Chapter 13 in the U.S. Army’s second volume on the Iraq war covers the end of 2009 to the start of 2010. The Islamic State of Iraq reached a nadir during that period losing most of its leadership and manpower. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continued to be an incompetent war time leader while plotting to hold onto power after he lost an election. That meant Iraq couldn’t take advantage of the decline of the insurgency.
By the summer of 2009 the U.S. thought the insurgency was losing despite a number of headline grabbing mass casualty bombings. In July 2009 the American military estimated that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) only had 1400-3500 fighters not enough to be an army anymore. The next month the group set off four truck bombs in Baghdad two of which targeted the Finance and Foreign Ministries leaving 75 dead and 749 wounded. In October the Justice and Public Works Ministries were hit with around 800 casualties. Car bombs struck the Finance Ministry and other targets in Baghdad in December causing 50 dead and more than 200 wounded. These attacks had two goals. One to show that the Islamists were still active despite their losses and two to draw in donations which were desperately needed as the group was falling apart.
At the time the American and Iraqi forces were hunting down ISI’s leadership, personnel and money. In 2009 ISI’s governor for Baghdad Manaf al-Rawi was arrested. He provided information that allowed for the break-up of ISI’s networks that shipped men and material into Iraq as well as its finances. Quickly a slew of insurgent commanders were captured that eventually led to the whereabouts of ISI’s leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and his War Minister Abu Ayub al-Masri. They killed themselves during a joint US-Iraqi raid in April 2010. The next month the U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno announced that 32 of ISI’s 42 leaders had been killed or captured. By April 2010 the US believed there were only around 1000 ISI members left in Iraq. The Americans were ready to declare victory believing that the Surge along with its outreach to Sunnis which led to the Anbar Awakening and Sahwa had turned the tide of the war.
The U.S. didn’t realize until too late that its ally Prime Minister Maliki was becoming a greater threat to the stability of the country. After two large bombings in Baghdad in August and October 2009 Maliki blamed Baathists and Syria when they were the work of ISI. Baghdad broadcast false confessions saying that they acted on orders of Baathists living in Damascus. Iraq then expelled Syria’s ambassador. The premier told the U.S. that Iraq’s security problems resided in former regime elements living in Iraq’s neighbor rather than domestically with ISI. Maliki and his Dawa operatives had been obsessed with Baathists since the day they returned to Iraq in 2003. Having lived in exile and being under constant threat from Saddam’s intelligence services they always believed Baathists were behind anything and everything. Maliki also made the tactical decision to blame foreign elements rather than Iraqis for two massive bombings in the capitol. This pointed to Maliki’s politicization of security which meant that the real threats were not adequately dealt with.
Last in 2010 Iraq held parliamentary elections which Maliki lost but he was determined not to give up power. Maliki and his State of Law list came in second to Iraqiya led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Maliki responded by attacking the Election Commission and threatening to arrest members accusing it of cheating. Iran was also intent upon keeping the premier in office and together they began lobbying Iraqi parties to rally behind Maliki which they eventually did.
The U.S. was split over what to do. General Odierno was weary of Iranian interference fearing it would undermine faith in elections. New Ambassador Christopher Hill didn’t believe Iran was a real issue and more importantly thought Maliki was the best leader Iraq had. Vice President Joe Biden was behind the PM as well and travelled to Baghdad to get other politicians to back him. He was instrumental in creating what became known as the Irbil agreement where Maliki would get a second term and Allawi would lead a new strategic council. Odierno warned that supporting Maliki would only lead him to abuse his power even more.
The premier ended up staying in office and never followed the Irbil protocols. Rather than continue the fight against ISI Maliki increasingly used the security forces against his opponents while stealing a huge amount of money to enrich himself and his party. Iraq missed the opportunity to finish off the insurgency. Maliki’s misrule would directly lead to the rebirth of the insurgency and the fall of Mosul in 2014.
SOURCES
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
No comments:
Post a Comment