Update On Iraq’s Insurgency Interview With Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

 

Iraq’s insurgency continues to make gains across central Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) now just the Islamic State (IS) is in the vanguard of this war, but other groups such as the Baathist Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshibandi (JRTN) and its Military Councils, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, the Mujahadeen Army, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and others are involved. In many areas where ISIS has moved into it is attempting to dominate these other organizations. For an update on the situation is Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi who has extensively researched Syrian and Iraqi militant groups. He can be followed on Twitter at @ajaltamimi.

1. ISIS has been in the headlines during the current surge in violence, but in Anbar it doesn’t seem to have the same hold it does in other provinces. So what groups are active there and what are they doing?

If we start with Fallujah, which has been the city in Anbar the longest out of government hands since January [2014], the media made much of the ISIS parade and hoisting the banner there, but six months later ISIS still doesn’t exercise full control over the area. They are sharing power with a military council, which is composed of representatives of a variety of insurgent groups in the Fallujah area who are backed by local tribesmen. They include the local front-group branch of the Naqshibandi (i.e. the Fallujah branch of the General Military Council for Iraq’s Revolutionaries), the 1920s Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and others. Evidence that ISIS is still somewhat cautious of asserting itself too far is the fact that it hasn’t issued the equivalent of that city charter that it issued for Mosul, which details Islamic regulations like compelling women to wear modest dress, vowing to destroy idols, and so on. The city charter was a very clear indication of a rejection of Baathism equally as much as the “Safavid” republic, which is referring to the Shiite led government. In Fallujah ISIS still doesn’t have a full monopoly on power, but I’m sure its position has grown over time because they have the financial resources to engage in outreach.

If we go further out into the wider Fallujah area, for example like al-Garmah it’s not just ISIS. You have ISIS and their number one rival insurgent group in that area Jaish al-Mujahadeen, which is a nationalist-Islamist group that aspires to overthrow the central government, but is at the same time anti-Shiite in outlook.

The Islamic State holds both sides of the border with Al Qaim in Anbar and Al-Bukamal in Syria and even won the allegiance of members of Syria's Jabhat al-Nusra (Wikipedia)

In terms of the majority of recent gains made by the overall insurgency in Anbar against federal forces I think it is fair to say ISIS spearheaded or went it alone for the majority of those operations. If you look back at the controversy in April surrounding incursions into other areas of Anbar east of Fallujah and Ramadi like Zuba there were competing claims for credit from both ISIS and the JRTN’s front group the General Military Council. ISIS accused the General Military Council of stealing credit for operations, and reminded the other factions that its goal is to build a caliphate and anyone who opposes that project is its enemy. It subsequently emerged via a Military Council spokesman from Fallujah that it was actually just ISIS that carried out those incursions. Secondly, in terms of the recent gains in western Anbar like Rawa, al-Qaim, Ana, and so on it’s apparent that’s been spearheaded by ISIS particularly with al-Qaim. What happened there was once ISIS moved into the town they then went over to the other side of the border into Syria’s al-Bukamal as well, which had been controlled for some time by Jabhat al-Nusra, which is Al Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate. Jabhat al-Nusra, faced with the prospect of ISIS moving into al-Bukamal pledged allegiance to it. For a time ISIS controlled the majority of al-Bukamal, and other factions there basically acquiesced to ISIS’s rule, but it seems renewed fighting has broken out as rebels in al-Bukamal and reinforcements called in from elsewhere in Deir az-Zor province have sought to expel ISIS, which in turn has called up reinforcements from al-Qaim. So I think that’s a clear indication of who is calling the shots in al-Qaim and the other western Anbar towns need to be seen in that light as well. Although I have seen reports that local General Military Council militants operate in western Anbar as well, but again, I think it’s clear the gains in that area have been spearheaded by ISIS.

What’s interesting about far western Anbar is that with the initial wave of breakdown in government control sweeping across northern and western Iraq, rebels from the Syrian side of the border took advantage of the situation to make incursions and seize weaponry to defend themselves against ISIS on the Syrian side of the border, as ISIS had swiftly sent army HUMVEES taken from the Mosul offensive to its Hasakah province stronghold of ash-Shaddadi to be deployed in Deir az-Zor to conquer the remainder of the province.

Captured Iraqi Humvees being transported to Syria by IS (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

The incursions by rebels from Syria into western Anbar may well have been facilitated by local tribesmen, and historically there are strong links between al-Bukamal and al-Qa’im even as the two localities were separated by provincial boundaries going back to the Ottoman era. Moreover, over the course of last year, the local leadership of at least two local groupings in al-Bukamal (Jabhat al-Nusra and a similarly aligned battalion called Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya) had participated in fighting in Iraq against government forces, working with ISIS in the days before widespread infighting broke out in Syria. However, the case of western Anbar demonstrates a pattern repeatedly seen where other insurgents might create the initial security vacuum but ISIS fills that gap eventually.

2. Let’s go to Mosul. There ISIS came in, but then people were speculating how they could take such a large city, so it obviously must have been working with other groups. Then afterward as you mentioned it issued a code of conduct for the city, so it’s pretty clear that ISIS led that attack. Who else is operating in Mosul?

IS parade in Mosul with captured ISF vehicles (via Alexandre Massimo)

If you look at the initial claims that were made in Mosul it was that the western half of the city fell, and from there the rest of the city fell out of government hands. The problem is the other insurgent factions tend not to admit to coordination. If you just read the ISIS Ninawa provincial feed you would think that it was just ISIS who seized those areas. On the other hand, the General Military Council, which as I said is the Naqshibandi (JRTN) front group, issued a statement saying that “all” the rebel factions in Mosul liberated the western side of the city. If you look at past evidence from before the fall of Mosul it is clear that other factions besides ISIS took part in the fall of the city most notably JRTN and Jamaat Ansar al-Islam. However I think there the gains were still spearheaded by ISIS. Secondly ISIS seized the bulk of financial assets and new military equipment in the city.

If you look at the way these groups present themselves in Mosul there’s been lots of evidence of ISIS parades in the city since its fall, while the evidence from the other groups has been more about showing the weaponry they captured or destroyed. The General Military Council’s output has featured destroyed Army HUMVEES for example. I have no doubt these other groups like JRTN and others played an auxiliary role in the capture of the city, but I’d stress it was an auxiliary one. The city charter issued by ISIS indicates a clear intention in the long run to exert sole control over the city. I think they will be able to do so because they’ve made so much money from the area from extortion and so on. We also have to consider that recent pledge of allegiance of dozens of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam members to ISIS. ISIS and Jamaat Ansar al-Islam clashed many times in Mosul, but I would say that ISIS had the upper hand in the clashes because it had better weaponry, more manpower, and better finances. I think it is quite clear that members of these other insurgent groups are fearful of ISIS’s power. While evidence currently suggests that ISIS hasn’t fully implemented the terms of their city charter particularly with regards to alcohol and cigarette smoking and so on, it has to be noted that the same was true of Raqqa, which is ISIS’s de facto capital in Syria. For some time ISIS didn’t fully implement its vision of Islamic law in that city either. For example, for many months before they gained full control of the city in January of this year, ISIS was putting up billboards stipulating that women should wear the hijab according to sharia [i.e. niqab], but that didn’t become prevalent until ISIS seized full control of the city. So I think there are clearly other factions in Mosul, but ISIS is the major faction there, and they have the means to reach out to the locals, and have the bulk of the weapons. In the scenario of future infighting in Mosul ISIS would likely succeed in completely expelling other insurgent groups from the town, and I think the longer the other insurgent groups tolerate ISIS then the more difficult it will be for them to dislodge ISIS.

3. After the fall of Mosul insurgents moved south. In Kirkuk almost the entire western half of the province fell, so who is doing what there?

Image posted on social media when idea of Jamaat Ansar al-Islama and Jaish al-Mujahadeen cooperation was proposed in Kirkuk (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

Kirkuk's Hawija used to be a Naqshibani stronghold but IS has now asserted control over it (AFP)

Kirkuk is interesting because areas like Hawija have traditionally been associated with JRTN. So for example, the Hawija protest site from last year was managed by Intifada Ahrar Al-Iraq, which is the activist wing of the JRTN. In particular an interesting trend more recently was this output from Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and Jaish al-Mujahadeen suggesting brotherhood and coordination in the Hawija area. That seemed to be a trend dating back to April. There were these hints of forging a closer relationship between those two groups as a counter to ISIS. There were apparent proposals of a cease-fire between ISIS and Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in April, but those failed because ISIS ultimately sees itself as a state and wouldn’t except third party independent arbitration of their disputes with other groups. So there was that dimension. There has also been evidence of JRTN activity in particular in the seizure of army bases and weaponry, and the destruction of Iraqi Army equipment. Again I think you see the same pattern coming where again ISIS places emphasis upon raids and hoisting their banner. So you’ve seen ISIS raising their banner at Sulaiman Bek and also Hawija in the main square and they held a parade there. I’d say that is indicative of the pattern I mentioned above where the other insurgent groups might play the initial role in destabilizing government control and seizing an area and creating a vacuum, and then ISIS moves in and fills that gap with an emphasis upon the urban areas. So in the urban area of Hawija ISIS seems to have asserted itself. To give a parallel example at the Fallujah Dam [in Anbar], which was initially seized by JRTN in January [2014], ISIS later filled that gap.

Jaish al-Mujahadeen video in Hawija, Kirkuk driving a captured Iraqi Army T-55 tank (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

4. Salahaddin appears to be where most of the heavy fighting is going on. The Baiji refinery has been attacked over and over again, Samarra is a really important city for the militias because of the Askari shrine there, and the Iraqi forces just launched an operation in Tikrit. What’s going on there?

The crucial initial event there was the fall of Tikrit actually, which involved not only ISIS guys coming in from the north, but from the west as well. As I recall the General Military Council claimed involvement through moving in on the southern entrance into Tikrit. Jamaat Ansar al-Islam also posted a photo where they hoisted their banner over one of the entrances to the city. So again I think multiple insurgent groups moved in on the city, but again ISIS seems to have spearheaded the offensive. Since then they’ve asserted themselves by putting their banner up in one of the central points of the city. They also crucially executed hundreds of army soldiers in the Tikrit area. Again in terms of other [militant] output it’s more of the same where the other insurgent groups put the emphasis upon taking new military equipment from army bases, but when it comes to power it’s ISIS who have asserted power within the center of Tikrit.

Jamaat Ansar Al-Islam raising their banner at one of the entrances to Tikrit showing they were involved in taking the city (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

IS's banner in the center of Tikrit shows whose in control of Tikrit (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

 

The Islamic State is in the lead in Salahaddin's Baiji, Tikrit and the attack upon Samarra (Defence Point)

Also in Baiji it’s largely under ISIS control again. It held a military parade there. They’re not the only faction within that city, but I think the way things are going they will assert themselves there as they have done in Tikrit.

Samarra is relevant because there had been an offensive into the city only days before the fall of Mosul. The evidence for that suggests that it was an ISIS led offensive. Samarra is also relevant because of the role of Shiite militiamen have been involved in the fighting. Asaib Ahl al-Iraq lost at least one fighter in the defense of the city that [initially] pushed ISIS out. More recently Kataib Hezbollah with their new front group the Popular Defense Brigades also lost two fighters in that area and crucially pro-government outlets like al-Masalah have readily reported on the role the Popular Defense Brigades have played in assisting government forces in the fight to retake Tikrit.

Much of the media reporting seems to be focused on the fight for the Baiji refinery. I think the evidence for that shows that ISIS is involved, but I think other insurgent groups seem to be playing an auxiliary role in the fighting there.

Overall I think Salahaddin province mimics the picture of what’s going on in the other provinces. Again it is ISIS that spearheads most of these attempts to rest these new areas from government control. I think the second most relevant dimension is the role of Shiite militiamen and their concern about the “defense of the shrine” narrative, which has been mentioned previously by Phillip Smyth.

5. Diyala really hasn’t been getting much press, but there’s been fighting there for a while too. So who is active in Diyala province?

In Diyala province again ISIS has been there as well. They’ve played off sectarian tensions there for some time, and that’s going back to at least last year. Shiite militiamen are there as well, and that’s not a new phenomenon. So for example I’ve mentioned before in my work about complaints about Asaib Ahl Al-Haq operating there with impunity, and causing displacement of Sunnis within Diyala province going back to last year. ISIS has played off of that to build local support.

Islamic Army of Iraq fighters hold a Shiite banner captured in Diyala (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

On the other hand, Diyala is interesting because there’s photographic evidence of the Islamic Army of Iraq being active there. The Islamic Army of Iraq is disliked by most of the other insurgent factions because after the U.S. withdrawal it set up an activist wing Al-Herak Ash-Sha’abi as-Sunni, the Sunni Popular Movement, which sought by peaceful means to achieve a Sunni federal region. That was seen as being too moderate by other factions like Jaish al-Mujahadeen that have always been rejectionists towards the central government. Again, the JRTN front, the General Military Council, is there and I’m sure they have been coordinating with ISIS in the contested areas like Jalwala and Azim.

There’s a third element at play as with the Kirkuk area with the Kurdish aspirations to use this opportunity to take the disputed territories. I’m not saying it is wholly opportunistic. I think most people in practice would prefer to see a place like Kirkuk and some of these Diyala areas come under KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] control rather than insurgent control, but nonetheless one has to remember that this is not a recipe for stability in the long run because the Sunni insurgent groups hate the central government, but that doesn’t mean they look favorably upon the KRG either. Interestingly, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam has some Kurdish members although it is mostly Sunni Arab now, but it considers the KRG and peshmerga apostates. So neither in Kirkuk nor in Diyala will simply having the peshmerga in these contested areas lead to stability in the long run as long as the Sunni Arab insurgency is so active.

6. Northern Babil province has been under insurgent control for a while now. The security forces have launched operation after operation there saying that it is cleared, and then go right back in a week or two later.

In northern Babil's Iskandiriya, Jurf al-Sakhr and Musayib it is just the Islamic State carrying out attacks (IraqSlogger)

Babil province is interesting because it is essentially just ISIS. There is no evidence to suggest that other insurgent groups are operating there, and more over the evidence shows that ISIS has been active in these hot spot areas both now as ISIS and as its predecessor the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) for a number of years now even during the height of the Surge when there was still a large U.S. presence. The security forces were not able to build sufficient trust with the local population to crackdown on ISI or ISIS. In the same way that ISI and ISIS were never dislodged from Mosul ISIS and its previous incarnation have been in Jurf al-Sakhr and Iskandiriya and Musayib for a long time. I think that exemplifies a fundamental problem that goes beyond just who is prime minister. Of course the prime minister is the commander and chief of the armed forces, but ultimately what goes on on the ground and how the security forces conduct their operations alienates locals, and I think that is a problem that pervades the entire military culture. That’s not just true of Iraq but of the wider Middle East and North Africa.

7. Lets do the last province Baghdad. Obviously that is the goal of all the insurgent groups to reach the capital and overthrow the government. Are there any other groups that have claimed operations there besides ISIS?

Yes, if we look at Tarmiya and Taji in northern Baghdad province there has been video evidence of operations by the Naqshibandi front group the General Military Council. Also there’s been this minor insurgent brand called Kataib Thwar al-Sunna who have carried out IED attacks in the Baghdad suburbs. However I haven’t seen any other output from them for a couple months now. As a brand it seems like it just doesn’t compete with ISIS. The operations in Taji by the Naqshibandi are primarily mortar rounds and IEDs, and that doesn’t suggest anything like mounting a full-scale offensive on the city in the way ISIS is emphasizing through its rhetoric. ISIS talks about the “greatest battle of Baghdad” is coming for months now, and that was before the fall of Mosul. I don’t think that will succeed. The only likely result of that will be more ethnic cleansing of Sunni Arabs from the Baghdad suburbs and from the Baghdad belt area. It’s just going to trigger a terrible human cost of mass displacement and killings, and so on.

Summing up where the insurgency is going it can only go so far as Sunni majority areas. They can’t overthrow the central government. ISIS just can’t go in and claim the capture of Baghdad. Of course you’ll have unrest in the Sunni suburbs, but Baghdad is a Shiite majority city. Given the activation of Shiite militias as well it will just trigger bloodshed and displacement of Sunni Arabs, and they’ll just be an even smaller demographic constituent of the city then now considering they are a smaller proportion of the city since 2003. Some areas to look out for would be Saidiya in southern Baghdad that’s one of the few mixed Sunni-Shiite areas of the city that is still left. I think it will go majority Shiite by the end of all this.

On another major concluding note I would add that ISIS’ announcement of the establishment of a Caliphate marks the boldest venture yet in ISIS’ assertion of the primacy of its status and goals in relation to the other insurgent groups. Already prior to the announcement there were signs of a shift towards Caliphate messaging in ISIS’ Iraq discourse, referring to its flag prior to the announcement as the “Banner of the Caliphate” and the rebuke to the General Military Council back in April. Certainly it is a somewhat risky move in increasing the chances of wider infighting in Iraq between ISIS and the other insurgent groups, but as even the Syrian experience should show the chances of substantially rolling back ISIS in this scenario are slim. Generally there is too much willingness to buy into the claims of the likes of [Sheikh] Ali Hatem [Sulaiman] that “tribal” fighters will defeat ISIS or General Military Council claims to have tens of thousands of fighters. Ultimately a real change in the situation would only come about if the U.S. decided to deploy a large-scale ground force but I think J.M. Berger is right that ISIS’ declaration of the Caliphate may complicate things- whether through U.S. airstrikes or a ground force- as it becomes easier to attract global Muslim support if the U.S. is seen to be the power trying to destroy the new Caliphate. Things just got a whole lot murkier. If ISIS’ long-term trajectory is to experience a major decline in its fortunes, then we are talking of a timescale of at least several years, I believe.

Tracking Al Qaeda in Iraq's Zarqawi Interview With Ex-CIA Analyst Nada Bakos

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was most famous for leading Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In fact, his first organization was called Tawhid wal Jihad, which he formed in the 1990s before he had joined al Qaeda. In 2002, Zarqawi travelled to Iraq to prepare for the U.S. invasion. It wasn’t until January 2004 that he asked for assistance from Al Qaeda central, and then in October 2004 he finally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi proved to be a much more bloodthirsty terrorist than even bin Laden was used to as AQI became committed to attacking Iraqis, and especially Shiites to start a civil war, which was hoped would destabilize the country and lead to the failure of the American effort in Iraq. To help explain Zarqawi’s career in Iraq is former CIA analyst Nada Bakos. She was part of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center who was sent to Iraq shortly after the 2003 invasion to track Zarqawi’s activities.

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi turned his Tawhid wal Jihad into Al Qaeda In Iraq in 2004 (Institute for the Study of Violent Groups)

1. When did the CIA send you to Iraq?

That was right after the invasion in May 2003.

2. When you were sent there were you tasked with following the insurgency or just intelligence gathering in general?

Remember in May 2003 we hadn’t experienced an increase in violence yet. The uptick started while I was there.

I was sent to Iraq as an expert for my team [the CIA’s Iraq Counterterrorism unit] because they needed someone who could evaluate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network, and if he had a connection to Al Qaeda. They wanted at least one expert on the ground in case something came up, but also at that point the CIA was just trying to find out what Zarqawi’s network was doing.

3. Zarqawi had his own group Tawhid wal Jihad that he started in the 1990s. After he came to Iraq in January 2004 he asked Al Qaeda for aid, and then in October 2004 pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Why did he decide to make that connection to Al Qaeda?

At the time everyone thought of course Zarqawi was going to join Al Qaeda, because it’s Al Qaeda, it’s a bigger brand. Yet he had all the money. He was galvanizing all this support and new recruits because he was gaining ground, not unlike what the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is doing now. Al Qaeda at the time was still the big dog on the block. They were worth joining from his perspective because they would have more consistent funding, weapons, people, and give him a broader reach. Yet, he managed to do it on his terms.

4. In the HBO documentary “Manhunt, The Search for Bin Laden” you said that Zarqawi was different from others leaders in Al Qaeda. What was the big difference that led AQ to criticize him in 2005-2006 in two letters saying that he was hurting their cause?

The tactics that ISIS are using today stem from Zarqawi’s strategy. He took advantage of the sectarian divide, using it purposely to cause more destruction. He knew that was going to cause a huge disruption for U.S. troops, which it did.

The differences that emerged with Al Qaeda was how Zarqawi was waging jihad. Al Qaeda was disgruntled with how he was going about killing Muslims and civilians seemingly at random. They wanted to reign him in, but he wasn’t having it. He had figured out his strategy early on, and this was how he was going to approach jihad, and he was actually going to take advantage of the insurgency. That’s what ISIS is doing now.

5. It seems like ISIS is trying to do the same things Zarqawi did. ISIS cooperates with different insurgent groups, and it sees itself as the vanguard leading all these other organizations. What kind of cooperation did Zarqawi have with other militant groups?

Zarqawi ran a very different organization than core Al Qaeda. He wasn’t as stringent about the hierarchy in his organization. He started out with what we termed as a network. His nodules of contact were more like concentric circles whereas Al Qaeda has a hierarchy. He wasn’t as concerned with that. He ended up working with random insurgent groups just from an opportunist perspective versus worrying about whether they were pledging allegiance to him or really why they were fighting. His concern wasn’t the same as what Al Qaeda does when they join allegiance with someone. He was taking advantage of the insurgency just depending upon the territory. That was a big distinction. That was a strength and a drawback. When you look at ISIS today it appears that they are more military like in the way that they approach what they’re doing. They seem to have more of a structure, more of a hierarchy. In large part probably because these are Iraqis that were probably in the military or the Baathist regime at one point, so that’s their background and experience.

6. Did Zarqawi get into arguments with other insurgent groups as well?

Yes, I think I vaguely remember some. It wasn’t on the scale of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. Not even remotely close. There were certainly plenty of arguments. Look at the arguments between him and core Al Qaeda, Zarqawi wasn’t someone who was going to give up his stance. How much inter-jihadi violence there was I’m not really sure.

7. How about Zarqawi’s funding. Today a lot of Iraqis talk about how ISIS is funded from donations from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Where did Zarqawi’s money mostly come from?

ISIS has a lot of its own funding. I don’t think even the U.S. government thinks most of their funding is coming from the Gulf States. Zarqawi began his start up in the 1990s, it was a $200,000 loan from bin Laden. He continued to galvanize more support as time went on because he was focusing on the Jordanian government. He was getting support from people that supported that cause. He was really looking at the Levant at that time. Then of course once Iraq popped up that was an opportunity for him. He ended up getting a lot of money from different sources and donors because he was the main player. Al Qaeda wasn’t doing anything on the same scale as Zarqawi after 9/11. So he ended up attracting a lot more funding at that time.

8. Was he getting most of that money from within Iraq or from foreign sources?

The majority of his network was foreign fighters. He pulled from all sorts of areas. He pulled guys from the Maghreb, from the Levant. He had some fighters from the Caucuses. He had a global network not unlike Al Qaeda, so they were tapping into a lot of the same sources.

9. Zarqawi had a plan called the Baghdad Belts. It seems like ISIS is trying to follow the same thing today, get into Babil province, Anbar, etc. surround Baghdad and head for the capital. Did you get any information about Zarqawi’s strategy?

We didn’t have the same open source visibility that you have today about ISIS. It was not like that with Zarqawi. It was much more clandestine and compartmented. The basic information that ISIS shares all over social media was treated as classified by Zarqawi’s organization. Zarqawi released videos that revealed some of his political messages, and military capabilities, but not on the same scale as ISIS. Obviously we had clandestine sources as well.  Zarqawi’s battle plan looks very similar to what ISIS is doing today.

10. Could you tell the story of how the U.S. finally tracked down Zarqawi?  

This is the ironic part of my experience, I spent five years focusing on Zarqawi and two months before he was killed I decided to move onto another assignment. I was just ready to go. Everyone I had known who had worked on this topic had largely moved onto something else, so I decided to do the same at that time too. In the end it doesn’t matter, it was a team effort from the beginning and I was relieved after hearing the news.

SOURCES

Benjamin, Daniel and Simon, Steven, The Next Attack, New York: Times Books, 2005

Debat, Alexis, “Vivisecting the Jihad,” National Interest, 6/23/04

Filkins, Dexter, “Intercepted memo seeks al Qaeda aid,” San Francisco Chronicle, 2/9/04

Gambill, Gary, “Abu Musaib Al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 12/16/04

HBO, “Manhunt, The Search For Bin Laden” May 2013

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi group ‘splits’ from al-Qaeda,” 4/12/07

Reid, Robert, “U.S. planes, tanks batter insurgent stronghold,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10/18/04

Roggio, Bill, “Dear Zarqawi: A Letter from Zawahiri, and a Constitutional Compromise,” Long War Journal, 10/12/05

- “Harmony: The Attyia – Zarqawi Letter,” Long War Journal, 9/27/06

- “Islamic Army of Iraq splits from Al Qaeda,” Long War Journal, 4/12/07

Ware, Michael, “The Enemy With Many Faces,” Time, 9/27/04

Musings On Iraq In The News

I was quoted in “ISIL funding becomes increasingly self-sufficient” in Today’s Zaman and Andrew Sullivan's "The Ever-Expanding ISIS, Ctd" in the Daily Dish.

Iraq’s Northern Front Stalemate In Salahaddin

Salahaddin was where the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and militias stopped the insurgent’s surge south from Mosul. That was not before nearly half of the province fell to militants. Salahaddin became where the government drew the line because it contains the Askari shrine in Samarra, which is important not only for Baghdad, but the militias and Iran. Since that time the fight in the governorate has settled into a war of attrition, foreshadowing what the battle against the militants will be like in the entire country. 

 ISIS destroying an ISF outpost in Salahaddin (via Alexandre Massimo)

Islamic Army of Iraq in Salahaddin (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

ISIS victory parade in Baiji after its fall featuring captured ISF HUMVEES (via Alexandre Massimo)

 ISIS fighter in front of a destroyed HUMVEE in Tuz Kharmoto district (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

Images released by ISIS of its massacre of captured soldiers in Tikrit (via Alexandre Massimo)

 Burnt out HUMVEE destroyed in Tikrit by Naqshibandi (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

 HUMVEE captured at army base in Tikrit by Naqshibandi (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

After the Fall of Mosul the insurgents charged south for Baghdad, but were stopped in Salahaddin. June 10, 2014 the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) collapsed in Ninewa province, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and other insurgent groups immediately went for the capital. They took Highway 2 south taking Shirqat and Baiji in northern Salahaddin, while another force went through western Kirkuk and ended up taking Sulaiman Bek in the western part of the province. They stopped outside the provincial capital of Tikrit. Like in Ninewa most of the ISF fled, sometimes without putting up a fight. The army depot in Baiji for example was abandoned leaving behind all the weapons and supplies for the insurgents. This also led the peshmerga to move into the Tuz Khurmato district in the west to fill the security vacuum left by the retreating security forces. The Tuz area is also a disputed area that the Kurdish regional government has long claimed. The next day the militants took Tikrit, and launched an assault upon Samarra, which was repulsed. It was during this period that ISIS released pictures on social media claiming that it had executed 1,700 soldiers who were captured in Tikrit. That was made for propaganda purposes, and Human Rights Watch believes that around 160-190 men were actually killed in two locations in the city. By June 14 the ISF had rallied a bit and were able to clear Dhuluiya, which is to the east of Samarra, and Ishaqi that is to the west of Balad, while holding onto the Tikrit air base. By that time there was a general mobilization in the country after Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani called on the public to support the security services. Militias also moved into Samarra to help the army and police protect the Askari shrine there.

Smoke billowing from the Baiji refinery which the ISF has been able to hold after several ISIS attacks

Army and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq militia units operating outside of Samarra (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

Funeral in Najaf for a Badr militiamen killed in Samarra (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

Today Salahaddin represents how even if the ISF and militias stand and fight it will be a long and bloody war ahead of them to defeat the insurgency. Neither the militants nor the government have been able to make much headway since June 14. Ishaqi for example was cleared that day, then again on June 19, and then a third time on June 25. To the west ISIS has repeatedly clashed with the peshmerga and Turkmen units in the Tuz Kharmato area, but have gained no ground. Militants have also attacked Balad air base. The real point of contention has been the Baiji refinery, which is one of the largest producers of fuel in the country. Despite continued assaults by tribes and ISIS and most of the guards and army units withdrawing the ISF were able to hold onto the facility. Ishaqi shows how even if the government is able to retake an area it lacks the capability to hold it. This has been repeated again and again in Anbar for the last six months where the ISF has cleared a town and then left allowing the insurgents to move right back in, requiring another operation and another and another. In western Salahaddin ISIS has run into the Kurdish and Turkmen forces and made little headway, but Irbil is content with just holding onto the disputed areas and not moving forward. That means there will be constant clashes along this area between Sulaiman Bek and Tuz Kharmato but nothing decisive. Baiji refinery has been held for now due to some valiant fighting by a SWAT unit, but the Islamic State is not going to give up as the facility could provide a huge source of fuel for Mosul and other territory it has captured in northern Iraq. Finally, Samarra is too important for Baghdad, the militias or Iran to let it fall. That has led to the current stalemate in the province.

Salahaddin is one area of Iraq where the Iraqi forces have stopped running and put up a fight. They have been able to hold onto roughly the southern half of the province with the Kurds securing the western section. In the future some new towns may fall to the insurgents, and others could be taken back, but the battle lines are pretty much set and the two sides are facing a long war ahead of them. Samarra has become a rallying cry for the government, the militias, and Iran, and the government has been able to hold onto the Baiji refinery. Those have both blunted the militants’ fast war of maneuver. At the same time, the ISF and militias have not proven successful at retaking and holding any territory as has happened in Ishaqi. The larger problem is that Baghdad has no strategy on how to turn around the security situation. That has left it and its militia allies to simply shoot it out with the insurgents, which will be a very long and costly endeavor.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Jihadists take areas in Iraq’s Salaheddin province,” 6/10/14

- “Iraq’s Tikrit falls to militants: police,” 6/11/14

AIN, "Samara Operations Command, 100 security elements besieged inside air base in Tikrit," 6/14/14

- “Security forces supported by tribes free Baiji district from ISIL elements,” 6/11/14

Buratha News, “Army regains control of Ishaqi Saladin after being cleared,” 6/25/14

- “Daash terrorists control Mosul and battles in the east of Tikrit,” 6/11/14

- “Defense Announces cleansing ISHAQI and grab large quantities of weapons and wheels,” 6/19/14

- “Terrorists seize weapon caches belonging to the army in northern Baiji,” 6/10/14

Daily Star, “Iraq forces repel militant assault on Samarra: witnesses,” 6/11/14

Al Forat, “Salah al-Din: Big ISIL military show in Sheikh Hamad village,” 6/10/14

- “Tuz Khormato freed of ISIL control,” 6/17/14

Fox News, “Sunni militants reportedly take control of small oil fields, attack air base in Iraq,” 6/25/14

Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: ISIS Execution Site Located,” 6/27/14

Hussein, Muhammed, van den Toorn, Christine, and Osgood, Patrick, “Clashes and tension along Kurdistan’s new border,” Iraq Oil Report, 6/26/14

Lando, Ben, Van Heuvelen, ben, Najm, Jamal, and Tahir, Rawaz, “Baiji refinery nearly falls to insurgents,” Iraq Oil Report, 6/25/14

Al Mada, “Daash attacking army barracks east of Tikrit and its members are fleeing checkpoints in the region,” 6/10/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “The armed forces prepare to launch an operation of cleansing the road Baghdad-Samarar,” 6/25/14

- “BREAKING NEWS. Daash gunmen burning building of Salhuddin provincial council,” 6/11/14

- “Breaking News..Gunmen occupy Sulaiman Bek district, south of Kirkuk,” 6/10/14

- “Breaking News..Iraqi flag was raised over the building of the University of Tikrit after cleansing it from the ISIS elements,” 6/26/14

- “Breaking News..ISIS elements escape from al-Alam district in Salah al-Din and the police regain control it,” 6/26/14

- “The ISIS gunmen seize control on a checkpoint north of Tikrit and violent clashes in Tikrit Air Base,” 6/10/14

- “The militants control al-Dour district,” 6/11/14

- “Samarra Operations Command regains control (Ishaqi) area north of Baghdad,” 6/14/14

Al Rayy, “Cleansing Mutassim south of Tikrit of elements of Daash,” 6/20/14

- “Security forces and the support of tribes liberate Dhuluiya from elements of Daash,” 6/14/14

Shafaq News, “Daash control villages north of Tikrit, violent battles to control others,” 6/10/14

Sly, Liz and Hauslohner, Abigail, “Shiite militia seizes control of Iraqi town, slowing ISIS drive toward Baghdad,” Washington Post, 6/14/14

Iraq’s Western Front Is Anbar Next To Fall?

 

Back in December 2013 Prime Minister Nouri al-Malik instigated the current fighting in Iraq by making a poor political decision in Anbar. In the middle of December the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) ambushed the leadership of the Iraqi Army’s 7^th Division and killed all the commanding officers along the Anbar-Ninewa border. The premier announced a security operation to clear the province of insurgents, which rallied most of the country behind it. Maliki decided to take the opportunity to arrest Parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani from the Iraqi Islamic Party who had been one of the more vitriolic speakers at the Anbar protests, and then shut down the Ramadi demonstration site. Immediately afterward gunmen were seen in many of the provinces’ cities. Fighting quickly ensued and Fallujah and much of the surrounding area fell to militants. Since that time Baghdad has continuously claimed that it has the situation under control and that the insurgency is losing the fight there. The reality has been much different. Since ISIS’s surge across much of northern Iraq in June 2014 the security situation in Anbar has gotten worse and it appears that it could be the next province to fall.

The insurgency is pushing from Qaim and Rawa in the west and Fallujah in the east to squeeze out the government forces in between in places like Haditha, Hit, and Ramadi (Institute for the Study of War)

There has been heavy fighting in Anbar throughout June with the insurgency holding the upper hand. Starting on June 7, 2014 20 Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) gunmen stormed the Anbar University campus in Ramadi and held thousands of students hostage. They were repelled, but not before they raided the school’s treasury of 15 billion dinars. The insurgents then continued their campaign to cut off the major thoroughfares in the province to limit the mobility of the security forces (ISF). June 9 the bridge from Fallujah to neighboring Amiriya Fallujah in the south was blown up. The next day the bridge from Amiriya Fallujah to Baghdad was detonated. Starting in May the ISF said that it was launching a major operation to clear Fallujah, but it has gone nowhere. That’s because it has not been able to secure the insurgent bases and supply lines surrounding the city and has had its own cut by the bombings of these bridges. Things really turned for the worse starting on June 12 when the security forces began collapsing. The ISF withdrew from Kubaisa near Hit after a short gunfight, lost Saqlawiya to the north of Fallujah after a determined attack, almost lost Baghdadi, which is between Haditha and Hit, and suddenly withdrew from the Anbar-Syrian border near the town of Qaim and the major entrances to Fallujah with no provocation. That included fleeing the Mazra army base and leaving most if not all of its equipment behind. That was followed by the ISF fleeing Rawa, Ana, and Qaim on June 14. ISIS also took the border crossing from Qaim into Syria. That secured all the major towns in western Anbar along Highway 12 the major travel route through the province. The next day insurgents tried to storm the Tahadi power plant that supplies electricity for most of province, fired rockets at the Al-Asad army base the home of the 7^th Division, and started fighting in Garma to the east of Fallujah. June 16 insurgents laid siege to Habaniya air base. The ISF responded with a security operation in southern Ramadi, retook Qaim, and sent in reinforcements, while the deputy head of the council Faleh Issawi claimed Rawa, Anan, Saqlawiya, Amiriya Fallujah, and Khalidiya had all been cleared. Those victories were short lived as the militants quickly recaptured Qaim, Rawa, Ana, Rutba, two small towns outside of Haditha, and the major border crossings to Syria and Jordan. The governing council was so alarmed by these advances that it told the press it was afraid the entire province was about to fall, while the Iraqi command claimed that these reversals were in fact a tactical withdrawal so that the security forces could regroup and attack again. By June 25, Haditha, which is the next major town on Highway 12 was nearly surrounded, and officials were afraid Ramadi might go next. Radio Free Iraq, which has been keeping track of the security situation in Anbar estimated that up to 85% of the province is now under insurgent control. It is important to note that while the Islamic State has done plenty of fighting in Anbar there are several other major groups involved as well, such as the Baathist Naqshibandi and its Military Councils, Jaysh al-Mujahadeen, many tribes, and others. Together they have made the security forces chase them across Anbar, while seizing town after town. 

Military Council firing mortar in Anbar (via Jawad Aymenn al-Tamimi)

Captured tanks and armored personnel carriers at Mazra army base (via Jawad Aymenn al-Tamimi)

 Insurgents taking down security barriers in Saqlawiya (via Alexandre Massimo)

Captured army equipment in Qaim (via Alexandre Massimo)

Captured border police vehicles in Qaim (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

Just as the Iraqi forces collapsed in Ninewa and parts of Kirkuk and Salahaddin in June, it has done the same in much of Anbar. The border crossings with Syria and Jordan are now under insurgent control, along with much of the area around Fallujah. The militants are now attempting to seize the remaining towns and cities between those two points such as Ramadi, Haditha, and Hit. The security forces, allied tribes, and the militias were already doing a bad job in holding the province before the June offensive started. They have repeatedly gone into the same towns again and again, but then leave allowing the insurgents to move right back in. Now they are fleeing like they have in the rest of the country. That could lead to the fall of Anbar, and another huge setback for the Iraqi government. The fact that it has not come up with any clear strategy to reverse the advances of the insurgency helps explain why these failures continue to occur.

SOURCES

BBC, “Iraq violence: Dozens killed by Baghdad bombings,” 6/7/14

Buratha News, “Combat and logistical reinforcements to Anbar for security forces after achieving great victories with clans in 7 areas,” 6/17/14

- “Start the process of an extensive security campaign in the district of Rawa, west of Ramadi cleared of “Daash,”” 6/16/14

Al Forat, “ISF liberate Saadan area in Anbar province,” 6/20/14

El-Hamed, “ISIS and the Anbar Crisis,” Sada, 6/12/14

Independent Press Agency, “Army regains control of the areas west of Ramadi,” 6/19/14

Al Jazeera, “Sunni rebels seize more towns in Iraq,” 6/22/14

Al Mada, “Anbar Operations regain control of Qaim after the storming of Daash,” 6/17/14

- “Anbar police declared an emergency to send three regiments to fight Daash in the western regions of the province,” 6/18/14

- “Armed groups re-open ports Fallujah after the withdrawal of the army surrounding the city,” 6/12/14

- “Army forces preparing to storm the center of Saqlawiyah to purify it from Daash,” 6/19/14

- “Expectations of the armed seizure of Anbar due to the withdrawal of the army and the provincial council says state control of over 80% of cities,” 6/14/14

- “The start of a major military operation to cleanse the western regions and border crossings in Anbar,” 6/24/14

Namaa, Kamal, “Iran rejects U.S. action in Iraq, ISIL tightens Syria border grip,” Reuters, 6/22/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Breaking News..The army is launching a violent attack on militants west of Falluja,” 6/17/14

- “Clashes between the Awakening and the ISIS in al-Qaim east-west Anbar,” 6/19/14

- “Defense Ministry confirms that the security forces control Alwaleed and Trebil border ports,” 6/23/14

- “Helicopters bombed the military oil depot in Habbaniyah after being controlled by ISIS,” 6/16/14

- “Security forces and the sons of the tribes in Ramadi control al-Tash area and Street 60 after the expulsion of the terrorists,” 6/21/14

- “The withdrawal of the army from Kubaisa district western Anbar,” 6/12/14

Radio Free Iraq, “09 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 6/9/14

- “10 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 6/10/14

- “12 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 6/12/14

- “13 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar,” 6/13/14

- “14 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar,” 6/14/14

- “15 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 6/15/14

- “21 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 6/21/14

- “22 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 6/22/14

- “25 June 2014,” Daily Updates from Iraq, 6/25/14

Al Rafidayn, “Daash holding 15 employees hostage at the University of Anbar and steal $ 15 billion from its treasury,” 6/9/14

- “The fight against terrorism: Ninety percent of the city of Ramadi became freed,” 5/9/14

Al Rayy, “The start of a military operation to regain control of the area in Karabilah based Western Anbar,” 6/17/14

Xinhua, “Iraqi security forces withdraw fro border with Syria,” 6/12/14

- “Iraqi troops withdraw form three cities in Anbar,” 6/22/14

Precarious Relationship Between The Islamic State of Iraq And The Baathist Naqshibandi

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshibandi (JRTN) is the Baathist insurgent group led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Saddam Hussein’s former number two. After the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) the Baathists are one of the largest insurgent groups in the country. Those two organizations have had a very rough relationship. For years the two have cooperated in carrying out attacks in Iraq with one usually providing the money and planning, while the other launches the operation. Now however ISIS is demanding that JRTN units pledge allegiance to it, which has been resisted. That has led to several clashes between the two in Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Diyala provinces. These cracks in the insurgency have continued in the midst of their uprising against Baghdad, and are likely to grow in the future.

The Baathist Naqshibandi have had a difficult relationship with ISIS over the last few months leading to constant clashes between the two (Wikipedia)

Starting this spring there have been continued reports of clashes between the JRTN and ISIS. The latest lasted several days in Kirkuk province. The fighting started in Riyad on June 20 when ISIS allegedly confiscated the weapons of a Naqshibandi unit and kidnapped one of its leaders, and told it that it had to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. When the JRTN refused there was a gunfight that left 9 Naqshibandi and 8 ISIS fighters dead. An alternative story emerged that the two might have been fighting over money that would come from a number of fuel tankers that JRTN was using. Two days later shooting broke out again in the same area leaving 10 dead, and the next day an IED was set off against an ISIS convoy killing one and wounding two. These were just the most recent incidents between the two. On June 16 for example, 12 insurgents died in Mosul after the JRTN’s Military Council criticized the Islamic State’s code of conduct for the city. Control over the money seized in Mosul might have been an issue as well. Those all occurred after the current uprising started, but the two had been arguing over the same issues for months beforehand. On May 28 ISIS killed 8 Naqshibandi fighters in Baiji, Salahaddin because the Islamic State told them they had to follow its lead. JRTN retaliated by setting up an ambush for an ISIS leader and two of his aides in the Hamrin area of Diyala. Earlier on May 2 there was a news report that the Baathists had authorized the killing of ISIS members in Diyala after it had killed six of its leaders since January 2014. For instance, the Islamic State murdered a Naqshibandi commander and his son in Hamrin on April 7. A member of the Diyala provincial council claimed that the conflict between the two cost ISIS up to 70 fighters a not insignificant number. Publicly the Baathists have denied that there are any problems between it and the Islamic State. That shows the basic inequality between the insurgent organizations. ISIS is by far the most well armed and organized militant group in Iraq. The JRTN is in effect living in its shadow willing to cooperate with it, but not give its loyalty since the two have diametrically opposed worldviews. ISIS wants to create an Islamic State across the Muslim world, while the Naqshibandi want to restore Baathist rule in Iraq. These differences will persist in the future, and likely grow in intensity as the insurgency spreads to new areas of the country.

As ISIS takes more territory and attempts to administer it more examples of these conflicts with not only JRTN but other insurgent groups will emerge. ISIS and its predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq have a long history of trying to impose itself upon others. That’s especially true of the Islamic State who sees itself as a vanguard in the jihadist movement, which all others should follow. Already in Syria it has fought not only the Assad government, but various other opponents of the regime. The Americans were able to play upon these divisions with the insurgency with the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq that were instrumental in turning the tide during the civil war years. Now it is nearly impossible to imagine Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki or any other Shiite premier making a deal with Baathists or other Islamist groups to turn on ISIS since all are seen as existential threats to the state and Shiite rule. The results are a lost opportunity to turn the militants upon themselves, which will mean more fighting in the long run.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Sunni militant infighting kills 17 in Iraq’s Kirkuk,” 6/21/14

Alsumaria, “Intelligence source in Diyala: Naqshibandi allow the killing of leaders and members of Daash and describe them as apostates,” 5/2/14

Buratha News, “Diyala Council reveals the existence of the terrorist al-Baghdad, and confirms the existence of problems between Daash and Naqshbandi,” 6/1/14

- “The killing of a leader in the terrorist organization “Naqshibandi” and his son at the hands of the elements of “Daash” terrorists northeast of Baquba,” 4/7/14

- “Naqshbandi executed terrorist organization leader in Daash and two of his aides in Diyala in response to executions in Salahuddin,” 6/1/14

- “Sharp differences between Daash gangs and leaders of Saddam’s Baath Party over the looted money in Mosul,” 6/14/14

Al Masalah, “Organization “Naqshibandi” deny entry in an armed conflict with “Daash,”” 6/3/14

Namaa, Kamal, “Iran rejects U.S. action in Iraq, ISIL tightens Syria border grip,” Reuters, 6/22/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Clashes erupt between ISIS and other armed groups in Kirkuk,” 6/23/14

- “ISIS executes eight people for not swear allegiance to ISIS,” 5/31/14

New Sabah, “Council Diyala: sharp differences between armed groups,” 5/5/14

Al Rafidayn, “Diyala announce the deaths of more than two dozen in armed infighting going on between Daash and Naqshbandi,” 6/3/14

Al Rayy, “Clashes between the Naqshibandi and Daash in Mosul,” 6/16/14

Shafaq News, “ISIL kidnap Nashbandi leader in Kirkuk due to influence conflict,” 6/21/14