The third chapter of the U.S. army’s history of the Iraq War covers the start of the Surge in February 2007. There were two main issues. First, there were still differences over the new strategy. Second, the Americans looked to the Iraqi government to be a partner but it was an actor in the civil war trying to establish Shiite supremacy over Baghdad.
In February 2007 General David Petraeus took command in Iraq. He said his goal was to gain control over the sectarian violence and protect the Iraqi population. He warned that it would take months to make a difference. The Surge would also be a process as the new troops would not arrive in the country all at once but rather in waves.
The first two new U.S. units in Iraq were sent to flashpoints in northern and western Baghdad province. It was aimed at cutting off insurgent supply lines into Baghdad city as well as to block militia expansion into Sunni areas. After an early operation was over violence went back up showing that clearing an area was not enough to change the status quo.
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to support the new American effort but they were full of problems. General Petraeus ordered a review of all the Iraqi army units and found that they still needed extensive U.S. support. The National Police were even worse. U.S. units found that the National Police exacerbated the situation because they were full of militia and would attack and kill civilians. The Facilities Protection Service were considered a rogue force. They were supposed to protect government buildings, officials and ministries but they answered to different government officials and had no unified command. It was supposed to come under the Interior Ministry but never did.
The list of problems continued. Manpower was an issue for all the ISF. There was rampant corruption. Ghost soldiers and police were an example where commanders created fake personnel to steal salaries. The U.S. ordered that ISF units be staffed up to 120% in the hopes that around 80% would actually show up. Officers also hoarded supplies and equipment for their own personal gain and did not distribute it to their forces. Overall most Iraqi units lacked logistics or communications which meant they could not operate independently or leave their home areas. General Martin Dempsey who was in charge of training the ISF said it had no staying power and didn’t improve with time or more experience because they were rarely if ever relieved.
Not only that but Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was attempting to assert his control over the ISF through his office of commander in chief and carrying out a sectarian policy against Sunnis. For example he wanted to create a new National Police Brigade to secure a mosque in Samarra, Salahaddin The list of recruits were 100% Shiite.
Besides the civil war Shiite factions were also vying for power amongst themselves. In southern Iraq Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army fought the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq and its Badr Brigade. In early 2007 the Mahdi Army tried to assert its control over Diwaniya in Qadisiya province.
Finally General Petraeus asked for an assessment of the overall situation in Iraq. He received a report on April 20. It recommended that Iraq’s communities be pushed towards accommodation from both the bottom and top. The U.S. therefore, should back the Awakening in Anbar which would be an example of the former. It was hoped that improving security would allow for better governance and the inclusion of all groups within the administration. The problem was there was no political will amongst Iraq’s elite to reconcile. Not only that but the Maliki administration was an actor in the civil war. To address that Baghdad had to be held accountable for sectarian actors and there had to be an effort to purge extremists. The government also lacked the capacity to improve the conditions for its citizens. That meant the Surge had to continue for as long as possible because there was so much work to do. The effort had to be both military and political to achieve its goals. That was a daunting list of issues and objectives.
The U.S. proved able to reduce violence but it was never able to achieve any kind of accommodation between communities. Instead, Maliki used the Surge as an opportunity to increase his personal power which eventually led him down the path towards being an autocrat.
SOURCES
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
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