Iraq’s Amnesty Law

In February 2008 Iraq’s parliament passed an Amnesty Law, which was part of the reconciliation process. On March 27, the Presidential Council ratified it, making it official. The Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and the Sadrists were the main supporters of the act because up to 80% of those detained are Sunnis, and the Sadrists have faced a wave of arrests by government forces. At the time, most reports said that Iraq held 26,000 prisoners. In fact, the true number was two to three times that. It turns out the government was holding thousands of Iraqis that were never officially arrested or were just waiting for a court date, while others had been found guilty but never given a sentence.

On July 22 Baghdad announced that 109,087 people had been pardoned under the Amnesty Law. There was no breakdown given, but some specifics were publicized in June and May. On June 29, the Voices of Iraq reported that the courts had released 13,199 people that had been found guilty but not sentenced, and 46,371 had been given bail. An additional 33,273 had been pardoned that were wanted, but had never been captured. In May, Iraq had pardoned a total of 55,053 people. 5,636 were convicted criminals, 24,472 were given bail, 11,476 were being held awaiting trial, and13,469 were wanted persons that had not been arrested. The government said they wanted to provide job training for those released to keep them out of trouble.

The huge number of those released, far past the official number of 26,000, shows the dysfunctional nature of the Iraqi justice system. While the U.S. has worked to improve the top court in the country, the rest of the legal system barely works. The United Nations has said that many times Iraqi forces arbitrarily arrest anyone suspicious in an area after an incident. Suspects are then suppose to be assured of due process, where the government can only hold suspects for 48 hours, and then they need to be brought before an investigative judge. The system is so overwhelmed by the number of cases however, that rarely happens. Police often hold people even after their cases have been dropped. Even those that actually go to court and are found guilty rarely get sentenced as the numbers above point out. A U.S. adviser on a Provincial Reconstruction Team told the New York Times that Iraqi courts lack basic necessities and the government doesn’t care about them. Baghdad now has the money to pay for basic services because of the oil boom, but the legal system is not one of its priorities. It will probably take years for this to be fixed, and until then the Amnesty Law will continue to release tens of thousands that should have never been held in the first place, and some that are probably guilty, but the system simply can’t process.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi Lawmakers Pass 3 Key New Laws,” Associated Press, 2/13/08

Alsumaria, “Iraq Amnesty Law forging ahead,” 2/19/08

BBC News, “Iraq government backs amnesty law,” 12/26/07

Colvin, Ross, “Iraqi police raid Mehdi Army strongholds,” Reuters, 3/12/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraqi Force Development,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008

Gluck, Jason, “From Gridlock to Compromise: How Three Laws Could Begin to Transform Iraqi Politics,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2008

Moore, Solomon, “Thousands of New Prisoners Overwhelm Iraqi System,” New York Times, 2/14/08

Stone, Andrea, “Iraq frees, pardons detainees,” USA Today, 4/22/08

Voices of Iraq, “3245 prisoners released under pardon law – source,” 3/17/08
- “8229 detainees released – judicial source,” 3/20/08
- “55,000 wanted encompassed by amnesty law – Supreme Judicial Council,” 5/6/08
- “More than 100,000 detainees released under pardon law,” 7/22/08
- “MP unleashes details of agreement to pass key laws,” 2/13/08
- “Two opposition parliamentary blocs slam implementation of Amnesty Law,” 6/29/08

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Report on Squatters

Enticing Iraqi Refugees To Return

In the past, Iraq has been widely criticized for not trying to help its displaced citizens. Currently, the country has one of the worst refugee problems in the world. The United Nations claims that 4.2 million Iraqis have left their homes since the U.S. invasion. 2.2 million live in other countries, while the other 2 million are internally displaced. With Iraq’s coffers overflowing with oil money, it is finally trying to entice these people to return to their homes. This will not be an easy job, and it’s still an open question whether Iraq can actually come through with its promises.

In the summer of 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government announced that the return of Iraq’s refugees was an integral part of its Baghdad security plan. At the beginning of June, it was announced that the cabinet had agreed to spend $195 million to help refugees return home from other countries. That same month, Iraq gave $8 million to the United Nations to help with the education and health of Iraqis in other nations. It was also announced that displaced families that were squatting in government buildings and other people’s homes were going to be asked to leave their residences, and if they didn’t, they would be forcibly removed. On July 16 for example, squatters in two Baghdad neighborhoods, Al Jamia and Al Adel, were told they had three days to vacate. Also in July, Baghdad announced that it had set up a $83 million program to help the internally displaced. Finally, the government came out with a detailed plan on July 23. The basic idea is to offer cash rewards to families that either leave homes they’re squatting in, or that return to their original domiciles. Baghdad is offering 1.8 million dinars (approximately $1,500) for squatters to leave, one million dinars (around $840) to refugees to return home, 150,000 dinars ($145) for three months to the internally displaced, and free airplane tickets and shipping for refugees to come back from foreign countries.

Offering aid is the first step in any serious plan, but taking care of the refugees once they come back is the next problematic issue. Millions of Iraqis have been forced to leave. Many of the 2 million internal refugees do not live in camps, but rather rented new places, moved in with relatives, or squatted in homes vacated by other people displaced. Taking care of squatters is one of the most explosives issues. Some may have to be actually forced out. That could lead to trouble. Even if they take the government’s money to leave, they may not be able to find a new place, and become refugees all over again. Most of Iraq’s displaced also came from Baghdad, and were ethnically cleansed during the sectarian war period. While some neighborhoods will accept families back, others may not. In late June for example, a group of Shiites protested in central Baghdad claiming that a local Sons of Iraq unit in Adil had prevented them from returning to their homes. Another major issue is whether the government can fulfill its promises. Iraq definitely has the money now, but actually distributing it effectively will be a major challenge. During the summer the head of parliament’s Displacement and Migration Committee complained that the government hadn’t come through with any money and wasn’t listening to their pleas. At the same time, there are signs of hope. The Immigration Ministry announced that 6,293 families had returned to Baghdad on June 18. 5,252 of them had received the government’s promise of money, while 1,041 were still waiting. The International Organization for Migration also reported that the number of displaced has slowed in 2008. With security improving, it’s a priority of the government to begin taking care of its people and solving the other problems created by the years of fighting. Taking care of the country’s refugees is one of these.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq gives UN $8 mln to help refugees in Jordan,” 6/15/08

Alsumaria, “150 Iraqi families return to Al Dora region,” 7/11/08
- “Iraq gives 3 day deadline to evacuate displaced houses,” 7/16/08
- “Iraq Government to improve displaced status,” 7/10/08

Associated Press, “Group says displacement of Iraqis has slowed,” 7/18/08

Buzbee, Sally and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq handing out cash to people on the streets,” Associated Press, 7/12/08

Hendawi, Hamza, “Program in Iraq against al-Qaida faces uncertainty,” Associated Press, 6/29/08

IRIN, “Internally displaced Iraqis demand government return them home,” 6/16/08
- “Iraq announces incentives to encourage return of IDPs, refugees,” 7/23/08

Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operational Update: Rear Adm. Driscoll, Maj. Gen. Atta,” 6/22/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Shiies Reclaim a Village Razed by Sunnis,” New York Times, 7/12/08

Al-Sabaah, “Over 6000 Families Return Back Homes,” 6/18/08

Voices of Iraq, “$195 millino allocated for refugees’ return – MP,” 6/3/08
- “MP criticizes govt. on displaced measures,” 6/1/08

Demise of Al Qaeda In Iraq Update

Al Qaeda in Iraq continues its steady decline. General David Petraeus told the Associated Press on July 19 that Al Qaeda central was changing its focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. On July 8, the Gulf News reported that Al Qaeda fighters were being diverted away from Iraq to places like Sudan and Somalia. These statements, follower earlier ones at the end of May when U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Charles Crocker and CIA chief Admiral Michael Hayden said that Al Qaeda in Iraq was near defeat.

The group's undoing began in 2005 when Sunni tribes and other insurgents turned against its harsh tactics, strict interpretation of Islam, attempts to move in on domestic businesses, and assert themselves as the leaders of the insurgency. Al Qaeda in Iraq was largely able to carry out these policies under the harsh and ruthless leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi also kept his distance from Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan/Pakistan, attempting to create his own independent organization. Zaraqawi’s successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is much closer to Al Qaeda central, and has been widely criticized for not being able to keep the organization together. Masri is an Egyptian and a disciple of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s number two. While Zarqawi tended to ignore bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s suggestions, Masri has aligned his groups message and tactics with Al Qaeda central.

Today, Al Qaeda in Iraq is on the run. Its funding sources within Iraq are drying up, the number of foreign fighters joining the group are dwindling, and it has been pushed out of its last urban center in Mosul. While the group is not finished, and is still a threat, it has become less of a factor within Iraq. Ambassador Crocker told the Associated Press yesterday, July 24, that the insurgency overall has lost much of its relevancy. Political conflicts and the inter-Shiite power struggle are much more pressing issues in the country today. When a nation moves on to other issues is always a good sign that a terrorist group such as Al Qaeda in Iraq is fading from the scene.

SOURCES

Adas, Basil, “Al Qaida groups ‘leaving Iraq for Sudan, Somalia,’” Gulf News, 7/8/08

Agence France Presse, “Al-Qaeda near defeat in Iraq, on defensive globally: CIA chief,” 5/30/08

Bergen, Peter & Cruickshank, Paul, “Al Qaeda in Iraq: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” Mother Jones, 10/18/07

Black, Ian and Norton-Taylor, Richard, “Experts fear new front with al-Qaida as terror group switches focus from Iraq,” Guardian, 6/11/08

Burns, Robert, “Commander: Al-Qaida in Iraq is at its weakest,” Associated Press, 5/21/08
- “US general: al-Qaida may be easing effort in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/19/08

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape,” 4/30/08

Levinson, Charles, “U.S. troop deaths in May near lowest level of war,” USA Today, 5/29/08

Michaels, Jim, “Foreign fighters leaving Iraq, military says,” USA Today, 3/20/08

O’Hanlon, Michael and Pollack, Kenneth, “Iraq: One Year Later,” Brookings Institution, 6/13/08

Roggio, Bill, “al Qaeda’s Grand Coalition in Anbar,” Long War Journal.org, 10/12/06
- “Divisions in al Qaeda in Iraq,” Long War Journal.org, 10/13/06

Samuels, Lennox, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, 5/21/08

Scheuer, Michael, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Still Striving to Undo al-Zarqawi’s Damage to Mujahideen Unity,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 4/30/08

Ware, Michael, “Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq,” CNN, 6/11/08

25th Female Suicide Bomber of 2008

Another woman suicide bomber detonated her explosives in Baquba, the provincial capitol of Diyala on July 24. This is the 25th such incident in 2008. 14 of these attacks have been in troubled Diyala province that Iraqi security forces are targeting for a new offensive at the beginning of August.

As has been the pattern, this bombing was aimed at a Sunni Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit. The attack killed 8 SOI fighters, and wounded 24 others. The target was Shiekh Naaim al-Duliami, the head of SOIs in western Baquba, who was killed along with seven bodyguards. Originally security forces thought that it was a car bombing, but then a woman’s pair of legs were found.

As reported earlier, female suicide bombers is a growing tactic employed by Al Qaeda in Iraq as it runs out of foreign fighters to carry such attacks, and their overall number of operations decline dramatically.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Woman suicide bomber kills eight in Iraq: police,” 7/24/08

Gamel, Kim, “Suicide bomber kills 8 US-allied Sunnis in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/24/08

Oppel, Richard, “8 Die in Iraq in Suicide Bombing, Apparently by Woman,” New York Times, 7/25/08

Reuters, “Female bomber kills seven in northeast Iraq,” 7/24/08

Conspiracy Theories Abound On Election Law Veto

On July 22 Iraq’s parliament passed the much-anticipated provincial election law. The next day, the Presidential Council rejected it. That was expected because President Jalal Talabani, who is a Kurd and heads the Council, said that he would veto the bill. The law now goes back to parliament to be revised. Conspiracy theories are flying about why the bill was passed and later rejected, and whether elections will be held in 2008.

The Passage and Eventual Veto of the Election Law

The major issue of dispute is the future of Kirkuk’s Tamim province. The bill said that elections in the province will be delayed six months, but until then the provincial council will be divided evenly between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkoman. Currently the Kurds control 21 of the 41 seats on the council, the council head, and the governorship. Another provision in the law said that security for Tamim would be under Baghdad. Kurdish Peshmerga militias largely control the city today.

When the law came up for vote on July 22 the parliament went through each clause of the bill. First the parliament rejected delaying the vote in Tamim. Next, the power-sharing provision was objected to as well. A secret vote was finally put forward and the bill was passed. Most of the Dawa party voted for it, but 60 Kurds and 15 Shiites, mostly from the Supreme Islamic Iraq Council (SIIC), walked out. An independent Shiite politician said this was the first time the Kurds were defeated in parliament. The next day, both President Jalal Talabani and Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi from the SIIC vetoed the law.

Conspiracies and Complications Surrounding Kirkuk

This is where the conspiracy theories come in. The BBC reported that the Kurds, the SIIC, and the Dawa party agreed to block the power-sharing clause in the law. Opposition groups say the law was passed knowing that it would be vetoed in the Presidential Council to delay elections. One of the leading Kurdish parliamentary members Mahmoud Othman said that the secret vote was also meant to anger politicians, and increase disputes over the bill.

There is no easy answer to the future of Kirkuk and Tamim province. The Kurds and the SIIC have both said voting in Kirkuk should be delayed 6 months. The problem is they have no plans on what will happen during that time to resolve the outstanding issues. It will allow the Kurdish parties to expand their influence over the area however, as they are intent on annexing it to the Kurdistan autonomous region. The other two main groups in the province, the Arabs and Turkoman support the power-sharing clause. They believe this is a way to maintain their power in the city that is coming under increasing Kurdish control. The problem is the Kurds are probably a majority, so this compromise would be a political loss for them. The State Department’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) believes that 60% of Tamim is Kurdish, but under the power-sharing idea, they would only get 31% of the provincial council seats. The Iraq constitution says there should have been a census and a vote on the future of Kirkuk by December 31, 2007, but that never happened. These two measures were postponed until June 2008, but that deadline passed by as well. The United Nations is now trying to handle the situation. A State Department official with Kirkuk’s PRT suggested that the major groups should come up with a percentage for seating on the provincial council without actually counting, and divide up power that way. The same person said that at best, Kirkuk could take three years to solve.

Conclusion

Since the Presidential Council vetoed the election law, it will now be sent back to parliament to be amended. Mahmoud Mashadani, the speaker of parliament, said there was little chance that this cold be done before the legislature goes on its summer recess on August 1. Others say that it can happen. The President of Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani, is traveling to Baghdad to try to work out a deal. If none can be made in the next few weeks that will most likely mean the elections will be delayed until 2009. The Election Commission said that it needs three months after the law is passed to prepare for the vote. Iraqi politics has always been known for its Byzantine style, and the events surrounding the election law are no exception. The Kurds and SIIC have a long-standing alliance dating back to the Saddam days. They have had their way in parliament since it was established in 2005. It is to be seen whether the passage and subsequent veto was part of their scheme to delay the vote so they can shore up their support in the country because they expect to be challenged, or if their plans were actually derailed by opposition politicians who want to have the elections as soon as possible to unseat the powers that be.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi politicians squabble over election law,” Associated Press, 5/26/08

BBC News, “Iraqi Kurdish Alliance says most blocs agree to Kirkuk poll delay,” 7/22/08

Jam, Kawa, “Delay of provincial council elections sought,” Kurdish Globe, 5/23/08

Al Jazeera, “Iraq president rejects election law,” 7/23/08

Morgan, Benjamin, “Iraq elections risk delay after presidency council rejects bill,” Agence France Presse, 7/23/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Kurds Object to Iraqi Provincial Election Law,” New York Times, 7/23/08

Steele, Jonathan, “Iraqi MPs stall deals on Bush benchmarks,” Guardian, 6/28/08

Voices of Iraq, “UIC proposes postponing Kirkuk elections for 6 months – MP,” 7/15/08

Warden, James, “Disagreements over Kirkuk’s status could sideline voters,” Stars and Stripes, 7/14/08

Youssef, Nancy, “Kurds storm out as Iraqi parliament OKs Oct. 1 elections,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/22/08

Drought Update

Iraq’s drought has had far ranging affects. Not only is it greatly reducing the country’s agricultural output, it is also cutting hydroelectric production for Iraq’s notoriously bad power grid. Lower water levels mean Iraq’s dams are producing less power. The Los Angeles Times reports that the drought has cut hydroelectric power by 30%.

SOURCES
Negus, Steve, “Black-outs sap public’s faith in Baghdad,” Financial Times, 6/16/08

Zavis, Alexandra, “Iraq’s electricity-starved capital goes solar,” Los Angeles Times, 7/14/08