Why Saddam Hussein Did Not See The United States As A Military Threat Before The 2003 Invasion

Iraq’s military confrontations with the United States largely shaped the Saddam Hussein’s view of America. Each time Iraq did something provocative in the 1990s the White House would usually respond with a few cruise missiles, which did not have much affect. The Iraqi dictator believed that the U.S. was therefore wed to air power rather than the use of its ground forces. America’s defeat in the Vietnam War, and its experience in Somalia and Serbia seemed to solidify Saddam’s opinion. For all of those reasons, Baghdad did not believe that the Bush administration was serious about going to war in 2003.

Saddam Hussein looked down upon the United States’ military might, seeing it as a paper tiger. He saw the American defeat in Vietnam as a sign of its weakness. Saddam pointed out that the U.S. lost 58,000 soldiers in that war, and then gave up, while Iraq lost 51,000 in just one battle for the Fao Peninsula in the Iran-Iraq War. He interpreted this to mean that the U.S. was afraid of taking casualties. The Clinton administration’s experience in Iraq, Serbia, and Somalia seemed to further prove Saddam’s point. In June 1993, Washington fired cruise missiles at the Iraqi Intelligence Service for an attempted assassination of former President George Bush. Then in October 1994, the U.S. sent forces to the Persian Gulf to deter Saddam’s deployment of 64,000 soldiers across the border with Kuwait to protest United Nations’ sanctions. In September 1996, the Americans launched Operation Desert Strike, which consisted of another cruise missile attack in response to an Iraqi offensive against the Kurds. Finally, in December 1998, Operation Desert Fox was a four-day missile and bombing campaign to punish Baghdad for refusing to work with United Nations’ weapons inspectors. Likewise, in Serbia, the Americans insisted on only using air power to achieve its goals. Finally, there was the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, which led to an American withdrawal. The Iraqi dictator took this all to mean that the U.S. was afraid to fight. That led him to believe that the U.S would never launch a serious invasion of Iraq to overthrow his government, because it would cost too many soldiers. In his opinion, Iraq had one of the strongest armies in the world since it was willing to take huge losses such as during the Iran-Iraq War. The United States on the other hand, lacked this wherewithal, and therefore would not take on Baghdad.  

When it became apparent to many in 2002 that the Bush administration was set upon invading Iraq, Saddam Hussein had the exact opposite opinion. He thought that the Americans and British were afraid of the strength of the Iraqis forces. In a February 2003 speech, he said that Iraq might lack the advanced equipment of the United States military, but its morale and beliefs were stronger, and that’s what mattered in war. To most of Iraq’s leadership, if something were to happen with America it would be like Operation Desert Fox, a series of air assaults or perhaps a seizure of southern Iraq like how the U.S. moved into Kurdistan after the 1991 Gulf War. The Director General of the Republican Guard’s General Staff for instance, told American interrogators after the war that he believed that the Coalition would take Basra, and perhaps Amarah in Maysan province, and then leave. Saddam thought that the Iraqi military would inflict such high casualties upon the Americans that they would withdraw if a war were to ever come. These seem like incomprehensible views, but they show the subjective nature of human reality. Iraq’s leadership looked at a series of events in American foreign policy, and they all seemed to point to the same thing. That was a military superpower that was afraid to use its ground forces, and over relied upon air power after Vietnam. When the new Bush administration came into office, and immediately singled out Iraq, Saddam didn’t think anything had changed strategically. After all, the previous Clinton administration had a series of confrontations with Baghdad, but nothing serious ever came of them. The Iraqis thought the same thing would happen with the new president.

Many foreign policy analysts and politicians believe that the majority of people act in a rational way. What they don’t understand is how worldviews vary from individual to individual creating a multitude of ways to act rationally. Saddam Hussein before the 2003 invasion was a perfect example. He operated in a bubble, but it was one partially based upon his analysis of American foreign policy. If the worst America could do was send a few cruise missiles after Iraq attempted to assassinate a former president, what was there to fear? Baghdad seemed to believe that the new Bush administration’s tough talk would not change America’s preference for using air power. Therefore there was not a real threat of an invasion. This was obviously a massive miscalculation, but one that could be explained by how Saddam and his followers viewed the United States.

SOURCES

Global Security, “Operation Desert Strike”

Pine, Art, “U.S., Iraq Move More Troops Toward Kuwait: Military: Baghdad mobilizes force of 64,000. Tension up as American ships, planes, 4,000 soldiers converge on Gulf,” Los Angeles Times, 10/9/04

Von Drehle, David and Smith, Jeffrey, “U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush,” Washington Post, 7/27/93

Woods, Kevin with Pease, Michael, Stout, Mark, Murray, Williamson, and Lacey, James, “A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership,” Iraqi Perspectives Project, 3/24/06

Interview With Theme Park

Here is a link to a short interview I did with the Theme Park blog about Iraq. Covers the Bush administration's decision to go to war, what went wrong with the American occupation, and the current state of Iraqi politics and economy.

Interview

Understanding Saddam’s Information Minister “Baghdad Bob”

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the West was both shocked and amused by the announcements made by Iraq’s Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, better known as “Baghdad Bob.” He repeatedly claimed that the Americans and British were being thrashed, and that Iraq was winning the war. These comments were incomprehensible in the West as their news was reporting a quick and deadly thrust by the U.S. led Coalition, which reached Baghdad in only a matter of weeks. In fact, Minister Sahaf’s pronouncements reflected what Saddam Hussein’s government was actually hearing from its military and officials. This was due to the environment the Iraqi dictator created based upon Iraq’s history, and his conspiratorial mind.

Saddam's Information Minister al-Sahaf became known as "Baghdad Bob" during the 2003 invasion (Wikipedia)

Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf made a name for himself internationally by his unbelievable quotes he gave to the media during the invasion of Iraq. When U.S. troops were on the outskirts of Baghdad he told the press, “They are not any place. They are on the move everywhere. They are a snake moving in the desert. They hold no place in Iraq. This is an illusion.” On April 3, when the Americans reached the Baghdad airport, he said, “We butchered the force present at the airport. We have retaken the airport! There are no Americans there!” Two days later, when U.S. forces were in the center of the capital, the Minister told the press, “They are not near Baghdad. Don’t believe them. … They said they entered with … tanks in the middle of the capital. … This speech is too far from reality. It is a part of this sickness of their plan. There is no … existence to the American troops … in Baghdad at all.” On April 6, he claimed, “Whenever we attack, they retreat. When we pound them with missiles and heavy artillery, they retreat even deeper. But when we stopped pounding, they pushed to the airport for propaganda purposes.” It seemed like the Minister was living in some fantasy world, but in fact, his public pronouncements reflected what the Iraqi regime actually thought was happening during the war.

The state of fear that Saddam Hussein imposed on Iraq created a distorted picture of the 2003 invasion. This started with Saddam’s mistrust of his military. Given the history of coups in the nation, Iraq’s leader was always weary of another happening. The Baath party for example, had seized power in May 1963, only to be kicked out by a countercoup in November. During the 1990s, there were also several attempts to unseat Saddam, one involving the Republican Guard, the elite military unit in the country. This caused the Iraqi dictator to create a series of parallel military and paramilitary forces, such as the Special Republican Guard and the Saddam Fedayeen, each meant to keep the other in check. He also routinely carried out purges of the officer corps. As Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz noted, “If a military leader disappeared one did not ask to know what happened, since it was known that the security services had dealt with the unfortunate individual.” Given this culture, officers were afraid to speak the truth to Saddam out of fear that they might anger him, and be killed as a result. This happened within the government bureaucracy and the Baath Party as well. The result was when the U.S. led Coalition invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, the leadership received rosy news from the battlefield. Soldiers, local officials, and the Baath Party offices all reported fierce fighting with the Americans. When the rare negative memo was received it was dismissed. That’s why on March 30, when U.S. forces were in Najaf, Saddam believed that the war was a stalemate. That same day, his secretary told the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to relay to France and Russia that it would only accept an unconditional withdrawal by the Coalition from the country. The picture that Information Minister Sahaf was painting therefore was a reflection of what the government was hearing from its underlings not the ranting of a government apparatchik desperately trying to spin a positive story in the face of defeat. Almost to the end, Baghdad believed that it was actually winning the war.

Saddam on Iraqi TV, April 2003. Right up to the end of the war Saddam actually believed that Iraq was winning, because of the false reports his underlings were sending him out of fear of telling him the truth (Reuters)

Minister Sahaf seemed like a joke every time he appeared on TV proclaiming that the U.S. led Coalition was losing. He became something of a celebrity as a result, and there are websites to this day that archive his statements, and make fun of them. What was not known then was that Saddam Hussein actually believed that his forces were beating the Americans. When the U.S. and England invaded, all Baghdad heard was that waves of fearless Iraqis were not only holding their own against the Coalition, but pushing them into the desert. When Minister Sahaf said there were no U.S. forces in the capital, most in the government actually believed that. This was a result of the bubble that Saddam created around himself. The fear of being overthrown caused him to undermine his own military, and instill a reign of terror throughout the government in an attempt to defeat any plots that might be hatched against him. In turn, bearing bad news was not allowed out of fear of death. Saddam thus became a victim of his own survival tactics, and Minister Sahaf provided a look into this world more than anyone knew at the time.

SOURCES

Center for Individual Freedom, “The Collected Quotations of “Baghdad Bob,” Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf: The Iraqi Minister of Disinformation”

Gordon, Michael, Trainor, General Bernard, Cobra II: The Inside Story

of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Pantheon, 2006

Mohan, Geoffrey, and Perry, Tony, “Troops Reach Baghdad’s Airport,” Los Angeles Times, 4/3/03

Polk, William, Understanding Iraq, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Harper Perennial, 2005

Woods, Kevin with Pease, Michael, Stout, Mark, Murray, Williamson, and Lacey, James, “A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership,” Iraqi Perspectives Project, 3/24/06

Does Iraq Suffer From The Oil Curse?

Iraq is the most oil dependent country in North Africa and the Middle East. More than half of its Gross Domestic Product and almost all of its foreign exchange come from petroleum. That has led to major difficulties with its economy. Some would explain this through the resource curse. That theory holds that countries that are natural resource dependent usually underperform, lack productivity in other parts of the economy, suffer from poor social indicators, poor governance, authoritarianism, and corruption. Having oil does not automatically mean that a nation will run into these problems. There are plenty of countries that have petroleum such as the United States, Canada, and Norway that have prospered. The deciding factors are trying to base development solely upon exploiting that resource, and then how the wealth generated is used and distributed. The resource curse definitely helps explain many of Iraq’s current economic difficulties.

There are several different versions of the resource curse. The four main ones are the rentier thesis, the repression thesis, the rent seeking thesis, and the Dutch Disease. The rentier thesis argues that oil creates regimes, which are not dependent upon their publics. Petroleum brings in so much money that taxes are not necessary to fund the government. That makes countries dependent upon oil, and less accountable and representative of their publics. The result is that there is no social contract formed between the people and the authorities. Petroleum dependence also leads to booms and busts in the economy and government spending. When oil prices are high, public expenditures not only go up, but countries usually over spend, causing inflation. Likewise, when prices go down as they traditionally have, spending has to be dramatically cut. Oil is also capital and technologically intensive, and employs few people. Not only that, but petroleum producing countries usually lack the skilled labor force to work on the industry, and have to import foreign workers meaning there are even fewer jobs available. The huge amount of wealth generated from hydrocarbons, and the large government projects that are started with it open up ample opportunities for corruption. The repression thesis is based upon the idea that oil leads to authoritarian governments. Oil money is used to fund large security forces to keep the elite in power. The rent seeking thesis believes that oil becomes the spoils that factions within countries compete over. Political parties then use the petroleum wealth to create patronage systems to stay in power. For example, they start government programs that are about distributing goods and services to hold onto their followers rather than ones that are about producing things. Finally, the Dutch Disease is based upon the experience of the Netherlands. In the 1960s, it found natural gas in the North Sea, and went on to emphasis it over other industries, which distorted its economy. Nations afflicted by the Dutch Disease see the value of their currency driven up by oil profits, which makes their other exports less competitive as a result. Businesses then start focusing upon sectors that are not affected by the appreciation, and that usually leads to less innovation. The government then steps in by creating high protective tariffs to try to preserve those sectors, which are struggling. The net results it that the agriculture and manufacturing sectors most often get pushed out, and the countries become even more oil dependent. The growing strength of the domestic currency also drives up demand for imports as they become cheaper. The overall affects are countries that on the surface appear rich, but are actually economically hollow, corrupt, have weak bureaucracies, and ruling elites that are intent upon staying in power.

Iraq appears to have many of the characteristics of a nation struck by the resource curse. First, according to a 2010 study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iraq is the most oil dependent country in the Middle East and North Africa. 60% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 95% of its foreign exchange comes from petroleum. In comparison, Saudi Arabia, which is the large producer in OPEC, depends upon oil for less than 30% of its GDP and approximately 78% of its revenue. Second, Iraq does not rely upon taxes. They only account for 2% of the government’s income. That means the government is not dependent or connected to the public. Third, public spending and the GDP are directly correlated to oil revenues. For instance, in 2008, Iraq earned $58.79 billion in oil receipts, and had a $72.18 billion budget. That year, its GDP was $86.53 billion. The next year, oil revenues went down to $37.02 billion, driving down the budget to $58.61 billion, and the GDP declined to $65.84 billion. Then in 2010, oil prices went back up, and so did the budget and GDP. That’s a classic example of the boom and bust that oil dependent countries experience. Not only that, but much of the public spending goes towards salaries, pensions, and goods and services provided by the government with only around a quarter being for infrastructure and investment. The Food Ration System for instance, takes 7% of the budget, and is the largest in the world. The state is also the largest employer in the country. Fifth, the reason why the public sector employs so many is because the country’s largest industry, oil, only provides 1% of jobs. The government therefore has to step in, and uses jobs as a form of social service to keep the public content. They are part of vast patronage systems run by the ruling parties, so that they can stay in power. Sixth, Iraq has been ranked one of the most corrupt countries in the world since 2003. In 2012, it was eighth from the bottom of 174 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Seventh, there is a huge pent up demand for products in Iraq after years of wars and sanctions. Most of this spending goes towards imports, and is fueled by government salaries, which are in turn, paid for by oil profits. Those all point to Iraq suffering for the resource curse, but there are some differences. For one, Iraq’s dinar has not seen a large increase in value as the Dutch Disease argues. While there was high inflation in the mid-2000s, the Central Bank has now gotten that under control. It now wants to revalue the currency upwards, but Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is opposed. Iraq does not have many tariffs either. There are few protectionist barriers, and those that exist have just been implemented, because the Americans got rid of most of them when it ran the country after the 2003 invasion. That’s a major reason why Iraq’s agriculture and industry have regressed. Iraq has been flooded by cheap imports, which have put out of business many of Iraq’s farmers and factories. Last, Iraq is predicted to be one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the next several years. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch estimated that Iraq’s GDP would grow 10.5% in 2012 and 8.2% in 2013. That’s due to the massive government spending that is going into affect with high oil prices. That is the opposite of most oil dependent countries that have traditionally underperformed compared to others that do not rely upon natural resources. There are far more characteristics of the oil curse apparent in Iraq than not. Oil affects the economy, government, and society. It has created a country that depends upon oil for growth and a large public sector that is responsible for goods, services, and jobs. It also helps keep the ruling parties in power, and provides them with plenty of money to pocket as well.

There are many ideas on how to solve the oil cruse, but they would be very difficult for Iraq to implement right now. Transparency is being pushed by international organizations such as the World Bank in Iraq. Baghdad recently singed on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for example, which will make the authorities open up some of its books on the oil industry. That could help reduce the amount of theft going on, and give the public more confidence in the authorities. Privatization could get the government out of the oil business. It would in turn, force the government to set up a taxation system, and re-connect it with the public. Iraq could follow other countries that have set up oil funds. That would limit public spending, and provide a means for escaping the booms and busts that afflict it right now. Smart investing using those funds could also help diversify the economy. Oil profits could be directly distributed to the public as well. That could increase private spending, and provide an incentive for the growth of businesses. This was included in the 2012 budget, but has not been followed through with. Still, Iraq would face many problems trying to follow any of these policies. A big one is that Iraq’s government lacks skilled staff, and has weak institutions to carry out reforms. The oil money not being distributed to the public is an example of this. Second, the ruling parties and the public would oppose privatizing the oil industry. Iraqis are very nationalistic about oil, and would not want to turn it over to businesses especially if that meant foreign control. The political parties would lose a huge source of money to steal and spend, and therefore would be against the idea as well. Finally, even in developed countries, some of these ideas don’t work out. Setting up oil funds for example require difficult decisions about how much money should be taken out of the budget, and requires smart investing both of which can go wrong. Transparency can only go so far, as many of the energy companies that have joined the Oil Ministry, as partners do not want to divulge their business. Iraq also has bad bookkeeping, and many of its records are incomplete even if wanted to make all of them public. For the foreseeable future then, Iraq is likely to remain under the resource curse. Changes in the economy and governance could very well take place, but they’re likely to take a generation, because Iraq is coming out of such a problematic past.

Iraq seems a fitting example of the resource curse. It is an oil dependent country, and that has caused distortions in both the economy and government. Everything from the budget to jobs to food to investment are largely driven by the petroleum industry. Not only that it has created a public that relies upon the state rather than the other way around. Baghdad has talked a lot about diversifying the economy with all the money it is generating, but there have been very few concrete steps in that direction. That doesn’t mean it can’t happen, but right now the status quo seems pretty much set as there would be political and public opposition to many of the ideas on how to reform things.

SOURCES

Birdsall, Nancy and Subramanian, Arvind, “Saving Iraq From Its Oil,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004

Dickey, Christopher, “The Oil Curse,” Newsweek, 5/7/10

Al-Hassoun, Naseer, “Iraq Parliament Stalls Handout Of Surplus Oil Cash to Citizens,” Al-Hayat, 12/10/12

Karl, Terry Lynn, “Covering Oil, Chapter 2-Understanding the Resource Curse” Covering Oil, A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development (Open Society Institute: New York, 2005)

Kumas, Gizem, “The Oil Curse and Iraq,” Bilkent University

Kurdish Globe, “Iraq to be world’s fastest growing economy 2012/2013,” 11/25/12

Looney, Robert, “Can Iraq Overcome the Oil Curse?” World Economics, January-March 2006

Mustafa, Karim, “Iraq’s current monetary crisis: bubbles or fleeting appearance of a deeper economic crisis?” Al Mowaten, 5/13/12

Naim, Moises, “The Devil’s Excrement Can oil-rich countries avoid the resource curse?” Foreign Policy Sept./Oct. 2009

Peel, Michael, “Iraq issues arrest warrant for bank governor,” Financial Times, 10/18/12

Shafaq News, “Parliamentary Economic committee: 2013 won’t witness the birth of the new Iraqi currency,” 12/2/12

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/12

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” December 2012

West, Johnny, “Iraq’s Last Window: Diffusing the Risks of a Petro-State,” Center for Global Development, September 2011

Al-Zubaidi, Hassan Latif, “social welfare flip-flop: why iraq’s ration card can’t be scrapped,” Niqash, 11/15/12

Iraq Still Towards The Bottom Of Corruption Index

The German anti-corruption group Transparency International recently released its yearly Corruption Perceptions Index. For the last several years, Transparency has been looking at how corruption is viewed throughout the world. This year’s addition included 174 countries. As usual, Iraq was towards the very bottom of the list.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is a study of how people see corruption in their countries. The group uses a variety of surveys and studies to base their Index upon, and then gives each country a score of 0, highly corrupt, to 100, very clean. Transparency uses studies and surveys, because it believes there is no real way to compare corruption. There is no accurate reporting for example, on how much money officials might steal or how many bribes are demanded each given year. Instead, Transparency uses how citizens in countries feel about their government’s performance. That’s important to know, because it means that the nations at the bottom of the list are not the most corrupt, it’s just those that have the worst reputations amongst their public.

In the 2012 Index, many of the same countries were at the bottom as the last time. Three countries tied for the lowest score this year. Those were Somalia, North Korea, and Afghanistan with a score of 8 each out of 100. In 2011, Somalia and North Korea were tied for the last spot. They were followed by Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Iraq came in at number eight from the end with a score of 18. It was followed by Venezuela, Haiti, Chad, and Burundi who all had a score of 19. Iraq’s ranking was exactly the same as last year. Those were actually a slight improvement from 2006-2010 when Iraq was second from the bottom in 2007 and 2008, and fourth worse in 2009 and 2010. Since the Index is based upon people’s perceptions the change in scores cannot quite be compared year to year since there’s no real way to determine what might make people feel one way and another the next in such a list. Still, the fact that Iraq does so poorly the last several years means its public does not think well of its government.

Transparency International 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index

1. Somalia 8

1. North Korea 8

1. Afghanistan 8

4. Sudan 13

5. Myanmar 15

6. Uzbekistan 17

6. Turkmenistan 17

8. Iraq – 18

9. Venezuela 19

9. Haiti 19

9. Chad 19

9. Burundi 19

Iraq’s Ranking In Corruption Index 2003-2012

2003 #20

2004 #17

2005 #22

2006 #2

2007 #2

2008 tied #2

2009 tied #4

2010 #4

2011 tied #8

2012 #8

Corruption can affect a country in many different ways. In Iraq’s case it permeates the entire government bureaucracy and society. It has been going on for decades, and has become a basic means of governance amongst the ruling parties. It contributes to a lack of economic development and rebuilding, because so much money is siphoned off from contracts. It means a lack of services, or the necessity to bribe officials to receive them. It also affects the quality of the goods and services people receive. Finally, it undermines the public’s confidence in the authorities. Those are the problems that Iraqis have to face everyday, and the reason why their country consistently does so poorly on the corruption index.

SOURCES

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” December 2012

JOURNEYMAN PICTURES VIDEO: Saddam On Sale Nov. 2007

FORA TV VIDEO: Christopher Hitchens On Saddam's 1979 Purge Of The Baath Party