Have Iraq’s Oil Exports Hit a Plateau?

In January 2013, Iraq’s oil exports went up a fraction from the previous month. The price for a barrel of Iraqi crude did increase by over a dollar however. Still, with disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over oil contracts, infrastructure bottlenecks, and other issues, it appears as if Iraq’s ability to deliver more petroleum for foreign sales has hit a plateau until some of these problems are resolved.

Oil exports barley changed from January 2013 to December 2012, and was far lower than the amounts seen last year. In January, the Iraqi Oil Ministry reported an average of 2.35 million barrels a day in exports. That was only a small increase from December’s 2.34 million barrels. Both figures were below the 30-year highs seen in 2012. In October and November for example, Iraq hit 2.62 million barrels a day, the highest amount since the 1980s. The south remained the workhorse of the country’s industry, exporting an average of 2.093 million barrels a day last month, up from 2.022 million in December. The flow through the southern pipeline went up despite the Rumaila oil field shutting down for a short period for maintenance work, and bad weather preventing tankers from docking in Basra’s ports. Both of these are routine events, which have a negative affect upon exports. The northern pipeline on the other hand, has seen a three-month decline. In January, 264,500 barrels a day went through the line, down from 325,800 in December. This was due to the Kurds ending exports in the middle of December over disputes with the central government over paying oil companies operating in the north, and more importantly, who has the right to sign oil contracts and sell petroleum. The central and regional governments have signed a series of short-term deals that inevitably break down, which means a steady flow of Kurdish oil through the northern pipeline cannot be counted on until the larger arguments are resolved. The northern line was also blown up in January in Turkey. The Iraqi government blamed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is carrying out a campaign against Turkey’s energy field. Finally, 11,000 barrels a day were trucked to Jordan in January. Iraq has seen steady progress in oil production in the last several years. What the country lacks is adequate infrastructure and political agreements to fully exploit that potential. Iraq has plans to address the former, but they are coming along slowly. The differences between Kurdistan and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are more enduring, and are unlikely to be solved any time soon. All together that accounts for why exports have plateaued after witnessing record highs last year.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits 2011-2013

Month	Avg. Exports (Mil/ Bar/ Day)	Avg. Price Per Barrel	Revenue (Bill)
Jan. 11	2.16	$90.78	$6.082
Feb.	2.20	$98.44	$6.064
Mar.	2.15	$107.13	$7.167
Apr.	2.14	$114.26	$7.342
May	2.22	$108	$7.45
Jun.	2.27	$105.17	$7.173
Jul.	2.16	$108.79	$7.311
Aug.	2.18	$104.91	$7.124
Sep.	2.10	$104.89	$6.619
Oct.	2.08	$104.04	$6.742
Nov.	2.13	$106.59	$6.833
Dec.	2.14	$106.18	$7.061
2011 Avg.	2.16	$105.00	$6.913
Jan. 12	2.10	$109.08	$7.123
Feb.	2.01	$112.92	$6.595
Mar.	2.31	$117.99	$8.472
Apr.	2.50	$116.79	$8.795
May	2.45	$103.03	$7.831
Jun.	2.40	$90.09	$6.487
Jul.	2.51	$97.14	$7.577
Aug.	2.56	$106.22	$8.445
Sep.	2.59	$107.59	$8.371
Oct.	2.62	$105.51	$8.578
Nov.	2.62	$104.32	$8.200
Dec.	2.34	$103.72	$7.551
2012 Avg.	2.41	$106.20	$7.835
Jan. 13	2.35	$104.92	$7.672

Oil Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February 1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917 mil/bar/day

April 2.115 mil/bar/day

May 2.086 mil/bar/day

June 2.085 mil/bar/day

July 2.216 mil/bar/day

August 2.252 mil/bar/day

September 2.178 mil/bar/day

October 2.172 mil/bar/day

November 2.122 mil/bar/day

December 2.022 mil/bar/day

January 2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January 2012 393,500 bar/day

February 375,800 bar/day

March 400,000 bar/day

April 393,300 bar/day

May 364,500 bar/day

June 316,600 bar/day

July 300,000 bar/day

August 312,900 bar/day

September 420,000 bar/day

October 451,600 bar/day

November 426,600 bar/day

December 325,800 bar/day

January 2013 264,500 bar/day

Despite exports hardly changing, the price of oil did go up for Iraq. In January a barrel of Iraqi crude went for $104.92. In December it sold for $103.72 per barrel. That dollar plus increase allowed Iraq’s revenue to go from $7.551 billion in December to $7.672 billion in January. The value of oil has been above $100 a barrel for twenty-one of the last twenty-four months for Iraq. This is a prime time for the country to pump and sell as much petroleum as possible in case prices take a dip. That is actually Iraq’s current strategy. Unfortunately, that has not been possible, because of the problems stated above.

Iraq’s oil industry has hit several plateaus in recent years. It now appears that the country is facing another. Exports peaked in late-2012, but have since gone back down to what they were at the beginning of last year. With new infrastructure only slowly coming on line, and more importantly, the continued bickering between Kurdistan and Baghdad over the future of the energy industry there appears little chance for change in the short-term. Iraq will still be able to reap a huge amount of money, but it could be earning a lot more if it was able to solve these outstanding issues.

SOURCES

Ajrash, Kadhim and Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq Kurds Halt Crude Exports, Central Government Official Says,” Bloomberg, 12/24/12

Business News Europe, “Iraqi oil link to Turkey hit by explosion,” 1/21/13

Ministry of Oil, “Iraq Crude Oil Exports – January 2013,” 2/21/13

Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Iraq Basra oil exports restored after bad weather –shipper,” 1/12/13

Siddiqui, Shoaib-ur-Rehman, “Iraq oil exports rise to 2.359mn bpd in January,” Reuters, 2/3/13

Wicken, Stephen and Sullivan, Marisa, “2013 Iraq Update #7: De-Baathification Body Ousts Iraq’s Chief Justice as Protests Continue,” Institute for the Study of War, 2/15/13

Iraq Still A Far Deadlier Place Than Afghanistan

Many have tried to compare Iraq and Afghanistan, but the nature of their conflicts are quite different. Afghanistan has a healthy insurgency, and is a mostly rural nation. Iraq on the other hand suffers from high levels of urban terrorism. For five of the last six years casualties in Afghanistan have increased, while Iraq’s have dropped dramatically for three years, and then increased slightly over the last two. Most would think that Afghanistan would suffer from far higher levels of violence, but in fact, Iraq’s militants have been able to take a far deadlier toll. That’s because Iraq’s large cities provide far more targets of opportunity than are available in Afghanistan.

When comparing the number of civilian deaths in the two countries, Iraq has far more than Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, there were 1,523 civilians killed in 2007, 2,118 in 2008, 2,412 in 2009, 2,790 in 2010, peaking at 3,131 in 2011, before dropping to 2,754 in 2012. Iraq Body Count recorded 25,280 deaths in 2007, 9,626 in 2008, 4,967 in 2009, 4,073 in 2010, 4,144 in 2011, and 4,568 in 2012. The numbers cannot be directly compared, because Iraq Body Count includes police fatalities, while the United Nations does not. By going through Iraq Body Count’s individual incident reports, the statistics for civilians killed in Iraq can be discerned. In 2012 for instance, there were 3,717 civilian deaths in Iraq. That was still far higher than the 2,754 seen in Afghanistan that year. The statistics for Iraq are so much higher that it can only be assumed that it is deadlier than Afghanistan. 2011 might be the only year that the two were close, because Iraq had around 1,000 more deaths then, which is roughly how many Iraqi police are killed annually. The reason why Iraq still has far higher death counts is because of the change in tactics taken by the country’s militants. After the civil war ended in 2008, the majority of the public was tired of fighting. That led to many turning on militants, which eventually ended most of the insurgency. The remnants have now increasingly turned to terrorist bombings in an attempt to undermine the government and restart the sectarian conflict. That’s shown in the fact that Iraq Body Count recorded 7.3 people killed per day in suicide or car bombings compared to 5.0 by gunfire in 2012. Iraq provides plenty of targets, because 66% of the population is urban. Afghanistan has a thriving insurgency, but the country is mostly rural. Only 23% of the population lives in cities there. Much of the fighting occurs out in the country and in small towns where the population is more spread out. Overall, there are far fewer opportunities to kill large numbers of people each year in Afghanistan than in Iraq.

 

Comparison of Deaths In Afghanistan and Iraq 2007-2012

	Afghanistan Civilian Deaths	Iraq Civilian & Police Deaths
2007	1,523	25,280
2008	2,118	9,626
2009	2,412	4,967
2010	2,790	4,073
2011	3,131	4,144
2012	2,754	4,568

 

Iraq and Afghanistan are suffering from different forms of violence. In Afghanistan, the insurgency is mostly fighting the government and Western forces, along with targeting public workers. In Iraq, civilians are the main victims of attacks as militants there are trying to stoke tensions amongst the Shiites to restart the civil war, and have largely given up directly confronting the police and army. Mass casualty bombings occur far more often in Iraq as a result. With large urban populations these acts of terrorism usually take a far higher toll than they do in Afghanistan. That accounts for why Iraq remains a deadlier place than Afghanistan.

SOURCES

CIA, The World Factbook

Iraq Body Count

United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, “Afghanistan civilian casualty figures drop for the first time in 6 years,” 2/19/13

Iraq’s Latest Controversy, The Attempted Removal of Chief Justice Medhat Mahmoud

Iraqi politics are never without drama. In February 2012, the Accountability and Justice Commission, which replaced the deBaathification Commission, announced that it had removed Chief Justice Medhat Mahmoud from office for his work under the Baathist regime. Mahmoud headed the Iraqi Supreme Court, the Judicial Council, and the Federal Appeals Court. Immediately after the decision, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki removed the head of the Accountability Commission, while Mahmoud won an appeal to overturn his removal. Now it seems that events have come full circle as the leadership of the Accountability and Justice Commission is the new center of controversy rather than the Chief Justice.

Chief Justice Medhat Mahmoud is in charge of Iraq’s judiciary (Shafaq News)

On February 12, 2013, the Accountability and Justice Commission removed Chief Justice Medhat Mahmoud from office for ties to the former regime. Mahmoud started working as a judge in 1960, and continued in that position all the way through the Baathist governments to the present. Mahmoud appealed his case, and on February 19, a court reversed his removal saying that it did not find any strong evidence between the judge and the rule of Saddam Hussein. The Accountability Commission announced at the beginning of February that it was starting an investigation of several judges after it received a request to do so from independent parliamentarian Sabah al-Saadi. Mahmoud is the head of the Iraqi Supreme Court, and the Federal Appeals Court. Beforehand he was also the head of the Higher Judicial Council, but lost that spot under a new law passed in December 2012. The move by the Accountability Commission came as a bit of a surprise as everyone in Iraqi politics knew that he had a long career under both Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. Holding any kind of high position under those men opened the opportunity to be removed under the deBaathification legislation. That also makes the decision by the appeals court puzzling as well.

Judge Mahmoud’s reign over Iraq’s judiciary for the last several years has garnered plenty of criticism from many sectors. At first, Mahmoud won favor with the Americans when Paul Bremer appointed him supervisor of the Justice Ministry in June 2003. He then became the deputy president of the Federal Appeals Court, before taking it over in March 2005. He then became the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the leader of the Judicial Council. While Mahmoud claimed that he was trying to maintain an independent judiciary against interference by Iraq’s politicians, his critics both within and without the country believed that he was cozying up to the prime minister. In February 2010, the Supreme Court became involved in that year’s parliamentary elections when it reversed a lower court’s decision by disqualifying over 500 candidates for alleged Baathist ties. That came right after Maliki met with Judge Mahmoud. In January 2011, the Court ruled that all the country’s independent commissions, the Election Commission, the Integrity Commission, and the Accountability and Justice Commission were under the cabinet, despite the constitution explicitly stating that they were the parliament’s responsibility. Mahmoud has also been criticized for concentrating power over the judiciary in his hands, and interfering in decisions of the courts. A U.N. official said that no one on the Judicial Council for example, could make any decisions without the approval of the chief justice. A senior judge told the International Crisis Group that many of his peers’ mindset was shaped by years of working under Saddam, when it was dangerous to act independently and the executive was feared. They have carried this over into the present time, and are being accommodating to Maliki as a result. Finally, a former judge told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction that 40-90% of decisions made by the courts came under outside influence either through threats or bribes by politicians and militants. All together that meant Judge Mahmoud had plenty of enemies. His decisions angered many, and his critics believed that he was in the pocket of the prime minister. That meant there were plenty who could have been waiting for the right time to try to unseat him.

Independent PM Saadi has been leading a campaign against Judge Mahmoud for several years now (AP)

Legislator Sabah al-Saadi and the head of the Accountability and Justice Commission Falah Hassan Shanshal have been accused of leading the charge against Judge Mahmoud, but it is not that clear cut. Saadi has definitely been pushing for the removal of Mahmoud for years. For example, in July 2011, Saadi complained that Mahmoud had given into political pressure when he cancelled arrest warrants for former Trade Minister Abdul al-Falah al-Sudani and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Safi al-Din al-Safi, both of which were from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list. (1) A year later, Saadi called Judge Mahmoud a leftover from Saddam’s dictatorship, and criticized his decisions that gave the premier control over all the country’s independent commissions. In December 2012, Saadi said the judge was a supporter of Maliki’s “dictatorship.” Many commentators have also pointed to Commission head Shanshal of the Sadr Trend as being behind the move against Mahmoud. The Sadr bloc however, has gone back and forth about the judge and the judiciary. In April, Moqtada al-Sadr denounced Maliki for becoming an autocrat, and said, “The acts of marginalization [by Maliki]… and politicization of the judiciary … lead to a dictatorship [and] … using the armed forces or the judiciary to eliminate [opponents] are two sides of the same coin.” Then in September, when some members of parliament wanted to start a signature campaign against Judge Mahmoud, the Sadrists said that they supported him, and would block any moves against him. Mahmoud has been in Saadi’s crosshairs for years, because he believes that the judge is aligned with the prime minister, and allowing him to set up an autocracy. The Sadrists however usually talk badly about Maliki, but then never act against him, because they are still the premier’s strongest supporters. The contradictory statements by Sadr in April and then his lawmakers in September are a perfect example of that. The Accountability Commission itself is split between various parties including the Kurdish Coalition, the Iraqi National Movement, State of Law, and the Sadrists meaning that Shanshal by himself could not push through any decision against Judge Mahmoud without support from the other lists. All of those parties with the exception obviously of Maliki’s own list have issues with the prime minister that could have motivated them to act against him with this measure. In April 2013, Iraq is also due for provincial elections, so the dismissal could have been political posturing in anticipation of the voting.

Premier Maliki immediately responded with a counter attack. On February 17, his legal adviser told the press that Accountability and Justice Commission head Shanshal was dismissed, because he was never approved by parliament. Lawmaker Saadi then claimed that Maliki issued an order through the cabinet to cancel all the decisions made by the Commission, while under Shanshal. Mohammed Badri of Dawa-Iraq Party was named as his replacement. His first action was to hold a meeting with four of the seven members of the Commission, who then voted to remove Shanshal from the Commission altogether. That has to be approved by parliament. The accountability commission in the legislature responded by saying that it supported Shanshal, and that he could hold his position until lawmakers voted to confirm him. Then on February 18, Speaker of Parliament Hussein Nujafi rejected Maliki’s decision to dismiss Shanshal, and reappointed him to be the head of the Commission. The appeals court however, which said Judge Mahmoud could stay in office, ruled that Maliki had the authority to appoint a new head of the commission as well. Ironically, the fate of Shanshal and the leadership of the Accountability and Justice Commission is the main point of contention now that the appeals court has saved Judge Mahmoud. Leading members of parliament have come out for Shanshal, while Maliki and his allies are his opponents. This was quite a move by the premier, because the debate has largely shifted away from the judiciary to the Commission.

Every other month it appears that a new controversy arises amongst Iraq’s elite. This new one is part of the larger battle for power between Prime Minister Maliki and his opponents. While it was not clear which individuals were behind the move to dismiss Judge Mahmoud it took a combination of parties that were all against the premier on the Accountability and Justice Commission to vote against him. Judge Mahmoud and Maliki did not stand idly by, and showed once and for all that they were allied with each other, when the judge won his appeal to hold onto his position, and then the prime minister dismissed the head of the Commission, cancelled all of his decisions, and named his replacement, thus shifting the focus away from Judge Mahmoud to the Commission. This controversy is likely to dominate the political scene for the next few weeks until things die down like the previous ones did before another conflict arises. Sadly this is another example of the dysfunction of Iraq’s current government. Maliki and his critics are as far apart as ever. The opposition suffers from deep divisions, which usually allows the prime minister to come out on top. This will not end until the next parliamentary elections in 2014 leaving these tit for tat reprisals as the main focus of the elite’s energies.

FOOTNOTES

1. Al-Rayy, “Saadi accused the President of the Judicial Council “fail” on the back of the cancellation of arrest warrants,” 7/12/11

SOURCES

AIN, “Sadrist MP elected as head of Justice & Accountability Committee,” 10/8/12

AK News, “Judicial institution proved its independence, says Ahrar bloc,” 9/13/12

Alsumaria, “The discriminatory denounce De Mahmood,” 2/19/13

- “Justice and Accountability: Denunciation de Mahmood and legal Badri began working,” 2/19/13

- “Reappointing Shanshal of Parliament headed accountability and government’s decision to void,” 2/18/13

International Crisis Group, “Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government,” 9/26/11

Al-Mada, “Shanshal announce the start of the audit request inclusion Medhat al-Mahmoud and some judges of accountability and justice,” 2/7/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “Adel Maliki demands JA to show legal evidence for including Medhat al-Mahmoud with its measures,” 2/15/13

- “BREAKING NEWS Medhat al-Mahmoud included in Justice, Accountability measures,” 2/13/13

- “Maliki assigns Bakhtiar Omar instead of Shanshal,” 2/18/13

- “Maliki cancels all decisions taken by the Accountability Commission during Shanshal’s presidency,” 2/18/13

-“Al-Maliki removes head of accountability and justice commission from his post,” 2/17/13

- “Sabah al-Saadi: accused Chairman of Federal Court as a great maker of dictatorship in Iraq,” 7/12/12

- “Sabah al-Saadi: The “Fetish” of Medhat al-Mahmoud has fallen,” 2/14/13

Al-Rayy, “Saadi accused the President of the Judicial Council “fail” on the back of the cancellation of arrest warrants,” 7/12/11

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraq panel clears senior judge over Saddam ties,” Associated Press, 2/19/13

Shafaq News, “Judge Hassan Humairi head of the Supreme Judicial Council,” 2/12/13

- “Maliki adviser: Shanshal’s assignment canceled,” 2/17/13

- “Parliament assigns Shanshal for the Accountability,” 2/18/13

- “Shanshal’s nomination withdrawn from Justice and Accountability Commission,” 2/19/13

Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 48,” 10/16/12

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/11

Sugarman, Eli and Al-Nidawi, Omar, “Back in Black The Return of Muqtada al-Sadr,” Foreign Affairs, 2/11/13

Visser, Reidar, “Iraq Gets A New De-Baathification Board but the Supreme Court Becomes a Parody,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 5/7/12

- “The Political Dynamics behind the Downfall of Midhat al-Mahmoud, Iraq’s Supreme Court Chief,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 2/15/13

Wicken, Stephen and Sullivan, Marisa, “2013 Iraq Update #7: De-Baathification Body Ousts Iraq’s Chief Justice as Protests Continue,” Institute for the Study of War, 2/15/13

“We Will Be Greeted As Liberators,” Why The Bush Administration Saw Iraq As A War Of Liberation

Before 2003, many members of the Bush White House held a rosy image of what the Iraq war would be like. Kenneth Adelman of the Defense Policy Board for example wrote an op ed for the Washington Post entitled “Cakewalk in Iraq.” Vice President Dick Cheney told NBC’s Meet The Press that Iraqis would see the Americans as liberators. These scenarios were based upon several factors including advice officials received from Middle East scholars and Iraqi exiles. Most importantly, President Bush and others were driven by their conviction that what they were doing was right, and therefore would have a positive affect in the end. The reality of what the invasion wrought in Iraq would quickly change Washington’s view of things.

Professors Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami were key in convincing Vice President Cheney that Iraq and the Middle East were ripe for democratization and a war of liberation (Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa)

The Bush administration was largely bereft of any high officials that knew about Iraq. There were several who were involved in the 1991 Gulf War such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, but actual knowledge of Iraq’s internal politics was lacking. Following the attacks on 9/11 Vice President Cheney attempted to fill in some of these gaps by asking experts to brief him about the Middle East and Islam such as Princeton Professor Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami then of Johns Hopkins. Lewis and Ajami held the view that the Middle East was a backward region, because of its dictatorships, corruption, extremists, and lack of cultural and economic development. They held Saddam Hussein as a prime example of the problems facing the Arab world. The two advocated the use of American military force to overthrow Saddam, and begin the process of modernization and democratization of the entire area. This would be greeted by locals they argued, because Arabs knew they had difficulties, but could not solve them themselves. In August 2002, the Vice President went public with some of these ideas in a speech at the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. “Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab “street,” the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans,’” said Cheney. This dovetailed with beliefs held by neoconservatives that the domestic policies of countries determined their foreign agendas. Countries that were run by autocrats who did not care about their own populations would not care about other countries, and were therefore more likely to cause problems in the international system such as wars. They also believed in the forceful promotion of democracy and human rights around the world using the American military. The ideas of thinkers like Lewis, Ajami, and the neoconservatives gave some ideological support to the President’s agenda of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. They gave moral weight to the administration’s argument that the invasion of Iraq would help not only the Iraqi people, but the region and the world in general.

Iraqi exiles also assured the president that Iraq would welcome the overthrow of Saddam. On January 10, 2003, author and member of the Iraqi National Congress Kanan Makiya, head of the Iraq Foundation Rend Rahim, and head of the Iraqi National Movement Hatem Muklis met with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and White House representative to the Iraqi opposition Zalmay Khalilzad in Washington. Makiya said that the invasion of Iraq would change America’s image in the Arab world from being a supporter of dictators to one of liberators, and that Iraqis were modern professionals who were waiting for the yoke of oppression to be thrown off them. He told the gathering that, “People will greet the [U.S.] troops with sweets and flowers.” Muklis on the other hand believed that if the Americans did not win over the public immediately after the overthrow of the regime they would turn on them, a warning that went unheeded. Cheney would later mention this meeting an interview with Tim Russert on NBC’s Meet The Press in March, just before the invasion. Russert asked the Vice President what would happen if the public did not welcome the Americans, and Iraq turned into a long and bloody occupation. Cheney responded, “I don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators. I’ve talked with a lot of Iraqis in the last several months myself, had them to the White House. … The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want is to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.” The meeting with Makiya, Rahim, and Muklis reassured the president and other administration officials that their course of action was a righteous one. For Cheney, their views only supported what he had already been hearing from Lewis and Ajami. Iraq was prime for regime change, something that the Iraqis themselves had been waiting for a long time.

Other members of the administration shared these ideas. In early 2003 for example, the CIA believed that the Shiites of southern Iraq would greet the Coalition forces after years of harsh treatment by Saddam. Operatives at the Agency even suggested that American flags should be sneaked into Iraq so that they could be waved as U.S. troops entered the country. That would be filmed and used as part of a propaganda campaign in the Arab world. The plan never got off the ground. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told Congress in February 2003 that post-war Iraq would be easier than the invasion, because Iraqis would embrace America. “I am reasonably certain that [Iraqis] will greet us as liberators, and that will help us to keep [post-war] requirements down,” he remarked. “We can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops [being necessary for post-invasion Iraq] is way off the mark,” the Deputy Defense Secretary continued. His comments came in response to Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki who warned Congress that America’s experience in the former Yugoslavia pointed to a large occupation force being necessary to maintain order after initial military operations were over. Wolfowitz was a neoconservative who was one of the strongest advocates of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East by invading Iraq. CIA Director George Tenet threw his support behind the President’s Iraq policy, and set up several groups within the Agency to deal with it. This showed that both true believers in the war, and some members of the long-term bureaucracy saw post-war Iraq as being the easy part of the war, because the Coalition would be embraced by the public opening the way for a quick conflict and an early exit.

Polling of Iraqis after the 2003 invasion showed that many did welcome the U.S, but quickly turned against it. In April 2003, nearly 50% of Iraqis saw the Americans as liberators. Half a year later in October, that had dramatically changed as only one in six held that view. In April 2004, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup survey found that 71% of Iraqis saw the U.S. as occupiers, 46% said that they had done more harm than good in Iraq, while only 19% said the U.S. were liberators. In June, only 2% of the public had a favorable opinion of the Coalition. As the polls showed, many people were happy that Saddam was overthrown. The post-war chaos that followed in the wake of the Coalition forces quickly spoiled that mood. It seemed as if Muklis was prophetic when he warned the White House that Iraqis would quickly turn on the Americans if they didn’t see immediate benefits from the invasion. 

President Bush believed in the liberation of Iraq and the spreading of democracy. Several members of his administration such as Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz shared those views. Middle Eastern experts and Iraqi exiles assured the White House that Iraq was ready for freedom, and could transform the region. Those predictions proved partially true when Coalition forces were initially welcomed in Iraq. The problem was the United States had no plans for what to do after the fall of Saddam, and things quickly turned sour. With no authority running the country anymore, Iraqis took matters into their own hands, and started looting and murdering as the Iraqi bureaucracy and police disappeared. Chaos was what the Americans ended up bringing to Iraq, which cost them any good will that might have initially been generated. This change in mood took a while to work its way up from the U.S. soldiers on the ground to Washington, but the White House did eventually give up its vision of Iraq as a quick war of liberation, and thereafter saw it as a long-term occupation that would hopefully end in a democracy in time.

SOURCES

Arquilla, John, “Evolution Of Attack,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/21/05

Battle, Joyce, “The Iraq War – Part I: The U.S. Prepares for Conflict, 2001,” National Security Archive, 9/22/10

Benjamin, Daniel and Simon, Steven, The Next Attack, New York: Times Books, 2005

Cheney, Vice President Dick, “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103^rd National Convention,” White House, 8/26/02

Diamond, John, Keen, Judy, Moniz, Dave, Page, Susan and Slavin, Barbara, “Iraq course set from tight White House circle,” USA Today, 9/11/02

Elliott, Michael and Carney, James, “First Stop, Iraq,” Time, 3/31/03

Fukuyama, Francis, America at the Crossroads, Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2006

Gordon, Michael, “’Catastrophic Success’ Poor Intelligence Misled Troops About Risk of Drawn-Out War,” New York Times, 10/20/04

Hertzberg, Hendrik, “Cakewalk,” New Yorker, 4/14/03

Meet The Press, “Interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney,” NBC, 3/16/03

Packer, George, The Assassins’ Gate, America In Iraq, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005

San Francisco Chronicle, “Majority of Iraqis eager to see foreign troops go, poll finds,” 5/1/04

Pace Of Refugee Returns To Iraq Picked Up In 2012

The number of Iraqi refugees returning to their homes saw a large increase in 2012. This was the second straight year that the number of people coming back went up after taking a large dip in 2010. In fact, four of the last five years has seen an annual return rate of over 200,000 people. The United Nations pointed to the improved security situation, and the money offered by the government as the main reasons why so many have decided to move. That ignored the most obvious motivation, which was the conflict next door in Syria, the country with the largest number of Iraqi expatriates in the world. Whatever the reason, the trend is for more and more people to take the path back to Iraq, which could mean in time the nation’s huge refugee problem could one day be resolved.

Iraqi refugees at UNHCR offices in Syria, 2010 (U.N.)

Almost two million displaced Iraqis have made the decision to return since 2003. In 2012, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recorded 301,060 people making the trip back. In 2011, 260,690 came back. That was more than double the rate for 2010 when only 118,890 made the trip due to uncertainty over national elections that occurred that year. Before that 204,830 returned in 2009, 221,260 in 2008, while there was a large drop in 2007 with only 81,420 coming back. That last year was when violence increased in the country due to the American Surge. 2008 saw the end of the civil war, which accounts for why four of the last five years has seen 200,000 plus returnees per annum. In total, from 2003 to 2012, 1,859,966 displaced and refugees have come back to their homes. The most common figures for the total number of Iraqi refugees is 2.5 million, and 2.7 million displaced, although some believe there might be far fewer. If those statistics are accurate, just over one-third have since reversed course and come back. With the current trend there appears little reason to believe that in a decade or so most of the displaced and refugees might return as well. Despite the terrorist attacks, security in Iraq is rather stable, the booming oil industry is pumping in large amounts of money into the economy, both of which mean the majority of people have returned to their normal lives, and are looking for opportunities. That gives ample reasons enough for displacement to eventually end.

Overall Returns 2003-2012

2003: Displaced 0, Refugees 55,429, Total 55,429

2004: Displaced 98,000, Refugees 193,997, Total 291,997

2005: Displaced 98,000, Refugees 56,155, Total 154,155

2006: Displaced 150,000, Refugees 20,235, Total 170,235

2007: Displaced 36,000 Refugees 45,420, Total 81,420

2008: Displaced 195,890, Refugees 25,370, Total 221,260

2009: Displaced 167,740, Refugees 37,090, Total 204,830

2010: Displaced 92,480, Refugees 26,410, Total 118,890

2011: Displaced 193,610, Refugees 67,080, Total 260,690

2012: Displaced 216,160, Refugees 84,900, Total 301,060

TOTAL: 1,859,966

During 2012, the rate of return and where people went was not even throughout the year. 206,530 people went back to Baghdad. That was followed by 42,940 going to Diyala, 10,590 to Anbar, and 7,410 to Ninewa. In comparison, no one went back to Sulaymaniya, 220 returned to Dohuk, and 770 went back to Irbil last year. Over the course of 2012, the number of people coming back also went up and down. January to May saw a steady flow of people returning peaking at 33,940 in April. There was a large drop in June to 18,560, before going back up in July to 28,420, which continued until September. In the last three months the numbers went back down to 19,090 in October, 15,350 in November, and 11,890 in December. Baghdad has the largest population out of Iraq’s eighteen governorates, and was also the center of fighting for much of the Iraq War. For those reasons the majority of displaced, refugees, and returns all come from there. Like Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, and Ninewa also saw major conflicts and displacement. Kurdistan on the other hand, saw very few people forced out after 2003. The reason why the rate of return was inconsistent is far harder to determine since people came from so many different places.

Returns By Province 2012

Baghdad 206,530

Diyala 42,940

Anbar 10,590

Ninewa 7,410

Basra 6,730

Karbala 4,840

Najaf 4,710

Babil 4,210

Salahaddin 3,490

Tamim 2,070

Dhi Qar 1,940

Wasit 1,920

Maysan 1,670

Irbil 770

Muthanna 580

Qadisiyah 440

Dohuk 220

Sulaymaniya 0

Total Returns By Month 2012

Jan. 29,680

Feb. 32,950

Mar. 27,540

Apr. 33,940

May 30,590

Jun. 18,560

Jul. 28,420

Aug. 24,220

Sep. 28,820

Oct. 19,090

Nov. 15,360

Dec. 11,890

For seven of the last ten years, more internally displaced have come back compared to refugees, and 2012 was no exception. Last year, 216,160 displaced made the trip back, while 84,900 refugees did so. That was up from 193,610 displaced and 67,080 refugees in 2011. For the latter, 7,440 came back in January 2012, peaking at 8,330 in April, before dropping in June to 3,010. Eventually they went back up to 10,260 in September before seeing a steady decline for the rest of the year. 56,930 came back from Syria in 2012, followed by 6,855 from Iran, and 2,820 from Jordan. The displaced followed almost the exact same pattern with high numbers from January to May with over 20,000 returns each month, before going down in June to 15,550. The figures then went back up to 18,560 in September, and then went down to 6,130 in December. The fighting in Syria was obviously a strong reason for many Iraqis to leave that country, and go back home. From 2009-2010 the UNHCR recorded 29,135 Iraqis returning from Syria. That jumped to 28,230 in 2011, and then 56,930 last year. With the civil war raging there with no end in sight, a growing flow of refugees is likely to come back to Iraq in the near future. There was an increase in people returning from Iran as well going from 11,905 from 2009-2010 to 24,870 from 2011-2012. Those people, along with the internally displaced are most likely making the trip because of the improved security in Iraq. While many internal refugees have settled in their new homes, many still yearn to go back to their home provinces. With the decline in violence, and the offer of aid from the government there have been increasing numbers of people willing to take the chance and start again in their original residences.

Refugee Returns By Month 2012

Jan. 7,440

Feb. 7,910

Mar. 6,590

Apr. 8,330

May 6,370

Jun. 3,010

Jul. 4,300

Aug. 8,830

Sep. 10,260

Oct. 7,100

Nov. 6,360

Dec. 5,760

Refugee Return By Country 2012

Syria 56,930

Iran 6,855

Jordan 2,820

Sweden 2,545

Egypt 1,565

UAE 1,495

USA 1,120

Germany 955

England 843

Netherlands 720

Denmark 705

Others 685

Yemen 675

Australia 660

Libya 615

Lebanon 595

Canada 645

Saudi Arabia 350

Norway 325

Oman 255

Turkey 215

Malaysia 150

Sudan 105

Belgium 95

Kuwait 95

Greece 90

Finland 85

Italy 75

Romania 75

Displaced Returns By Month 2012

Jan. 22,240

Feb. 25,040

Mar. 20,950

Apr. 25,610

May 24,220

Jun. 15,550

Jul. 24,120

Aug. 15,390

Sep. 18,560

Oct. 11,990

Nov. 9,000

Dec. 6,130

Iraq has one of the largest refugee populations in the world. This started long before the 2003 invasion, and had its origins with the ruthless dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The toppling of his regime, the ensuing chaos, and then the sectarian war that followed caused thousands more Iraqis to flee their homes. With that conflict now over, tens of thousands of Iraqis have decided to go home, and see if they can rebuild their lives. While there are still a large number of people displaced, it’s not too hard to imagine that within a decade or so most of them will have either decided to settle where they are or make the trip back. That will mean this refugees saga might finally see an end.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Four Years of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 4/13/10

IRIN, “MIDDLE EAST: Iraqi refugees – interpreting the statistics,” 12/28/10

UNHCR Iraq Operation, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – December 2012,” UNHCR Iraq Operation, February 2013

Human Rights Watch: Iraq’s Kurdistan Limiting Freedom Of the Press And Speech

Human Rights Watch recently released a report on abuses that occurred in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2012. It noted that the authorities were carrying out arbitrary arrests and harassing journalists and critics of the government. When officials were interviewed about these cases they said that the charges against the KRG were either made-up or lies perpetrated by the press. One said that the KRG had to work outside of the law to deal with increasing pressure from the public and media. This followed a report by Human Rights Watch that found the same practices happening in the rest of the country. Kurdistan likes to call itself “the other Iraq,” but Human Rights Watch found that it is much like Baghdad when it comes to dealing with dissenters.

Media that have questioned the Kurdish government have faced harassment. There have been arbitrary arrests without warrants, detentions for long periods, and defamation lawsuits filed against them. The authorities issued orders to follow the June 2012 Draft Law to Protect Sanctities, which would make insults against religious and national symbols illegal, even thought it has not bee passed by the regional parliament. A KRG foreign relations official told Human Rights Watch (HRW) that the government had to act outside the law, because it was facing new pressures from the public and the press. The fact that many of these people were demanding that the KRG be held accountable didn’t seem to stop it from using extrajudicial methods to silence them. The ruling parties have been in power since the 1990s, and have shown little patience for those that question their rule. The treatment of reporters is a perfect example of that.

Kurdistan Journalists Association’s press conference reporting violations against the press in the first half of 2012 (Shafaq News)

Human Rights Watch documented several specific cases of members of the media and critics being harassed and arrested by the security forces. In April 2012, the editor of Bashour magazine was arrested after published two articles criticizing officials. One piece said that public workers stole 206 million dinars, and another said that the brother of President Massoud Barzani received $2 million in a business deal. The editor was held for three days, released, then picked up again by soldiers, and held for three additional days. He is now facing defamation charges. The director of KNN TV was arrested for broadcasting a piece in June 2012, which interviewed public employees who charged members of the Irbil provincial council of stealing money. The director was later convicted of insulting a council member in October, and charged a $1,300 fine. Anonymous people told him that it he had apologized to the politicians the charges would have been dropped. A lawyer said that he was arrested, and held for six days in Chamchamal in October 2012 after he wrote an article accusing judges of being loyal to the ruling parties. He was told that a judge accused him of defamation, but he was never charged with that crime, and eventually released. That was just a fraction of the 50 cases that were recorded by HRW for 2012. It was supported by Kurdish organization as well that have found similar abuses. The Kurdistan Journalists Association in Irbil for example, reported 43 violations against journalists in the first half of 2012 alone, including 22 attacks upon reporters, seven assaults, four being threatened with death, and two cases of fines. The Metro Center for Defending Journalists recorded over 100 complaints such as 50 arrests, 34 cases of equipment being seized, 21 assaults, and five reporters being killed during 2012. Kurdistan has laws that protect the right of journalists to report stories about the government as long as they are supported by evidence. As these cases show, this legislation is often ignored. In fact, the attitude of the authorities is that these stories are an affront to their public standing. In talks with Human Rights Watch for example, various officials said that they would not stand for any accusations of corruption against the ruling parties, that these stories were “violating the human rights of the government,” and that the articles were all based upon lies. It’s those feelings that lead to reporters and others being picked up and detained or sued in Kurdistan.

Human Rights Watch also found cases of the KRG limiting protests. On February 17, 2012, hundreds of security forces surrounded around 150-200 people in Sulaymaniya City who were attempting to commemorate the 2011 protests that occurred there. The security forces beat up the activists, as well as reporters trying to cover the event. Two journalists were arrested as well. The police continued to crackdown on both demonstrators and reporters who attempted to mark the anniversary for the rest of the month. People originally began assembling in Sulaymaniya in 2011 to protest against the monopolization of power and corruption of the ruling parties. They lasted for several months. The government gave lip service to their demands, but in the end resorted to force to break them up. This showed that the Kurdish parties were not only unwilling to carry out any meaningful reforms, but would not stand for people who publicly questioned their rule either. Like with the media, the security forces were used against those that decided to speak out.

Finally, there was the case of Akram Abdul Karim, a former customs officer who accused leading officials of theft. In November 2011, Karim told Livin Press that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was confiscating many of the custom fees collected at the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing with Turkey. He later told Naliya TV that the money was going to KRG Premier Nechirvan Barzani. As a result, Karim was arrested, beaten, and denied a lawyer for up to three weeks. He was later charged with violating national security, because he talked about classified material. Karim is still being held in Dohuk with no court date set for his case. Rather than investigating Karim’s stories, the police decided to arrest him, beat him, and still holds him to this day. Again, the government proved uninterested in questions about how it ran the region, and decided to muzzle a critic instead.

Kurdistan might be more peaceful and stable than the rest of Iraq, but the way it deals with the media and dissenters is the same as the central government. Neither takes criticism well, and readily uses the security forces against those that question them. That shows that rule of law is weak, and the politicization of the police and armed forces. Iraq does have a large number of media outlets, something that is new to the country after decades of dictatorial rule. At the same time, the country is one of the most corrupt in the world. That provides a plethora of stories to report and protest about. The problem is anyone that chooses to do so faces the risk of raising the ire of the elite, and could be arrested, beaten, and held for long periods in retaliation. Until Iraq’s political parties understand that they have to respect those that differ in opinion, and that accountability is part of good governance, these abuses will continue.

SOURCES

Ahmed, Hevidar, “Kurdistan’s Border Revenue Scandal,” Rudaw, 12/1/11

Human Rights Watch, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Free Speech Under Attack; Government Critics, Journalists Arbitrarily Detained, Prosecuted for Criticizing,” 2/10/13

Kurdistan Tribune, “”Border point taxes are pocketed by KDP deputies” claims ex-security boss,” 11/27/11

Saifaddin, Dilshad, “Two journalists arrested in Sulaimaniya,” AK News, 2/17/12

Shafaq News, “43 cases of violation against journalists in Kurdistan,” 7/17/12

How The U.S. Reconstruction Effort Came Apart During Iraq’s Sectarian Civil War

The United States project to rebuild Iraq had been beset by problems the day it started in 2003. When the civil war started in 2005 it complicated matters more as security steadily declined. Things got worse after the bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006. In the next four days approximately 1,300 people were killed. 25,000 were eventually displaced. The sectarian cleansing of Baghdad began as the Shiite militias went on the offensive. The Iraqi government and the United States were overwhelmed by the situation. Reconstruction of the country was thrown into disarray as a result just as American officials were trying to change directions.

The violence that was unleashed after the bombing at Samarra greatly impeded the U.S. rebuilding effort. First, the program was run out of Baghdad. Movement throughout the city and entering and leaving it became very difficult as militias, insurgents, and local neighborhoods created informal checkpoints to protect their areas from attack. Parts of the capital were declared no go zones for the U.S. Iraqi professionals and public workers also begin fleeing the capital in a massive brain drain. That further impaired the capacity of the government, which was already poor. The Iraqi authorities were now even less able to run the infrastructure that they were being left with. The ability of the Americans to monitor and manage projects became greatly impaired as well.

The outbreak of civil conflict came as the United States was attempting to change the emphasis of its rebuilding program. 2006 was the year that the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF2) was coming to an end, which emphasized large infrastructure projects using major American corporations such as Bechtel. These were long-term efforts that would take years to impact the country. The U.S. was now trying to move towards small and medium sized projects that would have immediate effects, and include more Iraqi companies and local communities out in the provinces. The two tools that would be used to achieve these goals would be the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was distributed by local military units, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This was part of the new Clear, Hold and Build counterinsurgency strategy put together by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and the White House. There were many problems in this transition. First, some U.S. officials didn’t see the necessity of the medium term projects, and refused to approve them. Second, there wasn’t enough funding, and there were delays in budgeting and acquisition. That meant that the nine cities that were supposed to be targeted by the new campaign in the summer of 2006 was reduced to four. The PRTs were not adequately staffed, lacked money, and there were disputes between agencies over who would have responsibility over them. Finally, there were disagreements within the administration over whether the new strategy should be initiated to begin with. These all undermined the effectiveness of the new counterinsurgency plan. Without a unified stance, there was no way the Americans were going to be able to carry out the new strategy. That on top of the increased violence meant restoring and securing the country suffered.

Still, the U.S. pressed ahead with a new focus upon agriculture. Farming was the second largest industry after oil in Iraq, and employed 25-30% of the workforce, so it had great potential to effect a large part of the population. It faced major problems. It was behind in techniques and technology, because it had been cut off from innovations due to sanctions imposed in 1990. Production had largely collapsed as a result, and there were problems with irrigation, water supply, and salinity. This started a large exodus of people from the countryside to the cities in search of jobs. Farming had been largely overlooked in the first three years of the reconstruction program. IRRF2 didn’t fund any agriculture projects for example, but the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did get the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to work with the Agriculture Ministry. The new U.S. effort focused upon reforming the Agriculture Ministry into becoming more of a regulatory body rather than a manager, and helping to modernize the industry. While the Americans repaired a large amount of farm equipment, and started long-term planning for land and water use, it wasn’t able to change the overall situation. Iraqis were still using mostly 1980s techniques, output was below pre-war levels, there were few market-based mechanisms, and the lack of services like a steady supply of electricity hurt production. The Agriculture Ministry was still controlling important inputs like fertilizer and seeds, as it does to this day. All the U.S. was able to accomplish was put a bandage upon a declining industry.

Another major focus of the Americans was the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In June 2005, President Bush announced that the United States wanted the Iraqis to take responsibility for security. This was stated in a number of speeches by the president where he said, “As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.” What was left unstated was that this was just the latest version of the withdrawal plan, because as more Iraqi units were stood up that would eventually allow the American forces to pull out. The ISF had already become the largest expenditure in U.S. reconstruction funds. The problem was the Americans were pushing for immediate results in a process that would take years to come to fruition. First, too many Iraqi units were put out into the field before they were ready, and performed poorly or disintegrated as a result. That caused continuous changes in the training program. Second, Iraqi institutions were not ready to manage the forces. Budgeting, acquisition, and maintenance were all weak within the Defense Ministry. Corruption also siphoned off huge amounts of money. The U.S. tried to help with this process by skipping the Iraqi procurement system, and used the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program instead. The amount of equipment the Iraqis needed however, overwhelmed the FMS, leading to huge delays. Of the $1.7 billion in orders placed in 2006, only $300 million had arrived by 2007. The U.S. also setup a modern financial and accounting system within the Defense Ministry, but this was based upon American norms, which were completely foreign to the Iraqis, and proved to be a failure. By the end of 2006, more and more Iraqi units were finally considered ready to take the lead in operations, and two provinces were transferred to local control. There was still a lot of work ahead, and any hopes of withdrawing would have to be put on hold as a result.

A far more difficult task was handling the Iraqi police. Training for the force had always been haphazard and uncoordinated. 2006 was coined the “Year of the Police” as the program was reformed with more trainers being sent. The major problem was the divided control of the police. The Interior Ministry was split between rival political factions, while the local police came under the influence of tribes, religious groups, families, and parties as well. In April 2005 for instance, Bayan Jabr of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq became Interior Minister. He immediately began recruiting members of his Badr Brigade militia into the force, especially the National Police. They were accused of running death squads, and kidnapping and torturing Sunnis. Jawad Bolani replaced Jabr in 2006, and attempted to reform the National Police. He replaced seven out of nine brigade commanders, 17 out of 26 battalion chiefs, and made all of the units go for retraining. That didn’t stop abuses by the unit. A U.S. review later recommended that the National Police be completely disbanded, because they were too corruption and sectarian. That never happened as the U.S. military still felt that the force could be reformed, and was needed to counter the insurgency. Another issue was the location of the Interior Ministry headquarters in Baghdad by Sadr City. For several years it was too dangerous for many employees to go to work with dozens of workers being killed. Like the Defense Ministry, corruption was also widespread. Attempts at vetting the police proved ineffective, because it only worked when commanders were willing and able to overcome all the local and national pressures they faced from those who wanted control over the security forces. Last, American civilian officials were worried about the militarization of the police. The U.S. military took control of all training of the ISF, and many times regular units, not the Military Police were responsible for much of this. That meant routine police work like investigating cases and arrest procedures were ignored for paramilitary training on weapons use and raids to be used against militants. That was a job no police force was built for, but the Americans wanted to employ them in the counterinsurgency strategy nonetheless. The problem as ever was the lack of civilian trainers, which had been a recurring issue since the 2003 invasion. The effects of all these would be that the Iraqi police would lag far behind the armed forces in terms of readiness and professionalism. In fact, to this day many of these problems still afflict the force.

A final area the Americans attempted to focus upon was the Iraqi court system. There were a large number of U.S. agencies working on rule of law. That caused problems with coordination and a unified effort. In 2005, Ambassador Khalilzad created the Rule of Law Task Force. It didn’t have a manager until 2006, and wasn’t given real authority until 2007. The U.S. also tried to bring together the various Iraqi ministries and officials involved in the matter. One success story was the support given to the Central Criminal Court, which mostly dealt with terrorism cases. It was given protection within the Green Zone and new facilities. The rest of the system was suffering. The number of detainees was overwhelming the bureaucracy. There weren’t enough judges, workers to handle the files, and prisons and jails. The attempt to deal with those issues proved unsuccessful, and the regular Iraqi courts were neglected. One U.S. legal adviser said that the Americans only cared about the Central Criminal Court, because it suited their goals of fighting the insurgency, and did little for the rest of the justice system. Regular courts also came under attack by militants with lawyers and judges being killed. Corruption and political influence played a huge role with the judiciary as well, making an impartial ruling a rarity. Iraq had so many problems with the various parts of the government that the Americans could never deal with all of them at the same time. The pressing need for security meant that the ISF would get the most attention, while other parts of the government were going to be overlooked even though they were important parts in dealing with militants. The justice system was an example of the latter.  

2006 was a year of transition for both the Americans and Iraqis. The civil war went into overdrive after the Samarra bombing, and the number of deaths skyrocketed. Large parts of the country were torn apart by the fighting with Baghdad at the center of it all. That made governing the country even more difficult than it already was as public workers were killed or couldn’t go to work, because it was too dangerous. At the same time, the U.S. was attempting to move towards a more targeted reconstruction effort that would support its new counterinsurgency program. Work with the Iraqi military proved the most effective, while the other parts were mixed like with the police to complete failures like the attempt to reform agriculture. In the end, the new Clear, Hold, and Build strategy proved incapable of stemming the violence or improving services and the economy. The events of 2006 simply proved too much for the U.S. to handle. That led to outside reviews like the Iraq Study Group, internal studies within the administration, and the firing of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The result would be another change in direction in 2007 with the Surge.

SOURCES

CNN, “Death Squads,” 3/25/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program, “Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priority In Iraq,” United States Agency for International Development, 10/4/12

Wing, Joel, “From Bad To Worse, How Militias Moved Into the Iraqi Police Force, And The United States Failed At Nation Building. Part Two Of An Interview With Jerry Burke, Former Advisor To The Baghdad Police And Interior Ministry,” Musings On Iraq, 2/13/12