Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Chapter 3 The Department of Defense Takes Charges

The third chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) review of the U.S. effort to rebuild Iraq covers the confusion that ensued when the Pentagon was given control of the post-war effort in January 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that the Pentagon would provide unity of effort in Iraq after the invasion, but in fact, it just made the chaotic planning even more disjointed. Instead of creating one command, there emerged three separate organizations each with its own leader. Rumsfeld also became personally involved in the war planning and staffing, which undermined the effort as well. These were trends that had emerged from the very beginning of post-war planning, and would continue for years afterwards. This was one of the major reasons why the SIGIR believes the U.S. failed to rebuild Iraq.

In October 2002 the Pentagon decided not to create a civilian organization to plan for post-invasion Iraq because it thought it would give the wrong message when the White House was claiming that it was doing everything possible to avoid war. That left most of the planning to the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Command (CENTCOM), the military staff in charge of the Middle East. As reported before, this effort was uncoordinated with few of the working groups knowing about each other. On the NSC side, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had created a humanitarian and reconstruction plan, and started signing contracts with companies to carry out the work. The Pentagon was in charge of securing and running the oil sector. The Treasury Department was working on Iraq’s finances. CENTCOM had its own group working on what was called Phase IV, post-war planning. There was no overall agency in charge of this effort however.

In mid-October 2002 the NSC was briefed on what its groups had come up with so far. The planners said that there would be a civil administration of Iraq, although there were no actual plans behind it. The administration didn’t agree with the level of U.S. involvement, which caused major problems. The White House and Pentagon believed that the U.S. would be liberators, but had no concept of how this would actually work.

During this period CENTCOM’s Phase IV group was also getting sidelined for all the invasion work. On August 2002 the Joint Chiefs became worried about this, especially because there were only 2 majors doing most of the planning. In December 2002 they intensified their effort, and got more staff. They gave a briefing to the Joint Chiefs that month saying that there would be chaos after the invasion because there would be no Iraqi government. They believed that eventually either the U.N. or the U.S. would run Iraq, but had no specific ideas on how that would work. After that meeting, the Joint Chiefs realized that Phase IV didn’t have enough workers so it was made into Joint Task Force 4 (JTF 4) with 58 more officers.

The Pentagon became more involved when President Bush said that war was inevitable at a NSC meeting on December 18, 2003. This spurred Rumsfeld to finally create a civilian organization within the Defense Department for post-war planning. Following this Rumsfeld convinced the President to give the Pentagon control of post-invasion Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed to this saying that his agency lacked the personnel and capacity to do the job. Rumsfeld argued that there would be unity of command with Defense in control. On January 20, 2003 President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24) giving Rumsfeld this authority. The Pentagon went on to create the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) as a result.

NSPD caused chaos within the administration. It effectively put an end to all the NSC’s projects. The officials that had been working there were shocked at the change. The Pentagon in turn ended up shunning a lot of these other groups that had been working on Iraq previously. More importantly, rather than creating unity of command, it led to three separate organizations with their own leaders. One was ORHA, the other was JTF-4, and the third was CENTCOM. As with the earlier planning, none of these groups worked with each other, and actually competed, causing more problems.

JTF 4 did away with half of CENTCOM’s Phase IV work, and tried to assert its authority over the planning process. Phase IV had a two part plan for Iraq. First humanitarian issues would be dealt with, and then reconstruction would begin. JTF-4 shut down the humanitarian work and just focused upon rebuilding. This happened in mid-January 2003, just two months before the invasion. The Joint Chiefs had also envisioned JTF-4 as the command for postwar Iraq. It was supposed to take over as soon as military operations were over, and coordinate with all the other government agencies. The problem was, that was supposed to be the job of the OHRA.

In early January Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith called up retired General Jay Garner to head the OHRA. Rumsfeld knew him from before, and thought a military man who had worked in Iraq after the Gulf War would be ideal for the job. Garner started his work 56 days before the invasion with no staff and no integration with the military. This was a major drawback as OHRA had no secure communications, and thus was cut out from Washington, CENTCOM, and the military command set up in Kuwait to run the invasion. The lack of staff was also another major drawback. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice told other government agencies to send officials, but it never really happened. One reason was that the other agencies resented the creation of OHRA as they were told about it after the fact. Garner ended up with an ad hoc group made up of retired soldiers, private contractors, military officers, and government officials. This was another trend that would continue for years with the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq. Garner also started his job from scratch as he was not told about the earlier efforts.

When Garner started getting the OHRA up and running it was believed that he would just be operationalizing the ideas that had already been created. Garner found out that there were no concrete plans, and didn’t even find out about all the groups that had been working on the effort. He discovered the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project and Undersecretary of Defense Feith’s Office of Special Plans for example by mistake just before the invasion. On his own Garner came up with three jobs for the OHRA: humanitarian aid, governance, and reconstruction. This closely mirrored the work already done by the NSC and Phase IV. The State Department was to run the humanitarian and governance efforts. This largely took over the work that the NSC had done. Likewise, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) continued on with its NSC job of reconstruction. The USAID had already signed contracts with companies to do this task. One such business, the International Resource Group briefed the USAID in February 2003 telling it that it didn’t have anywhere near the money it needed to rebuild Iraq. An ominous foreshadowing of what was to come.

The cost of reconstruction became a major point of contention within OHRA, and with Garner’s superiors. At one briefing Rumsfeld asked Garner how much reconstruction would cost, and he said billions. Rumsfeld said he must be crazy. In fact, the U.S. went on to spend $50 billion on rebuilding Iraq. There were also heated debates amongst the OHRA staff about what reconstruction actually meant. Some believed it was just fixing war damage, while others thought about how it could lead to a new Iraqi government. This occurred during the earlier planning when the USAID was the only agency that believed rebuilding was an integral part of creating a democracy in Iraq. Rumsfeld and the White House however wanted that form of government without the U.S. doing the work.

What Iraq’s government would look like after Saddam was also a major point of contention. The State Department’s governance group had little to go on because there was so little information about how Iraq worked internally. The Pentagon leadership also thought that the U.S. would pass off Iraqi to Iraqis quickly, and therefore didn’t think that State had to really plan for the matter. Garner went ahead and looked into the issue anyway. A review warned that there would be a power vacuum after the invasion and criminality would result if authority wasn’t established immediately. Many in the U.S. believed that the Iraqi government would continue to operate after the war, and Garner planned to have a senior U.S. advisor help each of the country’s ministries to keep operating. The problem was OHRA didn’t even know how many ministries Iraq had.

Rumsfeld then began interfering as well, just adding to the difficulties. The Defense Secretary demanded that the Pentagon control all three of Garner’s reconstruction efforts rather than have State and USAID involved. This was all part of Rumsfeld’s belief that he was creating unity of command. That was far from reality.

CENTCOM was the third group that thought it was going to be in control of Iraq after the war. Its leadership didn’t like either the JTF-4 or OHRA. Rumsfeld believed that Garner would just be part of CENTCOM, but the military didn’t want him. CENTCOM commander General Franks tried to assert his control over OHRA, but Garner said he was independent because he was created by a presidential directive.

Franks was too caught up in the military planning for the invasion anyway. The original U.S. war plans for Iraq called for 500,000 troops. Rumsfeld was unhappy with this number as it didn’t fit his vision of a transformed military. Eventually Rumsfeld cut down the force to 160,000. At a briefing, President Bush asked whether this would be enough to secure the country and Franks said that it was. He asserted that in every village in Iraq there would be a mayor, a lieutenant, and captains to maintain civil order. In fact, there was no such plan. Others down the chain of command in the U.S. military were also uneasy about the reduced invasion force. Coalition ground commander General David McKiernan for one didn’t think there would be enough troops to secure the country after the invasion.

These ideas and agencies were put to the test one month before the invasion in a drill. All of the different groups that were working on post-war Iraq were present, although the State Department, CENCOM, and JTF-4 were told not to fully participate. The drill brought up major problems that would actually materialize after the invasion, but it was not able to prevent them. First the main difficulty that emerged was securing the country. The 160,000 strong invasion force was simply not large enough to do the job. The drill predicted that there would be civil chaos after the war that would undermine the establishment of a stable Iraq. The second problem was that there was no set reconstruction budget. Instead the U.S. was going to war with no idea about how much it would have to spend on rebuilding or whether it would be adequate. This too could lead to unrest amongst Iraq’s poor, who could rise up as a result. Third the lack of coordination between the various groups within the U.S. government was another hinderance.

President Bush and other top officials were later briefed on the drill and other plans. Garner warned the President that there was still lots of work to be done. Garner said that the Iraqi civil service, police and army all needed to be maintained to ensure domestic order. He suggested that the army be used for reconstruction. Bush okayed this plan. The same day, the President was briefed on a deBaathification plan. The idea was that only the top Baathists would be removed to ensure that the government would keep running. Bush agreed to that idea as well. Two days later Undersecretary Feith presented his plan for the creation of an Iraqi Interim Authority that would help with governance. Bush had previously vetoed the idea of creating a provisional Iraqi government before the invasion. The Interim Authority would now be doing just that using Iraqi exiles and the Kurds that the U.S. had been meeting with. Bush affirmed that idea too. The Authority would initially work with the U.S. military after the invasion before eventually taking over leadership of the country. There were no set plans on how this was to work, and it was decided to do it on the fly based upon facts on the ground in Iraq. None of these plans were actually adhered to.

Finally, days before the invasion was to begin Rumsfeld again interfered with planning. The Secretary told Garner that he had to get rid of two State Department officials from his staff. One was the head of the Future of Iraq Project. Garner was forced to get rid of him, but kept the other member of State. Then two days before the war began, Rumsfeld called Garner telling him that he was going to appoint all of the advisors that were to help run Iraq’s ministries. Garner at first objected, but then gave in.

Years later Garner lamented that the U.S. started too late to have an effective post-war planning effort. His OHRA was put together only two months before the invasion, and never had the staff to do all that was asked of it. Garner was also competing with General Franks at CENTCOM and JTF 4. This was a trend that started early on in planning when the NSC, Pentagon and CENTCOM’s Phase IV were all working independently. On top of all that Secretary Rumsfeld continually imposed himself on planning even though he had no experience in making war or reconstruction. His insistence on reducing the invasion force from 500,000 to 160,000 made it impossible for the U.S. to ensure security in Iraq. He also interfered with Garner’s staff picks, and most importantly did not believe in rebuilding Iraq. Even before the March 2003 invasion the U.S. was setting itself up for failure when it came to dealing with post-Saddam Iraq.

SOURCES

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons”

How The Failure To Deal With Iraq’s Militias Caused The Breakdown Of The Country

The October 2008 issue of Conflict, Security & Development has an article by David Ucko, program coordinator and research fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London, on the U.S.’s failure to integrate Iraq’s armed groups after the invasion. The piece details how the Americans lacked a plan to deal with either the anti-Saddam exile groups or the former regime elements. Ucko argues that this led the U.S. to empower the exile groups who then took over Iraq’s fledging security forces and government, while at the same time excluding the Sunnis, which helped create the insurgency. Together, these actions led to the disintegration of the country into the sectarian war of 2006-2007, and continue to cause problems for peace in the country today.

As soon as the invasion ended in 2003, the United States needed to come up with a plan to demobilize and integrate the various armed groups inside and out of the country into the new political system. This policy had to be applied to both the Kurds and Shiites, who made up the anti-Saddam exile groups, and the former Baathists and security forces of Saddam Hussein. The situation was especially difficult for a number of reasons. First, the Americans were beginning from scratch, building the new Iraqi government from the ground up. Second, many in the White House did not care about nation building. Third, the United States knew next to nothing about Iraq’s internal politics. Fourth, the looting and lack of security after the war gave little incentive for the militias to disarm. Finally, none of the U.S. officials in Iraq took integrating the militias or negotiating with the insurgency seriously. Together these led to a series of missteps that only increased the violence and instability within Iraq.

Problems with the U.S. policy towards the militias began in earnest when Paul Bremer took charge in Iraq. The Pentagon first turned to Retired Jay Garner and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to run post-war Iraq. The ORHA came up with a plan to demobilize the militias by integrating some into the new security forces, offering pensions to others, and vocational training for civilian jobs to the rest. The ORHA set aside $70 million for the project. The problem was Garner was never able to do much as Paul Bremer and the Provisional Coalition Authority (CPA) quickly replaced him in April 2003.

Bremer did away with all of Garner’s policies, and neither had a plan for the militias, nor cared about them at first, which allowed them free reign in sections of the country. Walter Slocombe, who was in charge of national security within the CPA from May to November 2003, believed that the militias were protection for Iraq’s exile leaders until a new political order was created. The CPA was also sympathetic to the militia leaders because they had opposed Saddam, and the Kurds and their Peshmerga fighters had assisted in the invasion. Also, because the U.S. and Coalition didn’t have enough troops to secure the entire country, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Masooud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the north, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in the south began filling the security vacuum with their militias, and became the de facto sovereigns in many areas. The growing influence of the SIIC, also led Moqtada al-Sadr to create the Mahdi Army. The two were long-time rivals, which often led to violence between them. Early on then, the U.S.’s attempts to build a new and secure Iraq were being undermined by the lack of a policy to deal with the militias who were asserting their own control over regions.

On the other hand, Bremer and some in the administration believed that the former regime elements needed to be punished rather than integrated, which helped create the insurgency. Ucko doesn’t mention it, but many U.S. officials, including Bremer, compared Iraq and Saddam to World War II Germany and the Nazis, who had to be wiped clean from the slate to start a new order. This led to Bremer’s decision to disband the country’s security forces and start the deBaathification process. The ex-soldiers were not offered pensions or jobs afterwards, while Sunnis felt persecuted under the deBaathification process. Both of these eventually led many Sunnis to join the insurgency. When that took off, the CPA and the White House believed it was all due to Al Qaeda in Iraq and Baathists, ignoring the deep resentment that American policies had created, and ignoring the nationalist element. From 2003-2006 the U.S. lacked intelligence, troop levels, legitimacy and a counterinsurgency approach to deal with the insurgency, leading to purely punitive measures against them. Again, Ucko points out, the U.S. failed to come up with a plan to demobilize and integrate combatants in Iraq that had deadly consequences.

By the end of 2003, Bremer was forced to address the militia issue, but gave it no priority and the effort floundered. In November 2003 Walter Slocombe was replaced by David Gompert, who was told by Bremer to disband the militias. Bremer had come to see the armed groups as a possible threat to Iraq’s state, so Gompert came up with a Transition and Reintegration strategy in May 2004. The plan was almost identical to Garner’s that was scrapped by Bremer in early 2003, calling for integration into the security forces, pensions, and vocational training. Gompert realized the process was going to take years, especially because fighting was increasing across the country, which would make the militia leaders reluctant to disarm. On June 1, 2004 Gompert signed a memorandum of understanding with nine parties, the two Kurdish ones, the SIIC, Iraqi Hezbollah, and Dawa. Sadr and his Mahdi Army were not included. Ucko doesn’t mention it, but the CPA considered Sadr a threat after his April 2004 uprising, which was probably the major reason for his exclusion from the deal. On June 7, the CPA issued Order 91 to demobilize and integrate the militias that had signed the June 1 memorandum. The process was placed under the Iraqi Interior Ministry, and any militias that failed to comply were to be considered outlaws. The problem was neither the CPA nor the interim Iraqi government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi believed in the process, and little time or money was spent on it. While the militias never fully cooperated, they did take advantage of the opportunity to join the security forces, giving them legitimacy and official cover.

While the CPA talked about dealing with the exile groups and their fighters, but did nothing in practice, they were also empowering them politically. That began with the CPA appointed Iraqi Governing Council that was created on July 13, 2003. Rather than appoint internal Iraqi leaders, the U.S. turned to those they knew, Abdul Aziz al Hakim of the SIIC, Abdel Karim Mahoud al Mohammedawi of Iraqi Hezbollah, Ibrahim al Jaafari and Ezzidin Salim of Dawa, Massoud Barzani of the KDP, and Jalal Talabani of the KDP. Outside of the two Kurdish parties, none of them had any popular support within Iraq, yet four of them would go on to be the rotating Governing Council president. In November 2003, the White House decided to turn the Council into the basis for the Iraqi Interim Government, which took over after the CPA disbanded. This was the beginning of Iraq’s ruling parties that were given power by the United States. They went on to run in the provincial and parliamentary elections in 2005 and solidified their hold on the government. Ministries were broken up between them, and officials appointed based upon patronage rather than competency. Each became a personal fiefdom committed to supporting their party and followers rather than Iraq.

Sunnis continued to be shut out of the process. The exile groups largely saw the Sunnis as responsible for the Saddam regime and continued with the U.S. policy of seeking to punish them. While the interim Iraqi government, and that of Prime Minister Ibarhim al-Jaafari gave lip service to reconciliation with the Sunnis, in practice, nothing was done. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saliah in August 2005 announced an amnesty plan for insurgents. That was scraped by the United States. The Transitional Administrative Law that was to govern Iraq between the end of the CPA and the election of an independent Iraqi government was negotiated between the Shiites and Kurds, while the Sunnis were shut out. The deBaathification Council let Shiites rejoin the government, while keeping Sunnis out. The Sunni boycott of the provincial council elections in the beginning of 2005, entrenched the Shiites and Kurds in power. In the parliamentary elections, Sadr and his militia became part of the government. Sadrists purged their ministries of Sunnis, and used the Health Ministry to kill Sunnis as well. Former Badr Brigade commander Bayan Jabr Solagh from the SIIC became Interior Minister, where he fired hundreds of Sunnis, incorporated militiamen into the police, carried out sectarian attacks on Sunnis. Finally, the constitution written in 2005 was seen as sectarian by Sunnis, who just barely failed to vote it down. The three elections in 2005 and the U.S.’s failed policies to deal with the militias therefore solidified the hold of the exile groups, plus Sadr, as the new rulers of Iraq to the detriment of the Sunnis. The ruling parties had no reason to compromise with the Sunnis, and just as important, had no unified vision of Iraq. This pushed more Sunnis into the hands of the insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki proved no better in dealing with the Sunnis. In June 2006 he announced a reconciliation project that included an amnesty for insurgents and reform of the deBaathification process. The United States and the SIIC got rid of both, so the process went nowhere. Maliki also relied upon the backing of the SIIC, the Kurds, and also Sadr at first, to stay in power, making him directly connected to the militia parties. Iraq’s parliament passed several reconciliation laws in late 2007 and early 2008, but there are questions about their implementation, and they have not consoled the Sunnis yet.

Finally, the U.S. began changing its anti-insurgent policies at the end of 2006, which eventually came to fruition with the 2007 Surge. American commanders were able to create local cease-fires with reconcilable insurgents across western and central Iraq. For the first time, the U.S. moved away from their purely punitive policies against the Sunnis. The same policy was used with Sadr. The Americans tried to work with the moderates, while going after the irreconcilable elements, who were dubbed the Special Groups.

The problem was, all of these reconciliation efforts were local and made on an ad hoc basis by individual American commanders. The Iraqi government was not involved in any of them, except in Anbar. Reintegration plans are supposed to be conducted by the government, not by a third country. This gave the ruling parties no incentive to reach out to the former insurgents or Sadr. Not only do they still consider the Sunnis and Sadr as threats to their control of the government, but also to their influence over the security forces. Because of this, Ucko believes the cease-fires will fall apart in the long run because they are not supported by Baghdad. He argues that bottom up reconciliation can only go so far, if those at the top don’t want it.

Finally, Ucko believes that the failure of the Americans to deal with the militias has created a deeply flawed Iraqi society. The U.S. came to rely upon the exile groups and their armed men to help secure the country, while at the same time only sought to punish the Sunnis until the Surge in 2007. Ucko believes that the U.S. would’ve been better off if they allowed new Iraqi leaders from within the country to emerge to run the government, instead of relying upon the militia parties. It was easier for the U.S. to turn to them first, but it has proven to be a major problem in the long run. This would’ve delayed the handover of power however, and probably led to more violence. He also thinks the lack of knowledge about Iraq by the White House and CPA led to these bad decisions.

One possible route for change is the provincial and parliamentarian elections scheduled for 2009. This could allow more representation by the Sunnis and change the power dynamic within the government. At the same time, the ruling parties could also work to destroy or undermine these new groups so they can stay in power. That would leave the U.S. in the middle to try to either mediate or squash any potential violence that might emerge from these struggles.

SOURCES

McCallister, William, “Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, 9/8/08

Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, Penguin Press, 2006

Truth, War & Consequences, “Interview Gen. Jay Garner,” PBS Frontline, 10/9/03

Ucko, David, “Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq,” Conflict, Security & Development, October 2008