Appeals Court To Go Through Banning Cases Before Iraq’s March Election

Campaigning for the March 2010 parliamentary election was supposed to start on February 7, but that was postponed because of the on-going drama of the banned candidates for alleged Baathist ties. On February 3 the Election Commission announced that all of the banned candidates could run, after a seven-judge panel said that their appeals would be dealt with after the voting. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki immediately condemned the decision, declaring that the panel had no authority over the Election Commission. He called for a special session of parliament on February 7 to deal with the issue.

As that day approached, the situation intensified. First, the Prime Minister accused U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill of interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs by influencing the judges. Second, the legal committee in parliament demanded that Vice President Tariq Hashemi be included in the deBaathification process for allegedly glorifying the Baath party while he was visiting Washington D.C. Third, the head of the Accountability and Justice Commission, which took over the duties of the deBaathification Commission, filed a lawsuit against banned parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq for criticizing the Commission. Finally, Maliki’s Dawa party organized protests against Baathists in Baghdad and Basra, Iraq’s two largest cities, while a third demonstration was held in Dhi Qar province. All of these were acts of brinkmanship by Iraq’s politicians, who have never shied away from threatening to make a bad situation worse.

The crisis has leveled off a bit after Maliki met with the country’s top judge and leaders of parliament, and the Presidential Council asked the seven-judge panel to change its decision. Afterward, the panel agreed to go through all of the banned candidates cases one by one before the election. They said they would be done by February 12, which is the new date set to start campaigning for the March election. By February 8, they claimed to have gone through 30% of the candidates so far. This has the potential to finally diffuse the situation, but it could also drag the process out if the judges aren’t able to finish their work on time, or if the Shiite parties complain once again that candidates they don’t like are allowed to participate in the election.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq in stalemate of appeals commission,” 2/8/10
- “Iraqi List criticized the Accountability and Justice commission,” 2/8/10

Alsumaria, “Appeals panel backtracks Iraq poll decision,” 2/8/10
- “Maliki discusses Iraq appeals panel decision,” 2/5/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Hundreds in Baghdad, Basra protest Baathists’ return,” 2/7/10
- “IHEC says all banned candidates to run in election,” 2/3/10
- “MP proposes debaathification to cover VP Hashemi,” 2/6/10
- “Parl. Cancels extraordinary session,” 2/8/10
- “Political prisoners foundation in Thi-Qar protests against Cassation Board’s decision,” 2/8/10

Myers, Steven Lee, “Ban on Hundreds of Iraqi Candidates Overturned,” New York Times, 2/4/10
- “Iraqi Court Given Time to Review Candidates,” New York Times, 2/8/10

Visser, Reidar, “Reinstated, for the Time Being,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 2/3/10

Political Disputes Continue in Ninewa

In the January 2009 provincial elections the new al-Hadbaa party won a majority in Ninewa, and took all the positions in the local government in April. The al-Hadbaa party was made up of Mosul businessmen, tribal leaders, Kurds who opposed the ruling Kurdish parties, Turkmen, and also garnered support from many nationalist insurgent groups and former Baathists. They stood for a strong central government, opposition to Kurdish claims to disputed areas in the province, and called for the Kurdish militia the peshmerga to withdraw. They replaced the Ninewa Fraternal List who was led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) who had ruled Ninewa since 2005 when Arabs boycotted the local elections. The Fraternal List protested not being included in the new government by announcing that they and 16 districts they controlled would not cooperate with al-Hadbaa, and denouncing the party as Baathists. The Kurds went further by saying that no provincial officials could enter the 16 areas without their permission. This resulted in two dramatic confrontations in May when the governor and provincial police chief were stopped from entering Kurdish controlled areas by the peshmerga. Tensions grew as later in the month people in the Telafar district demanded that they be annexed by Kurdistan, and then in June pro al-Hadbaa tribesmen got into a shootout with peshmerga in the Sinjar district. In August when three large bombings struck minorities the Fraternal List and al-Hadbaa blamed each other rather than insurgents for the attacks.

Things have gotten no better as the March 2010 parliamentary elections are nearing. In January 2010 the governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Nujafi initiated a no confidence vote against the mayor of Sinjar, who turned around and filed a lawsuit against the governor. The Fraternal List condemned the removal of the mayor as well, claiming that al-Hadbaa represented Baathists and their henchmen. At the beginning of February, Governor Nujafi went to the Tel Kaif district where protestors threw fruits and vegetables at his car, while Fraternal List officials said that the governor had gone to the area without their permission. Later in the month Kurdish parties accused al-Hadbaa of trying to shut down their offices in the province before the vote, while Governor Nujafi held a press conference calling on the central government to have the peshmerga removed from Ninewa. 

The tit for tat between the al-Hadbaa party and the Ninewa Fraternal List does not look like it will be abating anytime soon. Their dispute has resulted in Ninewa province being divided into two separate and rival administrative areas, with no cooperation between them. This is one reason why the province is the most violent per capita in Iraq, because the insurgents have been able to exploit these differences. Several parties in parliament, and the United States and United Nations have tried to mediate between the two, but to no avail. Recently joint U.S.-Iraqi-peshmerga checkpoints have been created in Ninewa, which the Americans hope will build confidence between Arabs and Kurds, but since the Iraqi forces involved are controlled by Baghdad, not the provincial government, they’re unlikely to do anything about the al-Hadbaa-Fraternal List argument. Many hoped that the January 2009 elections would lead to reconciliation in Iraq, as many Sunnis boycotted the last one, but in Ninewa the balloting made the situation worse.

SOURCES

AK News, “Call to resolve conflict between key Kurd and Arab lists in Nineveh,” 2/5/10
- “KRG Spokesman calls for allowing Peshmerga forces to share in security,” 2/7/10
- “Kurdish parties in Nineveh is legal: official,” 2/6/10
- “Nineveh brotherhood renewed fears from Hadba list program,” 2/2/10

Asawt al-Iraq, “Sinjar mayor to sue Ninewa governor,” 1/29/10

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” 9/28/09

Some Of Iraq’s Provinces Still Unhappy With New 2010 Budget

At the end of January 2010 Iraq’s parliament passed a new budget. After the details were made public, two provinces complained about their allocations as several others did before the budget was passed. On February 6, the governors of Maysan and Qadisiyah both claimed that their provincial budgets did not meet their needs, and would result in large deficits. Before the budget was passed, five provinces and a southern conference made similar complains, and asked the central government to make more money available to cover local development projects.

The source of the problem for the provinces was the 2008 budget. That was the largest amount of money spent by the government since the U.S. invasion. It set aside $6.4 billion for the governorates, compared to just $2.1 billion in 2007. The provinces went on a spending spree signing several large contracts to expand services. When oil prices collapsed due to the world recession, Iraq was forced to drastically cut its spending since petroleum accounts for the vast majority of the country’s revenue. In 2009 the provinces only got $2.17 billion for investment, a $4.23 billion cut from the previous year. The 2010 budget only allots $2.18 billion for the governorates’ capital spending even though it’s just around the same amount as the 2008 budget.

In the end, the provinces will have to cut their spending to meet their new financial situation. The governorates were never known for using most of their money in the first place, but they are probably under added pressure to do so this year because the elections are just a few weeks away and they haven’t produced much since they took power in 2009. If they want more local development projects, they will have to rely upon the ministries in Baghdad, but they too have a bad record of expending their capital budgets on investment.That makes the real loser not the local governments who are running deficits, but the Iraqi public who have long complained about a lack of jobs and services.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Diwaniya demands more allocations, 2/6/10
- “ID70b deficit in 2010 budget for Missan – governor,” 2/6/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/10

2009 Numbers On Displaced and Refugee Returns To Iraq

In late-2007, as the security situation improved, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was attempting to bolster his reputation for having improved the country before the 2009 provincial elections, the government began a concerted effort to encourage Iraq's estimated 2.9 million internally displaced and 1.7 million refugees to come home. The authorities offered money, plane rides, and bus trips to those that would take up their offer. By 2008, a large number of Iraqis were coming back, but the majority has still not returned.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released its latest report on Iraq at the end of January 2010 that gave rough estimates for the number of Iraqis that have moved back. It shows that there was a huge increase from 2007 to 2008, but that has leveled off in 2009. In 2007, the sectarian war was still going on, with militias and insurgents using forced displacement as a weapon to control Baghdad and other areas of central Iraq. In that year 81,420 Iraqis returned, compared to 170,235 the year before. By mid-2008, fighting was in the decline, and the government stepped up its efforts to get Iraqis to move back to their homes. The result was 221,260 came back, the second largest amount since the U.S. invasion. Roughly 195,890 of those were displaced, compared to just 25,370 refugees. In 2009, 204,830 returned, and again, displaced made up the majority at 167,740 compared to 37,090 refugees.

In total, the United Nations has estimated 1,179,326 Iraqis have come back since 2003. Since the war began, most of these people were internally displaced at 745,630, compared to 433,696 refugees. Of those, at least 249,426 were refugees from Saddam's time that returned in the two years after his overthrow. That would mean of the 4.6 million Iraqis who have lost their homes since the U.S. invasion, around 929,900 have returned, or approximately 20%.

Returns 2003-2009

Period	Displaced	Refugees	Total
2003	0	55,429	55,429
2004	98,000	193,997	291,997
2005	98,000	56,155	154,155
2006	150,000	20,235	170,235
2007	36,000	45,420	81,420
2008	195,890	25,370	221,260
2009	167,740	37,090	204,830
TOTALS:	745,630	433,696	1,179,326

The UNHCR's numbers also show that the majority of those that lost their homes came from Baghdad, the center of power and conflict in post-Saddam Iraq. In 2009 for example, 60% of those that came back, around 123,700 people, went to the capital. Diyala was second with 58,280, or 28% of the total. Ninewa province was a distant third at 3,570.

2009 Returns By Province

Province	Number
Baghdad	123,700
Diyala	58,280
Ninewa	3,570
Babil	2,800
Najaf	2,730
Karbala	2,100
Salahaddin	1,200
Basra	1,790
Wasit	1,590
Tamim	1,250
Dhi Qar	1,130
Anbar	960
Qadisiyah	900
Maysan	860
Dohuk	680
Irbil	480
Muthanna	440
Sulaymaniya	370
TOTAL	204,830

Last year also saw a constant flux in returns. In January 2009 7,520 came back, compared to 26,540 in March. That dipped to 14,910 the next month, only to go back up to 21,010 by August, followed by 12,020 in September. By December, 15,050 journeyed home.

Returns by Month 2009

Month	Number
Jan	7,520
Feb	18,780
Mar	26,540
Apr	14,910
May	15,330
Jun	18,410
Jul	20,330
Aug	21,010
Sep	12,020
Oct	18,850
Nov	16,080
Dec	15,050

Despite the large number of returns since 2007, 80% of Iraq's displaced and refugees have still not come back. Those people face increasing difficulties as they have been without their homes for several years now. In mid-January 2010 for example, Syria complained that Baghdad was not taking care of the thousands of refugees that resided there. There are also anecdotal stories of Iraqis coming back, and then leaving again because they couldn't find work or assistance. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) for example, one of the largest aid agencies that works with Iraq's displaced, reported that 55.5% of heads of households of internal refugees were either unemployed or unable to work. Security is greatly improved in Iraq from the heyday of the sectarian war that caused so many Iraqis to be displaced. That has encouraged many to make the effort to go back home. The UNHCR report however, shows that this process has only just begun, and may take years more for all the issues to be settled. That means Iraq's displaced and refugees still need lots of support, which they unfortunately have not found an abundance of.

SOURCES

Bigio, Jamille and Scott, Jen, "Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions," Brookings Institution and University of Bern, June 2009

International Organization for Migration, "Assessment of Return to Iraq," 11/3/09

Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, "Syria says Iraq evading responsibility to refugees," Reuters, 1/18/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress," 1/30/10

UNHCR, "Monthly Statistical Update on Return – December 2009," 1/27/10
- "Poor conditions in Iraq drive returned refugees back to Syria," 12/21/09

League Of The Righteous Break Off Talks With Baghdad Again

For the second time the Iranian backed League of the Righteous announced that it was breaking off talks with the government. At the beginning of February 2010 they claimed that the government had not released all of its followers from prison as they had promised to. They made a similar complaint in December 2009.

Not only that, but they claimed that they held a British and an American hostage. The British prisoner could be Alan McMenemy, a security guard that was kidnapped by the League in May 2007 in a raid on the Finance Ministry in Baghdad that also resulted in four other British nationals being taken. In March 2009 a deal was cut between London, Baghdad, the League, Tehran, and the Americans to let League fighters out of U.S. jails in return for the five British captives. McMenemy is the only one that has not been let go. As for the American, the League recently released a video claiming it is of a U.S. contractor they captured in Baghdad in January 2010. They are obviously hoping to use these hostages to ensure that the rest of the League members are freed.

The League of the Righteous is led by Qais Khazali, who was one of the leaders of the Sadrist movement during Saddam’s time. After the U.S. invasion, he became one of Moqtada al-Sadr’s chief lieutenants. He started breaking with Sadr during the 2004 uprisings against the U.S. By 2006 Khazali was chosen by Iran to head the Special Groups, which Tehran was organizing to gain more direct control of Shiite militiamen. After the May 2007 attack on the Finance Ministry, Khazali and other League leaders were captured in Basra. In 2009 the League said that it was renouncing violence, and wanted to join Iraqi politics, which led to the deal to release their followers. The League faces an uncertain future as few Shiites actively supported armed opposition to the government or U.S. anymore, and many Iraqis have turned against Iran, leaving the group with a shrinking base.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Asaib Ahl Al Haw group suspended talks with Iraq’s Government,” 2/5/10

Associated Pres, "Militant Video Shows Abducted American In Iraq," 2/6/10

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Roads To Iraq, “Asaib Al-Haq: We still have a British and an American hostages,” 2/2/10
- “Militia kidnapped a senior U.S. officer – [hostage video],” 2/4/10

U.S. Media Coverage Of Iraq Down, And Almost Out

Iraq has largely faded from the headlines of America’s media. From 2002-2008 it was one of the leading stories in the country, regularly making the top ten across the various media formats. Beginning in 2007 however, the press began to steadily reduce their coverage. In the first quarter of that year, Iraq made up 22.3% of all stories in America. By the last quarter of the year, it was down to 8.7%. For all of 2007, Iraq still accounted for 15.5% of reporting in the United States. 

By 2009 however, the war had dropped to just 0.4% of stories. In June 2009 for example, Iraq was not only not in the top ten stories in the country, it failed to break the top ten in any media format from newspapers to cable and broadcast TV to radio to the internet. Only in 11 of the 58 weeks that the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism analyzed last year did Iraq break the top ten. Of those weeks, the biggest event was the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities on June 30, which received 6% of media coverage. After that, the only time Iraq broke the top ten was when Baghdad was hit with huge bombings of government buildings occurring in August, October, and December 2009. 

U.S. Media Coverage Of Iraq - 2009

America’s media largely follows the lead of Washington. When the country’s politicians and elite are not talking about a topic, neither is the press. Iraq has fallen off the front pages of newspapers and the screens of TV stations because the government has moved onto other issues. The presidential campaign and the recession were two of the most important ones. Since then, only statements by the White House or large outbursts of violence like the Baghdad attacks will raise the attention of the media. 2010 is probably more of the same. The March election will garner some coverage, followed by the planned withdrawal of combat troops from the country afterward, but after those, unless a large number of Iraqis are killed in some incident Iraq cannot expect to get many stories in the U.S.

SOURCES

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Iraq – The Incredible Shrinking Story,” 7/9/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index – Top Ten News Stories By Percent,” 1/5/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index – Top Ten News Stories By Percent,” 1/12/09
- “PEJ News Coverage Index – Top Ten News Stories By Percent,” 1/27/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: April 6-12, 2009,” 4/13/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: April 13-29, 2009,” 4/14/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector April 27-May 3, 2009,” 5/4/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: August 3-9, 2009,” 8/10/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: August 10-16, 2009,” 8/17/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: August 17-23, 2009,” 8/24/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: August 24-30, 2009,” 8/31/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: August 31-September 6, 2009,” 9/7/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: December 7-13, 2009,” 12/14/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: December 14-20, 2009,” 12/22/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: February 2-8, 2009,” 2/9/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: February 9-15, 2009,” 2/17/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: February 16-22, 2009,” 2/23/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: February 23-March 1, 2009,” 3/3/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: January 26-February 1, 2009,” 2/3/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: June 1-7, 2009,” 6/8/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: June 8-14, 2009,” 6/15/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: June 15-21, 2009,” 6/22/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: June 22-28, 2009,” 6/29/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: June 29-July 5, 2009,” 7/7/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: July 6-12, 2009,” 7/13/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: July 13-19, 2009,” 7/20/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: July 20-26, 2009,” 7/27/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: July 27-August 2, 2009,” 8/3/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: March 2-8, 2009,” 3/9/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: March 9-15, 2009,” 3/16/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: March 9-15, 2009,” 3/16/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: March 16-22, 2009,” 3/23/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: March 23-29, 2009,” 3/30/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: March 30-April 5, 2009,” 4/6/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: May 4-10, 2009,” 5/11/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: May 11-17, 2009,” 5/18/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: May 18-24, 2009,” 5/26/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: May 25-31, 2009,” 6/1/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: November 2-8,2009,” 11/9/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: November 9-15, 2009,” 11/16/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: November 16-22, 2009,” 11/23/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: November 30-December 6, 2009,” 12/7/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector, October 5-11, 2009,” 10/12/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: October 12-18,2009,” 10/19/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: October 19-25, 2009,” 10/26/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: October 26-November 1, 2009,” 11/2/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: September 7-13, 2009,” 9/14/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: September 14-20, 2009,” 9/21/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: September 21-27, 2009,” 9/28/09
- “Top Ten Story Data by Sector: September 28-October 4, 2009,” 10/5/09

Maliki Reaches Out To Kurds Before March 2010 Vote

Since the beginning of 2010 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has attempted to mend fences with the Kurdish Alliance, opening the door to a possible coalition with them after the March elections. In January, Maliki began talking about allowing the Kurds to re-start oil exports that were halted in October 2009 because Baghdad would not pay the companies doing the work. The issue of who has the right to explore, develop, and sell petroleum is one of the largest disputes between the central government and Kurdistan. Then on February 1 Aswat al-Iraq reported that the Prime Minister had issued orders to allow the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to determine who has access to disputed areas. This was a major change from 2008 when Maliki challenged the Kurds in those exact same territories by moving in government forces into Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa provinces leading to several confrontations.At that time, the Prime Minister said that the federal government should have control of security in all areas of Iraq. Acknowledging the KRG’s authority is a major reversal, and shows that Maliki is moving away from his nationalist agenda. Finally, on February 2, a member of Maliki’s State of Law List said that if they get a majority of votes in the March election they would join with the Kurdish Alliance afterward to run the country. The member mentioned that Iraq needed a consensus government, which necessitated the Kurds being included in any new government. This marked another major difference from Maliki’s previous statements when he said in mid-2009 that Iraq should have majority rule, even if that angered the Sunnis and Kurds. He went on to say that sectarian quotas in the government were no longer needed. Those ideas now appear to be dead.

All of these statements by Maliki and his State of Law List are major concessions to the Kurds. Since they are the opposite from what the Prime Minister talked about previously, they would appear to be out of desperation. Maliki was riding high after the January 2009 provincial elections. He won pluralities across the south and Baghdad by running on Iraqi nationalism and security. Since then, his standing has dropped. First, he was not able to draw in any new major parties to his State of Law List before the 2010 vote. Second, the massive bombings in Baghdad beginning in August 2009 have led Iraqis to question whether he has truly secured the country or not. Third, his coalition has not accomplished much since taking over the provincial councils. Last, he has turned to sectarian politics by warning of a Baathist return. At best, Maliki is looking at winning the largest plurality in this year’s vote, at worse he could finish behind his former Shiite partners the Iraqi National Alliance, which he refused to join. Either way, he’ll have to find friends after the balloting to try to form a new coalition, and that’s where his latest comments about the Kurds come in. Maliki needs their large bloc in parliament if he wants to remain prime minister, and he’s been willing to jettison much of his nationalist rhetoric to win them over. Only time will tell whether these new tactics will accomplish Maliki’s goal of holding onto power. It will also be interesting to see whether he actually follows through on any of these promises to the Kurds if he retains his position as Maliki made it clear in 2008 that he’s willing to turn on anyone to increase his influence. This is just the latest example of the Byzantine politics of Iraq where the unexpected always seems to happen.

SOURCES

AK News, “Shiites may form coalition with Kurds to seek win majority,” 2/2/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “PM coordinates with Kurds regarding disputed areas,” 2/1/10

Dagher, Sam, “Incremental Steps in Iraq to Let Kurdistan Oil Flow,” New York Times, 2/1/10

Lawrence, Quil, “A precarious peace in Northern Iraq,” The Middle East Research and Information Project, 10/1/09

Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09