Iraq’s Sadr Backs Off Threat Of Reviving Mahdi Army

In April 2011, Sadrists held a huge rally in Baghdad. A spokesman read a statement to the crowd from Moqtada al-Sadr saying that he would bring back the Mahdi Army if U.S. troops stayed past their deadline to withdraw from Iraq by the end of the year. The threat was part of Sadr’s effort to put pressure upon Washington to follow through with its exit strategy. Sadr’s tactics backfired as it angered other Iraqi parties, and now he claims he will not revive his militia.

On July 10, a statement was posted on a Sadr website that the Mahdi Army would not return. The release said they had studied the affects of their parade in Baghdad in May, which featured unarmed fighters, and decided that it was not the right time to end the freeze on the militia. Sadr disbanded the Mahdi Army in March 2008. The march was meant to send a message to the United States that the Sadr Trend was ready and willing to oppose them if they stayed past the end of 2011, but instead it was received badly by some of the country’s political parties. The movement also said it was not responsible for any clashes that might involve individual Sadrists, which might have been a reference to a June 20 shootout between members of the Sadr movement and a breakaway group led by Abu Dura in Baghdad. This was a dramatic change for Sadr who had been making ever more menacing remarks about using force if the Americans stayed in Iraq.

Sadr's April rally in Baghdad (Reuters)

The threat to revive the Mahdi Army was first aired on April 9. That was the 8th anniversary of the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the Sadr movement held a rally in Baghdad to commemorate the date. A Sadrist spokesman read a speech at the event, which said that the Trend would resist the Americans if they stayed with both peaceful protests and armed resistance. This came the day after Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he wanted Baghdad to agree upon a troop extension. The next day a Sadr leader remarked that the Promised Day Brigades, the armed faction of the movement, continued to carry out attacks upon U.S. troops. This was the opening salvo in a lobbying effort by Moqtada to convince the Americans that they should not stay in the country. Sadr wanted to publicly show the strength of his followers through his assembly in Baghdad, while also reminding Washington that violence could increase in Iraq if its troops remained past 2011.

Sadr's May march through Baghdad (Agence France Presse)

Sadr’s campaign continued into the next month. On May 26, the Sadrists held a march through Baghdad to protest against the U.S. presence. The Iraqi security forces counted 35,000 participants, the press said 70,000, while the Sadr Trend claimed 100,000. They waved Iraqi flags, chanted “No, no, America!”, walked over U.S., Israeli, and British flags painted on the street, and marched in military order. While Washington was the intended target, it actually had unintended domestic effects. First, a spokesman for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list, as well as members of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement complained that the march was a challenge to the authority of the state. Second, the premier was deeply angered. Shatt al-Arab ran a story saying that Maliki sent letters to Iraq’s political parties and to Tehran and Qom in Iran as well, stating that he had tried to accommodate the Sadrists by giving them ministries and integrated some of his followers into the security forces, but threatening to bring back his militia had crossed a redline. While the Mahdi Army was active it was a threat not only to the U.S., but to Sunnis that they expelled from Baghdad and other sections of the country, other parties like its rival the Supreme Islamic Iraqi party, the Shiite population, which it ended up exploiting, and the government. Maliki had also made his mark as a strong leader by cracking down on the Sadrists in 2008, and he along with others did not want to see the militia return to prominence again.

In June, the rhetoric became more inflamed. Members of the Mahdi Army claimed that they would be willing to carry out suicide attacks upon the Americans if they were still in the country in 2012. A Sadrist official later said that Moqtada had not condoned these types of attacks. Soon after, Sadr’s Promised Day Brigades claimed responsibility for ten mortar and rocket attacks upon U.S. bases in Baghdad, Ninewa, Diyala, Tamim, Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna provinces. It also said that it had set off roadside bombs against U.S. patrols, and to have killed and wounded U.S. soldiers in these operations. That same day, a Sadrist parliamentarian told the press that these attacks were meant to pressure the Americans to leave. The message was clear, the Sadrists were militarily opposing the Americans right now, and that would increase in intensity if they were given a troop extension. They also wanted to claim that they were responsible for the U.S. departure.

After three months of fiery words and deeds, Sadr has now backtracked. His rallies, threats about the Mahdi Army, and attacks by the Promised Day Brigades were meant to intimidate the Americans, and make them leave by the end of the year. Instead, he angered Maliki, the Iraqi National Movement, and others who were opposed to seeing militiamen back on the streets of Iraq. Sadr has always tried to straddle the line between being a militia leader and man of the street on the one hand, and being a politician on the other. In the previous Maliki administration, Sadr failed at this attempt when he ended dropping out of the government, and was then faced with an assault by the Americans during the Surge, and then the prime minister himself. Sadr tried again in the 2009 provincial election, and then the 2010 parliamentary voting. He is back to having control over several governorates, and was the major reason why Maliki returned for a second term. Talking about the Mahdi Army could threaten all of that, and was probably the main reason why he retreated from his militant talk.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq: Thousands Rally Against U.S. Troops,” Associated Press, 5/26/11

Agence France Presse, “Sadr supporters ready for attacks on US troops,” 6/25/11

Alsumaria, “Mehdi Army Promised Day Brigade claims responsibility for missile attacks on US bases,” 6/27/11

Arango, Tim, “Spike in U.S. Deaths in Iraq Raises Worries,” New York Times, 6/26/11

Craig, Tim, “Sunni fears grow over Sadr’s resurgence,” Washington Post, 6/2/11

Dar Al-Hayat, Alsumaria, “Sadrist Militia Marches Unarmed In Baghdad, Challenging Al-Maliki’s Government,” MEMRI Blog, 5/27/11

Jakes, Lara, “Shiite militias step up Iraq attacks on US troops,” Associated Press, 6/30/11

Karim, Ammar, “Iraqi cleric Sadr will not revive anti-US militia,” Agence France Presse, 7/10/11

Latif, Nizar, “Sadrists stage massive rally to demand US troops leave Iraq on schedule,” The National, 5/27/11

The National Staff, “Iraqis fear return of the Mahdi Army,” The National, 4/13/11

New Sabah, Al Jewar, “Muqtada al-Sadr Escalates Threats Against U.S.,” MEMRI Blog, 4/12/11

Ramzi, Kholoud, “mahdi army parade raises further questions, no answers, on us troops,” Niqash, 6/1/11

Reuters, “Iraq cleric pursues U.S. troop ban in strongholds,” 6/30/11

Saadi, Ahmed, “Maliki is upset at the Sadrist movement and threatening new targeting of the Mahdi Army,” Shatt al-Arab, 5/26/11

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq’s Mehdi Army faces splits, wary of return to war,” Reuters, 6/16/11

Al Sharqiya Television, “Sadrists freeze the number of affiliated organizations,” 7/10/11

Shat News, Al-Sabah, “Al-Maliki Responds To Al-Sadr’s Muscle-Flexing Last Week,” MEMRI Blog, 5/31/11

Al-Wannan, Jafaar, “Mahdi Army to be disbanded on US departure,” AK News, 6/27/11

How Iran Used Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) To Influence Events In Iraq

On July 7, 2011, two more U.S. soldiers were killed in Iraq. They died just outside their base at Camp Victory, Baghdad at the hands of an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP). EFPs were first introduced into Iraq in 2005 by Iran, utilizing Iraqis and smuggling routes they had relationships with dating back to the 1980s. The EFP is one of the deadliest weapons encountered during the war. Tehran began supplying them to militants as part of its policy to make the Americans pay for the invasion of Iraq, and to eventually force them to leave.

An EFP (Wikipedia)

Iran began shipping EFPs to Iraq at the beginning of 2005. EFPs are different from regular roadside bombs, which rely upon an explosive force to cause damage. Instead, the EFP sets off a charge behind a series of plates, which are then turned into slugs that are specifically designed to penetrate armor. They were first encountered just after the January elections. In May, they started being noted in the press when one killed ten British soldiers in Basra. They would soon show up across southern Iraq, and then the rest of the country by the end of the year. At the time, Tehran was expanding its military operations in Iraq. Immediately after the 2003 invasion, it had relied upon its Iranian Revolutionary Guards, intelligence agents, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and its Badr Brigade to collect intelligence on the Coalition forces, carry out sabotage attacks, and assassinate Baathists and officials associated with the Iran-Iraq War. By 2005 however, Iran had decided to confront the occupation more directly, and began reaching out to Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and its various breakaway groups, which would later become known as Special Groups. Providing them with EFPs was part of this stepped up military campaign.

In the summer and fall of 2005, the Coalition began publicly complaining about Iranian assistance to militants, and especially about EFPs. In June, the Pentagon claimed Iran was sending EFPs into Iraq. (1) The next month, a large shipment of the devices was captured in Diyala. The Pentagon then claimed that the weapon was behind the May death of the ten British soldiers in Basra. That led U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalizad and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to tell the press that Tehran was interfering in Iraq. The U.S. military also found two high-quality videos of how to build EFPs, which were just like CDs captured by Israel from Hezbollah in Lebanon. That set off speculation by the Americans that the Lebanese group was working within Iraq, which they had been since 2003. In September, Sadrist cleric, and breakaway Mahdi Army commander Sheikh Ahmad Majid al-Fartusi was arrested for carrying out attacks upon the British in Basra, which included EFPs. By October, the English were also chiming in, accusing the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah of providing EFPs to the Mahdi Army in southern Iraq. Tehran denied any involvement at that time, hoping to hide its decision to try to force the Coalition out of Iraq by supporting a variety of Shiite militant groups.

EFP cache found by U.S. troops (Wired)

The man delivering EFPs to Iraq was Abu Sheibani. He was a former commander in the Badr Brigade, who was in charge of their operations in Baghdad during the 1990s. In 2005, he had around 280 men under his command broken up into 17 cells. Some of them had received training in Lebanon from Hezbollah. They were not only responsible for shipping weapons to Iraq, but for sending Iraqis to Iran for training. Sheibani also conducting some attacks upon Coalition forces himself. He was told by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to contact as many groups as possible that were opposed to the occupation, and get them to carry out attacks in return for armaments. At its height, there were EFP cells stretching from Basra in the south to Kirkuk in the north where Shiite Turkmen and Arabs were used. Sheibani was eventually put on a waned list by Baghdad, and he ended up fleeing to Iran. While Sadr and his Mahdi Army were usually blamed for carrying out attacks upon the Coalition, it was actually older Badr Brigade elements that were arming them. The Badr Brigade was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War as part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and fought against Saddam Hussein. They were therefore more trusted than Sadr or any of his militiamen, who Tehran considered unpredictable, and it was they who early on were delivering weapons into Iraq.

Some of the supply lines used by Iran to ship weapons into Iraq that had been used since the 1980s

Sheibani’s network relied upon old smuggling routes, which Iran and anti-Saddam Iraqis had been using since the 1980s. These originated in Iran, and went to Basra and Maysan in southern Iraq, and Diyala in the east. They then stretched out to other parts of the country such as Kut in Wasit, Qurnah in Basra, Hillah in Babil, Diwaniya in Qadisiyah, Samawa in Muthanna, and Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar. Trucks carrying legitimate Iranian imports were usually used to ship in the weapons, and most of the EFPs ended up in Sadr City, Baghdad. These same routes had been used by Iran throughout the 1980s and 1990s to support Shiite parties like the Supreme Council and the Dawa Party that opposed Saddam Hussein. When Tehran decided to oppose the U.S. occupation, they used many of the same people and the same trails they had been using for the last twenty years.

Behind Sheibani was the Revolutionary Guards Qods Force’s Ramazan Corps. The Corps was created in the mid-1990s to coordinate its anti-Iraqi operations. It ran three camps along the border in Ahvaz, Khorramshahr, and Nasr. By the time of the U.S. invasion, it had three commands as well, the Nasr Command, which was in charge of Kurdistan and Diyala, the Zafar Command that dealt with Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Babil, Wasit, and parts of Diyala, and the Fajr Command that operated in Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthanna. With most of this infrastructure in place for two decades, it was easy for Tehran to begin supplying EFPs and other means of assistance to militants after the 2003 invasion.

In 2006, the use of EFPs was increasing, and so were the casualties. From January to December EFP incidents increased 150%, and accounted for 30% of U.S. casualties by the last quarter of the year. In June, the British found an EFP factory in Majar al-Kabir, Basra. In November another factory was discovered by the Americans in Baghdad. It was apparent that Iran, Hezbollah, and the Sheibani network had not only developed a group of militiamen willing to carry out operations against the Coalition, but also taught them how to build their own EFPs so that they were not completely reliant upon supplies from Tehran.

As Washington sent in extra troops and changed tactics with the Surge of 2007, Tehran also upped its opposition to America’s plans. In January, EFPs only made up 2.5% of all IED attacks within Iraq. They then reached a high in July with 36 incidents, leading to 23 of the 69 U.S. casualties that month. Almost all of these occurred in Baghdad, which accounted for 66.9% of the 623 EFP attacks for the year. The capital was the center of operations for the Surge, so it should have been no surprise that most EFPs were deployed there as Tehran tried to make the U.S. pay for its troop increase.

In the summer, the use of EFPs suddenly dived. From July to October 2007, there were 50% less attacks using the devices. This was part of a larger cut back in operations by Special Groups. The cause of the decrease was Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who told Iran that it needed to stop its weapons shipments because they were not only leading to more American casualties, but also Shiite on Shiite violence. He was referring to the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army, which were carrying on a running war against each other across southern Iraq. By December, Iraq’s Foreign Minister claimed that Iran was helping with the security situation. Tehran used the flow of weapons and money to militants as a way to control them. When the Surge started at the beginning of 2007, they vastly increased the number of EFPs heading to Iraq. By the middle of the year, when these weapons were being used by Iran’s allies against each other, it rolled back some of its support in order to put a damper on the internecine violence.

This policy continued until 2009. EFP attacks dropped 60-80% to around 20 by July 2008 for example. In the second half of the year, Iran was focusing upon the January 2009 provincial elections. Iraqi politics was always Tehran’s main priority, and it would consistently cut back its military policy when an important date such as the voting was approaching. There were thus fewer arms flowing into Iraq until all the negotiations over forming local governments were completed in 2009.

In 2010, Iran’s focus changed again. Under the Status of Forces Agreement, the United States was to withdraw all of its troops by the end of 2011. Iran wanted to take responsibility for this pull out, so it began once again to supply EFPs and other armaments to its Shiite allies. As a sign of that, it was reported in September that Abu Sheibani was returning to Iraq. He was allegedly sent back by to organize forces to attack the Americans as they prepared to leave. It was also noted that he joined the League of the Righteous, a Sadrist breakaway group. By June 2011, the U.S. was publicly complaining about EFPs, Special Groups, and Iranian interference all over again, topped off by retiring Secretary of Defense Robert Gates accusing Iran of supplying armaments, just as his predecessor Rumsfeld had done six years before. This time, Iran’s role is more out in the open as it wants everyone to know that it is forcing the Americans out of Iraq. That has led to new highs in American casualties, with 14 soldiers killed by Special Groups in June, and two more in July. Just like in 2005, Iran is using its most effective weapon the EFP to carry out its military plans in Iraq.

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 was seen as both a challenge and an opportunity by Iran. On the one hand, U.S. forces were just on its border, and the Bush administration was making threatening statements about it being next. On the other, Tehran’s greatest threat, Saddam was overthrown, and friendly Shiite and Kurdish parties swept in on the coattails of the Coalition, and would eventually take control of the government. When that was guaranteed after the 2005 elections, Iran began focusing upon making the U.S. and its allies pay for occupying Iraq. The EFP was at the forefront of that strategy, as Sheibani and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards supplied them to almost any militant willing to use them. When political issues became more important like making peace between Shiite parties in 2007 and the provincial elections in 2009, Iran would ratchet back the flow of weapons. When 2010 rolled around and a withdrawal date was set for U.S. forces, Tehran again began focusing upon feeding EFPs to Special Groups. That is the current situation in Iraq, and the reason why American casualties are going up. When the fate of American troops are finally decided upon by Baghdad, Iran will likely return to its political and economic focus, and the flow of EFPs will go down, until they are needed once again to prove a point by Tehran that it must be considered when making any policy choices about Iraq.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mroue, Bassem, “Car bomber kills 7, injures 90,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/10/05

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iranian support for Iraq insurgency appears to wane: US general,” 12/11/08

Ali, Ahmed, Knights, Michael, and Eisenstadt, Michael, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5/6/11

Ali, Fadhil, “Iran Charged with Infiltration and Sabotage of Iraq’s Awakening Councils,” Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 4/9/08

APS, “Iranian Consulates In Kurdistan – US-Iran Talks To Resume,” 11/12/07

Associated Press, “Baghdad roadside bomb kills 2 U.S. soldiers,” 7/7/11

BBC, “Iran ‘behind attacks on British,’” 10/5/05

Beehner, Lionel, “Intelligence on Iran Still Lacking,” Council on Foreign Relations, 12/4/07
- “Iran’s Goals in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2/23/06

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Cockburn, Andrew, “In Iraq, anyone can make a bomb,” Los Angeles Times, 2/16/07

Craig, Tim and O’Keefe, Ed, “U.S. military sees Iran behind rising trop deaths in Iraq,” Washington Post, 6/29/11

DeYoung, Karen, “Iran Cited In Iraq’s Decline in Violence,” Washington Post, 12/23/07

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Gamel, Kim, “US: Armor-Piercing Bomb Attacks Down,” Associated Press, 1/20/08

Gienger, Viola and Capaccio, Tony, “Iran Again Arming Iraqi Groups Attacking U.S. Troops, Gates Says,” Bloomberg, 6/29/11

Gordon, Michael, “U.S. says Iran – supplied bomb is killing more troops in Iraq,” New York Times, 8/7/07

Gordon, Michael, Shane, Scott, “U.S. Long Worried That Iran Supplied Arms in Iraq,” New York Times, 3/27/07

IraqSlogger.com, “Casualties Attributed to EFPs,” 2/17/07

Jelinek, Pauline, “General: Iraq groups supported by Iran,” Associated Press, 11/26/07

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07

Knights, Michael, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, November 2010
- “Iran’s Ongoing Proxy War in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3/16/09

Levinson, Charles, “Iran may now be cooperating with U.S. in Iraq,” USA Today, 12/16/07

Michael, Jim, “General says U.S. has proof Iran arming Iraqi militias,” USA Today, 1/31/07

Mroue, Bassem, “Car bomber kills 7, injures 90,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/10/05

O’Keefe, Ed and Warrick, Joby, “Weapons prove Iranian role in Iraq, U.S. says,” Washington Post, 7/5/11

Phillips, James, “Iran’s Hostile Policies in Iraq,” Heritage Foundation, 4/30/07

Porter, Gareth, “US Briefing on Iran Discredits the Official Line,” Inter Press Service, 2/14/07

Pound, Edward, “The Iran Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04

Reuters, “Iran’s aid to Iraq insurgents less broad-based-US,” 10/1/09

Ricks, Thomas, “In Iraq, Three Wars Engage U.S.,” Washington Post, 2/3/08

Roggio, Bill, “Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,” Long War Journal, 12/5/07
- “Iranian-backed Shia terror group remains a threat in Iraq: General Odierno,” Long War Journal, 7/13/10

Schmitt, Eric, “Some Bombs Used in Iraq Are Made in Iran, U.S. Says,” New York Times, 8/6/05

Simon, Steven and Takeyh, Ray, “Iran’s Iraq Strategy,” Washington Post, 5/21/06

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

UPI, “Iraq: Return of Sheibani’s killer squads,” 9/30/10

Visser, Reidar, “The Sadrists of Basra and the Far South of Iraq,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 2008

Ware, Michael, “Inside Iran’s Secret War For Iraq,” Time, 8/22/05

PRESS TV VIDEO: Iraq NGOs To File Lawsuit Against US Forces

Iraq NGOs to file lawsuit against US forces by presstv

AL JAZEERA VIDEO: Debate Over US Diplomatic Expansion In Iraq

Iraq Could Be Benefiting From Unrest in Syria

Iraq may be benefiting from the on-going protests and government repression in Syria. Damascus has long been a supporter of the Iraqi Baath party and insurgents since the 2003 invasion. Now that it is caught up in its own internal struggle, its backing for opponents of the Iraqi government may be declining, at least for the short-term.

After the overthrow of Saddam, Syria became a base for opponents of the Americans and the new Iraqi government. Many members of Iraq’s Baath party moved there. In December 2010 for example, a Baathist faction claimed that they had formed a new party based out of Damascus made up of five other groups, all living in Syria as well. They were opposed to the official Baath Party led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, who was Saddam’s vice president, and operates out of the same country. Syria was also the main gateway for foreign fighters entering Iraq. (1) At the end of 2010, intelligence officials claimed that there was a slight increase in fighters crossing the border. By 2009, the U.S. said that the number of foreign fighters had dropped from the hundreds to the tens. Foreign intelligence told the press that in October 2010 up to 250 had come from Syria that month. All of this is done in conjunction with the Syria government and corrupt border guards. In April 2011, the anti-terrorism police in Anbar arrested 12 Iraqi officers who were involved with insurgent attacks who confessed to working with Syrian intelligence. Damascus was opposed to Saddam, but saw the U.S. invasion as a bigger threat. Some in the Bush administration talked about Syria being next on their list after Iraq. The Assad government therefore allowed Baathists and other opponents of the new Iraq to set up there, just as it had done during the Saddam years.

By the spring of 2011, officials in Anbar noted a slight change. On May 24, a member of the provincial council said that the governorate was more secure because Syria was preoccupied with its domestic protests. That meant they couldn’t assist the militants crossing the border as much as they had before. The head of Anbar’s security committee warned that Syria would still be a threat as long as Assad was in power, and an intelligence source worried that more foreign fighters could enter with Syria’s border forces withdrawn to deal with demonstrations. That being said, it’s obvious that Assad is much more concerned about his own survival than undermining Iraq right now. This could lead to a decline in support for the insurgency, and give Anbar and other provinces a temporary respite.

In recent years, Iraq and Syria have tried to reconcile. That led to Damascus cutting some of its backing for Iraqi militants. Still the assistance persists, and there are occasional reports of Syrian intelligence being involved in some sort of nefarious activity within Iraq. Beginning in March however, Syria’s protest movement started and President Assad responded with force. That has diverted his attention away from Iraq, and security could be improve in parts of the country as a result.

FOOTNOTES

1. Reid, Robert, “Al-Maida’s route though Syria persists,” Associated Press, 10/28/08

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Anbar: Syria still poses a risk on Iraq if regime is not changed,” 6/17/11

Associated Press, “More foreign fighters seen slipping back into Iraq,” 12/5/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Better Security Due Syrian Occupation With Internal Affairs,” 5/24/11
- “Possible terrorist penetration from Syria, intelligence source,” 6/22/11

Reid, Robert, “Al-Maida’s route through Syria persists,” Associated Press, 10/28/08

Al-Sabah, “12 Arrested Iraqi Policeman Acted For Syrian Intelligence Officers,” MEMRI Blog, 4/18/11

Sands, Phil, “Baathist factions form new alliance,” The National, 12/31/10

Violence In Iraq Picks Up As Summer Approaches

Violence in Iraq is currently following a seasonal pattern, and that’s shown in the number of attacks and deaths each month. During the winter, militants have reduced their operations and casualties have gone down, while in the summer, the pace picks up, and so do the death counts. That has meant for the last three months the number of security incidents and people killed have steadily climbed upward.

In June 2011, the three sources for Iraqi deaths showed different trends. Iraq Body Count had 371 deaths, Iraq’s ministries had 271, while icasualties had 204. The first two showed increases from the previous month, while the last went down. On its website, icasualties notes that the actual number of deaths in Iraq are much higher than what they report, and that’s because they only rely upon western sources, which misses dozens of deaths each month. That accounts for the consistently low numbers provided by the group, and its different pattern from the other two. All together, June saw an average of 282 deaths, and 9.4 killed per day. That was up from 8.1 in May, and 7.1 in April. 

Monthly Iraqi Death Counts And Averages Jun. 09 – Jun. 11

Month	Iraq Body Count	Icasualties	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jun. 09	491	367	438	432	13.9
Jul.	394	240	275	303	9.7
Aug.	586	439	456	493	15.9
Sep.	300	158	203	220	7.3
Oct.	404	320	410	378	12.1
Nov.	206	106	122	144	4.8
Dec.	457	287	367	370	11.9
Jan. 10	260	135	196	197	6.3
Feb.	297	236	352	295	10.5
Mar.	334	183	367	294	9.5
Apr.	380	259	328	322	10.7
May	377	279	337	331	10.6
Jun.	368	176	284	276	9.2
Jul.	430	534	535	499	16.1
Aug.	517	363	426	435	14.0
Sep.	252	174	273	233	7.7
Oct.	311	185	293	263	8.4
Nov.	302	174	171	215	7.1
Dec.	217	128	151	165	5.3
Jan. 11	387	210	259	285	9.2
Feb.	250	216	167	212	7.5
Mar.	307	171	247	241	7.7
Apr.	285	152	211	214	7.1
May	378	223	177	252	8.1
Jun.	371	204	271	282	9.4

If you look back to the beginning of 2010, a definite pattern emerges for Iraq’s casualties. From January to June, the average number of deaths per day was relatively flat. They started at 6.3 in January, than went up to10.5 in February, before leveling off at 9.5 in March, 10.7 in April, 10.6 in May, and 9.2 in June. In July and August however, deaths spiked to 16.1 for the former and 14.0 in the latter, before going back down to 5.3 in December. 2011 has followed the same trend. In January, there were 9.2 deaths per day, then hitting a plateau at 7.5 in February, 7.2 in March, and 7.1 in April, before slightly going up to 8.1 in May, and 9.4 in June. This up and down pattern follows the seasons with fewer deaths in the winter and higher counts in the spring and summer.

The number of average deaths also mirrors attacks in Iraq. According to estimates based upon charts provided by AKE, a British security firm that operates within the country, which are published in Iraq Business News, militant operations have also gone up and down with the seasons. In the first week of June 2010 for example, there were around 92 attacks. They then went up and down, before steadily declining with 75 in the first week of October, to 65 in November, to 58 in December, and then 30 at the beginning of January 2011. Since then, security incidents have gone up as the temperature has gotten warmer and warmer. At the start of February there were around 41 attacks, 55 in March, 52 in April, 70 in May, and approximately 95 in the opening week of June.

This is a decided change from 2009, which had a monthly ebb and flow. For the twelve months of that year, casualties went up and down every month. For instance, in June 2009 there were an average of 13.9 deaths per day, then 9.7 in July, 15.9 in August, 7.3 in September, 12.1 in October, 4.8 in November, and 11.9 in December.

The reasons for the change in deaths then, has to be related to something other than the weather if 2009 is compared to 2010-2011. Perhaps the cause is due to a weakening of the insurgency, and an increase in Special Group activity. In 2009-2010, almost all of the violence in Iraq was due to Sunni militants. In that first year, they obviously had more capabilities as they were able to pull off larger and more deadly operations every other month, hence the up and down pattern. Starting in 2010 however, they appeared to have lost some of their power. 2011 has been different because Iranian-supported Special Groups have dramatically increased their attacks since the spring to coincide with American pressure on Baghdad to allow a troop extension past the December 31 withdrawal deadline. That is probably the reason why security incidents have steadily increased this year, and casualties along with them. Although the Special Groups concentrate upon American bases and patrols, there is always the chance for collateral damage. Shiite militants can be expected to keep up their pace of operations until the fate of American forces are finally decided upon by Iraq’s politicians. After that, casualties may actually go down as Iran cuts off their supplies to their Iraqi friends, and a weakened insurgency takes back responsibility for most attacks. Despite all these ups and downs, violence is still at its lowest levels in Iraq, and will hopefully remain so for the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq death toll rises to 271 killed in June,” 7/1/11

Drake, John, “Weekly Security Update for 2nd Dec 2010,” 12/2/10
- “Weekly Security Update for 15th December 2010,” Iraq Business News, 12/15/10
- “Weekly Security Update for 30th of June 2011,” Iraq Business News, 6/30/11

icasualties, “Operation Iraqi Freedom”

Iraq Body Count, “Recent Events”

CNN VIDEO: Militias Using Iranian Weapons To Target U.S. In Iraq