2009 Review Of Iraqi Violence

2009 was characterized by the lowest levels of violence in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. This was due to the majority of Sunnis rejecting violence and turning to politics, which began with the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq movements, followed by high voter turnout by them in the January 2009 provincial elections. The Shiite militias were also dispersed and disbanded during 2008 due to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s offensives. Iran also has a history of reducing its support for militants before important political events, which were the 2009 and upcoming 2010 balloting. The result is that large scale fighting is over in the country, and there are hardly any reports of gunmen even attacking U.S. or Iraqi forces head on. Instead, most attacks are drive by shootings, grenades, assassinations, car bombs, rocket and mortar fire, IEDs, magnetic bombs, and suicide bombers with a few mass casualty bombings thrown in. All together that led to almost a 50% drop in deaths from 2008. Iraq’s ministries for instance, reported 6,772 deaths in 2008, compared to 3,492 in 2009.

Monthly deaths followed an up and down pattern throughout the year. All five major organizations that cover casualties, the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index, Iraq Body Count, icasualties, Iraq’s ministries, and the Associated Press showed deaths declining in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the last quarter of 2008. Then they went up in the second quarter, down in the third, and then down for the last half of the year. Iraq’s ministries for example, recorded an average of 324.6 deaths in the fourth quarter of 2008, 233.6 deaths in the first quarter of 2009, 319.3 deaths in the second quarter, 311.3 deaths in the third, and 299.6 deaths in the last. In the second half of the year, the major cause for the increase in deaths every other month was large-scale bombings in Baghdad of government buildings beginning in August. According to Iraq Body Count, there were actually more large bombings that resulted in 50 or more deaths in 2009, than the previous year. In 2008 there were nine such attacks leading to 534 deaths, and in 2009 there were eight resulting in 750 deaths. In total, there were 226 mass casualty bombings with ten or more casualties last year, resulting in 1,933 reported deaths, and 6,945 wounded.

Despite these large decreases Iraq has more casualties from terrorist attacks than any other country in the world. Iraq Body Count recorded an average of 8.3 deaths per day from suicide attacks or car bombs, and 4.3 killed by gunfire or executions per day last year. Violence also still occurs in all parts of the country. In December 2009 there were attacks in thirteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and in November in fourteen governorates. Baghdad, Ninewa, Anbar, Tamim, Diyala, Salahaddin, and Babil had the most attacks showing that governorates that had mixed populations were the most violent. Baghdad has the most security incidents and casualties overall, but on a per capita basis Mosul in northern Ninewa had more. Mosul, with a population of about 1.8 million people had 735 deaths recorded by Iraq Body Count in 2008, compared to 1,488 deaths in Baghdad with a population of approximately 6.5 million. Mosul also had more violent incidents that resulted in deaths at 538 compared to 277 in Baghdad.

2010 will likely be more of the same. Deaths have hit a relative plateau, and settled into an up and down monthly pattern. Al Qaeda in Iraq is still set at destabilizing the government by carrying out a mix of sectarian and spectacular terrorist attacks on institutions, while actual fighting has all but ceased. Large victories by Sunni parties in central and northern Iraq in the next election could lead to a slight reduction in attacks there as happened in Mosul after the al-Hadbaa party took power in 2009. Otherwise Iraq will face increasing stability, but a large terrorist threat at the same time.


Iraqi Deaths

	Brookings Institution	Iraq Body Count	icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Associated Press
2008
July	500	584	419	465	510
Aug.	450	592	311	431	475
Sep.	400	535	366	440	503
Oct.	350	528	288	318	446
Nov.	270	473	317	340	360
Dec.	350	522	320	316	393
TOTALS	6,360	9,226	5,929	6,772	7,496
2009
Jan.	270	276	187	191	242
Feb.	230	343	202	258	288
March	260	416	278	252	335
April	340	484	347	355	371
May	240	333	188	165	225
June	320	488	367	438	447
July	220	395	240	275	309
Aug.	300	593	439	456	425
Sep.	200	299	158	203	238
Oct.	280	410	320	410	364
Nov.	150	205	106	122	93
Dec.	N/A	442	287	367	383
TOTALS	N/A	4,684	3,119	3,492	3,720
Averages
3rd Qtr. 2008	450.0	570.3	365.3	446.3	496.0
4th Qtr. 2008	323.3	507.6	308.3	324.6	379.6
1st Qtr. 2009	253.3	345.0	222.3	233.6	288.3
2nd Qtr. 2009	300.0	435.0	300.6	319.3	347.6
3rd Qtr. 2009	240.0	429.0	279.0	311.3	324.0
4th Qtr. 2009	N/A	352.3	237.6	299.6	280.0
Last 6 months of 2008	386.6	539.0	336.8	385.0	447.8
First 6 months of 2009	276.6	389.8	261.5	276.5	318.0
Last 6 months of 2009	N/A	390.6	258.3	305.5	302.0

Mass Casualty Bombings 2009

Months	Bombings	Deaths	Wounded
Jan.	10	104	185
Feb.	8	52	143
Mar.	15	155	297
Apr.	21	198	497
May	9	111	262
Jun.	14	174	517
Jul.	35	180	655
Aug.	44	359	2,252
Sep.	13	70	263
Oct.	22	241	887
Nov.	10	43	136
Dec.	25	246	851
TOTALS:	226	1,933	6,945
Avg.	18.8	161.0	578.7

Attacks and Casualties By Province December 2009


Baghdad
Attacks: 95
Dead: 217
Wounded: 831 + 3 Americans

Ninewa
Attacks: 73
Dead: 58
Wounded: 134

Anbar
Attacks: 30
Dead: 39
Wounded: 71

Tamim
Attacks: 33
Dead: 21
Wounded: 56

Diyala
Attacks: 19
Dead: 17
Wounded: 30

Salahaddin
Attacks: 9
Dead: 15
Wounded: 25

Southern Iraq: 18
Babil: 5
Karbala: 5
Basra: 3
Wasit: 2
Maysan: 1
Najaf: 1
Qadisiyah: 1
Dead: 31
Wounded: 158+

Likely Special Groups Attacks In Southern Iraq

Rocket attack on U.S. base in Basra, 12/5/09
IED attack on U.S. patrol in Karbala 12/17/09
Katyusha attack on U.S. base in Wasit 12/26/09

Kurdistan:
Attacks: 2
Dead: 2
Wounded: 0

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq death toll in 2009 lowest since the invasion,” 1/1/10
- “Iraq Hails Lowest Monthly Death Toll in Three Years,” 1/2/09
- “Six anti-Qaeda fighters gunned down in Iraq: police,” 12/7/09

Associated Press, “Iraq: Key figures since the war began,” 12/1/09
- “Iraq: Key figures since the war began,” 1/4/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 Baghdad blasts wound 4 civilians,” 12/21/09
- “2 bodyguards died of wounds in Ninewa,” 12/25/09
- “2 civilians gunned down in Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “2 civilians killed, 3 wounded in fresh attack in Baghdad,” 12/9/09
- “2 civilians wounded in Baghdad blast,” 12/22/09
- “2 cops wounded in Kirkuk blast,” 12/6/09
- “2 cops wounded in Mosul bombing,” 12/30/09
- “2 gunmen arrested in Najaf,” 12/14/09
- “2 gunmen killed, detained in western Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “2 IEDs wound civilians, cops in Baghdad,” 12/21/09
- “2 Iraqi soldiers killed in Ninewa attack,” 12/3/09
- “2 persons killed in tribal clash near Amara,” 12/26/09
- “2 pilgrims killed, 11 wounded in Baghdad blasts,” 12/26/09
- “2nd attack on Shiite mourners leaves 2 dead, 7 wounded,” 12/23/09
- “2nd Falluja bombing injures civilian,” 12/20/09
- “2nd Talafar resident killed by gunmen,” 12/19/09
- “3 car bombs kill 4, wound 14 in Baghdad,” 12/15/09
- “3 civilians injured in southwest of Kirkuk,” 12/15/09
- “3 civilians wounded in downtown Baghdad blast,” 12/14/09
- “3 civilians wounded in mortar attack in Baghdad,” 12/23/09
- “3 cops wounded in Diala blast,” 12/5/09
- “3 cops wounded in IED blast in Ramadi,” 12/16/09
- “3 mortar shells land on former public security building,” 12/15/09
- “3 rockets fired at Delta base,” 12/26/09
- “3 rockets land in Baghdad’s Green Zone,” 12/12/09
- “3 students wounded in Falluja blast,” 12/20/09
- “3rd Falluja blast leaves no casualties,” 12/13/09
- “4 civilians wounded in Baghdad blast,” 12/29/09
- “4 cops killed in western Baghdad,” 12/23/09
- “5 wounded as IED blast rips through Mosul,” 12/10/09
- “5 civilians wounded in Baghdad blast,” 12/4/09
- “5 civilians wounded in market blast in Baghdad,” 12/23/09
- “5 wounded in blast in Baghdad,” 12/26/09
- “6 cops wounded in Kirkuk bombing,” 12/27/09
- “6 killed, wounded in market blast,” 12/6/09
- “8 injured in Babel blast,” 12/19/09
- “9 killed, wounded in two blasts south of Baghdad – BOC,” 12/11/09
- “10 men nabbed, girl found dead in Basra,” 12/30/09
- “13 killed, wounded as Baghdad attacks continue,” 12/9/09
- “22 pilgrims killed or wounded in Karabala,” 12/24/09
- “31 pilgrims killed, wounded in Baghdad blast,” 12/23/09
- “Anbar council member survives assassination attempt,” 12/23/09
- “Anbar council’s member dies, governor lost left hand,” 12/31/09
- “Anbar emergency police chief escapes assassination attempt in Falluja,” 12/25/09
- “AQI assassinated Talafar council chief – source,” 12/22/09
- “Army patrol hit by IED in Mosul,” 12/14/09
- “Army recruit killed, 19 injured in Mosul bombing,” 12/13/09
- “Asayesh member killed by IED near Kirkuk,” 12/30/09
- “Attack on Shiite procession leaves 3 killed, 7 wounded in Baghdad,” 12/25/09
- “Baghdad’s local council member survives IED blast,” 12/25/09
- “Basra airport comes under Katyusha attack,” 12/5/09
- “Blast in Baghdad leaves 4 injuries,” 12/14/09
- “Blast kills 3 Peshmerga forces, injures 10 in Sinjar,” 12/25/09
- “Blast near Mosul church kills 4, wounds 40,” 12/15/09
- “Bodies of 2 civilians found in Kirkuk,” 12/19/09
- “Body of merchant found hours after kidnapping west of Mosul,” 12/13/09
- “Body of young girl salvaged from river in Kut,” 12/18/09
- “Bomb explodes in Falluja without casualties,” 12/1/09
- “Bomb hits police patrol in Kirkuk,” 12/13/09
- “Bomb kills 2 and wounds 3 civilians in Babel,” 12/22/09
- “Bomb kills 3, wounds 8 in Baghdad,” 12/9/09
- “Bomb targets motorcade of lawmaker in Talafar,” 12/26/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 12/1/09
- “Bomb wounds civilian in village near Kirkuk,” 12/13/09
- “Bus blast kills 2, wounds 5 in Baghdad,” 12/16/09
- “Casualties from mourning tent blast reaches 6,” 12/23/09
- “Child wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 12/3/09
- “Child wounded in thermal bomb attack in Mosul,” 12/17/09
- “Christian killed in eastern Mosul,” 12/24/09
- “Christian killed in Mosul,” 12/17/09
- “Civilian gunned down in Baghdad,” 12/2/09
- “Civilian injured, 2 al-Naqshabandiya group gunmen arrested in Diala,” 12/21/09
- “Civilian killed, 3 wounded as sticky bomb explodes in Baghdad,” 12/23/09
- “Civilian killed, 4 injured in Baghdad blast,” 12/27/09
- “Civilian killed, 4 wounded by roadside bomb in Baghdad,” 12/25/09
- “Civilian killed, another found dead in Khanaqin,” 12/16/09
- “Civilian killed, body found in Mosul,” 12/25/09
- “Civilian killed by gunmen in Arbil,” 12/8/09
- “Civilian killed, child injured in Mosul,” 12/29/09
- “Civilian killed in Falluja blast,” 12/23/09
- “Civilian killed in Falluja blast,” 12/26/09
- “Civilian wounded in central Kirkuk blast,” 12/20/09
- “Civilian wounded in north Hilla blast,” 12/11/09
- “Civilian killed in northern Mosul,” 12/15/09
- “Civilian killed in western Mosul,” 12/21/09
- “Civilian killed inside own store in Mosul,” 12/17/09
- “Civilian wounded in eastern Mosul,” 12/10/09
- “Cop critically injured in Baghdad shooting,” 12/5/09
- “Cop gunned down in Mosul,” 12/19/09
- “Cop killed, 2 wounded in Mosul blast,” 12/8/09
- “Cop killed, civilian wounded in 2 incidents in Mosul,” 12/19/09
- “Cop killed during arrest operation,” 12/16/09
- “Cop wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 12/9/09
- “Corpses of 2 Sahwa fighters found in Kirkuk,” 12/7/09
- “Driver kidnapped, 4 suspects arrested in Salah al-Din,” 12/3/09
- “ED explodes inside restaurant in Karbala,” 12/24/09
- “Emergency policeman killed in armed attack in Kirkuk” 12/21/09
- “Ex-cop gunned down in Mosul,” 12/5/09
- “Ex-MP survives attempt on life,” 12/19/09
- “Falluja blast kills civilian, wounds 3,” 12/8/09
- “Falluja mosque preacher survives attempt,” 12/17/09
- “Fresh Baghdad blast leaves 3 dead, 8 wounded,” 12/24/09
- “Girl wounded by gunmen in Kirkuk,” 12/21/09
- “Government vehicle attacked in Talafar,” 12/12/09
- “Gunman arrested after attacking government vehicle,” 12/15/09
- “Gunmen detonate policeman’s house in Falluja,” 12/23/09
- “Gunmen kidnap son of traffic police chief,” 12/19/09
- “Gunman killed, another wounded in Ninewa blast,” 12/4/09
- “Gunman kills policeman in Falluja,” 12/14/09
- “Gunmen kill 3 employees in Mosul,” 12/25/09
- “Gunmen kill 4 cops in Baghdad,” 12/6/09
- “Gunmen kill civilian in Kirkuk,” 12/24/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in Mosul,” 12/21/09
- “Gunmen kill soldier in Baghdad,” 12/2/09
- “Gunmen slay prominent figure in Jalawlaa,” 12/24/09
- “Gunmen wound Christian in western Mosul,” 12/30/09
- “Hand grenade injures 3 people in Mosul,” 12/29/09
- “Hilla bombings kill 25, wound 105 – source,” 12/25/09
- “IED blast in Baghdad’s Karrada, no casualties,” 12/17/09
- “IED blast in Sadr City leaves 27 casualties,” 12/24/09
- “IED blast near Kirkuk leaves 4 wounded,” 12/26/09
- “IED blast near police HQ in Mosul,” 12/6/09
- “IED explodes near church in Mosul; no casualties,” 12/15/09
- “IED injures 2 in Baghdad,” 12/14/09
- “IED injures 3 civilians in Falluja,” 12/16/09
- “IED kills 6, wounds 10 in Diala,” 12/30/09
- “IED kills civilian, injures 6 in Baghdad,” 12/3/09
- “IED targeting Shiite procession leaves 10 casualties,” 12/26/09
- “IED targets US vehicle in eastern Karbala,” 12/17/09
- “IED wounds 2 civilians, 5 wanted men arrested in Diala,” 12/8/09
- “IED wounds 3 servicemen in Diala,” 12/30/09
- “IED wounds civilian in Falluja,” 12/22/09
- “Iranian envoy says embassy blast caused no casualties, damage,” 12/15/09
- “Iraqi soldier killed, brother wounded in Mosul,” 12/22/09
- “Iraqi soldier killed in armed attack in Kirkuk,” 12/6/09
- “Iraqi soldier killed in eastern Mosul,” 12/15/09
- “Iraqi servicemen wound civilian in Mosul,” 12/14/09
- “Iraqi soldier wounded by gunmen bullets in Kirkuk,” 12/11/09
- “Iraq soldier wounded in Mosul blast,” 12/12/09
- “Judge injured in armed attack in Kirkuk,” 12/29/09
- “Judicial council member survives assassination attempt,” 12/22/09
- “Karbala blast wounds 9 people,” 12/24/09
- “Laborer found dead in Mosul,” 12/16/09
- “MNF patrol attacked in Kirkuk,” 12/8/09
- “Mosul attack’s casualties up to 7,” 12/23/09
- “Mosul mayor escapes assassination attempt,” 12/24/09
- “Municipal council chief survives attempt on life,” 12/15/09
- “Officer gunned down in central Baghdad,” 12/26/09
- “Officer survives attempt on life in Kirkuk,” 12/21/09
- “Old man injured in armed attack in Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “Police chief survives attempt on life in Kirkuk,” 12/22/09
- “Police kill armed man in Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “Police kill gunman in Mosul,” 12/30/09
- “Police officer dies of wounds in Kirkuk,” 12/21/09
- “Police officer survives assassination attempt in Baiji,” 12/16/09
- “Police officer, woman wounded by thermal bomb in Mosul,” 12/15/09
- “Police officer wounded by sticky bomb in Baghdad,” 12/16/09
- “Police officer wounded in Falluja,” 12/8/09
- “Policeman dies of wounds in Kirkuk,” 12/12/09
- “Policeman wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 12/3/09
- “Policeman wounded in attack on his patrol in Mosul,” 12/6/09
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 12/12/09
- “Ramadi 2nd blast injures five,” 12/30/09
- “Ramadi bombings casualties rise to 57,” 12/30/09
- “Retired army officer gunned down in Mosul,” 12/23/09
- “Roadside bomb wounds 2 Iraqi soldiers in Ninewa,” 12/10/09
- “Sahwa council member killed in Kirkuk,” 12/27/09
- “Sahwa fighter killed, 3 wounded near Kirkuk,” 12/6/09
- “Sahwa fighter wounded by gunmen fire near Kirkuk,” 12/13/09
- “Sahwa leader killed as bomb explodes in Baghdad,” 12/16/09
- “Senior officer survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 12/10/09
- “Serviceman wounded in Kirkuk attack,” 12/1/09
- “Soldier killed, medic injured in shooting in Mosul,” 12/22/09
- “Six civilians killed, injured in Baghdad,” 12/7/09
- “Sticky bomb explodes in eastern Falluja,” 12/25/09
- “Sticky bomb injures army officer in Kirkuk,” 12/23/09
- “Sticky bomb kills, injures 2 civilians in Baghdad,” 12/1/09
- “Sticky bomb wounds 2 in Baghdad,” 12/16/09
- “Sticky explosive charge wound civilian in Baghdad,” 12/6/09
- “Stockpile of bombs caused Sadr City blast – spokesman,” 12/7/09
- “Student kidnapped in southern Kirkuk,” 12/30/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 12/21/09
- “Tikrit suicide blast casualties up to 18,” 12/3/09
- “TV channel worker found dead in Basra,” 12/23/09
- “U.S. patrol hit by blast in Baghdad,” 12/5/09
- “U.S. vehicle hit by IED near Kirkuk,” 12/29/09
- “Uni. professor escapes attempt on life in Falluja,” 12/23/09
- “Unknown corpse found, 2 gunmen detained in Diala,” 12/1/09
- “URGENT/4 wounded in clashes between Shabak, Christians in Ninewa,” 12/25/09
- “URGENT/Cart bomb leaves 5 casualties in Mosul,” 12/23/09
- “Young man found dead in Makhmour,” 12/1/09

Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday December 11, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/11/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday December 7, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/7/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday December 14, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/14/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday December 1, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/1/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday December 29, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/29/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday December 23, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/23/09

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 3 December, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/3/09

Heintz, Jim, “US deaths down in Iraq in 2008, up in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, 12/31/08

Huusein, Jenan, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 10 December, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/10/09

Icasualties.org

Iraq Body Count, “Civilian deaths from violence in 2009,” 12/31/09

Iraq Today, “War News of Tuesday, December 22, 2009,” 12/22/09

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 4 December, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/4/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 18 December, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/18/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 21 December, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/21/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 30 December, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/30/09

Jakes, Lara, “Officials: Gunmen kill 5 Sunni guards in Iraq,” Associated Press, 12/29/09

Kurdish Globe, “Two Iraqi “Awakening” members killed in Kirkuk,” 12/24/09

Londono, Ernesto, “At least 127 dead in string of Baghdad bomb attacks,” Washington Post, 12/8/09

Monsters & Critics, “Iraqi militants attack checkpoint near Falluja,” 12/1/09

O’Hanlon, Michael, Livingston, Ian, “Iraq Index,” 1/7/10

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 1,” 12/1/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 4,” 12/4/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 7,” 12/7/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 8,” 12/8/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 12,” 12/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 22,” 12/22/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 23,” 12/23/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 25,” 12/25/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 29,” 12/29/09

RTT News, “Chief Of Iraqi Security Forces In Baghdad Replaced After Deadly Bomb Attacks,” 12/9/09

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “At least 5 Shiite pilgrim skilled in Baghdad,” CNN, 12/23/09

Xinhua, “4 wounded in separate bomb attacks in Iraq,” 12/22/09
- “5 Iraqis killed in violence in Iraq,” 12/12/09
- “Policeman killed, 8 injured in bomb attacks in Iraq,” 12/21/09
- “Policeman killed, 9 injured in separate bomb attacks in Iraq,” 12/14/09
- “Two killed in Iraq’s Diyala violence,” 12/14/09

Accountability And Justice Commission Attempts To Interfere In 2010 Elections

On January 7, 2010 the Accountability and Justice Commission, which replaced the DeBaathification Commission, pronounced that it was banning 14 political lists and 400 candidates from the March 2010 elections. The reason given was that they were all connected to Baathists. The most prominent politician facing a ban was Saleh al-Mutlaq. He heads the National Dialogue Front, which joined with former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, and Vice President Tariq al-Hasemi in the new Iraqi National Movement List to run in 2010. Mutlaq participated in the 2005 elections and his party won 11 seats in parliament. He later went on to help draft the constitution that year as well. This decision could undermine Sunni participation in Iraqi politics, and is just the latest episode in the sordid history of the DeBaathification process.

The Accountability and Justice Commission’s announcement led to immediate protests from several leading Sunni politicians. One told Aswat al-Iraq that Mutlaq had been “politically liquidated,” while others are threatening a boycott of the 2010 elections unless Mutlaq is allowed to participate. The leaders of the Iraqi National Movement condemned the move. Sunnis have been participating in the government and elections more and more, which is a major reason why violence declined so much in 2009. Mutlaq’s banning, and a boycott could undermine that process.

According to Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the chief of the Accountability and Justice Commission Ali al-Lami and the chairman of the accountability and justice committee in parliament who is a Sadrist, made the decision against Mutlaq and the others. Lami claimed that the Commission had found new documents connecting Mutlaq to Baathists. Mutlaq and the other politicians and lists’ fate now lies with the Election Commission, which will have the final say on whether they can run in the upcoming vote.

The Accountability and Justice Commission and Lami have a controversial past. DeBaathification began on May 16, 2003 with Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1. The decision was widely criticized for cutting too deep into the Iraqi bureaucracy and creating opponents to the new Iraq. Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) was also put in charge of the DeBaathification Commission, and was accused of using it against his political opponents as well as blackmailing people, and extorting money from them. In April 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority chief Paul Bremer admitted to his mistakes and reversed the order saying that it was poorly implemented. The 2005 Iraqi constitution maintained the Commission however, and Lami, who was Chalabi’s deputy, later succeeded him as its head. In August 2008, Lami was arrested by the United States for allegedly working with Iranian intelligence, and the Tehran backed League of the Righteous to carry out a bombing in Sadr City in June 2008 that killed members of the local council and two U.S. soldiers. One year later Lami was set free as part of a deal the Iraqi government worked out with the League and the British government to release members of the League in return for five British nationals who were kidnapped by the group in May 2007. In January 2008 the Iraqi parliament passed the Accountability and Justice Law, which was suppose to replace the DeBaathification Commission with the Accountability and Justice Commission, and create new rules for the process. The problem was that parliament never implemented the law by naming new commission members. Instead, Lami and others from the old commission simply took over the new one. This further complicates their decision since the legislature has never approved their positions.

DeBaathification has never been an objective process. Shiite Baathists were often allowed to rejoin political life, while Sunnis felt persecuted. Commission members used it for their own benefit and against their opponents. The Accountability and Justice Commission’s decision to ban Saleh al-Mutlaq and others smacks of more of the same. It could greatly undermine the political changes going on in Iraq that has seen more and more Sunnis participating, which in turn might affect security. The fact that Ali al-Lami hasn’t even been approved for his position by parliament just adds to the theater that is Iraqi politics. Hopefully the Election Commission will overturn his decision, so that the elections can move forward.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq March poll under threat,” 1/10/10

Ali, Ahmed, “Iraq’s Elections Challenge: A Shifting Political Landscape,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11/20/09

Allam, Hannah, “Chalabi aide: I went from White House to secret U.S. prisoner,” McClatchy Newspaper, 9/5/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Al-Motlak politically liquidated – MP,” 1/8/10

Bakri, Nada, “Anger Over Move to Bar Sunni From Iraq Elections,” New York Times, 1/8/10

Houreld, Katharaine, “Fate of 15 Iraqi political parties in balance,” Associated Press, 1/9/10

Inside Iraq, “Iraq bans 14 political blocs and its 400 politicians,” McClatchy Newspapers, 1/7/10

Lake, Eli, “EXCLUSIVE: Iraqi official’s top aide linked to Shi’ite terrorists,” Washington Times, 8/28/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/18/09

Powell, Bill and Ghosh, Aparism, “Paul Bremer’s Rough Ride,” Time, 6/28/04

Reuters, “Influencial Group Threatens To Boycott Iraq Election,” 1/9/10

Sly, Liz, “Iraq bars major Sunni party from election,” Los Angeles Times, 1/8/10

Spangler, Nicholas and Kadhim, Hussein, “Chalabi aide arrested on suspicion of Baghdad bombings,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/28/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq’s Parliamentary Election,” Institute for the Study of War, 10/21/09

Thomas, Evan and Hosenball, Mark, “The Rise and Fall of Chalabi: Bush’s Mr. Wrong,” Newsweek, 5/31/04

Visser, Reidar, “Why Ad Hoc De-Baathification Will Derail the Process of Democratization in Iraq,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/8/10

Theories On Violence In Iraq

In November 2009 Toby Dodge from the Queen Mary University of London and member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies published a report for the Chilcot Inquiry that is looking into England’s involvement in the Iraq war. His paper, “What were the causes and consequences of Iraq’s descent into violence after the initial invasion?” covered three theories about the violence in Iraq. These were: 1) that Iraq is hopelessly divided between ethnosectarian groups, 2) that the U.S. presence led to resistance, and 3) that the toppling of Saddam led to a security and political vacuum as the state collapsed.

Ethnosectarianism is based upon a primordial concept of Iraq that sees it divided between three distinct, homogenous groups, the Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. Each has its own geographic region, the Kurds in the north, the Sunnis in the west, and Shiites in the south, and a never-ending animosity towards the others. The Sunni Arabs dominated the government since the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, keeping the other two groups oppressed. Saddam Hussein was the last of these rulers, so his overthrow was going to unleash the decades of resentment by the Shiites and Kurds. Believers in this idea then, saw the chaos and civil war that erupted after the U.S. invasion as the natural and inevitable result of these deep seeded differences amongst Iraq’s people.

Both Iraqi parties and American notables promoted an ethnosectarianism view of Iraq. The two ruling Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) suffered under Saddam’s Arabization and Anfal campaigns that killed and displaced tens of thousands of their people. The Kurds' experience created a great mistrust towards Arabs and their support of a strong central government and Iraqi nationalism, both of which had been used to subjugate the Kurds in the past. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) used sectarianism to organize Shiites behind them for the 2005 elections, and to argue for a Shiite autonomous zone in southern Iraq.  Americans such as Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, adviser to the Kurds and former U.S. ambassador Peter Galbraith, and current Vice President Joe Biden also took up this theory.

If one believes that ethnicity and sect hopelessly split Iraq than three policies have been advocated. One is to divide the country up into three homogenous regions in a federal system with a weak central government or to break Iraq up into three separate countries, the north for the Kurds, the west for the Sunnis, and the south for the Shiites, something that Gelb, Galbraith, and Biden have promoted. The third is to have some sort of grand bargain between the three major groups, which is what the U.S. government has backed under both the Bush and Obama administrations. For example, this was the basis of the 18 benchmarks promoted by President Bush when he announced the Surge in January 2007 that included moves such as deBaathification, a new oil law, and allow for autonomous regions. President Obama and Vice president Biden have also called for a power sharing agreement amongst the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.

The problem with this theory is that it is not very popular with Iraqis. First, as Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs has pointed out, before Saddam’s era there were only three periods of deep ethnosectarian divisions in 1508, 1623, and 1801. He argues that the policies of Saddam and the civil war that broke out in 2005 were exceptions, not the rule to Iraqi history. Iraqi opinion polls from 2004-2009 have shown little support for this idea as well, with 58%-79% being for a unified Iraq with a strong central government. The idea of a southern Shiite region also appears dead. In January 2009, politicians in the southern province of Basra tried to get a referendum to make it an autonomous region, but only garnered less than 2% of the voting population’s backing. After the SIIC’s sweeping defeat in the January 2009 provincial elections it also sidelined its call for a southern Shiite zone. Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds also did not live in homogenous areas. For example, central and northern Iraq had large Sunni populations in Diyala, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Baghdad, and Babil, as well as a community in Basra, not just western Anbar.

The second theory about violence in Iraq blames the U.S. presence. The belief is that the U.S. stayed too long, and that naturally led to resistance. U.S. military policy, such as mass arrests they carried out against Sunni men early on in the war, aggravated the situation, and led to the growth of the insurgency. The policy recommendation that results from this idea is withdrawal. This was actually U.S. policy until the Surge began in 2007. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was always for pulling out U.S. troops as soon as possible. President Bush’s June 2005 speech where he declared that the U.S. would stand down as Iraqis stood up was actually a plan to transfer security responsibilities as quickly as possible to the Iraqi forces so that the U.S. could leave. General George Casey followed this plan when he was commanding general in Iraq from June 2004 to February 2007 by transferring most U.S. troops to large bases, while the Iraqi police and army were given more and more responsibility.

The difficulty with this second idea is determining when the U.S. should have left to stem the violence. Immediately after the overthrow of Saddam, there was chaos throughout Iraq as the government collapsed. Looting occurred in most major cities such as Baghdad, individuals began asserting that they were in control of local governments, communities started creating their own militias because of the complete lack of law and order, shootings and deaths were occurring throughout the capital, crime sky-rocketed, and there were already random attacks on Americans. With no functioning government, and the United Nations shut out of the situation by the Bush administration, withdrawing immediately after the invasion as was the original plan would’ve left anarchy as no one, not even the Americans, were in control of the situation. In June 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) turned over authority to an interim government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. The Iraqi security forces were just beginning to be put back together then, and were just as likely to run as to turn on the United States in a fight. When the U.S. did try to withdraw from 2005-2006, Iraqi forces were not ready yet, and that helped lead to the civil war as people turned to insurgents and militias to protect them, which is a common occurrence when the central government no longer has a monopoly on force and can’t fulfill its duties. In mid-2007, the British pulled out of Basra, cutting a deal with the local Shiite militias telling them that they would not interfere in the city as long as their troops were not attacked, but that only led to more lawlessness as the competing political parties, gunmen, and gangs were free to battle it out for control of Basra’s ports and lucrative oil industry. If the point of a U.S. withdrawal was to stop the violence, there didn’t appear to be a good time to do that early on.

The final theory, that the violence was caused by the collapse of the Iraqi state, is the position of the author of the report, Toby Dodge. He argues that the state fell apart due to U.S. and British policies, and their inability to control the country. First, neither members of the Coalition adequately planned for post-war Iraq. The Bush administration for one, believed that Iraqis would greet American forces as liberators, that the government would be up and running the day after Saddam’s fall, and that everything would take care of itself with minimum U.S. involvement. All of these proved false assumptions. When looting and violence broke out after the fall of Saddam, and none of the ministries were working, the Coalition had neither the troops to restore order or the personnel to get the government running again. The CPA made the situation worse in mid-2003 when it implemented its deBaathification policy and disbanded the Iraqi military, which created thousands of angry Iraqis who were opposed to the new order. U.S. and British forces never increased enough in those early years to provide adequate security, and the Iraqi army and police weren’t competent enough until 2008 to carry out their own operations. The 2005 elections led to a Sunni boycott, and the rise to power of the SIIC and Kurds who were more interested in their own ethnosectarian agendas than building up Iraqi institutions. Criminal gangs, insurgents, and militias were also thriving, which undermined the legitimacy of the new Iraq even more. By 2005 the civil war had started, Iraq became a failed state, and deaths and violence skyrocketed.

There are of course problems with this third theory as well. One is that some argue that the sectarian cleansing of Baghdad during the civil war rather than the return of the Iraqi state or the Surge was the major reason for violence decreasing. Another is that a stronger government has not ended the violence. In 2009 Iraq still suffered from more terrorism than any other country in the world, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Icasualties for instance, counted 3,119 Iraqis killed in 2009 compared to 837 Afghans. Casualties are at their lowest level since 2003, but they have not ended.

Each one of these theories has its merits, but the failed state one is the most convincing. Ethnosectarian differences exist in Iraq, but dividing the country up based upon it has never been popular. U.S. troops, and especially the early punitive policies against Sunnis, definitely created resistance, but if the U.S. had withdrawn anytime from 2003-2008 there’s no telling whether that would have made the security situation better or worse. The reason why the collapsed state concept holds the most weight, is that it includes the best elements of the first two, while adding new ideas as well, making it the most comprehensive. Looking back using this idea shows that Iraq might have followed a different path if the Coalition had adequately planned for contingencies following the invasion, providing enough troops to provide security, and the money and infrastructure to get the government working after it collapsed. There might have been too many structural barriers within the Bush administration to accomplish that however. Going ahead, the re-birth of the Iraqi state is still a work in progress. Its inability to handle major political differences, and the continued problems with services, and the economy mean that there are still plenty of disaffected Iraqis to be recruited by militants. The question now is whether the government can keep up its current trajectory and bring about further improvements in security, or whether things have reached a plateau at a still unacceptable level of violence.

SOURCES

Anderson, Jon Lee, “The Collapse,” New Yorker, 4/21/03

Bennett, Brian and Weisskopf, Michael, “A Journey to the Dark Side of Baghdad,” Time, 5/26/03

Brown, David, “Britain negotiated Basra ceasefire with al-Mahdi Army, Iraq inquiry hears,” Times of London, 1/7/10

Byman, Daniel, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies, October 2008

Danner, Mark, “Iraq: How to Not Win a War,” New York Review of Books, 9/25/03

Dodge, Dr. Toby, “What were the causes and consequences of Iraq’s descent into violence after the initial invasion?” Chilcot Inquiry, 11/10/09

Elliott, Michael, “Occupation Hazards,” Time, 6/9/03

Guler, Claudio, “Baghdad Divided,” International Relations and Security Network, 11/9/09

Hendren, John, “More GIs needed in Iraq, says general,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/13/04

icasualties

Iraq Body Count, “Civilian deaths from violence in 2009,” 12/31/09

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service, 4/22/09

McGeary, Johanna, “Danger Around Every Corner,” Time, 10/27/03

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “More than “Shiites” and “Sunnis,” How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Reform in Iraq,” February 2009

Reidar, Visser, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Strauss, Valerie, “Pentagon: Ex-Iraqi Leader Aziz Is in Custody,” Washington Post, 4/24/03

Tyler, Patrick, “A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on Rise,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Walker, David, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,” Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07

Washington Post, “Obama’s Plan for Iraq,” 3/1/09
- “U.S. changes tactics in Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/24/04

Wilkinson, Tracy, “U.S. overseer tours Baghdad,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/22/03

Review of Security Situation In Mosul - 2009

In a recent study of security statistics, Iraq Body Count found that Mosul was the most violent city in Iraq in 2009. Mosul, with a population of around 1.8 million people had 735 deaths in 2009, compared to 1,488 deaths in Baghdad that has a population of around 6.5 million. Mosul also had more violent incidents that led to fatalities, 535, than Baghdad, 277. Most of the violence in Mosul in 2009 was made up of assassinations, drive-by shootings, IEDs, and car bombs, and lacked the mass casualty bombings that regularly occurred in Baghdad. 

In terms of trends, the average number of attacks in 2009 was about the same as 2008, while casualties were slightly down. In the first half of 2008 there was an average of 1.89 attacks per day, and 2.45 per day in the second half. That compared to 2.50 attacks per day in the first half of 2009, and 2.19 in the last half. In 2008, average daily attacks slightly increased from January, 1.85, to December, 2.09, while in 2009 they went up and then down. In January 2009 there was an average of 1.67 attacks per day, then 2.43 per day by June, before going down to 1.93 by December. Deaths saw an overall decline from 2008 to 2009, starting at an average of 2.90 per day in the first half of 2008, and then 2.10 per day by the second half of 2009. That was a slight increase from the first half of 2009 however where there was an average of 1.97 per day. The number of wounded saw a more steady decline going from an average of 6.92 per day in the first half of 2008 to 3.59 per day by the second half of 2009. At the very end of the year however, there were the fewest deaths since 2007 with 37 killed in November 2009 and 44 fatalities in December.

Two opposing factors can explain both the decline in violence and its continuation in Mosul. First, the victory of the al-Hadbaa Party in the January 2009 provincial elections ushered in the return to power of Sunnis in the city’s Ninewa province. They gained the cooperation of some of the nationalist insurgent groups in the city and former Baathists. At the same time, Mosul is divided between Arabs and Kurds, which gives Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants reason to carry on with their attacks.  

2009 Attack and Casualty Statistics for Mosul

Attacks:
Jan. 52/Avg. 1.67/day
Feb. 81/Avg. 2.89/day
Mar. 86/Avg. 2.77/day
Apr. 79/Avg. 2.63/day
May 83/Avg. 3.06/day
Jun. 73/Avg. 2.43/day
Jul. 73/Avg. 2.35/day
Aug. 77/Avg. 2.48/day
Sep. 72/Avg. 2.40/day
Oct. 66/Avg. 2.12/day
Nov. 55/Avg. 1.83/day
Dec. 60/Avg. 1.93/day

Deaths:
Jan. 56/Avg. 1.80/day
Feb. 58/Avg. 2.00/day
Mar. 69/Avg. 2.22/day
Apr. 53/Avg. 1.76/day
May 64/Avg. 2.06/day
Jun. 58/Avg. 1.93/day
Jul. 79/Avg. 2.54/day
Aug. 102/Avg. 3.29/day
Sep. 65/Avg. 2.16/day
Oct. 60/Avg. 1.93/day
Nov. 37/Avg. 1.23/day
Dec. 44/Avg. 1.41/day

Wounded:
Jan. 56/Avg. 1.80/day
Feb. 111/Avg. 3.96/day
Mar. 169/Avg. 5.45/day
Apr. 191/Avg. 6.36/day
May 164/Avg. 4.70/day
Jun. 123/Avg. 4.10/day
Jul. 169/Avg. 5.45/day
Aug. 171/Avg. 5.51/day
Sep. 60/Avg. 2.00/day
Oct. 82/Avg. 2.64/day
Nov. 71/Avg. 2.36/day
Dec. 108/Avg. 3.48/day

Averages:

Attacks:
1st Half 2008: 57.50/Month, Avg. 1.89/day
2nd Half 2008: 75.33/Month, Avg. 2.45/day
1st Half 2009: 75.66/Month, Avg. 2.50/day
2nd Half 2009: 67.16/Month, Avg. 2.19/day

Deaths:
1st Half 2008: 88.0/Month, Avg. 2.90/day
2nd Half 2008: 80.83/Month, Avg. 2.63/day
1st Half 2009: 59.66/Month, Avg. 1.97/day
2nd Half 2009: 64.50/Month, Avg. 2.10/day

Wounded:
1st Half 2008: 210.0/Month, Avg. 6.92/day
2nd Half 2008: 168.33/Month, Avg. 5.48/day
1st Half 2009: 135.66/Month, Avg. 4.49/day
2nd Half 2009: 110.16/Month, Avg. 3.59/day

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 civilians gunned down in Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “2 cops wounded in Mosul bombing,” 12/30/09
- “2 gunmen killed, detained in western Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “5 wounded as IED blast rips through Mosul,” 12/10/09
- “Army patrol hit by IED in Mosul,” 12/14/09
- “Army recruit killed, 19 injured in Mosul bombing,” 12/13/09
- “Blast near Mosul church kills 4, wounds 40,” 12/15/09
- “Body of merchant found hours after kidnapping west of Mosul,” 12/13/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 civilians in Mosul,” 12/1/09
- “Child wounded in IED blast in Mosul,” 12/3/09
- “Child wounded in thermal bomb attack in Mosul,” 12/17/09
- “Christian killed in eastern Mosul,” 12/24/09
- “Christian killed in Mosul,” 12/17/09
- “Civilian killed, body found in Mosul,” 12/25/09
- “Civilian killed, child injured in Mosul,” 12/29/09
- “Civilian killed in northern Mosul,” 12/15/09
- “Civilian killed in western Mosul,” 12/21/09
- “Civilian killed inside own store in Mosul,” 12/17/09
- “Civilian wounded in eastern Mosul,” 12/10/09
- “Cop gunned down in Mosul,” 12/19/09
- “Cop killed, 2 wounded in Mosul blast,” 12/8/09
- “Cop killed, civilian wounded in 2 incidents in Mosul,” 12/19/09
- “Cop wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 12/9/09
- “Ex-cop gunned down in Mosul,” 12/5/09
- “Gunman arrested after attacking government vehicle,” 12/15/09
- “Gunmen kill 3 employees in Mosul,” 12/25/09
- “Gunmen kill cop in Mosul,” 12/21/09
- “Gunmen wound Christian in western Mosul,” 12/30/09
- “Hand grenade injures 3 people in Mosul,” 12/29/09
- “IED blast near police HQ in Mosul,” 12/6/09
- “IED explodes near church in Mosul; no casualties,” 12/15/09
- “Iraqi soldier killed, brother wounded in Mosul,” 12/22/09
- “Iraqi soldier killed in eastern Mosul,” 12/15/09
- “Iraq soldier wounded in Mosul blast,” 12/12/09
- “Iraqi servicemen wound civilian in Mosul,” 12/14/09
- “Laborer found dead in Mosul,” 12/16/09
- “Mosul attack’s casualties up to 7,” 12/23/09
- “Mosul mayor escapes assassination attempt,” 12/24/09
- “Old man injured in armed attack in Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “Police kill armed man in Mosul,” 12/28/09
- “Police kill gunman in Mosul,” 12/30/09
- “Police officer, woman wounded by thermal bomb in Mosul,” 12/15/09
- “Policeman wounded by gunmen fire in Mosul,” 12/3/09
- “Policeman wounded in attack on his patrol in Mosul,” 12/6/09
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 12/12/09
- “Retired army officer gunned down in Mosul,” 12/23/09
- “Roadside bomb wounds 2 Iraqi soldiers in Ninewa,” 12/10/09
- “Senior officer survives assassination attempt in Mosul,” 12/10/09
- “Soldier killed, medic injured in shooting in Mosul,” 12/22/09
- “Thermal bomb wounds 2 soldiers in Mosul,” 12/21/09
- “URGENT/Cart bomb leaves 5 casualties in Mosul,” 12/23/09

DPA, “Witnesses: Ex-Baathist assassinated in northern Iraq,” 12/25/09

Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday December 7, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 12/7/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09

Iraq Body Count, “Civilian deaths from violence in 2009,” 12/31/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Dec 24,” 12/24/09

Xinhua, “Three policemen killed in bomb attack in northern Iraq,” 12/15/09
- “Tribal leader, police officer killed in Iraq’s violence,” 12/26/09