Iraq’s Prime Minister Fails To Unseat Election Commission

Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has had an adversarial relationship with the country’s Election Commission since he lost to his main rival Iyad Allawi in the 2010 parliamentary election. Maliki demanded a recount, but that did not change the outcome. The premier was still able to outmaneuver Allawi and stay in power thanks to a favorable ruling by the Federal Court. Months later, Maliki was not done. At the beginning of 2011, the Federal Court again decided in his favor by saying that the Election Commission was under the cabinet’s control, instead of parliament. Members of the prime minister’s State of Law then began a relentless attack upon the commission for corruption, and pushed a no confidence vote to get rid of its leadership. That effort failed in July, marking an important setback for Maliki’s autocratic tendencies.

In January 2011, Iraq’s Federal Court ruled that all independent commissions in the country were under the control of the cabinet, and not parliament. The case was at the behest of Prime Minister Maliki who wanted to clarify the jurisdiction of the commissions. An advisor to the premier said that the decision was a good move because the Election Commission had no oversight before, and blamed any criticism of the court on politics. A legal aide to Maliki denied that the ruling was illegal, claiming that the constitution was unclear about what body the commissions came under. In fact, the constitution is quite unequivocal as Article 103 and 104 expressly state that all the independent commissions are under the parliament.

Why the Federal Court would make such a decision was widely debated within Iraq. It came after a number of other questionable rulings that favored Maliki. After the March 2010 parliamentary elections, the court said that the largest bloc that could form a new government meant one that was made either before or after the vote when previously it had been considered to mean one made before. That allowed the prime minister to make alliances after the vote to stay in office. The court followed that with a ruling that laws had to come from the cabinet, not parliament, which would have severely limited the power of the legislature. Some analysts believed that since the judges were from Saddam Hussein’s time, they were following their history of ruling in favor of the country’s leader.

The Election Commission was very worried about the court’s decision. It said that Maliki could interfere in elections, and undermine public confidence in them in the future. The head of the commission, Faraj al-Haydari stated that the United Nations was also worried. Right after the court ruling, the prime minister did intervene by ordering it to halt the appointment of 38 low-level election officials. The commission refused to follow that order. By doing so, the commission  was defying not only the prime minister, but the court as well, which again angered Maliki.

The prime minister’s problems with the Election Commission started right after the March 2010 balloting. Maliki’s State of Law lost by just a few seats to Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement. That led the premier to demand a recount over fraud charges. The commission eventually agreed, but only in Baghdad, and it did not change the results. The prime minister was still able to stay in office, but was obviously upset that the commission had not made him the winner.

In May 2011, State of Law began questioning the integrity of the Election Commission. State of Law members accused it of financial and administrative corruption. That led to hearings with the commission’s leadership who were questioned about their salaries, special allowances, trips, and overtime pay. Maliki’s list accused them of having excessive security costs, and taking their family members on official visits. These charges became the basis of a no confidence vote in the leadership of the commission.

In the summer, Maliki stepped up his attacks upon the commission. First, he ordered that it cease all of its work in June. Second, State of Law distributed a report accusing the commission of corruption in July. Members of the prime minister’s list also began collecting signatures for a no confidence vote in the commission’s leadership. The commission responded by refusing to follow Maliki’s order, while its chairman, Faraj Haydari, accused State of Law of conducting a witch-hunt against the commission. If the no confidence vote went through, Haydari, and the rest of the commission’s leadership would have to step down. New commissioners could then be appointed by the cabinet, following the earlier court decision, giving Maliki the control he sought.

The problem for the premier, was that he found few supporters for his plan. The Kurdish Coalition did not support the no confidence vote claiming that it was just a plot by Maliki because he was upset with the 2010 election results. It also didn’t help that Haydari was from their list. The Change List, a breakaway Kurdish opposition group, was also opposed to the move, along with Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement and the National Alliance. Allawi’s list claimed that Maliki was trying to remain in power and stop any early elections from being called, while the National Alliance, which was in a coalition with State of Law, questioned the prime minister’s motives as well. The premier could expect no victories with so little support. It also showed that the majority of parliament believed that the attacks upon the Election Commission were just a raw power grab by Maliki.

The vote on the Election Commission finally happened on July 28, with the State of Law going down in defeat. Only 94 out of 245 parliamentarians in attendance voted in favor of the no confidence motion when a majority was needed. State of Law only has 89 seats out of 325 total, meaning that it got few supporters for its initiative. It appeared that the White Iraqi National Movement was the only party willing to stand with it. State of Law proved poor losers, as they marched out of parliament afterward, as some members said they would not follow the commission’s decision in the future. One State of Law parliamentarian went for hyperbole, claiming that the legislature could never talk about corruption again because they had stood by and allowed the corrupt commission leaders to stay in office. In contrast, the Iraqi National Movement praised the defeat as a positive sign for Iraq’s parliament, while the Sadrists, who are part of the National Alliance, said that State of Law’s accusations against the commission were false. Maliki had seemingly made a big deal out of nothing. He had his followers in parliament relentlessly attack the parliament, bring it up for a no confidence vote, but it was apparent from the beginning that his list was almost alone. The other parties could see that Maliki was just attempting to take over the commission so that he could control future elections. There was no reason for any other party to allow that as it would’ve threatened their own political futures.

Prime Minister Maliki was defeated in his attempt to unseat the Election Commission’s leadership, and take control of it. State of Law is still pushing the matter, accusing the parliament of lacking integrity and standing for corruption, but that will only earn Maliki more enemies, something that he can little afford as he is only in power due to the good favors of the Kurdish Coalition and National Alliance, both of which voted against the no confidence push. More importantly, the premier has shown increasingly autocratic tendencies in the past few years, and this was the latest example. He has steadily moved to increase his powers at the expense of others. This was one of his more open attempts, and was so bold that it was doomed to failure, so much so that one could question whether Maliki was ever serious about this effort, or whether he simply wanted to run the Commission through the wringer to punish it for not following his orders. Either way, his attempt was not a good sign for Iraq’s fledgling democracy. Institutions are still weak, and they need to be supported and nurtured rather than manipulated as the prime minister attempted to.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “State of Law: Parliament does not have the right to talk about corruption anymore,” 7/30/11

Aswat al-Iraq, “State of Law to vote no confidence on Election Commission,” 7/27/11

Brosk, Raman, “Iraqi Federal Court standstill about independent bodies,” AK News, 3/9/11

Buratha News, “Falawi: we have enough to withdraw confidence from the Electoral Commission in the meeting of the House of Representatives tomorrow,” 7/27/11

Ibrahim, Haidar, “Kurds to oppose Electoral commission no confidence,” AK News, 7/27/11
- “MP deems support for electoral commission “a violation,”” AK News, 7/19/11
- “SLC deputy rejects renewed confidence vote for electoral commission,” AK News, 7/28/11

Independent Press Agency, “Iraqi white regrets for not withdrawing confidence from the Electoral Commission,” 7/28/11

Kareem, Karzan, “MPs vote down ‘no confidence’ in electoral commission,” AK News, 7/28/11

Al-Mada, “State law: dismissal of the election commission next week .. Haidari and critical questioning,” 7/19/11

Al-Nashmi, Fadel, “fears that iraqi pm grabbing power, becoming a ‘democ-tator,’” Niqash, 7/5/11

National Iraqi News Agency, “Buffy: Some parties tried to dismiss the IHCE members after politicized questioning rather than a regulatory,” 7/5/11
- “Leading member of IS political goals behind attempts to withdraw confidence from IEHC,” 7/4/11
- “MP for SLC announce formation of a tripartite committee to investigate financial issues for the Electoral Commission,” 7/23/11
- “MP for SLC ,demands withdrawal of confidence from IHEC for financial and administrative corruption,” 7/23/11
- “MP for the Center Coalition : most deputies consider questioning of IHCE targeting its head Alhaydari,” 7/24/11
- “Mutlaq: not to withdraw confidence from the electoral commission restore prestige of Parliament,” 7/28/11
- “Parliamentary sources: sacking of IHEC aiming at formation of subjected alternative,” 7/7/11
- “A parliamentary source; vote to dismiss the IHCE on Thursday,” 7/25/11
- “The political body of the Sadrist movement: the withdrawal of confidence from the electoral commission a step towards the return of dictatorship,” 7/29/11

Saadi, Ahmed, “Faraj al-Haidari: Results of the elections and refused to interventions targeting behind Maliki and the Commission,” Shatt al-Arab, 7/14/11

Schmidt, Michael and Healy, Jack, “Maliki’s Broadened Powers Seen as a Threat in Iraq,” New York Times, 3/4/11

Al-Shammari, Yazn, “MP: SLC will call for no confidence of electoral commission,” AK News, 7/23/11

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No, 18,” 7/14/11

Taha, Yaseen, “electoral commission may not survive as kurdish mps split,” Niqash, 5/12/11

Wanan, Jaafar, “MPs sign to withdraw confidence from IHEC,” AK News, 7/2/11

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U.S. Decides To Hold Onto Hezbollah Commander Captured In Iraq In 2007

In July 2011, Iraq announced that it would not be taking control of a Hezbollah commander, Ali Mussa Daqduq, being held by the Americans. That was because several U.S. Senators complained about turning him over. Daqduq was captured by U.S. forces in 2007 along with leaders of an Iranian-backed Special Group. Daqduq was the highest ranking Hezbollah operative captured within the country. The Lebanese organization began operating in Iraq just months after the U.S. invasion in coordination with Iran to spy on the Coalition, and work with Shiite militants. Daqduq is a symbol of how Hezbollah and Tehran tried to influence post-Saddam Iraq.

U.S. soldier posts picture of Daqduq after his capture in 2007 (Agence Presse France/Getty)

On July 22, 2011, Baghdad said that the United States was not going to be transferring Ali Mussa Daqduq to their control. This came a day after Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta received a letter from 20 Senators, which included Senate Minority leader Mitch McConnell, Senator John McCain, and Senator Joe Lieberman. The lawmakers said that they were afraid that Daqduq would be released by Iraq or escape if he was handed over. Daqduq was going to be turned over to Iraq as part of the U.S. withdrawal process. Even though the Americans are still going to detain him, he will eventually have to be given to the Iraqis. That’s because the Obama administration and Congress have ruled out the alternatives. The Congress vetoed a White House plan to have terror suspects tried in the United States, while the Supreme Court has ruled that Guantanamo Bay can only be used to hold Al Qaeda members, and those involved in 9/11. Daqduq is neither. The U.S. has to release all the prisoners it holds by the end of the year as part of the Status of Forces Agreement signed in 2008 between Washington and Baghdad.

Daqduq was at the head of Hezbollah’s operations in Iraq. Immediately after the U.S. invasion in March 2003, Lebanese operatives began moving into Iraq from Iran to collect intelligence on the Coalition forces. This information was passed onto Tehran. As early as July, there were reports that Hezbollah was trying to reach out to Moqtada al-Sadr, who was quickly making himself an early opponent of the occupation. By the end of the month, it was alleged that 30-40 Hezbollah advisers were operating in Najaf to help with his Mahdi Army militia. By the end of 2003, that had increased to a 90-man team. There were also unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had begun providing financial aid to Sadr as well. By Late 2004, it was said that up to 800 Hezbollah agents were in Iraq.

Hezbollah’s operations quickly began branching out. Some of the Hezbollah agents were organized into assassination squads to eliminate enemies of Tehran. The Lebanese introduced one of their deadliest weapons, the explosively formed projectile (EFP) anti-armor device, which they had perfected in their fight with Israel. Hezbollah also began training Shiite militiamen. This was a great relief to Iran, because Hezbollah were fellow Arabs, while many Iraqis complained about the haughtiness of their Persian trainers. The training took place several different ways. The most common was for a small group of Iraqis to travel to Iran, and be trained by the Lebanese and Iranians. Afterward, some were sent to Lebanon, via Syria for more advanced lessons. Iran also created two training camps within Iraq, east of Basra city in southern Iraq by 2006 that included up to 10 Hezbollah operatives. In late-2006, it was said that 1,000-2,000 militiamen had been trained by Hezbollah. All of this showed that Hezbollah was working hand in hand with Iran to spread its influence in Iraq. Both took advantage of the ascendancy of the country’s Shiites to power after Saddam Hussein was deposed. They found many friends amongst the more militant elements of that community that came to oppose the U.S. and foreign presence, and wanted to fight them.

By 2007, Moqtada al-Sadr openly praised his group’s connections with Hezbollah. He told England’s Independent that, “It is natural that we would want to improve ourself by learning from each other. We copy Hezbollah in the way they fight and their tactics, we teach each other, and we are getting better through this.” Elements of the Mahdi Army also admitted to being trained by Hezbollah. 

Ali Mussa Daqduq was at the head of Hezbollah’s operations in Iraq. Daqduq was originally in charge of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah’s bodyguards, and a top commander within the movement. He then joined Department 2800 to assist the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force efforts in Iraq. In 2005, he went to Iran to help train Iraqis, and in 2006 he began traveling through Iraq to observe their activities. He also worked with Abu Yaser Mustafa Sheibani, a former commander in the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade, who became one of the earliest conduits of Iranian arms to Iraq, and with Qais Khazali, a former leader in the Sadrist movement who eventually broke away, and formed his own organization, the League of the Righteous. Daqduq’s activities mirrored the escalation of Hezbollah and Iran’s work in Iraq. They went from collecting intelligence and training, to providing arms, organizing militant groups, and then finally, carrying out attacks.

Daqduq's fake papers he was captured with (Long War Journal)

It was just one such lethal operation that led to Daqduq’s arrest in 2007. In January, the League of the Righteous carried out a bold attack upon a U.S. base in Karbala. A large contingent of fighters drove into the compound in SUVs, dressed in American uniforms, and carrying U.S. weapons. They went on to kill one U.S. soldier, and kidnapped four others, who were later found dead. This eventually led to the arrest of Daqduq and Qais Khazali in Basra in March. They were found with documents that showed Daqduq was distributing up to $3 million a month of Iranian money to Special Groups Tehran supported, and they all eventually admitted to their involvement in the Karbala attack. As a result of their capture, the League of the Righteous and Hezbollah masterminded another raid, this time on the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007, which led to the kidnapping of five British nationals who were going to be held hostage until the U.S. agreed to release Daqduq and Khazali. Khazali was eventually released in a prisoner swap in 2010, but Daqduq remains in U.S. custody.

Iran saw the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein as both a great threat and opportunity. On the one hand, it removed Tehran’s existential enemy, and placed friendly parties in power in Baghdad. On the other, it placed a large number of American troops right on its border. Daqduq’s history in Iraq recounts how Iran tried to deal with the latter. Iran decided to militarily confront the United States in Iraq, wanting to make them pay for their occupation. This included supporting, training, and arming Shiite militias like Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the League of the Righteous. Hezbollah was brought in to facilitate these operations, since it had a long history of guerrilla warfare against the Israelis, and was a close ally and funded by Iran as well. The fact that they were Arabs also helped them work better with Iraqis rather than the Iranians who are Persian. Daqduq was at the middle of this military cooperation between Iran, Hezbollah, and Shiite militants. That eventually led to his capture by the Americans in 2007. He is now due to be released to Iraqi control. That will happen eventually since the U.S. can’t hold him past December 31 when U.S. forces are supposed to withdraw. If he ends up in Iraqi hands he could very well be released unless he’s charged with attacking Iraqis. Given Baghdad’s desire to have friendly relations with Tehran, that’s unlikely to happen, so he’ll probably be released by them, unless Washington comes up with some kind of exception that will allow it to keep him locked up. If released, and there are still U.S. troops in Iraq he can be expected to go right back to his lethal work. If the Americans do withdraw, Daqduq could end up back in Lebanon, waiting to be assigned his next job by Hezbollah since he is one of their top foreign operatives.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/13/09
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Gordon, Michael, “Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says,” New York Times, 2/10/07
- “Hezbollah Trains Iraqis in Iran, Officials Say,” New York Times, 5/5/08

Gordon, Michael, Filkins, Dexter, “Hezbollah may be helping militias,” San Francisco Chronicle, 11/28/06

Harari, Michal, “Status Update: Shi’a Militias in Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/16/10

Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Hezbollah said to train Shiite militiamen in Iraq,” Associated Press, 7/1/08

Jakes, Lara, “Iraq delays taking militant custody amid US fear,” Associated Press, 7/22/11

Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 8/20/07

Latif, Nizar and Sands, Phil, “Mehdi fighters ‘trained by Hizbollah in Lebanon,’” Independent, 8/20/07

Pound, Edward, “The Iran Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04

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UPI, “Iraq: Return of Sheibani’s killer squads,” 9/30/10