Economy Surpasses Security In New Iraqi Opinion Poll

From December 22-30, 2009 the English based YouGov internet research firm conducted an opinion poll of 1,561 Iraqis from all of the country’s eighteen provinces that found that economic issues surpassed security as the main concern of those questioned. 21% said unemployment was the most important issue in Iraq currently, followed by 16% who said it was security, and 15% who said it was financial insecurity. The lack of jobs, services, and opportunities has long been an issue in Iraq even before the invasion as wars and the U.N. sanctions crippled the Iraqi economy. During the run-up to the 2005 and 2009 elections the same concerns were voiced, but security was a more important issue since Iraq was still in the throngs of an insurgency then. In a February 2009 poll done by ABC, NHK, and the BBC for example, lack of security and terrorist attacks were rated as the two biggest problems facing the country, while economic problems was tied for third. When asked what were the main issues the public faced personally however, high prices and lack of jobs were the top two responses.

Another question on how Iraq was doing overall found respondents almost evenly divided between pessimists and optimists. 46% said that Iraq was going in the wrong direction, while 44% said it was doing the opposite. In the ABC/NHK/BBC poll from February 2009 58% said that Iraq was doing good, while 40% said it was doing bad. The new results might reflect the lack of economic development and political progress in Iraq despite the improvement in security and the January 2009 provincial elections, along with the return of large-scale bombings in Baghdad that began in August 2009.

It should be noted that YouGov is limited to those with internet access, so that might skew the results towards middle to upper class Iraqis.

SOURCES

BBC, ABC, NHK, “Iraq Poll February 2009,” 3/16/09

Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “basra’s dominant parties expect to maintain power,” Niqash, 12/15/08

Zawya, “More Iraqis fear unemployment than security issues, YouGov Siraj research report reveals,” 1/12/10

Kurds And Supreme Council Re-Affirm Alliance Before 2010 Iraqi Elections

On January 12, 2010 the head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Iraqi National Alliance Ammar al-Hakim traveled to Kurdistan. Hakim first went to Irbil where he met with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani and KRG Prime Minister Barham Salah. The next day Hakim traveled to Sulaymaniya where he met with Iraqi President and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) chief Jalal Talabani. These talks coincided with a conference between the political bureaus of Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PUK in Irbil. The purpose of Hakim’s visit was to solidify the alliance between the SIIC, KDP, and PUK before the March 2010 elections.

The result of the trip was an announcement by Hakim of plans to form a national coalition to rule the country after the voting this year. Hakim said that no party could run Iraq with just 51% of the seats in parliament, and that a broad based collection of lists would be needed instead. This is an attempt to replay 2005 and 2006 when the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance led by the SIIC joined with the KDP-PUK’s Kurdish Alliance to form the backbone of both Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s governments.

The SIIC and Kurds have had a long-standing relationship since the 1980s. That was when all three parties fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War. After the fall of Saddam they took leadership positions in the U.S. created Iraqi Governing Council in 2003, and then the interim Iraqi government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in 2004. In the January and December 2005 national balloting, the SIIC led United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance walked away with the lions share of the votes. In parliament they continued to work together to push through the 2005 constitution that included policies they advocated such as federalism and an article on Kirkuk, and a federal regions law in October 2006. They also worked actively to defeat or hold up legislation they were against like a new oil law, the provincial powers law, and the 2009 and 2010 provincial election laws.

Heading into the 2010 vote the two sides are hoping to maintain their relationship. Besides their advocacy for federalism, opposition to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also unites them. Any broad coalition they might attempt to form after the elections will likely be aimed at keeping Maliki out of a second term, and naming one of their own as the new prime minister of Iraq.

SOURCES

AK News, “MP: Ammar al-Hakim’s visit Kurdistan, confers with President Barzani,” 1/13/10

Associated Press, “A Look at Iraq’s New Interim Government,” 6/1/04

Aswat al-Iraq, “Barzani, Ammar al-Hakim discuss forming ‘wide national bloc’ in Iraq,” 1/12/10
- “Al-Hakim calls to resort to constitution to tackle problems between Arbil, Baghdad,” 1/13/10
- “Political bureaus of KDP, PUK meet in Arbil,” 1/13/10
- “President Talabani to meet SIIC chief in Sulaimaniya,” 1/13/10
- “PUK, KDP agree to form national bloc – al-Hakim,” 1/14/10

BBC, “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” 1/20/06

Burns, John and Glanz, James, “Iraqi Shiites Win, but Margin Is less Than Projection,” New York Times, 2/14/05

International Crisis Group, “Iraq After The Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy,” 4/30/88
- “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Tyler, Patrick, “Iraq pieces together its first postwar governing council,” San Francisco Chronicle, 7/13/03

New Iranian Ambassador To Iraq Is From Revolutionary Guards

Iraqi paper al-Zaman reported that Tehran has appointed a new ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Danafar. Like the outgoing ambassador, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Danafar is from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. Kazemi-Qomi was exposed as a member of the Revolutionary Guards in October 2007 by then commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General David Petraeus as part of an effort to counter Tehran’s support for militants. Earlier in his career Qomi helped organize Hezbollah in Lebanon. Danafar on the other hand, was the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards' navy.

The Qods Force is the main way Iran exerts influence in Iraq. It was created in 1990 as the foreign policy arm of the Revolutionary Guards. It has extensive ties with leading Iraqi parties such as the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, Dawa, the Sadrists, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party that it all fostered while Saddam was in power. It also funds some of these parties, has trained and equipped Shiite militias, provides economic aid to Iraq, and is charge of the crossings points in between the two countries used for trade.

Danafar’s appointment, like that of Kazemi-Qomi, shows that Iran does not want to have normal relations with Iraq. It would rather maintain a mix of overt and covert ties with Iraq’s parties and militias as it has since the 2003 invasion. This is to achieve its main goals of making sure Shiites stay in power in the 2010 elections so that Iraq never becomes a rival again, and increasing economic and cultural relations.

SOURCES

Dreyfuss, Robert, “Is Iran Winning the War in Iraq?” The Nation, 2/26/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Yates, Dean, “Petraeus says Iran stoking Iraq violence,” Reuters, 10/7/07

Al-Zaman, “Iran Appoints IRGC Commander As Ambassador to Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 1/14/10

The Continuing Saga Of The Candidate Banning In Iraq

The story of the Iraqi Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions’ banning of 500 candidates from the March 2010 voting for alleged Baathist ties has taken a few new turns. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has finally come out in favor of the ban. He said that the decision of the Accountability and Justice Commission should be adhered to. He also commented that the process should not be politicized, which ignores the fact that the Commission members have used it as a partisan tool since its inception in 2003, and that its head, Ali al-Lami, is running as a candidate for the Iraqi National Alliance. Second, the Election Commission is debating whether just the 400 politicians are barred from participating in the balloting or all their parties as well. As Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs points out, there is no legal basis in the constitution or election law that mentions blocking entire parties from running. Of course, the Accountability and Justice Commission’s members haven’t even been appointed by parliament, but everyone is going along with their decisions, so legality may not matter in this situation. Third, a document has emerged that allegedly shows that Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Iraqi National Dialogue Front and the most prominent politician banned, had contact with Iraqi intelligence in 2002. This was supposedly used in the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ruling against him. There is no reporting on whether the document is real or not, and again, given the circumstances, may not matter. Fourth, Mutlaq and all those banned can appeal their cases to a 7-member board of judges that was just created a few days ago. There is a concern that they may not be able to go through all the cases before the March 2010 balloting however, which may exclude candidates even if they are ultimately found innocent. Finally, there is news that the Accountability and Justice Commission may not be finished and could demand that a total of 1,200 candidates be blocked from running.

It was hoped that the 2010 parliamentary vote would be a continuation of the 2009 provincial elections where nationalist parties did much better than ethnosectarian ones, and Sunnis came out in high numbers. This in turn, would usher in a new wave of politicians to replace a group of lawmakers that have achieved very little in their four years in office, and are very unpopular as a result. The decisions of the Accountability and Justice and Election Commissions however have not only marked a return to sectarian politics, but also threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the 2010 balloting, along with bringing into question the legality of the entire Iraqi political process. Unless some institution challenges the chicanery going on, this fiasco will only continue, and could get worse.

SOURCES

AK News, “Electoral commission discusses the issue of excluded entities and candidates,” 1/17/10

Roads To Iraq, “Three Sunni candidates for the presidency, Zebari to the Vice-President,” 1/17/10

Sly, Liz, “Iraqi prime minister backs ban on 500 election candidates,” Los Angeles, 1/17/10

Visser, Reidar, “The Bloc That Has No De-Baathification Worries,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/17/10
- “Constitutional Disintegration (Part III): The IHEC Is Making Up the Law,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/15/10

Iraq's Election Commission Okays Ban On Mutlaq And Others From 2010 Vote

On January 14, 2010, the Iraqi Election Commission approved the Accountability and Justice Commission’s ban on parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq and 500 other candidates from participating in the March 2010 national vote for alleged Baathist connections. That was an increase from earlier reports that mentioned only 400 candidates as being singled out. The Election Commission said that Accountability and Justice had asked for 11 more political lists and their candidates to be banned as well. All of the parties can appeal the decision although whether that process will work or is legal is up in the air. This latest turn of events points to the continuing instability in Iraq's electoral and legal systems. 

The Accountability and Justice Act was passed by parliament in January 2008, and approved the following month. It was never enacted however, so the old members of the DeBaathification Commission simply slid over to the new Accountability and Justice Commission without parliamentary approval. Even with this lack of legal standing the Election Commission still decided to go with the Accountability and Justice Commission on Mutlaq and the others. Now the accused are supposed to be able to go to a seven-judge appeals court that was appointed just a few days ago. Some lawmakers have accused three of the judges of being Baathists as well, adding to the drama of Iraqi politics.

If the appeals court approves the Accountability and Justice ban it would not only be a setback for the 2010 vote, but a dangerous precedent for Iraq’s developing political system. Sunnis have been struggling to rejoin Iraq’s political process since 2005 when they boycotted elections. In 2009 Sunni areas had the highest increase in voter turnout during the provincial balloting. Banning Mutlaq could lesson their enthusiasm to participate by making them feel like their votes and voice don’t matter since their leaders can be removed at any time. Just as important, it would show that any official who was involved with the former regime in any capacity could be excluded at the whim of the Accountability and Justice Commission that has a questionable legal standing and a clear sectarian history, showing that Iraq is not really a country ruled by law. As a Shiite member of the Accountability and Justice committee in parliament told McClatchy Newspapers, “The political climate cannot tolerate what this shady commission is doing. It’s not because it’s going after candidates with Baathist connections that I criticize it, but because it has a filthy sectarian agenda and is manipulating the rules and regulations to attain its goals;" those being eliminating its political opponents, playing on sectarian tensions, and staying in power.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, "500 Iraq candidates banned from elections," 1/15/10

Aswat al-Iraq “IHEC excludes 500 candidates from election,” 1/14/10

BBC, "Iraqi election commission bans 500 candidates," 1/15/10

Mahdi, Osama, “Discrimination decisions of the judges are threatened with de-Baathification deracination,” Elaph, 1/12/10

Shadid, Anthony, "Iraqi Commission Bars Nearly 500 Candidates," New York Times, 1/15/10

Visser, Reidar, “More De-Baathification Antics in the Iraqi Parliament,” 1/10/10
- “System Failure: The Ban on Mutlak,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 1/14/10

Voter Dissatisfaction Growing In Anbar?

There are a few scattered reports that could bode ill for the March 2010 elections in Anbar. They all involve growing discontent amongst the public about their politicians, and their inability to improve the standard of living or maintain security in the province. Those issues could lead to lower voter turnout this year.

The on-line magazine Niqash talked with the director of the Election Commission in the province who said that there is less enthusiasm this year to vote than in 2009. He said that in last year’s provincial elections candidates promised better services and jobs, but have not delivered. In response, he is launching an outreach program with local sheikhs and community leaders to talk to their constituents about voting.

A recent series of headline grabbing attacks have also lessened enthusiasm about politicians. On December 30, 2009 two suicide bombers attacked the provincial council building killing a council member, three senior security officials, and 26 others, and injuring 100 including Governor Qassim al-Fahdawi. On January 7, five bombs targeted police and other officials in Hit, wounding ten and killing eight. Conflicts between the various parties and tribes in the province have been blamed. The sheikhs in the Anbar Awakening for one have broken up into several rival factions that ran against each other in 2009 and are expected to do the same in 2010. They are endlessly accusing each other of nefarious deeds, and these differences are allowing space for insurgents to operate. These issues have garnered little confidence that the local government will be able to deal with future security incidents.

The security forces are also engrossed in controversy. The former police chief General Tariq al-Assal, who was just recently replaced after the December 30 bombings, complained that officials didn’t listen to his advice about security, that they refused to have their cars or men be searched, and that council members interfered with his work. The security forces in turn, have been criticized because almost all of them are tribal fighters with no experience or training. The recent attacks even led to 400 people demonstrating in Ramadi in early January 2010 calling for better security and to end corruption.

All of these factors together could lead to fewer voters turning out in March. In the January 2009 elections, 40% of the voting public in Anbar participated, compared to just 2% in January 2005 when there was a Sunni boycott. Now that might be threatened by the new local officials inability to deliver on their campaign promises or to prevent attacks. An even larger problem could occur if this sentiment happens across the country, as not much has changed in daily life in Iraq since the 2009 election. Last year saw a drop in voter participation already with 51% casting ballots, compared to 58% in 2005. Every province in southern Iraq saw a decrease except for Muthanna that had the same percentage as 2005, which offset the large increases in Sunni areas. Less people voting would be a blow to Iraq’s attempt to develop a democracy. Popular dissatisfaction with their politicians, can translate into less support for the government, and a return to a strong man or other forms of authoritarianism that promise to get things working at the expense of people’s freedom.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Ramadi struggles to instill a rule of law,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/21/09

Dagher, Sam, “In Anbar Province, New Leadership, but Old Problems Persist,” New York Times, 9/13/09

Fadel, Leila and Hastings, Michael, “Deadly blasts underscore tenuous security in Iraq’s Anbar province,” Washington Post, 1/8/10

Lawrence, Quil, “Violence Returns To Anbar As U.S. Steps Back,” NPR, 1/11/10

Al-Mukhtar, Uthman, “Fear Grips Anbar After Bombings,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 1/5/10

Niqash, “anbar voters more phlegmatic this time round,” 1/11/10

Shadid, Anthony, “In Anbar, U.S.-Allied Tribal Chiefs Feel Deep Sense of Abandonment,” Washington Post, 10/3/09

Provinces Complain About 2010 Budget

Five of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have complained about the proposed 2010 budget, and several others have rejected it outright. Anbar was the first, when the head of its provincial council said on December 12, 2009 that the budget would not set aside enough for its needs. It called for the central government to appropriate more funds. Then on December 15, Baghdad’s governor said that the budget would threaten several development plans including new hospitals. On December 19, Wasit’s provincial council said they rejected the budget, and called on other provinces to do the same. A council member said they would only get $87 million next year, compared to $91 million they got this year. Later, on December 29 the governor of Maysan said the central government should give the provinces more money for development, and warned of a rejection as well. On December 31, a conference of southern and central provincial councils held in Najaf called on Baghdad to allocate 25% of the 2010 budget to the provinces. They claimed the proposed budget only appropriates 6% to provincial councils, which they said would not be enough for further reconstruction. Some of those same provinces later announced that they too were rejecting the new budget. That was followed by reporters being told by Basra's deputy governor on January 4 that the next budget would leave his province with a 30% deficit. The same day, the governor of the province said that they deserved more money due to Basra's size and importance. He called for  the central government to either allow Basra to charge fees on its oil and trade, or set aside 20% of the ministries' spending to development efforts. Finally, on January 6 Tamim's governor sent an official letter to protest its proposed allocation.

Iraq’s 2009 budget was for $58.6 billion. The 2010 budget is for $67 billion, and has been approved by the cabinet, but is still in parliament for debate. A spokesman said $17.83 billion of the budget would be for development, 26.6% of the total, and the rest would be for operational costs that go towards salaries, pensions, the food ration system, etc. That would be an increase from the 2009 budget, where approximately $11.72 billion, 20%, was for investment. The provinces however, have seen a large cut in their funding since 2008 after oil prices dropped, which is the major source of revenue for the government. From 2008 to 2009 for example, Iraq’s eighteen governorates faced a $1.748.2 million decrease.

It’s unlikely that these local demands will be met. Iraq is currently running a $16 billion deficit, and the 2010 budget is projected to be short $15.3 billion. The major reason is that Iraq has not been able to meet the oil export mark set in the budget. The provincial councils also signed a large number of projects in 2008, which they are still paying for. Iraq’s provinces then, will have to suffer like the rest of Iraq’s government.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, "Iraq central and southern provinces reject 2010 allocations," 1/4/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Anbar official says 2010 budget for province insufficient,” 12/12/09
- “Baghdad’s governor presses for higher budget,” 12/15/09
- "Basra faces 30 percent deficit in budget," 1/4/10
- “Missan governor demands higher budget for provincial development projects,” 12/29/09
- “Najaf conf. wants 25% of budget to provinces,” 12/31/09
- “Wassit council rejects 2010 provincial budget,” 12/19/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq Cabinet approves $67 billion budget for 2010,” Associated Press, 10/14/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09