring state of affairs), so the Iranians helped orchestrate a quite awkward alliance between the Sadrists and establishment parties like ISCI and Da’wa. Meanwhile, the Iranians wanted to keep bleeding the Americans – hence the their diversification of Shi’a militant assets via men like Khazali at a time when the mainstream Mehdi Army stepped back from the front lines of ‘resistance’ (in keeping with Sadrist participation in the political process as an ostensible ally of the Shi’a establishment).

3. When the Surge started in 2007 Sadr went to Qom for religious training, which many saw as him seeking protection from the Americans. What’s your take on why he left Iraq, and do you know what his time was like in Iran?

There are a number of good reasons why Sadr might have left Iraq when he did. One would certainly be fear of the Americans, who were growing increasingly aggressive, and effective, in targeting the Mehdi Army (and who made at least one attempt to capture him personally, I believe). Or perhaps he was playing ‘the long game’, and he figured it was best to wait out the Surge from the safety of Iran – knowing that the Americans would eventually pack up and leave. Another possibility would be fear of targeting by his fellow Iraqi Shi’a, as there was serious, multi-directional intra-Shi’a violence across southern Iraq at that time that involved the Mehdi Army, the Special Groups, and Badr. It’s also been argued that he was trying to distance himself from the abuses of the Mehdi Army and the mediocrity and corruption of prominent Sadrist politicians. By decamping to Iran, the argument goes, he would be able to return to Iraqi politics at some point in the future with not only enhanced clerical credentials, but also a measure of deniability for the failings/misdeeds of those who had been operating in his name. He could play the part of the returning reformer. Beyond that, you can pick from a colorful array of conspiracy theories.

As to his time in Iran, I don’t have any direct insight there. But it would be fascinating to hear how he was received/treated by Iranian officials in Qom, what Muqtada really thought of them, and what the dynamic was between him and other ‘scholars-in-residence’.

 

Qais Khazali (left) was a close aide to Sadr's father and Sadr himself (right) and would eventually leave the movement and receive Iranian backing to create Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. This was part of Tehran's move to gain greater control over Shiite armed factions in Iraq that would do its bidding. (Shafaq News)

4. Qais Khazali was one of the close aides to Moqtada’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, and after his death he took on a similar role with the son. In 2004 after the Sadr uprisings Khazali left the movement and started receiving backing from Iran. He would rejoin the trend and then leave again eventually forming Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), the League of the Righteous. Similarly Iran began organizing members of the Mahdi Army into what became known as Special Groups. What was Iran’s strategy behind taking on these breakaway factions and what was Sadr’s response?

Iran’s immediate purpose was to develop assets that could be used to kill American soldiers, Iraqi politicians, and members of the Iraqi Security Forces. Whenever possible, Iran wanted to exert direct operational control over these assets, as the ability to escalate/deescalate violence in Iraq was a key strategic weapon. Iran worked with the Mehdi Army to that end, but, as discussed above, this was a difficult relationship that I think was ultimately unsatisfying for Iran. The Mehdi Army, like the wider Sadrist movement, was a major player in Iraqi politics with objectives and interests that were not always compatible with the Iranians’. It was also large and unwieldy, with locally-oriented commanders exerting significant (and unpredictable) influence. So it made perfect sense for the Iranians to take advantage of divisions within the militia to develop separate relationships with splinter groups like AAH. These groups were far smaller and more manageable, more radical/militant, and more dependent on Iranian patronage due to their lack of popular/political support among Iraqi Shi’a.

You can think of it this way: the Mehdi Army, like the Sadrist movement, was a distinctly Iraqi phenomenon, which emerged independent of Iranian involvement and could pursue its ends, albeit much less effectively/efficiently, without Iran’s help. But AAH and the other Special Groups are inconceivable without Iran’s direct, ongoing involvement.  The underlying dynamics are evident in the example you give at the outset: AAH has sent fighters to Syria and Lebanon, where they fight alongside Quds Force and Hizballah. They are creatures/creations of Iran, and their orientation is international – in line with the international objectives of the Iranian government. The Mehdi Army, on the other hand, is Iraqi at its core. The militia maintained a relationship of convenience with Iran, but it was by no means a tool thereof.

With that in mind, on a longer-term horizon, Iran’s cultivation of groups like AAH looks like an attempt to undercut Sadrist influence in Iraq and reshape Iraq’s domestic politics in Iran’s favor. As noted below, the long-term aspirations of Muqtada and the Sadrist movement pose a direct challenge to the Iranian government, and the Iranians have good reason to be wary of both. By enabling AAH’s growth, and its transformation into a political organization that now competes with the Sadrists for the votes/loyalty of the latter’s traditional demographic base, the Iranians have altered the political landscape in Iraq. The ultimate success of this effort remains uncertain (AAH managed only 1 seat in the recent round of elections), but sudden changes of political fortune have been commonplace in the post-Saddam era.

5. Do you think today Sadr continues with this love hate relationship with Tehran?

As an outsider looking in, I’d suspect that the Iran-Sadr relationship leans more toward “hate” from both sides. I see Muqtada as an Iraqi nationalist who wants to realize his father’s dream: a place of preeminence for Iraq’s long-suffering Shi’a underclass within a unified Iraq, and an Iraqi Arab (in this case, Muqtada himself) at the helm of the Hawza in Najaf, providing leadership to Shi’a across Iraq and beyond. If achieving that dream requires working with Iran, then so be it. Yet this makes Muqtada a serious threat to Iran in the medium- to long-term. A forceful, popular/populist, and outspoken Iraqi Arab Marja’ advocating clerical rule from Najaf would be an enormous challenge to the Iranian establishment. But in the interim, the dance of politics goes on, as each side tries to make use of the other to navigate the immediate, day-to-day challenges of the region.

SOURCES

Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Smith, Craig, “Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/26/03

July 2014 Over 5,000 Casualties In Iraq

Iraq saw nearly 5,500 casualties in July 2014. That was down from June, but that was to be expected as fighting has settled down a bit. The insurgency is still carrying out attacks across the country and laying siege to several cities, while the government continues with futile security operations. As the Iraqi security forces have lost more ground they have increasingly turned to indiscriminate attacks upon civilian areas and militias, which are carrying out sectarian killings. There was also an uprising by followers of Mahmoud Hassani Sarkhi in southern Iraq at the beginning of the month. With insurgents set on restarting fighting in Baghdad the current situation could actually get worse in coming weeks.

July saw 2,195 killed and 3,276 wounded. That was made up of 1,681 civilian, 426 Iraqi Security Forces, 28 Sahwa, and 60 Peshmerga fatalities and 2,339 civilian, 738 ISF, 24 Sahwa, and 175 Peshmerga injuries. That was below June’s figures of 2,822 dead and 3,483 wounded. Salahaddin was the deadliest province last month with 503 deaths, followed by 460 in Baghdad, and 446 in Anbar. So far there have been 6,653 security incidents reported in the press resulting in 12,304 killed and 20,581 wounded this year.

Reported Security Incidents In Iraq 2014

Month	Incidents	Deaths	ISF/Sahwa/ Peshmerga/ Asayesh Deaths	Civilian Deaths	Wounded	ISF/Sahwa/ Peshmerga Asayesh Wounded	Civilians Wounded
Jan	1,014	1,483	427 ISF 69 Sahwa 2 Asayesh	985	2,880	646 ISF 48 Sahwa	2,186
Feb	945	1,274	516 ISF 58 Sahwa 2 Peshmerga	698	2,526	702 ISF 93 Sahwa 3 Peshmerga	1,728
Mar	996	1,606	567 ISF 48 Sahwa 2 Asayesh	989	2,901	631 ISF 57 Sahwa 1 Asayesh	2,212
Apr	999	1,456	538 ISF 46 Sahwa 1 Asayesh	871	2,905	806 ISF 53 Sahwa 5 Peshmerga 1 Asayesh	2,040
May	904	1,468	506 ISF 77 Sahwa 1 Peshmerga	884	2,610	719 ISF 50 Sahwa	1,841
Jun	877	2,822	815 ISF 31 Sahwa 62 Peshmerga	1,914	3,483	560 ISF 47 Sahwa 194 Peshmerga 1 Asayesh	2,681
Jul	918	2,195	426 ISF 28 Sahwa 60 Peshmerga	1,681	3,276	738 ISF 24 Sahwa 175 Peshmerga	2,339
TOTAL	6,653	12,304	3,795 ISF 357 Sahwa 125 Peshmerga 3 Asayesh	8,022	20,581	4,802 ISF 372 Sahwa 377 Peshmerga 3 Asayesh	12,841

Security operations like the two launched in Babil's Jurf al-Sakhr in July have proven futile as insurgents move in right after the army and police leave (Reuters)

The security situation across the provinces stabilized in July. There were no more insurgent sweeps across vast territory. Instead the militants laid siege to several major cities. Starting in Anbar, the insurgents were able to expand their hold upon Ramadi by spreading from the southern sections into the western half. The government responded by sending 4,000 volunteers to the city. These volunteers are receiving hardly any training and there are reports that they are barely armed or supplied begging the question of why they are being sent into high conflict areas like Ramadi. Militants also laid siege to Haditha. The ISF responded by announcing security operations inside and out of Ramadi on July 15 with the support of friendly tribes, along with Garma east of Fallujah and Saqlawiya to the west that included the Badr Brigade and militiamen from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. These are all areas that the ISF has cleared several times before. In Babil the security forces launched two more campaigns in Jurf al-Sakhr in the northern section of the province even though government spokesman General Qasim Atta and the governor claimed the area was safe at the beginning of the month. Like in Anbar these operations included militiamen from the League of the Righteous, Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, and the Hezbollah Brigades along with 500 volunteers. Three days after the first security operation it was reported that the Islamic State had moved right back into the area leading to the second campaign towards the end of the month. When the security forces move in the IS fighters shift over to eastern Anbar, and then return to Babil when the ISF and their allies leave showing the futility of the government’s strategy. Of course that did not stop the Babil Operations Command claiming success again at the end of the month. In a similar situation the ISF claimed that Latifiya farther north in Babil towards Baghdad was cleared, only to have intense fighting break out there immediately afterward. That showed that the IS has actually been able to expand its base of operations in the governorate. This same pattern is being repeated across the country. In July the ISF said it cleared Mansuriya, Muqtadiya, and the Hamrin Mountains in Diyala, and the Hawija district of Kirkuk. Like in Babil, as soon as these operations were over the militants moved right back in. Even more concerted military efforts like the attempt to retake Tikrit were stymied. With great fanfare the government announced that it had re-entered the Salahaddin provincial capital in the middle of July. In fact, the ISF drive was turned back by snipers, IEDs laid along the major highways, and suicide bombers. In turn, the insurgents tried to take the Speicher base outside of the city and the Baiji refinery, but failed showing that there is a rough stalemate in Salahaddin. In a more important development several local tribes fought the insurgents in places like Hawija in Kirkuk and Dhuluiya and several other small villages in Salahaddin. The government has not adequately supported these groups and many sheikhs find themselves standing alone against the militants. In the south from July 2-4 followers of Mahmoud Hassani Sarkhi, a breakaway cleric from the Sadr movement, rose up in Qadisiyah and Karbala. According to the press at least 160 of them were killed or wounded as their revolt was put down. Finally, in Ninewa, which is mostly under insurgent control IS has strengthened its hold over the population. The destruction of shrines and the driving out of Christians has been well documented. The Islamic State has gone after other groups as well, carried out executions, and destroyed people’s homes in the province. On July 2 30 Shabak from the town of Omar Kan were kidnapped. July 10-11 21 people were taken away in Mosul, another twenty from that city on July 27, and eight more on July 30. Their fate is unknown but they were probably executed as 10 bodies were found in Kokjla on July 14. The group has continued with its long time practice of blowing up the homes of members of the security forces as happened on July 12 when 20 policeman’s houses were destroyed with IEDs in Hamam al-Aleel. These actions all belie reports that the Islamic State is leaving Mosul for other groups. Instead it appears that the city will be the capital of its caliphate. July shows that while the insurgent charge has been blunted it still holds the initiative. It is largely choosing where and when engagements happen and it is attacking several cities and towns throughout the center of the country. The government even with the help of thousands of volunteers and the militias are still carrying out fruitless security campaigns in reaction to the militants. Baghdad’s inability to hold any Sunni territory means that it will not be able to reverse the current situation any time soon. 

The Islamic State has increased its hold over Ninewa province kidnapping people, murdering them, destroying shrines, and driving out not only Christians but other minority groups like Shabaks as well 

Security Incidents By Province July 2014

Province	Incidents	Dead	Wounded
Anbar	147	446 311 Civilians 127 ISF 8 Sahwa	854 756 Civilians 90 ISF 8 Sahwa
Babil	53	168 126 Civilians 42 ISF	300 132 Civilians 168 ISF
Baghdad	228	460 387 Civilians 71 ISF 2 Sahwa	848 729 Civilians 115 ISF 4 Sahwa
Basra	11	24 24 Civilians	16 16 Civilians
Dhi Qar	1	1 1 Civilian	4 4 Civilians
Diyala	150	263 181 Civilians 35 ISF 41 Peshmerga 6 Sahwa	279 92 Civilians 87 ISF 8 Sahwa 92 Peshmerga
Karbala	3	128 3 ISF 125 Civilians	70 35 ISF 35 Civilians
Kirkuk	63	113 97 Civilians 4 ISF 12 Peshmerga	242 145 Civilians 26 ISF 71 Peshmerga
Najaf	1
Ninewa	80	89 78 Civilians 4 ISF 7 Peshmerga	197 185 Civilians 12 Peshmerga
Qadisiyah	3
Salahaddin	178	503 351 Civilians 140 ISF 12 Sahwa	466 245 Civilians 217 ISF 4 Sahwa

 

The aftermath of a car bomb in Baghdad's Jihad July 19 (EFE/EPA)

The Islamic State (IS) has changed its use of car bombs in recent months. In July there were 42 Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) the lowest monthly total of the year. There were 17 in Baghdad, 7 in Anbar and Salahaddin each, 3 in Babil, Diyala, and Kirkuk each, and 2 in Basra. The attacks in Baghdad and Basra were aimed at rekindling sectarian tensions with Shiites. On July 7, 19 and 22 the Kadhimiya neighborhood in Baghdad was hit, which is the home a Shiite shrine. More importantly IS is using VBIEDs more as a tactical weapon. Hence Samarra faced two car bombs on July 15 and another on July 29. That city is on the frontline in the fighting in Salahaddin. Because of this change in emphasis VBIEDs are not coming in their traditional waves that they did before, but are occurring in longer stretches with at least one bombing a day from July 14 to 22.

Car Bombs In Iraq 2014

Month	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Total
Car Bombs	96	84	82	79	81	58	42	552

Car Bombs In Iraq July 2014

Date	Location	Dead	Wounded
Jul 1
Jul 2
Jul 3
Jul 4	South of Tikrit – Salahaddin	16	39
Jul 5	Basra x2 - Basra	10	8
Jul 6
Jul 7	Kadhimiya – Baghdad	7	21
Jul 8	Samarra – Salahaddin	6	6
Jul 9	Hillah & Imam x2 – Babil	4	11
Jul 10
Jul 11	Canal St – Baghdad, Kirkuk & Camp Khalid - Kirkuk	31	33
Jul 12
Jul 13
Jul 14	Alawi & Baya – Baghdad, Qara Tapa – Diyala	8	38
Jul 15	Sadr City x2 – Baghdad, Samarra x2– Salahaddin	23	80
Jul 16	Ramadi – Anbar	5	10
Jul 17	Taji – Salahaddin	6	23
Jul 18	Hit – Anbar, Balad – Salahaddin	6	3
Jul 19	Abu Dishir, Baya, Jihad, Elam, Kadhimiya – Baghdad	28	90
Jul 20	Rutba – Anbar		4
Jul 21	Ramadi – Anbar	1	5
Jul 22	Ana – Anbar, Kadhimiya & Nahrawan – Baghdad	34	67
Jul 23
Jul 24	Karrada x2– Baghdad	21	39
Jul 25	Mustafa Shrine – Kirkuk	8	24
Jul 26	Amiriya Fallujah - Anbar
Jul 27	Baquba & Jalawla– Diyala	5	11
Jul 28
Jul 29	Samarra – Salahaddin	6	16
Jul 30	Baghdadi – Anbar, Sadr City & Amin – Baghdad	34	57
Jul 31
TOTAL	42	259	585

The government is causing its fare share of casualties as well. This started in Anbar, but has now spread to Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninewa. From January to July 999 people have been killed and 2,685 wounded in shelling in Anbar. The vast majority of these occurred in Fallujah, but in July Qaim, Garma, and Rawa were also hit. There were also 15 fatalities and 20 injured in Salahaddin last month from mortar and artillery fire. Iraqi Army air strikes killed another 124 and wounded 285 in those four provinces. As the ISF has lost more territory to the insurgency it has turned to indiscriminate shelling and air strikes on civilian targets more and more. It apparently does not care about the consequences and considers anyone in enemy territory a legitimate target. 

A destroyed home in Fallujah after a government air raid. The security forces have increased its indiscriminate shelling and air strikes on areas under insurgent control since June with little concern for the civilian casualties (EPA/STR)

Civilian Deaths By Government Shelling In Anbar In 2014

Date	Dead	Wounded
Jan 1-7	8	144
Jan 8-14	8	37
Jan 15-21	17	30
Jan 22-28	44	205
Jan 29-31	8	30
JAN	85	446
Feb 1-7	15	40
Feb 8-14	19	88
Feb 15-21	14	34
Feb 22-28	13	42
FEB	61	204
Mar 1-7	31	78
Mar 8-14	22	56
Mar 15-21	36	108
Mar 22-27	17	82
Mar 28-31	16	81
MAR	122	405
Apr 1-7	13	44
Apr 8-14	40	119
Apr 15-21	56	127
Apr 22-28	26	49
Apr 29-30	5	20
APR	140	359
May 1-7	53	97
May 8-14	76	152
May 15-21	28	42
May 22-28	49	101
May 29-31	14	28
MAY	220	420
Jun 1-7	85	144
Jun 8-14	23	46
Jun 15-21	21	35
Jun 22-28	32	59
Jun 29-30	9	14
JUN	170	298
Jul 1-7	42	54
Jul 8-14	43	137
Jul 15-21	68	204
Jul 22-28	38	117
Jul 29-31	10	41
JUL	201	553
TOTAL	999	2,685

Civilian Deaths By Government Shelling In Salahaddin In July 2014

Date	Dead	Wounded
Jul 8-14	3	16
Jul 29-31	12	4
TOTAL	15	20

Civilian Deaths By Government Air Strikes In July 2014

Date	Location	Dead	Wounded
Jul 1-7	Ninewa	2	66
	Salahaddin	38	26
Jul 8-14	Anbar	10	-
	Diyala	3	-
	Ninewa	15	28
	Salahaddin	2	15
Jul 15-21	Anbar	-	25
	Ninewa	5	30
	Salahaddin	4	-
Jul 22-28	Anbar	5	12
	Ninewa	15	35
	Salahaddin	25	22
Jul 29-31	Ninewa	-	9
	Salahaddin	-	17
TOTAL		124	285

 

As security has deteriorated the government has come to rely upon militias like Asaib Ahl Al-Haq the League of the Righteous more and more. Many of these armed groups have been blamed for sectarian killings of Sunnis in Baghdad and the surrounding areas (Reuters)

Baghdad is relying upon militias more and more since fighting started in Anbar. One result is that groups like the League of the Righteous have been accused of kidnapping and murdering Sunnis in Baghdad. There has been a decided increase in bodies being dumped in the capital in recent months as a result. In April there 28 bodies found, going up to 42 in May, 44 in June, and 98 in July. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented cases of militias going after Sunni men, accusing them of being insurgents and murdering them not only in Baghdad, but in Diyala and Babil as well. On July 9 for instance, 53 bodies were found in Khamisiya north of Hillah. A government official and a brother of one of the victims told HRW that the League of the Righteous kidnapped these men on June 11, killed them, and then left their bodies. The League, Hezbollah Brigades, and the Badr Brigade have allegedly been given responsibility by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to police the Baghdad belts and route out insurgent cells. The result is the return of these sectarian killings.

Dead Bodies Found Baghdad 2014

Date	# Found
Jan 1-7	9
Jan 8-14	8
Jan 15-21	20
Jan 22-28	7
Jan 29-31	6
JAN	50
Feb 1-	11
Feb 8-14	11
Feb 15-21	7
Feb 22-28	12
FEB	41
Mar 1-7	13
Mar 8-14	3
Mar 15-21	5
Mar 22-27	6
Mar 28-31	5
MAR	32
Apr 1-7	6
Apr 8-14	3
Apr 15-21	6
Apr 22-28	13
Apr 29-30	-
APR	28
May 1-7	15
May 8-14	15
May 15-21	8
May 22-28	2
May 29-31	2
MAY	42
Jun 1-7	10
Jun 8-14	3
Jun 15-21	16
Jun 22-28	14
Jun 29-30	1
JUN	44
Jul 1-7	11
Jul 8-14	7
Jul 15-21	34
Jul 22-28	44
Jul 29-31	2
JUL	98
TOTAL	335

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim Salama, Vivian, "Talabani ally is Iraqi Kurds presidential choice," Associated Press, 7/23/14

Agence France Presse, "Bombings kill eight in Iraq," 7/8/14

- "Iraq Kurds claim oilfields as bombings kill 28," 7/11/14

- “Militants storm Iraqi air base,” 7/18/14

AIN, "3rd car bomb goes off central Hilla," 7/9/14

- "Car bomb goes off southern Samarra," 7/8/14

- “MoD announces liberating many areas of Jurf al-Sakhar district northern Babel,” 7/21/14

- “Several areas of Jurf al-Sakhar district freed from ISIL terrorists, says Atta,” 7/3/14

Alsumaria, "18 dead and injured in bombings in Qaratapa northeast of Baquba," 7/15/14

- “Army begins a military operation in Saqlawiyah with the participation of warplanes,” 7/20/14

- "Found 20 unidentified bodies in the Tigris River near Samarra," 7/18/14

- "Gunmen kidnap eight people from the national grid in Nineveh," 7/30/14

- "Interior announces the death of 11 people and injuring 53 others the outcome of three bombings in Baghdad," 7/19/14

- "Killing and wounding at least 74 civilians in Sadr City in eastern Baghdad," 7/30/14

- “Launching a military operation in Latifiyah and killed a number of Daash elements,” 7/29/14

- "The outcome of the end of the bombing south of Kirkuk, 32 people dead and wounded," 7/11/14

Associated Press, "Iraq elects new president as attacks kill dozens," 7/24/14

- "Iraqi cleric urges leaders not to 'cling' to power," 7/25/14

Aswat al-Iraq, "30 killed, 28 wounded in Kirkuk explosion," 7/12/14

Buratha News, “Al Bhan and Arab in Jurf al-Sakhar cleared of Daash rats,” 7/11/14

- "Daash gangs explode shrine of Imam Yahya Abu al-Qasim west of Mosul," 7/23/14

- "Daash terrorists abduct 20 students from mosque during religious lessons, north of Mosul," 7/27/14

- "The death and wounding of 12 people by a car bomb west of Anbar," 7/30/14

Buratha News-,” 7/8/14

- “The killing of 26 terrorists and the arrest of Daash in a security operation to “cleanse” the vicinity of Ramadi,” 7/15/14

- “The killing of Mufti of Jurf al-Sakhr Musab al-Owaisi with 70 other terrorists in violent clashes in the north of Babylon province,” 7/13/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding four civilians in a car bomb central Baquba," 7/27/14

- “Open the road between Jurf al-Sakhr and Musayyib after killing more than 115 Daash,” 7/28/14

- "Our correspondent in the holy city of Karbala found 56 criminals from Sarkhi's group killed and injured and 132 others arrested yesterday and still unknown fate of Sarkhi," 7/2/14

 - “The outbreak of violent clashes in 6 areas north of Hilla,” 7/27/14

- “The outbreak of violent clashes in Latifiiyah and Yusufiyah between the security forces and the terrorist rats Daash,” 7/27/14

- “Saraya Brigades and military wing of Badr killed 80 Daash terrorists in security Garma,” 7/20/14

- “Sons of Iraq clearing the last stronghold of terrorism in Latifiya of Daash terrorists,” 7/17/14

Coles, Isabel, “Insight – Purge of minorities re-draws Iraq map,” Reuters, 7/24/14

Dziadosz, Alexander, “Bruised Iraqi army leans on Shi’ite militias, volunteers,” Reuters, 7/10/14

Al Forat, “Babel Operations Command announces fully controlling Jurf al-Sakhar district,” 7/31/14

- "Casualties due to Samarra car bombs reach 41 deaths, injuries," 7/15/14

- "ISIL kidnap 15 officers of Iraq former regime in Mosul," 7/10/14

- "ISIL kidnaps 30 citizens of Shabak community," 7/2/14

- "ISIL terrorists blow up 20 policemen's houses in Mosul," 7/12/14

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Pro-Government Militias Trail of Death,” 7/31/14

Independent Press Agency, "28 killed and wounded in the final outcome of the bombing of Kazimiyah," 7/7/14

- “Army dominates most areas of North Babylon, kills dozens of Daash,” 7/23/14

- "Killing and wounding 29 people outcome of a suicide bombing south of Baghdad," 7/19/14

Iraq Times, "The end of the outcome of the bombing in Sedea, Baya at 25 martyrs and wounded," 7/19/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding 18 in explosion of two car bombs in central Basra," 7/5/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding 35 civilians in a car bombing in downtown Kazimiyah," 7/19/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding 52 people in two car explosions in Sadr City in eastern Baghdad," 7/15/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding 54 soldiers in a suicide bombing at a military camp south of Tikrit," 7/4/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding at least 20 civilians in a car bombing in central Baghdad," 7/14/14

Al Mada, “Army makes “tactical” withdrawal from Tikrit because of booby-trapped buildings and streets,” 7/17/14

- “Babylon Council enhances the security forces in Jurf al Sakhr with 500 volunteers,” 7/12/14

- "Baghdad bombings toll rises to 96 dead and wounded," 7/19/14

- "Daash kidnap 6 in central Mosul," 7/11/14

- “Governor of Babylon denies insurgents control Jurf al-Sakhr: proactive operations against insurgent pockets,” 7/8/14

- "Killed and injured 11 in a bomb blast in eastern Baghdad," 7/22/14

- "Killing and injuring eight people by a car bomb southwest of Baghdad in the second such incident today," 7/14/14

- "Killing and injuring seven policemen in an armed attack on Awakening central Ramadi," 7/16/14

- "Lawyer killed in a car bombing west of Baghdad," 7/11/14

- “Security expert: Delay in support of the tribes forced them to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi,” 7/16/14

- “”Slow progress” of the security forces because Daash sniper fire center of Tikrit,” 7/15/14

- "Two injured in a suicide bombing of the Peshmerga forces west of Kirkuk," 7/11/14

Al Masalah, "The death of 15 people and the wounding of 45 the final outcome of the explosion of bombs in Karrada," 7/24/14

- "Deaths of six policemen and wounding three others by a suicide bomber south of Tikrit," 7/18/14

- “Defense: fully cleanse the area of death in Hamrin Mountains,” 7/14/14

- "Fall between 24 people dead and wounded by a car bomb in eastern Baghdad," 7/30/14

- "Found 10 bodies west of Mosul," 7/14/14

- "Killing five people and wounding 21 including police by suicide bomber at entrance to Taji," 7/17/14

NINA, "/4/ people injured by a car bomb near Ratba," 7/20/14

- "/40/ soldiers and volunteers killed and wounded in the explosion of two car bombs south of Tikrit, 7/15/14

- “Army forces launched a military campaign to cleanse the area of al-Qarma from ISIS,” 7/17/14

- "Breaking News../44/ soldiers killed and wounded in a suicide attack south of Tikrit," 7/4/14

- "Breaking News..Death toll of the victims of the two car bombs in Sadr City up to 62 martyrs and wounded," 7/15/14

- "A car bomb exploded west of Hit in Anbar, without injuries," 7/18/14

- “Diyala police chief announces cleansing the areas of Dawalib and Al-Sherwin in al-Mansuriyya northeast of Baquba from the control of the ISIS,” 7/3/14

- “A military Operation Launched in Northeast of Diyala province,” 7/12/14

- “A security campaign by the army and the tribes to cleanse Ramadi from the ISIS,” 7/16/14

Radio Free Iraq, “02 July 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 7/2/14

- "27 July 2014," Daily Updates from Anbar," 7/27/14

Radio Nawa, “Daash militants deployed again in Jurf al-Sakhr, three days after their expulsion,” 7/26/14

Al Rafidayn, “Army governs full control on Muqdadiya,” 7/13/14

- "Killing and wounding six people in 3 terrorist attacks aimed at the municipal council building in Samarra," 7/29/14

Al Rayy, “Army troops control four sites from Daash southwest of Kirkuk,” 7/22/14

- "The death of four people and wounding 25 others, the outcome of the suicide bombing north of Baghdad," 7/17/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding 12 people in a car bomb attack on a Peshmerga police station in Jalawla," 7/27/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding 15 in the army, the police and the awakening in suicide attack west of Ramadi," 7/16/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding six civilians in a car bombing west of Ramadi," 7/21/14

- “Tribal militants in Kirkuk, gunmen attacked Daash in Hawija and killed and injured 17 of them,” 7/4/14

- "Wounding a civilian car bomb explosion west of Al-Anbar," 7/22/14

Rubin, Alissa and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “For Iraq, Debacle in Tikrit as Forces Walk Into Trap Set by Militants,” New York Times, 7/16/14

- "Top Iraqi general killed in mortar attack," Boston Globe, 7/7/14

Yacoub, Sameer, "Baghdad car bombing kill at least 27; ISIL terror blitz shakes Iraq's capital," Associated Press, 7/19/14

Xinhua, “Villagers repel Sunni extremist militants, battles continue in Iraq,” 7/8/14