Iraq May Sanction More Banks For Smuggling Dollars

The new Trump administration is renewing its anti-Iran policy and focusing upon Iraq’s ties to Tehran. There are reports that several Iraqi banks may be sanctioned for smuggling dollars to Iran.

Coordination Framework and Sadr Inch Closer To Agreement On New Govt

(Reuters)

Talks over forming Iraq’s new government are inching forward. The biggest issue right now is whether Nouri al-Maliki from State of Law and Qais al-Khazali from Asaib Ahl Al-Haq will be included in the next regime or not. They are longtime rivals of Moqtada al-Sadr who wants to exclude them.

Hezbollah Helping Iran Negotiate New Premier For Iraq

Hezbollah's Kawtharani has been in Iraq coordinating with Iran to pick a new prime minister (Long War Journal)

As the Iraqi parliament is deadlocked over deciding who should be the next prime minister, Iran is applying a full court press to make sure the candidate is favorable to it. That includes deploying its Hezbollah ally in the form of Mohammed Kawtharani. He has been assisting Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force Commander General Qassim Soleimani in lobbying Iraqi leaders.

How US Tilt Towards Iraq In Iran-Iraq War Led To Iran-Contra Scandal

Iran had Hezbollah kidnap CIA station chief Buckley and six other Americans in Lebanon in retaliation for the U.S. supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War The Reagan administration would later try to get its hostages released by offering Tehran weapons which would be exposed in the Iran-Contra Scandal

In 1985 The Reagan administration attempted to reconcile with the Iranian government by offering it arms sales, which it desperately needed to maintain its military during the war with Iraq. Profits from these sales were later diverted to the Contra rebels which the United States was banned from funding under the Boland Amendment. The White House was also hoping that if secret ties were made with Ayatollah Khomenei’s government he might decide to release several Americans seized in Lebanon. The deals with Iran were later exposed by a leak by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to a Lebanese paper in November 1986. This later became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal. What was little known was that this whole affair was caused by the United States’ decision to back Baghdad in its war with Tehran, which led the Iranians to retaliate by kidnapping American citizens in Lebanon.

2007 Political Kidnappings In Iraq Involving Asaib Ahl Al-Haq

In 2007 there were three series of political kidnappings surrounding Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), the League of the Righteous, a splinter group from the Sadr movement. Starting on January 20, a group of a dozen AAH fighters in five SUVs claiming to be commandos from Baghdad entered the Karbala provincial council compound. After gaining entry they began shooting and throwing grenades as they made their way to the command center. When they left they had killed one U.S. soldiers, wounded three, and kidnapped four more. As they were chased by the Iraqi forces they ended up ditching their vehicles and escaping. Three of the kidnapped Americans were found executed, while the fourth was mortally wounded and died soon afterward. Asaib Ahl Al-Haq was formed in 2006 by Moqtada al-Sadr, one of his lieutenants Qaiz Khazali, and Iran to carry out attacks upon the Americans, while denying Sadr’s involvement. This was their most dramatic act since they were formed and would set in motion a series of other kidnappings.

First, the leaders of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq were captured and revealed not only their role in the Karbala operation, but Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah’s as well. On March 20 the head of AAH Qais Khazali, his brother Laith Khazali, and Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq were captured in Basra by the British and turned over to the Americans. The Khazali brothers along with information captured with them showed that they were behind the Karbala raid, which was planned and assisted by Iran’s Quds Force and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The Iranians for example had collected extensive intelligence on the Karbala center. Daqduq was the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s Department 2800, which carried out foreign operations for the group, and was assigned by the Quds Force as a liaison between it and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. After the arrests AAH halted all their operations in Iraq for several weeks as they attempted to deal with the loss of their leadership. Iran tried to come to its aid with another kidnapping.

On March 23, Iran stopped a British frigate in the Shatt al-Arab waterway in Basra claiming that the vessel had crossed into its territory. The Iranians took 15 British Marines into custody and brought them to Tehran. It then let it be known that they would release the Brits in return for Qais Khazali. That failed, so a third round of kidnappings was carried out.

On May 29 around 100 men from Asaib Ahl Al-Haq rolled up to the Finance Ministry in Baghdad wearing Interior Ministry uniforms and driving the ubiquitous black SUVs. They entered the building and grabbed British IT technician Peter Moore, and his four bodyguards, Jason Swindlehurst, Jason Creswell, Alec MacLachlan, and Alan McMenemy. They were taken to Sadr City, and then to Iran where the bodyguards were all eventually killed. Like the Karbala raid, the Quds Force planned the operation, and likely took custody of the five Brits. AAH used their offices in Qom, Iran to negotiate with the British Foreign Office demanding the release of Qais and Lais Khaali. That eventually happened in 2009. In March the U.S. released ten AAH leaders, which set in motion the freeing of Laith Khazali at the start of June, and then the bodies of Swindlehurst and Creswell were given to the British at the end of the month. 300 more AAH members were let go starting in August, and in return MacLachlan’s body was returned in September. Finally Peter Moore was let go in December, Qais Khazali in January 2010, while McMenemy’s body wasn’t turned over until January 2012. Eventually almost all of the AAH fighters were released by the Americans in what they called a reconciliation effort as the group claimed it would give up its arms and enter politics. After Qais was released Asaib Ahl Al-Haq reneged on that first promise, and would take up attacks on the Americans until its military withdrew in 2011. Today AAH remains opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and is still one of Iran’s main proxies in the country.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “US Forces release 2 Asaib Ahl Al Haq members,” 7/30/09

August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09

BBC, “Alan McMenemy ‘brutally murdered’ by kidnappers in Iraq, inquest finds,” 11/28/12

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09

Cockburn, Patrick, “Revealed: why UK hostages were killed,” Independent, 7/10/09

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, General Bernard, The Endgame, The Inside Story Of The Struggle For Iraq, From George W. Bush To Barack Obama, New York, Pantheon, 2012

Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/16/10

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Mahmood, Mona, O’Kane, Maggie, Grandjean, Guy, “Why Iran’s kidnap squad struck,” Guardian, 12/31/09

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Iraqi Fighters Taking Part In New Assad-Iranian-Hezbollah-Russian Offensives In Syria

Allies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have been building up their forces for the last several months in anticipation of a new push to secure the northwestern section of the country. That includes Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ advisers and Basij militia, Lebanese Hezbollah, Russian air strikes and trainers, and Iraqi fighters. The Iraqis were some of the first to mobilize for these offensives, which just begun in October.

Starting in the summer of 2015 several Iraqi armed groups groups began recruiting for deployment to Syria. As Phillip Smyth wrote in a new report for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, one of those groups was Kataib al-Imam Ali that was formed by ex-Mahdi Army militiamen. They started a drive to gain new manpower in Najaf starting in July using the Sayid Zainab shrine outside Damascus as a rallying point. The group has been sending its men to Syria since 2013. Karakt Hezbollah al-Nujaba, which is made up of former Asaib Ahl Al-Haq members, Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib formed from Liwa Abu Fadhl al-Abbas, which has been fighting in Syria for years, new groups such as Kataib al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, and Kataib al-Ansar al-Wilayah, and veteran Hashd group Kataib Hezbollah have all been bringing in new fighters for Syria since the summer as well. Smyth told the Wall Street Journal that approximately 5,000 Iraqis had gone to Syria from July to August. Some of these groups like Kataib Hezbollah have been taking part in the Iraqi government offensives in Anbar and Salahaddin, while others appear to be exclusively fighting in Syria. They are all supported by Iran, which is organizing the pro-Assad forces, and that is why these groups are leaving Iraq.

The Iraqi militiamen will be backing the Syrian Army in their operations in Homs, Ladhidiya, and Hama provinces. Iraqis were said to be involved in the first part of this offensive that started in Hama and Ladhidiya at the beginning of October. That included Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah fighters, and Russian air strikes and missile barrages. The pro-Assad forces took six villages, but rebels held out in some other areas. On October 15, the second phase started with two Syrian Divisions moving on the Rastan Plains in Homs province. According to the Associated Press the main goals of these moves are to secure the Alwaite areas of Latakia in Ladhidiya, keep the supply lines to Aleppo open, and retake areas of Hama province lost to rebels with the larger aim of shoring up the Assad government’s position in the country. That stands in contrast to the narrative that Iraqi groups use to recruit fighters as none of this fighting is near the Sayid Zainab shrine that is far to the south, nor does it involve confronting the Islamic State as Russia is using to justify its new intervention in Syria. The main rebels that the joint forces will be taking on come from groups like Al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham.

The main architects of this offensive appeared to be Tehran. General Qasim Suleimani the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force allegedly travelled to Moscow in July 2015 and met with President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu probably to discuss a joint venture in Syria. One official told the Associated Press that Iran had been asking for Russian help for a year. Tehran is also said to be in charge of much of the Syrian government’s military operations since 2011 when Assad first began putting down the protest movement. Iran organized the National Defense Forces for example based upon its own Basij militia, and brought in its Lebanese and Iraqi allies to prop up Damascus as well. It now appears to be behind the current push, and Iraqis are an integral part to its plans as they have been from almost the beginning of the Syrian war.

SOURCES

Bassam, Laila and Perry, Tom, “Syria’s army, allies plan offensive against insurgents in Aleppo,” Reuters, 10/13/15

Dagher, Sam and Fitch, Asa, “Iran Expands Role in Syria in Conjunction With Russia’s Airstrikes,” Wall Street Journal, 10/2/15

Fadel, Leith, “Breaking: Syrian Arab Army Begins Long-Awaited Offensive in Northern Homs,” Al Masdar News, 10/15/14

Karam, Zeina, “Under Russia’s cover, Iran sends troops to Syria,” Associated Press, 10/14/15

Karam, Zeina and El Deeb, Sarah, “Iran sends fighters to Syria, escalating its involvement,” Associated Press, 10/14/15

Kozak, Chris, “Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial Gains,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/14/15

Roggio, Bill, “Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani rallies Iranian officers, Hezbollah in Syria,” Long War journal, 10/14/15

Smyth, Phillip, “Iran’s Iraqi Shiite Proxies Increase Their Deployment to Syria,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10/2/15

Stuster, J. Dana, “Iran Appears to Prepare for New Offensive in Syria,” Foreign Policy, 10/14/15

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Emma Sky On Iraq After The Surge

Iranian & Hezbollah Advisers Committed To Baiji Refinery And Ramadi Ops Leading To Another Loss For The Revolutionary Guard

Iran has become the main foreign power supporting Iraq in its fight against the Islamic State (IS). Currently, a large number of Iranian advisers are involved in the taking of the Baiji Refinery and surrounding area in Salahaddin province. At the same time, Iranians are heading west for Anbar where the effort to retake Ramadi from the Islamic State is now being led by the Hashd many of which are supported by Iran. That led to another loss for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Wherever there is major action in Iraq the Iranians can be expected to be taking part.

In April 2015, right after the taking of Tikrit, the Islamic State assaulted the Baiji Refinery. IS had attacked there before, but made its biggest advance this time taking over 50% of the facility. Government forces and Hashd al-Shaabi units including members of the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, the Khorasani Brigade, Kataib Imam Ali, and Jund al-Imam were sent to relieve the besieged unit protecting the refinery. Iranians were in a supporting role operating artillery, rockets, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and flying drones to collect intelligence. Iranians and their allies Lebanese Hezbollah were also not only providing advisers at Baiji, but were also said to be fighting on the frontlines. An officer from the Energy Police told Iraq Oil Report that the Iranians and Lebanese were wearing civilian and Hashd uniforms to blend in and not stand out as foreigners. There was so much press about Tehran’s involvement that its Foreign Ministry issued a statement denying that it had troops in Baiji, but did admit to advisers. Salahaddin has been the main province where Iranians and Lebanese have been present in Iraq. Tehran is justifying its intervention in Iraq in part to protect the shrines there including the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra, Salahaddin. It was reported that up to 1,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and 150 Hezbollah advisers took part in the Tikrit operation in March. Many of those same men are now probably involved in the fighting in Baiji.

The fall of Ramadi has also led Iranians to move into Anbar. The operation there was announced by the Hashd forces. The Badr Organization is pushing towards Ramadi from the northeast and Kataib Hezbollah from the south. These groups are close to Iran, so wherever they go they are accompanied by Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah advisers. That was highlighted by the fact that a commander in the IRGC Jassem Nouri was killed outside Ramadi on May 28. Nouri was a member of the Basij militia who are often called upon for manpower during major commitments by the Revolutionary Guard. This was the eighth IRGC member to be killed in Iraq since the fall of Mosul in June 2014. Two Iranians died in June. Two colonels were killed in July, followed by a general killed by a sniper in Balad, Salahaddin in December, another commander from the Basij in that same province in January 2015, and a second general in February. There is talk that four more Iranian commanders died during the April fighting to take Tikrit. Probably many more rank and file IRGC members have been killed as well. Syria and Iraq are the two most pressing foreign policy issues for Tehran and they have committed a large number of their forces to protect their interests there. As they are often advising from the front, and taking part in the fighting it is only natural for them to take losses such as these.

SOURCES

Coleman, Luke, “US Official: Iran is Fighting Alongside ISF and Shi’ite Militia in Baiji,” Bas News, 5/23/15

Daragahi, Borzou and Solomon, Eika, “Iraq launches operation to retake Ramadi from Isis,” Financial Times, 5/26/15

Duman, Bilgay, “A New Controversial Actor In Post-ISIS Iraq: Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi (The Popular Mobilization Forces ),” Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, May 2015

Iraq Oil Report, “Iraqi forces overpowered at Baiji refinery,” 4/30/15

Al Mada, “Iran denies sending troops to Iraq to restore Baiji,” 5/27/15

- “The popular crowd assisted by Iranian advisers and 4 thousand Sunni fighters in battles north of Tikrit,” 5/26/15

Morris, Loveday, “Pro-Iran militias take upper hand after U.S.-backed forces crumble in Anbar,” Washington Post, 5/30/15

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iranian Military Officer Killed While Advising Shi’ite Militia Near Ramadi,” 6/1/15

Roggio, Bill and Weiss, Caleb, “Iranian military commander killed fighting in Ramadi,” Long War Journal, 5/31/15

Van Heuvelen, Ben, Al-Najaf, Kamaran, Naji, Jamal, “Iraqi forces lose initiative as IS hits Anbar, Baiji,” Iraq Oil Report, 4/16/15

Did Iraq’s Sadr Ever Send Men To Fight In The Syrian War?

When the war in Syria took off there were some contested stories over whether Moqatada al-Sadr had sent his men to fight there or not. One problem was the fact that the Sadr movement had splintered so much during the U.S. occupation that it was often difficult to determine who was and wasn’t part of it. Sadr initially said he was opposed to intervening in the conflict on religious and political grounds. Eventually he did decide to join in after lobbying by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, and to keep up with the other major Shiite parties in Iraq.

As soon as President Bashar al-Assad came under threat from protesters and later rebels Iran stepped in to protect the regime, and called on its allies in Iraq and Lebanon to help. Starting in early 2012 Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, Hezbollah Nujaba, Kataib Sayid al-Shuhada, and others along with Lebanese Hezbollah began deploying to Syria. The Iraqi groups justified their presence in Syria as protecting the Sayid Zainab shrine in the Damascus suburbs. They were also afraid that Syria might fall to Sunni jihadists. Finally, they were all close to Iran and have worked with it before, and Tehran’s main goal is to keep Assad in power. Some like Kataib Hezbollah for example, were creating by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Many of these groups were made up of former Sadrists, making it difficult to determine whether Sadr was involved or not. The spokesman for Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein for example said that it was made up of former Mahdi Army fighters. At the same time, almost all of these groups were connected to Iran, which Sadr has had a very difficult relationship with. During the occupation Sadr asked Tehran for assistance to fight the Americans, and he went into self-imposed exile there from 2008-2011. At the same time, Iranian leaders found Sadr difficult to work with and actively tried to break his group apart leading to the creation of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and others. Given this history it was not surprising that Sadr was not immediately involved in the Syrian conflict.

Sadr has publicly denied that he joined the war. In June 2012, Sadr said that none of his men had gone to Syria, but that breakaway groups could have. Two years later he told Al Hayat, “What is happening in Syria is an internal issue and no one is entitled to interfere.” Sadr however has worked covertly before, not wanting to publicly take responsibility for some of his actions, and Syria proved to be the same.

Sadr also had religious objections to Iran and others intervening in Syria, but eventually joined in to keep up with his political competitors. According to Al Rai’s Elijah Magnier, Sadr told Iran and Hezbollah that Assad should be defeated so that the Mahdi could return. According to Shiite Islam, three figures will appear Yamani, Khorasani, and Sufyani, and their struggle will bring about the return of the Mahdi. Sadr told Tehran part of this battle would take place in Al-Sham, Syria and therefore Assad had to fall. Sadr claimed that Iran and its allies were preventing this from happening. Iran and Hezbollah lobbied with Sadr asking him what if the Mahdi did not appear should Syria be lost? This argument, along with the fact that most of the major Shiite parties in Iraq were already fighting in the war, eventually led Sadr to send around 2,000 fighters to Syria in June 2013. Sadr did not want to lose out to his competitors, and Iran and Hezbollah wore down his opposition. At the same time, he did not want to be open about his involvement. He has therefore, kept on attacking the Iraqi militias who went to Syria before him calling them “foreign entities” for their Iranian backing, while taking part in the fighting himself.

The Syrian war has become part of the larger competition between regional forces. Iraq’s Shiite parties have come to the side of the Assad government along with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. It didn’t seem like Sadr would have gotten involved in this conflict given his past with Tehran, but its pressure along with Sadr’s desire to keep up with other Iraqi parties made him throw in his lot. His forces are now in Syria with the rest even though he continues to deny it. This follows Sadr’s pattern of not wanting to take public responsibility for his actions. He took a similar path when he agreed to Iran’s backing in 2004 to help him fight the Americans. Being an Iraqi nationalist and his father’s opposition to Iranian influence he did not want people to know about his new alliance. Instead he formed Asaib Ahl Al-Haq that would act like an independent group, but would actually still be part of the Sadr Trend. Still, Sadr’s commitment to Syria does not appear to be a large one, and he may just want to be able to claim that he was involved in the fight.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, al-Taei, Sarmad, “Sadr calls on Maliki to visit protest sites in Anbar,” Al Monitor, 1/5/14

Agence France Presse, “Sadr says his followers not fighting in Syria,” 6/8/12

Haddadi, Anissa, “Syria: Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Reported Sending Fighters to Prop Up Assad Regime,” International Business Times, 11/23/11

Smyth, Phillip, “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” CTC Sentinel, 8/27/13

- “The Shiite Jihad In Syria And Its Regional Effects,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2015

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “The Return of Iraqi Shi’I Militias To Syria,” Middle East Institute, 3/16/15

Could Salahaddin Operation Be A Game Changer For Iran vs US Influence In Iraq?

Iraq has launched its largest security operation to date to free not only Tikrit but central Salahaddin province as well. Much has been made of the presence of militias and popular mobilization brigades that might be as much as two-thirds of the total force. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are playing a big role as well providing not only advisers but air cover and artillery as well. With the United States opting out of participating in this offensive due to Iran’s large presence, it could be a turning point where Tehran solidifies its place as Baghdad’s main ally in the war against the Islamic State (IS).

Iran is playing a large frontline role in the on going operation in Salahaddin. Reports are that around 1,000 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been deployed there. They are not only acting as advisers, but operating artillery, rocket launchers, and flying drones. Iranian air power is also present with Su-25s flying bombing missions. 150 members of Lebanese Hezbollah are said to be present as well. Finally IRGC-Quds Force commander General Qasim Suleimani is overseeing planning too. Iranian and Hezbollah operatives have been present in previous security sweeps, but not as prominent and public as this one. In November 2014 for example, Iranian jets were filmed carrying out missions in eastern Diyala. Iranian politicians said that they considered the area a buffer zone, because it was so close to their border. That cannot be said for the current offensive, which is taking place in the middle of Iraq.

Who is notably absent from this operation is the U.S. led Coalition due to Iran’s presence. As several news reports have pointed out there is a rough division of labor between Tehran and Washington in Iraq. Where militias are heavily present Iran usually takes the lead and when the Iraqi Security Forces or peshmerga is prominent the U.S. plays a larger role. Many Pro-Iranian groups have said they do not want American support and they and Tehran are actively trying to undermine the U.S. position in the country by spreading rumors that it is supporting the Islamic State. Also given the recent history between the two countries in Iraq with the IRGC-QF leading attacks upon American forces and creating groups such as Kataib Hezbollah specifically to carry out those types of operations during the U.S. occupation there is no real incentive for them to cooperate except informally.

The Tikrit operation could play a large role in which foreign power will have a dominant role in Iraq in the future. Iran stepped in almost immediately after the fall of Mosul in the summer of 2014 committing advisers, brought in its Hezbollah allies, and provided weapons, training, and air support. The U.S. on the other hand, held out until Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was removed from office before it joined, which is still a sore point for many Iraqis. Also given the fact that the stories of America manipulating the war and the Islamic State for its own purposes is popular amongst a range of Iraqis, not just those connected to Iran makes its absence from the current offensive in Salahaddin a threat to Washington’s position in the country. If the Tikrit offensive is successful and the U.S. never becomes involved it will undermine its position publicly and politically in an environment where its messaging about its contribution to the war is already being outplayed by Iran.

SOUCES

Barnard, Anne, “Iraq’s Drive Against ISIS Reveals Tensions With U.S.,” New York Times, 3/3/15

Erem News, “Iraq ... evidence of American involvement in supporting Daash,” 3/6/15

El-Ghobashy, Tamer and Barnes, Julian, “Iran Backs Iraq Military Campaign to Reclaim Tikrit From Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, 3/2/15

Kenner, David, “For God and Country, and Iran, Shiite militias with American blood on their hands are leading the charge to drive the Islamic State out of Tikrit. But are they doing more harm than good?” Foreign Policy, 3/5/15

Khilkhal, Shukur, “Islamic State conspiracy theories sway Iraqis,” Al Monitor, 2/27/15

Al Mustaqbal, “Washington recognizes the role of Tehran and warns of sectarian strife,” 3/4/15

Sputnik News, “US, Israeli Military Advisors Accused of Aiding ISIL Arrested in Iraq,” 3/7/15

Lebanon’s Hezbollah Acknowledges Its Presence In Iraq

Lebanese Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah recently acknowledged that his group was involved in the war in Iraq. This came as no surprise as Hezbollah advisers were said to be in Iraq soon after Mosul fell, and in July one of its commanders died in the country. Just like Hezbollah’s previous time in Iraq during the U.S. occupation it is working as an adjunct for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In a speech on February 16, 2015 Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted that his organization was active in Iraq. He said that it only had a “limited presence” in the country, and called on others to join the fight not only in Iraq, but in Syria as well. Nasrallah was stating the obvious since Hezbollah’s presence in Iraq had been noted months beforehand.

After Mosul fell in June 2014, Nasrallah offered to protect the shrines in Iraq. By the next month there were reports that around 250 Hezbollah members were advising militias in Iraq in coordination with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). That might have increased to 500 since then. That was confirmed at the end of July when a Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Mohammed al-Haj was killed near Mosul. Haj was a veteran Hezbollah member who helped set off the July 2006 war with Israel. Since then there have been more reports of Hezbollah advisers active along the frontlines. In October for example, they were said to have helped in the operation to clear Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhr. When Iran came to aid Iraq in June it was inevitable that Hezbollah would enter the fray as well. Hezbollah is involved in most major Iranian operations such as Syria currently and Iraq in the past.

In 2003 the IRGC Quds Force asked for Hezbollah’s assistance in Iraq to oppose the U.S. occupation. Hezbollah deployed Unit 3800 to work with Iraqi militias. It provided advisers, brought Iraqis to Lebanon for training, and provided funding and weapons as well. It also worked hand in hand with the Quds Force on major operations such as the January 2007 Asaib Ahl Al-Haq raid upon the Joint Coordination Center in Karbala that killed five American soldiers. Afterward Unit 3800 commander Ali Musa Daqduq was arrested for his role in the attack. From 2003-2011 Hezbollah was brought in by Tehran to not only facilitate its anti-American operations, but to help with its Iraqi allies. The Iranians have a history of talking down to and mistreating Iraqis dating back to the Iran-Iraq War when it put together the Badr Brigade to oppose Saddam Hussein. Many Iraqi militiamen made similar complaints about Iranians when they went to Iran for training post-03. Hezbollah being Arabs were able to forge much better relations.

Hezbollah has consistently provided support for Iran in the Middle East and internationally so it was no surprise when it re-entered Iraq after the 2014 insurgent surge. It is currently playing the same role in Iraq that it is doing in Syria providing support for the IRGC and irregular forces. In fact, Hezbollah has worked with many of the same groups in both countries such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, the Khorasani Brigade, and Abu Fadhl Al-Abbas Brigade. Its relationship with the first couple groups goes back to the U.S. occupation as well. As long as Tehran is militarily involved in Iraq so will Hezbollah.

SOURCES

ABC/AP, “Hezbollah Commander who triggered the 2006 war Killed in Iraq,” 8/1/14

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Salama, Vivian, “Iran general said to mastermind Iraq ground war,” Associated Press, 11/5/14

Agence France Presse, “Hezbollah says it is fighting IS in Iraq,” 2/16/15

Associated Press, “Iranian commanders on front line of Iraq’s fight,” 7/17/14

Blanford, Nicholas, “Why Hezbollah is playing a smaller role in this Iraqi conflict,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/16/14

Dehghanpisheh, Babak, “Iran’s elite Guards fighting in Iraq to push back Islamic State,” Reuters, 8/3/14

Detmer, Jamie, “Hezbollah’s Widening War Spreads to Iraq,” Daily Beast, 8/1/14

Levitt, Matthew and Pollak, Nadav, “Hezbollah in Iraq: A Little Help Can Go a Long Way,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6/25/14

Orleans, Alexander, “Echoes of Syria: Hezbollah reemerges in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/1/14

DENVER UNIV VIDEO: The ISIS Crisis, Iran's Policy Towards Iraq & Syria & Saudi Arabia

Asaib Ahl Al-Haq From A Breakaway Sadr Militia To Defenders Of Iraq

Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) has gone through a dramatic transformation since its founding in 2006. Originally, its leader Qais Khazali started the group because he differed with Moqtada al-Sadr about how to fight the Americans. AAH then became one of many militias supported by the Iranians. That alliance led Khazali to send his men to Syria to defend the Assad government in 2012. At the same time, Khazali moved towards politics and an alliance with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. That proved eventful, because when the insurgency re-emerged in 2013, the premier called on AAH to help defend the country. Now AAH is on the frontline and taking part in almost every major operation to fight the militants. That has allowed AAH to move from being just one of many Shiite militias to claim that it is one of the main defenders of the Iraqi state.

Qais Khazali was a leading student of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr and claims to be the true inheritor of his legacy (Wikipedia)

The rise of Qais Khazali began with Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, but he would later break with his teachings. Khazali was one of Sadr’s leading students, while the ayatollah expanded the work of his cousin Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr by appealing to poor Shiites who had migrated to Iraq’s cities, setting up social programs for them, and restarting Friday prayers. Sadr was also an ardent nationalist who called for an Islamic State led by Iraq’s Shiites. (1) When Sadr was killed by the government in 1999, Khazali and several others of his followers kept the movement alive by going underground. By 2003 he was one of the top lieutenants to Sadr’s son Moqtada. When those two split, Khazali claimed he was the true inheritor of Sadiq al-Sadr. Khazali called on other Sadrists to join him in fighting the U.S.-led occupation in his nationalist Islamic movement. (2) That resistance was largely funded by Tehran, which led Khazali towards supporting an Iranian style religious state and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s vilyat al-faqih, the rule of the jurist. In doing so he became a disciple of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In August 2012 for instance, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq posted hundreds of posters of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khamenei all over Baghdad and Basra. The Sadr movement has constantly denounced AAH for its connections with Iran, and Moqtada al-Sadr has called them “people of the falsehood” and “foreign entities” meaning that they are not part of the Sadr legacy nor real Iraqis because of their loyalty to Tehran. Since Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr argued that Iraq’s Arab Shiites should lead the Hawza, the religious establishment, and not Iranians it would be hard to see how Khazali is maintaining the ayatollah’s traditions. Instead, his relationship with Tehran has led him to be under its religious and political influence. That has shaped most of his and AAH’s activities over the last several years.

Qais Khazali went from being one of Moqtada al-Sadr’s (pictured in the background poster) top lieutenants to breaking away and forming his own group Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AP)

Qais Khazali and Moqtada al-Sadr broke over differences on how to confront the American occupation of Iraq. In August 2004, the Mahdi Army launched its battle for control of the holy city of Najaf, which ended with a ceasefire. Khazali objected and went back to Baghdad to continue fighting the Americans. By October Khazali had formed his own militia along with Akram al-Kabi who was in charge of the Mahdi Army in Najaf, Abdul Hadi al-Darraji, a senior Sadrists in Baghdad, and several others. Sadr tried to woo them back by offering them high-level positions in 2005, but Khazali and the others continued on with their own independent activities. In 2006, Khazali finally broke with Sadr for good and went on to create Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. He brought along with him more leading Sadrists such as Mohammed Tabatabai, Kazim Abadi, and his brother Laith Khazali. All of them with the exception of Laith had been students of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr together. Moqtada al-Sadr and Qais Khazali were just as opposed to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Their differences were over tactics, as well as politics. In 2005 the Sadrists became major members in the new Iraqi government as Moqtada aspired to become one of the leaders of the country rather than just a militia commander. Khazali didn’t show any interest in that effort since the government worked with the Americans. Khazali also probably did see himself as one of the true leaders of the Sadr movement as he had studied under the Ayatollah, while Moqtada lacked religious training. Sadr was also known to be mercurial. All together this led the two to part ways.

Image from an AAH video of an IED attack upon an American Humvee (AP)

By the summer of 2006 AAH started carrying out its first operations against the Coalition, and quickly received Iranian backing. Khazali’s militia became organized into four main groups: the Imam al-Ali Brigade in southern Iraq, the Imam al-Kazem Brigade in western Baghdad, the Imam al-Hadi Brigade in eastern Baghdad, and the Imam al-Skeri Brigade in Diyala and Kirkuk. By July these brigades claimed responsibility for attacks in Sadiya, Rustamiya, Sabi al-Bour, and Shaab in Baghdad, Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar, Diwaniya in Qadisiyah, and Daquq in Kirkuk. Khazali needed a source of funding and weapons to carry out these activities, and found a willing sponsor in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF). In May, IRGC-QF commander General Qasim Suleimani and Hezbollah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq who had been sent to Iraq to coordinate militia activity with the Iranians met in Tehran to re-think their tactics. They had been working with the Mahdi Army and several other militias to oppose the American effort in the country, but the Sadrists were fracturing into many small groups such as Khazali’s, and Sadr proved difficult to work with. Instead, Suleimani and Daqduq decided to work with some of these breakaway entities, which were easier to control. Khazali became the beneficiary of this revision in policy. That opened the door to training by the Quds Force and Hezbollah in both Iran and Lebanon. Daqduq would also become the main link between Suleimani and Khazali. Mustafa Sheibani, a former Badr Brigade members helped smuggle Iranian weapons and money to AAH. The Sheibani network was noted for delivering Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) to Shiite militias like Khazali’s. Tehran facilitated Khazali’s break from Sadr, and enabled him to carry out attacks upon the Americans. His most notorious operation however backfired.

American mugshots of Qais and Laith Khazali after their arrests for the attack upon the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in 2007

In 2007 AAH carried out an elaborate infiltration into an American base, which led to the arrest of the group’s leadership. In January, a number of AAH operatives drove into the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in SUVs commonly used by Americans and dressed in U.S. uniforms. They then killed one U.S. soldier and kidnapped four others who were later shot as well. IRGC-QF provided the militia with intelligence on the base and planned the attack. This would lead to the arrest of Qais and Laith Khazali and Hezbollah commander Daqduq in Basra in March. This completely disrupted AAH’s activities for several months. Eventually Akram al-Kabi took over the movement while the Khazali’s were in custody. In retaliation, AAH kidnapped five British nationals, the bodyguards Alan McMenemy, Alec MacLachlan, Jason Swindlehurst, Jason Creswell, and technician Peter Moore from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May using 80-100 militiamen wearing Interior Ministry uniforms. The captives were taken to Sadr City and then Iran where they were allegedly turned over to the IRGC-QF. AAH then demanded the release of their leaders in return for their prisoners. This led to several years of negotiations that were conducted by AAH members in Iran. At one point General Suleimani offered to stop attacks by Iranian backed militias if Qais Khazali were released, but the Americans turned him down. By 2008 AAH was feeling added pressure to get its leaders released because the militia had been dispersed by the Charge of the Knights offensive in Basra, Maysan, and Baghdad, with most of its fighters fleeing to Iran. By January 2009 an elaborate deal had finally been worked out between the Iraqi, British, and American governments, which allowed Laith Khazali to be released. In return for releasing not only the Khazali and Daqduq, but also most of the group's fighters held by the U.S. and airing a video, the 5 Brits would be returned. Several AAH commanders, and around 300 of its men were eventually released before Qais Khazali was set free in January 2010. In return Peter Moore was returned in December 2009, but his four guards were all dead having been shot shortly after they were taken from the Finance Ministry. The last one of their bodies, that of Alan McMenemy was not delivered to the British authorities until January 2012. This set a precedent of kidnapping foreigners to achieve the organization’s goals. In January 2010 it seized American contractor Issa Salomi in Baghdad, and claimed it held a second American, Ahmad Quasay al-Taae, which it took back in 2006. Two months later AAH got four of its members out of prison for Salomi. What appeared to be a major setback, actually ended up working to the group’s benefit. AAH not only survived the arrest of its leader, but also got almost all of its militiamen eventually released via kidnappings. It now had the manpower to pick up the pace of its operations against the Americans as they prepared to withdraw from Iraq.

By the end of 2008 AAH had been able to reorganize itself. Many of its fighters eventually infiltrated back to Iraq after the Charge of the Knights campaign. There was then a cease-fire while talks with Baghdad and the Coalition were on going to get the release of the Khazalis. That ended when Qais Khazali was released in January 2010. It then began to expand. Abu Dura for example, who was known as the Shiite Zarqawi during the civil war came back to Iraq in 2010 and was said to have joined the militia. (3) AAH also started a recruiting campaign (4) offering people large salaries and other benefits to joint it and carry out operations against the Coalition. Much of this money was coming from Tehran who was said to be providing AAH with up to $5 million a month. At the end of 2011, it began picking up attacks on the Americans so that it could take credit for their withdrawal. It would later claim responsibility for over 6,000 attacks upon the U.S. and Coalition forces from 2006-2011. The Coalition wasn’t the only focus of the group however. By 2011, AAH was accused of carrying out assassinations (5) of Defense and Interior Ministry officials in Baghdad. (6) In 2012 the United Nations documented 56-90 murders of homosexuals and emo kids, and blamed AAH for most of those killings. The next year the militia was accused of attacking cafes in the capital for allegedly hiring under-aged girls, being used for prostitution, staying open too long, and breaking religious rules on contacts between the sexes. One of the main reasons why Khazali created Asaib Ahl Al-Haq was to oppose the American occupation. When the U.S. announced that it was withdrawing at the end of 2011, it saw a golden opportunity to not only claim credit for the Americans departure, but to expand its base as well. It also showed that it opposed factions within the Iraqi government, and was willing to kill them. Finally, its Islamic ideas led to attacks upon groups and businesses it considered immoral and unIslamic. Overall, the group proved that it held extremist views and would use violence as its main means to achieve its goals.

As AAH grew its rivalry with the Sadrists became violent. Sadr had tried several times to reach out to Khazali, but those efforts failed. By 2010 the two were fighting. In December AAH attempted to bury two of its fighters in a cemetery in Najaf reserved for Sadrists, which led to a shoot out. Starting in the summer of 2011 there were said to be almost daily confrontations between the two. On June 8, Sadrist Assad Khader Mohammed was killed in Baghdad. June 18 there was a clash between the two in a market in Sadr City. That led the Sadrists to do a drive by on Abu Dura. Then from June 28 to August 4 four Sadrist and AAH members were assassinated in tit for tat killings. In June 2013 an argument led to a shooting at a Sadrist rally in Baghdad, which the movement claimed was an attempt on the life of Hazim Araji who headed the Sadr office in Kadhimiya. The next month AAH men burned shops owned by Sadrists in Baghdad’s Karrada district. That led to more fighting in Sadr City, and the burning of three homes owned by Sadrists. In August there was shooting after a shouting match in Hurriya that left a Mahdi Army leader dead. The Sadrists then retaliated by kidnapping an AAH leader. Finally in November there was heavy fighting in Sadr City and Zafaraniya that led to 15 fatalities. The conflict between Sadr and Khazali had always been an intense one. Sadr considered Khazali an existential threat to his movement, since he was a leading student of his father, had much more religious training then him, and drew away some of his top commanders and officials when he left. Usually the two just attacked each other verbally, but that eventually escalated to a small scale ware lasting several years, which mostly raged in the capital. This conflict continues to this day.

Despite AAH’s history of violence, it finally decided to turn towards politics, which led to an alliance with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. At the start of 2009 the first stories emerged of AAH considering a run in that year’s provincial elections. This opened the door to a number of talks with the premier and the National Reconciliation Committee where the group promised to give up violence as well after Qais Khazali was freed from American captivity. As part of the negotiations Maliki agreed to free all AAH prisoners. When Khazali was finally released at the start of 2010 however, he broke off talks (7) and moved to Iran. A year later, AAH was back at the table with the National Reconciliation Committee (8) this time saying that it would join politics after the U.S. withdrawal. AAH was serious this time as most of its leadership returned to Baghdad from Iran at the end of the year, and on December 26 Qais Khazali officially said that his group would be taking up the ballot. Maliki once again courted them, allowing it to carry out a parade in January 2012 to celebrate the departure of American forces, and a military march in June, which was attended by members of the premier’s Dawa Party. The group didn’t end up running in the 2013 provincial elections, but it did look to expand its base. It opened offices in Baghdad, Hillah, Najaf, Khalis, Tal Afar and Basra along with one in Beirut, Lebanon, plus religious schools in Baghdad, Maysan, Basra, Dhi Qar, Najaf, and Muthanna. It also tried to portray itself as a nationalist group by meeting with Sunni and Sabean leaders. In December 2013 AAH decided to run in the 2014 national vote, and would support Maliki’s State of Law. It ended up winning one seat in Baghdad with its Sadiqun list. Like Sadr before him, Khazali was hoping that he could turn his militia into a political party and join the government in Baghdad. Maliki welcomed this move because he was hoping that AAH could cut into Sadr’s base. That was the reason why he never did anything about all the fighting that took place between the groups. Although the one seat it won in 2014 was insignificant it showed the larger aspirations of Khazali and his alliance with Maliki.

Funeral procession for AAH fighters killed in Syria, Nov 2013 (Reuters)

Although AAH was making a peaceful turn in Iraq, it had not given up violence as it went to fight in Syria. In 2012 General Suleimani called on his Iraqi allies to help protect the Assad government. AAH sent fighters early that year. It was supposedly protecting the Sayid Zainab shrine in the Damascus suburbs, (9) but its first fighter was killed in Hama just over 130 miles to the north. AAH initially denied its involvement, but finally admitted it in 2013 when it started having public funerals for its men that died there. Members of AAH joined the Abu Fadhl Al-Abbas brigade, and eventually formed its own Syrian militia the Liwa Kafeel Zainab. To prepare for the fighting many AAH militiamen went to Iran for training, received money and weapons from Tehran, had Iranian advisers on the ground with them, and aid from Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran was intent on protecting its ally the Assad government when protests broke out there. Part of that strategy was using Iraqi militias to prop up the regime and fight the rebels. AAH responded to that call showing that it had become one of many Iranian proxies that could be used in the region. AAH would eventually become part of the backbone of the Syrian regime’s defenses, something that would be repeated in Iraq.

ISF M113 armored personnel carrier with AAH logo painted on the front showing the integration of the militia within the government’s forces (W.G. Dunlop)

When the Iraqi insurgency took off in 2013 AAH quickly became involved in the fighting. Towards the end of 2013 Maliki reportedly began using militias like AAH as an ad hoc defense force. In September, an AAH leader told the New York Times that it was working with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and there were reports that its militiamen had access to government badges and weapons. The next month Khazali announced that he was creating popular committees in mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods, because he felt like the ISF were incompetent and could not protect people. In January 2014, he came out in support of Maliki’s effort in Anbar where open fighting had broken out at the end of December, and began bringing back his fighters from Syria to Iraq to be deployed in that province. One commander was said to have been killed in Anbar that month. In March, Maliki organized AAH, Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Brigades into a new security force for Baghdad out of frustration with the ISF. The next month it started a new recruitment program and formed Popular Defense Brigades. By the time Mosul fell, AAH was already integrated within many ISF units and was deployed in central and western Iraq. It would then be used in every major operation starting with the defense of Samarra in June. It would then go on to help clear Muqtadiya, Diyala and take part in the  failed thrusts at Tikrit in June, it fought for Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil in July, helped end the siege of Amerli in Salahaddin in August, and continued fighting in Anbar in September to name just a few. Everyone acknowledges that after the fall of Mosul and the collapse of the ISF in the north, Baghdad became reliant upon militias. What is less known was these armed groups were already operating alongside and within the security forces in 2013. The government’s turn towards militias was promoted by Iran, as it tried to replicate its Syrian strategy in Iraq. For example, after insurgents took Mosul General Suleimani flew to Iraq, and met with Khazali as part of his planning for the defense of Baghdad. IRGC-QF also provided advisers, weapons, training, and planning for AAH operations. In doing so, both AAH and Iran gained more power not only within the security forces, but the state as well.

As in the previous Iraqi civil war from 2005-2008, AAH was not only involved in fighting the insurgents, but carrying out sectarian attacks as well. In October 2013, it was reported that Maliki was using AAH for retaliatory attacks in Baghdad after terrorist bombings. This was confirmed by an AAH commander who told the Washington Post in early 2014 that it was behind targeted killings after bombings of Shiite neighborhoods in the capital. It was also accused of pushing out families from Jurf al-Sakhr in northeast Babil in January. In April AAH was thought to be behind death squad operations, and attacking homes and mosques in Diyala. The most glaring example was at the end of that month, when insurgents temporarily took over the town of Buhriz. When the ISF and AAH retook the village, armed men drove through it shouting Shiite slogans, burned houses and mosques, and rounded up 28 young men and executed them. After Tikrit fell to the Islamic State in June, AAH set up checkpoints in Salahaddin looking for ISF deserters and people fleeing the city, and ended up shooting at three cars and killing 12 people. It also kidnapped three Sunni men, killed them, and dumped their bodies in Sadiya, Baghdad on June 12. On June 17, Badr and AAH were believed to be behind the killing of 43 detainees who were taken from a prison in Jumarkhe, Diyala. The following month, 50 bodies were found blindfolded and shot in Khamisiya, Babil with rumors pointing to AAH being responsible. In early July AAH militiamen destroyed nine houses and five mosques in Ballor, Mansuriya, and Muqtadiya, and were involved in the killing of three civilians in Sensl and seventeen others in Nofal all in Diyala. Later in July, 8 black SUVs full of gunmen abducted the head of the Baghdad provincial council Riyad al-Adhadh and four of his bodyguards. They were taken to a secret facility in the capital where the guards were beaten and asked to confess that Adhadh supported the insurgency. The head of council was released after Prime Minister Maliki, the speaker of parliament, and several other Iraqi leaders and Western diplomats intervened. Qais Khazali secured his release, which led many to believe that AAH or a group connected to it was behind the incident. From June 1 to July 9 Human Rights Watch documented the deaths of 61 people with AAH being the most likely culprit. In September, AAH was accused of cutting off water supplies to Sunni areas, bulldozing and blowing up houses, ordering civilians to leave, kidnappings, executions, and mass arrests in northern Babil. The current Iraqi war is quickly repeating the worst aspects of the last civil conflict. Militias are targeting civilians because they are considered the support base of the insurgents, and therefore legitimate targets. This is leading to sectarian cleansing in places such as Salahaddin, Diyala and the Baghdad belts. While groups like AAH are behind many of these attacks, they could not be successful without the knowledge and support of the security forces and government, which again mirrors what happened from 2005-2008.

AAH has also been involved in criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom. The most infamous incident occurred on October 20, 2014 when there was a 20 minute shootout between the Federal Police and militia gunmen in Karrada, Baghdad. A spokesman for the Interior Ministry said that police were raiding a hotel where a kidnapping ring was operating. This came after a Kurdish businesswoman and relative of deputy premier Rowsch Shaways Sara Hamid Niran, who was abducted in September, escaped form her captors and made it to an ISF checkpoint. The police then surrounded the hotel she fled from. They found militiamen there who demanded that Niran be handed back to them. Gunfire ensued and four policemen ended up being wounded. A government official blamed AAH for the abduction. This was just one of many kidnappings, which have escalated throughout this year. While rogue elements might have been responsible for this act, it could have been one of many illegal activities AAH was involved in to raise funds for itself, something militias have been involved in before.

Since its inception in 2006 Asaib Ahl Al-Haq has increased its standing. It started off as one of many breakaway factions from the Sadr Trend. What set it apart was that its leadership was made up of many prominent students of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr and Mahdi Army commanders. It also gained Iranian backing because they shared a mutual interest in driving the Americans out of Iraq. It continued to work as an Iranian proxy when it sent troops to fight in Syria. At the same time, it moved into Iraqi politics gaining an early and powerful ally in Prime Minister Maliki. Today AAH claims to be a protector of the nation and the Shiite community against the insurgency, while politicians praise its activities, and it is routinely featured in the Iraqi media. That has led supporters to overlook its allegiance to Iran and sectarian attacks, and see it as a nationalist force. This has all allowed Qais Khazali to finally acquire the position he has always wanted, to be at the table of the Iraqi elite.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

2. Al Akhbar News, “Iraq: Qais al-Khazali: In the shadows of resistance,” 1/21/12

3. Fayad, Ma’ad, “Iraq: Notorious Shiite Warlord Returns to Baghdad,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 8/18/10

4. Sotaliraq, “League of the Righteous in Iraq, giving their followers the amount of two million dinars for every military operation, and news on the financing of Iranian,” 6/22/11

5. Alsumaria, “Iraq Minister: League of the Righteous willing to engage in national reconciliation,” 5/25/11

6. Radio Nawa, “Qassim Atta: League of the Righteous, and Al Qaeda were responsible for the death in Baghdad,” 7/29/11

7. Alsumaria, “Asaib Ahl Al Haw group suspended talks with Iraq’s Government,” 2/5/10

8. Alsumaria, “Iraq Minister: League of the Righteous willing to engage in national reconciliation,” 5/25/11

9. Shafaq News, “Source: Asaib alhel al – Haq intensify their presence in Damascus to protect Zeinab shrine,” 7/26/12

SOURCES

Abbas, Mushreq, “Iraqi Government Suppresses Baghdad Demonstrations,” Al-Monitor, 8/5/13

Abbas, Yasir and Trombly, Dan, “Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s 2^nd Division,” War On The Rocks, 7/1/14

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09

- “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim and Jakes, Lara, “Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian Leader, Is New Poster Boy In Iraq,” Associated Press, 9/25/12

Agence France Presse, “2^nd UPDATE: Iraqi PM Met Group Behind Kidnap Of Britons,” 8/3/09

- “British hostages in Iraq died from gunshots,” 6/30/09

- “Over 100 from Iraqi group who killed Britons freed,” 9/27/09

AIN, “Muqtada al-Sadr describes Asaeb Ahlulhaq as “governmental militia,”” 12/12/13

Al Akhbar News, “Iraq: Qais al-Khazali: In the shadows of resistance,” 1/21/12

Ali, Ahmed, “2013 Iraq Update #23: Sadrists and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq Fight for Baghdad,” Institute for the Study of War, 6/11/13

Ali, Ahmed and Kagan, Kimberly, “The Iraqi Shi’a Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offensive,” Institute for the Study of War, 6/14/14

Ali, Rafid Fadhil, “The People of Righteousness: Iraq’s Shi’a Insurgents Issue Demands for Hostages,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 2/12/10

Alsumaria, “Asaib Ahl Al Haq group: dropping arms out of question until full US withdrawal,” 11/2/11

- “Asaib Ahl Al Haq group suspended talks with Iraq’s Government,” 2/5/10

- “Asaib Ahl Haq kidnaps another American,” 2/8/10

- “Iraq Minister: League of the Righteous willing to engage in national reconciliation,” 5/25/11

- “US Army accuses Asaib Ahl Al Haq of targeting its forces to make believe they are forced to withdraw,” 11/25/11

- “US Forces release 2 Asaib Ahl Al Haq members,” 7/30/09

Al-Amiry, Kholoud Ramzi, “The Prime Minister Who Plays with Fire,” Sada, 4/19/12

Arraf, Jane, “Kidnapping of American in Iraq sparked by faltering reconciliation talks,” Christian Science Monitor, 2/11/10

- “US likely to release insurgent accused of killing five US soldiers,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/11/09

Arango, Tim, “Abduction of Sunni Displays Gangland Edge of Iraqi Politics,” New York Times, 7/27/14

- “Freed American in Iraq Expected to Return to U.S.,” New York Times, 3/28/10

- “Rise in Deadly Attacks on Shiites in Iraq Stirs Anger at Government,” New York Times, 9/27/13

Arango, Tim, Al-Salhy, Suadad, and Cowell, Alan, “Iraqi Kurds Take Oil City as Militants Push Forward,” New York Times, 6/12/14

Associated Press, “Baghdad’s blast walls to come down,” 8/6/09

- “Body of UK hostage turned over to embassy in Iraq,” 1/20/12

- “Militant Video Shows Abducted American In Iraq,” 2/6/10

August, Oliver, “End the torment, says Brown as death of British hostage is confirmed,” Times of London, 9/4/09

Awan Daily, “Maliki announced next week, the electoral coalition,” 9/25/09

Bradley, Matt and Nabhan, Ali, “Fledgling Iraqi Military Is Outmatched on Battlefield,” Wall Street Journal, 4/27/14

Buratha News, “Al Bhan and Arab in Jurf al-Sakhar cleared of Daash rats,” 7/11/14

- “The killing of Mufti of Jurf al-Sakhr Musab al-Owaisi with 70 other terrorists in violent clashes in the north of Babylon province,” 7/13/14

- “League of the Righteous Movement launches initiative for the formation of popular committees that help the security forces to close streets,” 10/9/13

Chulov, Martin, “Controlled by Iran, the deadly militia recruiting Iraq’s men to die in Syria,” Guardian, 3/12/14

- “Iraq faces the abyss after its military melts away,” Guardian, 6/13/14

- “Shia cleric’s release by US forces provided key to Peter Moore’s freedom,” Guardian, 12/30/09

- “Split among captors hits hope of freedom for British hostages in Iraq,” Guardian, 5/28/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/09

- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cockburn, Patrick, “Revealed: why UK hostages were killed,” Independent, 7/10/09

Cole, Juan, “The United States and Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003

Coles, Isabel, “Iranians play role in breaking IS siege of Iraqi town,” Reuters, 9/1/14

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Daragahi, Borzou, “Iraq’s sectarian war rages on as world focuses on Isis,” Financial Times, 9/26/14

Dziadosz, Alexander, “Bruised Iraqi army leans on Shi’ite militias, volunteers,” Reuters, 7/10/14

Evers, Erin, “Beyond Mosul,” Open Democracy, 9/26/14

-“Time is Running Out for Iraq as Nation Spirals into Chaos,” MSNBC, 7/20/14

Fayad, Ma’ad, “Iraq: Notorious Shiite Warlord Returns to Baghdad,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 8/18/10

Fordham, Alice, “Hostage Peter Moore’s fate tied to that of Laith and Qais al-Khazali,” Times of London, 12/31/09

Fulton, Will, Holliday, Joseph & Wyer, Sam, “Iranian Strategy In Syria,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War, May 2013

Gordon, Michael, “Iran’s Master of Iraq Chaos Still Vexes U.S.,” New York Times, 10/2/12

Habib, Mustafa, “niqash interview: iraq’s reconciliation minister on negotiating with militias, saddam hussein and libya,” Niqash, 11/10/11

Hadi, Ahmad, “cousin against cousin: iraqi militias in anbar bloody family ties,” Niqash, 6/5/14

Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/16/10

Hauslohner, Abigail, “Fifty bodies found in Iraq, raising fears of sectarian war,” Washington Post, 7/9/14

Haynes, Deborah, “Hope for British hostages in Iraq after release of Shia militant,” Times of London, 6/9/09

Healy, Jack and Schmidt, Michael, “Political Role for Militants Worsens Fault Lines in Iraq,” New York Times/ 1/5/12

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Rise of Shiite Militias Pose a Threat to Iraq,” Associated Press, 6/15/14

Hess, Pamela, “Hit squads training in Iraq,” Associated Press, 8/15/08

Hines, Nico, “Peter Moore: 31 months of Iraqi captivity,” Times of London, 12/30/09

Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights/United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Human Rights Office, “Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2012,” October 2012

- “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014,” 10/2/14

- “Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June – 5 July 2014,” 7/18/14

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Campaign of Mass Murders of Sunni Prisoners,” 7/11/14

- “Iraq: Pro-Government Militias Trail of Death,” 7/31/14

Institute for the Study of War, “Final 2014 Iraqi National Elections Results by Major Political Groups,” 5/19/14

- “Overt Shi’a Militia Mobilization in Mixed Areas,” 4/17/14

Iraq Times, “Al-Asaib militia “Righteous People” to officially join Maliki’s coalition in the next election,” 12/29/13

Iraq, Ali Abu and Van Heuvelen, Ben, “Basra security continues to decline,” Iraq Oil Report, 10/25/14

Jabar, Faleh, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, London: SAQI Books, 2003

Jakes, Lara, “Shiite militias step up Iraq attacks on US troops,” Associated Press, 6/30/11

Kagan, Frederick, Majidyar, Ahmad, Pletka, Danielle, Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iranian Influence In The Levant, Egypt, Iraq, And Afghanistan,” American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, May 2012

Karim, Ammar, “Baghdad shootout points to growing militia threat,” Agence France Presse, 10/21/14

Knights, Michael, “Analysis: Iraq’s never-ending security crisis,” BBC, 10/3/13

- “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, November 2010

- “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 6/27/13

Lake, Eli, “EXCLUSIVE: Iraqi official’s top aide linked to Shi’ite terrorists,” Washington Times, 8/28/09

Lewis, Jessica, Ali, Ahmed, and Kagan, Kimberly, “Iraq’s sectarian crisis reignites as Shi’a militias execute civilians and remobilize,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/31/13

Londono, Ernesto and Fadel, Leila, “U.S. failure to neutralize Shiite militia in Iraq threatens to snarl pullout,” Washington Post, 3/4/10

Al Mada, “3 Baghdadi neighborhoods witnessing armed clashes between “known militias,”” 12/1/13

- “An armed group attacked a hospital in Sadr City and infringe on the emergency department physicians,” 1/29/13

- “Sadr accused “the people of falsehood” of trying to assassinate al-Araji, and declared three days of mourning,” 6/3/13

- “Tensions between the Sadrists and Asaib worry neighborhoods of Baghdad and al-Khazali and clings to the truce,” 6/11/13

Mahmood, Mona, O’Kane, Maggie, Grandjean, Guy, “Why Iran’s kidnap squad struck,” Guardian, 12/31/09

Mandee, Samira Ali and Bezhan, Frud, “Iraqi Militias Make Comeback Amid Surging Sectarian Violence,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6/20/13

Al Masalah, “”League of the Righteous” declares its readiness to defend Iraq and sanctuaries and calls for politicians to unite and support the security forces,” 6/11/14

Mohammed, Abeer, “Maliki’s Chess Game,” Institute of War & Peace Reporting, 9/10/09

Morris, Loveday, “Iraqi army increasingly bolstered by Shiite militias as ISIS advances,” Washington Post, 6/20/14

- “Shiite militias in Iraq begin to remobilize,” Washington Post, 2/9/14

Multi-National Division-B, “(Enemy Action) Indirect Fire RPT (Rocket) JASG-C, JDOC : 0 INJ/DAM,” U.S. Military, 12/31/09

Muayed, Ahmed, “tricked into joining terror group: how militias are recruiting iraqi youth,” Niqash, 8/22/13

Naame Shaam, “Iran in Syria From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force,” September 2014

Naji, Jamal, “Abadi shakes up military leadership after Anbar massacre,” Iraq Oil Report, 9/24/14

Najm, Haider, “café clashes: Baghdad conservatives try to close ‘immoral’ coffee shops,” Niqash, 7/25/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Ahl Al-Haq denies links to fake checkpoints, demanding the Govt to take firm and strict action,” 5/26/13

- “Sadr condemns clashes between his supporters and / Ahlil-Haq militia/in Baghdad,” 6/3/13

New Sabah, “”The people of the right to” reveal the details turned into a brawl and shooting deaths,” 6/9/13

- “Sadr solemn assembly a “threat” addressed to the Government,” 8/6/13

- “Struggle for influence a prominent feature of the relationship between the two factions,” 9/29/13

Nordland, Rod, “Iraqi Group Renounces Violence,” New York Times, 8/4/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/18/09

Now, “Talking to a Hezbollah fighter in Syria,” 2/24/14

Parker, Ned, Rasheed, Ahmed and Salman, Raheem, “Before Iraq polls, Shiite militias unleashed war on Sunni insurgents,” Reuters, 4/29/14

- “Sectarian strife threatens Iraq ahead of election,” Reuters, 4/27/14

Parker, Ned and Salman, Raheem, “In defense of Baghdad, Iraq turns to Shi’ite militias,” Reuters, 6/14/14

Prothero, Mitchell, “Iraqi commandos and Shiite militias battling to retake Tikrit,” McClatchy Newspapers, 6/27/14

Radio Nawa, “Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous Andon today under the banner of national reconciliation,” 12/24/11

- “Qassim Atta: League of the Righteous, and Al Qaeda were responsible for the death in Baghdad,” 7/29/11

Ramzi, Kholoud, “mahdi army vs league of righteous: fears that fresh violence between shiites could spread,” Niqash, 7/14/11

Roads To Iraq, “Asaib Al-Haq: We still have a British and an American hostages,” 2/2/10

- “Leader of “Asaib” militia not released yet,” 1/6/10

Roggio, Bill, “New Special Groups splinter emerges on Iraqi scene,” Long War Journal, 8/20/08

Rosen, Armin, “Iraq Official Says Iran’s Military Mastermind Is In Charge,” Business Insider, 6/18/14

Rubin, Alissa and Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 6/9/09

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Sadr Gives Maliki ‘Final Warning,’” Al-Monitor, 5/29/13

- “Sadr Reconsiders Political Role, Mahdi Army,” Al-Monitor, 8/28/13

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq Shi’ite militia says U.S. has ‘failed,’ pledges to lay down arms in wake of Sunni bombings,” Reuters, 1/5/12

- “Iraqi Shi’ite militants fight for Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, 10/16/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, and Westall, Sylvia, “Insight: Iraqis hesitate on the edge of chaos,” Reuters, 9/19/13

Schreck, Adam and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “In Iraq, militia’s shift could bolster Iran’s hand,” Associated Press, 1/6/12

Semple, Kirk, “40 Are Killed in Attacks Targeting Shiites in Iraq,” New York Times, 10/20/14

Sengupta, Kim, “Britain backs prisoners release to free three hostages,” Independent, 6/23/09

Shafaq News, “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader threatens to strike Kurdish interests,” 6/15/14

- “Source: Asaib alhel al – Haq intensify their presence in Damascus to protect Zeinab shrine,” 7/26/12

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, “Al-Sadr fled to Iran due to assassination fears,” 1/26/11

Al-Shibeeb, Dina, “More militias disband their arms in Iraq,” Al Arabiya, 4/28/11

Sly, Liz, “Iranian-backed militant group in Iraq is recasting itself as a political player,” Washington Post, 2/18/13

Sly, Liz and Hauslohner, Abigail, “Shiite militia seizes control of Iraqi town, slowing ISIS drive toward Baghdad,” Washington Post, 6/14/14

Smyth, Phillip, “All the Ayatollah’s Men,” Foreign Policy, 9/18/14

- “Hizballah Cavalcade: The Badr Organization’s Syrian Expeditionary Force: Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr,” Jihadology, 10/18/13

- “Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 1,” Jihadology, 5/11/13

- “Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2,” Jihadology, 5/17/13

- “Hizballah Cavalcade: Saraya al-Dafa’ al-Sha’bi: Kata’ib Hizballah’s New Force in Iraq,” Jihadology, 6/9/14

- “Iranian Proxies Step Up Their Role in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6/13/14

- “Selling Sectarianism: Shia Islamist Groups & Maliki’s Anbar Offensive,” Hizballah Cavalcade, 2/3/14

Sotaliraq, “Jurf al-Sakhr front forgotten war in Iraq and the suffering of new entrants of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq,” 5/30/14

- “League of the Righteous in Iraq, giving their followers the amount of two million dinars for every military operation, and news on the financing of Iranian,” 6/22/11

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Parliamentary Election,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/21/09

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, “Iraq: Who are Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Islamists?” Islamist Gate, 3/6/14

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad and Spyer, Jonathan, “Iraq’s Shi’a Militias and Iran,” The Tower, December 2014

Tu’mah, Abd-al-Wahid, “One British hostage set to be released in Iraq, ‘before the end of the week’ – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 7/8/09

Ur News, “League of the Righteous to defeat al-Maliki, the Sadrists,” 12/24/13

- “War fires between Asaib and the Sadrists,” 7/4/13

Waleed, Khaled, “weapons for words: extremists enter politics, threaten govt power balance,” Niqash, 1/26/12

Wyer, Sam, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2012

Zahra, Hassan Abdul, “Iraq’s Sadr in war of words with splinter group,” Agence France Presse, 12/18/10

- “Iraqi Shiite militia ‘ready to lay down arms,’” Agence France Presse, 12/26/11

Zucchino, David, “In Iraq, Shiite militias are both friend and foe,” Los Angeles Times, 10/30/14