Review Hope Is Not A Plan, The War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone

Mowle, Thomas, Hope Is Not A Plan, The War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone, Westport London: Praeger Security International, 2007

 

Hope Is Not A Plan, The War In Iraq From Inside The Green Zone is a very informative book about the lack of U.S. strategic planning and coordination from 2004-05. It’s an anthology with each chapter written by military officers who served in Iraq during that period. As the editor Thomas Mowle points out everyone should know that the Bush administration did not plan for the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion that led to looting and the collapse of the Iraqi state. What this selection tries to point out is that the Americans continued to fail at planning afterward.

 

There are two main takeaways from the book. The first is that the U.S. was not institutionally capable of dealing with rebuilding Iraq for a number of reasons. Second there was no unity of effort in dealing with Iraq after 2003 nor a comprehensive strategic plan which meant the Americans constantly failed at the macro level even though it claimed it was succeeding.

 

One chapter argues that the U.S. was incapable of dealing with such a Herculean task as rebuilding Iraq. The U.S. did not have the personnel nor resources for such a large effort. More importantly it didn’t have the ideas or cultural knowledge. The Defense Department for instance had purposefully forgotten the lessons of Vietnam and solely focused upon conventional warfare. It thus quickly succeeded in dispatching Saddam and was left flatfooted afterwards. U.S. soldiers and diplomats were also culturally ignorant of Iraq and its history. It did not understand how its actions like sweeping through neighborhoods, breaking down doors and arresting all military age males would turn the population against it. It also lacked knowledge about the political rivalries and growing sectarianism within the Iraqi elites it was empowering. The authors believed it was a recipe for disaster. The Americans constantly made the wrong decisions during the occupation which only exasperated the situation.

 

The second big problem the book tackles was the failure of Americans planning from 2004-05. There was no single person or agency in charge of Iraq. The task was always spread out across different groups such as the Coalition Provisional Authority and the U.S. military. The latter for instance did not coordinate with the office in charge of reconstruction or the U.S. embassy during this period. That led to constant failures such as the 2^nd Battle of Fallujah which was a tactical success as the city was cleared but the military did not plan for the political fallout and the Iraqi Governing Council almost collapsed as a result.

 

There was also a lack of robust planning. The Americans called the January 2005 election a turning point which would lead to a U.S. withdrawal. It was believed that the creation of the first independent Iraqi government since 2003 would decrease violence and allow the U.S. to eventually leave. It turned out to be a failure because there was a Sunni boycott. That led to their exclusion from drafting the new constitution. The result was no letup in violence and only greater alienation by an important community.  

 

The last chapter argues for the United States government to invest in planning for the next nation building effort to try to avoid all the mistakes it made in Iraq. Unbeknownst to the authors at the time Washington has repeated its mistake from Vietnam and tried to put Iraq behind it. Thus the Pentagon has gone back to conventional military planning. The authors believed the U.S. was not capable of dealing with rebuilding a country. They were right as the government is not interested.

 

Hope Is Not A Plan is an important addition to the history of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. It explains why the Bush administration continued to struggle after the 2003 invasion. It deals with both the macro and micro level of planning and strategy in a very short read. Some chapters do come off as how to readings for military staff officers but those can be overlooked for the overall message that it delivers.

 

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