Review U.S. Policy In Post-Saddam Iraq

Eisenstadt, Michael and Mathewson, Eric, Editors, U.S. Policy In Post-Saddam Iraq, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003

 

Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq the Washington Institute for Near East Policy realized the United States could learn a lot from the British time in the country starting in World War I. The Institute collected together a group of Iraq experts and had them write about the United Kingdom’s experience and then make suggestions for the Bush administration. The authors provided a good history and there were plenty of lessons for the U.S. to learn. As we all know the White House thought it had all the answers and carried out a costly and highly flawed occupation as a result.

 

The Institute collected together an outstanding collection of writers for this book. That included Peter Sluglett, Ofra Bengio, Abbas Kelidar, Judith Yaphe, and the Institute’s own Eric Mathewson and Michael Eisenstadt who were also the editors. Each one got their own chapter and it is quickly apparent how the British and Americans ran into many of the same issues in Iraq.

 

Sluglett and Mathewson point out that the British were initially determined to draw down its forces in Iraq to save money and turned to force as one of the main means to maintain its influence. In October 1921 there 17 battalions of British and Indian army units in Iraq. By 1930 there were none as they had been replaced by 4 squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Their planes were used to bomb recalcitrant tribes who rose up in revolt or refused to pay taxes. That led to neglecting the administration of Iraq because using military power was much easier.

 

Bengio and Kelidar wrote about how the democratic system the British created was highly flawed. In 1917 when the British took Baghdad the commanding General Maude gave a speech saying they came as liberators not occupiers. He said that the British wanted the Arabs to rise to prominence once again now that they were free from the Ottomans. Part of that process focused upon creating a parliamentary and representative system of government. Balloting was fixed first by the British and then the leading politicians of Iraq. The system quickly gave way to corruption as well. In 1941 a British report said that Iraqi parliamentarians didn’t understand their jobs, none of the Senators were chosen for experience, elections didn’t represent the public and parliament was controlled by a small group of politicians and military officers. That led to constant instability and eventually a series of military coups. London did little to try to fix the system it created as long as it maintained its influence in the country.

 

Kelidar also noted that Iraqi politics excluded Shiites and Kurds. Many leading politicians for instance advocated for Pan-Arabism which was rejected by many Shiites and Kurds. The main job of the Iraqi military was putting down Shiite and Kurdish tribes and revolts. The officer corps was dominated by a group of Sunni Ottoman officers who followed King Faisal into power. Iraqi officials would often reject Shiite candidates claiming they were Persians.

 

Yaphe’s chapter is about how the British were divided over their policy towards the Ottoman’s Arabs and settled upon direct imperial rule which failed and led to a re-evaluation. The British government had little knowledge of Iraq’s culture or politics when it entered the area during World War I. Policy was split between the War Office, the Foreign Office and the India Office that all had different agendas. The India Office only saw Iraq as a means to protect India while the Foreign Office pushed for creating an Arab state under British control. The Foreign Office won the debate but the British administrators sent to run Iraq all came from India and wanted to recreate that system. Sir Arnold Wilson as the High Commissioner for Iraq didn’t believe Arabs were capable of self-rule. He set up a series of British officials to manage the country and relied upon sheikhs to run rural areas.

 

The similarities between the U.K. and U.S. occupation are striking. Washington was just as split over its stance towards Iraq before and after the invasion with the Pentagon and State Department often being at cross purposes. The White House believed that U.S. forces would be met as liberators not occupiers just as General Maude claimed when he entered Baghdad in 1917. Despite President Bush always talking about victory America’s actual strategy was to withdraw as soon as possible. The raging violence stopped that from happening but the overall goal never changed. The U.S. military and fighting the insurgency also dominated policy and efforts to create a better Iraqi government often fell to the wayside. Politics became dominated by a small and corrupt elite just as it did during British times. Sunnis ended up being excluded from the new Iraq first by the U.S. run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and then by the Shiite and Kurdish elites who were empowered by the Americans. The CPA’s Paul Bremer was also like the Britain’s Indian administrators who didn’t believe Iraqis were ready to run their own government and wanted to direct control of the country as a result.

 

The book suggested Washington take into account many of these issues so that it might avoid the mistakes London made. The problem was the Bush administration was listening to few and paid the price. There were many elements within the Defense Department that actually prided themselves on not knowing about Iraq believing those that did were against regime change. The U.S. ended up making many of the same decisions and just like the British faced the 1920 revolt when tribes and Iraqi nationalists rose up against its rule the Americans faced an insurgency and militia revolts.

 

U.S. Policy In Post-Saddam Iraq is worthwhile for the history of the British mandate in Iraq and the monarchy it put in power. The authors are all very knowledgeable and provide a coherent narrative about the flawed political and military system London created. The Washington Institute made a valiant effort to warn the White House about what it might face in Iraq based upon this past but there was no one listening.

 

Link to all of Musings On Iraq’s book reviews listed by topic