On
October 18, 2014 Iraq’s parliament confirmed the remaining positions in Prime
Minister Haider Abadi’s government. This included the much anticipated Interior
and Defense Ministers, along with all of the Kurdish officials who had been
boycotting the government since it was formed in September. The Americans were
pushing hard for an inclusive government that included all of Iraq’s different
ethnosectarian groups, and that was achieved. That is no panacea however as
Abadi’s government is made up of the same percentage of Shiite, Sunni, and
Kurdish parties as Nouri al-Maliki’s former administration, which was
considered a major cause of the current crisis in Iraq. The bigger question is
now that Abadi’s government is complete can it break the deadlock in Baghdad
and push any type of reforms that might clean up the country and help counter
the insurgency.
Abadi
achieved two of his and the international communities’ goals when his
government was completed in October. First, he promised a smaller
administration than previous ones. Iraq’s cabinet had ballooned in recent years
as the winning parties pushed for more and more positions to gain access to the
state’s coffers and dish out more patronage for their followers. When Nouri
al-Maliki’s government was finished in April 2011 it had 40 ministers, up from
the 30 that were offered up in its first manifestation in December 2010. When
Abadi’s cabinet was finished it had only 29 ministers. All the winning parties
also agreed to join in after much wrangling. The two main Shiite blocks State
of Law and the National Alliance received 15 ministers. Sunni parties made up
of Mutahidun, Arabiya, Loyalty to Anbar and the Iraq Coalition got 7 positions.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Change, the
Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group got one ministry each
for a total of 5. Finally, Iyad Allawi’s secular National Coalition and Science
Minister Faris Youssef Jajou, a Christian politician finished off the cabinet.
The Kurds were the last ones to agree to Abadi’s government. They had been making
demands
about the budget, oil policy, the disputed territories and other topics before
and after the formation of the government, but the prime minister refused to
make any concessions as he had the votes to put together his cabinet without
them. The Kurds finally relented as they realized they were gaining
nothing
from staying away from Baghdad when decisions were being made. In the end, the
breakdown of Abadi’s government was exactly like Maliki’s. The Shiite lists
have 51% of the ministries compared to 52% under Maliki. The Sunnis 24%, and if
you include Allawi in their camp that increases to 27% compared to 30% with the
former premier. Finally, the Kurdish Coalition has 17% of the cabinet today
slightly up from 15% under Maliki. The previous government was considered a
disaster because the parties were deadlocked on almost every issue including
not passing the 2014 budget. That showed that an inclusive government is not an
answer to Iraq’s problems, but rather a cause as there are too many lists with
opposing agendas all in the same house. That makes deal making and compromise
nearly impossible on anything substantial.
Abadi
Government
29 Ministers
Shiite
Parties: 15, 51%
State of Law: 8
National Alliance: 7
Sunni
Parties: 7, 24%
Arabiya: 1
Loyalty to Anbar: 1
Iraq Coalition: 1
Mutahidun: 4
Kurdish
Parties: 5, 17%
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 1
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 1
Change: 1
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 1
Kurdistan Islamic Group: 1
Secular
Parties: 1, 3%
Nationalist Coalition 1
Minorities:
1, 3%
Maliki
Government
40 Ministers
Shiite
Parties: 21, 52%
State of Law: 8
National Alliance: 13
Sunni
Parties: 12, 30%
White Iraqiya: 1
Centralist Alliance: 2
Iraqi National Movement: 9
Kurdish
Parties: 6, 15%
Kurdish Coalition: 6
Minorities:
1, 2%
Iraq’s
ruling coalition was also able to agree upon Interior and Defense Ministers
after much internal wrangling. Khalid Obeidi of Mutahidun was the early
frontrunner for Defense Ministry that has traditionally gone to the Sunni
parties. He’s from
Mosul,
and was a general in the Air Force under Saddam Hussein. He was the nominee by the
Iraqi National Movement in 2011, but was eventually turned down when he broke
with Allawi. The Accountability and Justice Commission also said Obeidi was
disqualified for his Baathist past, while the Kurds accused him of taking part
in anti-Kurdish operations while he served under Saddam. (1) The new Defense
Minister is supposed to appeal to Sunnis, while bringing a military background
to the position. Being a former Air Force general means he has some experience,
but it would have been better if he’d been in the army as that would be more
meaningful to his ministry. The real problem was on the Shiite side where Hadi
Ameri, former Transportation Minister under Maliki and the head of the Badr
Organization demanded Interior. Badr was a key component of State of Law’s
victory in the election, Ameri had been put in charge of security in Diyala by
the previous prime minister, and Badr was one of the militias that came to
defense of the state to confront the insurgency. The United States and Sunni
parties strongly objected to Ameri’s appointment. In 2005 Badr controlled
the Interior and filled the police and commandos with its militiamen who
were accused of running secret prisons, torturing people, carrying out
sectarian arrests, and running death squads. Ameri finally stepped aside, but
his party still got the ministry with Mohammed Salim al-Ghadban. Since Badr
filled the Interior with its operatives before it will probably do the same this
time around. Under Maliki there was no Interior Minister, while Sadoun Dulaimi
was named acting Defense Minister. He was always considered the prime
minister’s man. Abadi promised to fill those positions, and finally did. At the
same time, these were status quo appointments. Shiite parties have historically
wanted control of the Interior Ministry, because one it employs so many people
it is a perfect vehicle to hand out jobs to followers, and two it gives the
lists influence in every town and city in the country through the police. Likewise
Sunnis have held the Defense Ministry before, and that has meant little to the
insurgency or the street. The one positive is that both new ministers have
talked about clearing out incompetent commanders and holding people accountable
for the deterioration in security. The police and army are full of political
appointees who never had business serving in any capacity. Premier Abadi has
already started clearing out some of the officers, and if Obeidi and Ghadban
can continue that into the lower ranks and fight the institutional corruption
that would go a long way to reforming the Iraqi forces.
It’s
too early to tell whether Prime Minister Abadi will be able to bring about any
meaningful changes to Baghdad. He has so many structural barriers to overcome
it may be impossible for any executive to reform the government. He has
fulfilled some early promises such as curbing the size of the cabinet and
finally appointing an Interior and Defense Minister. He’s also gotten the Kurds
to give up on their boycott. It’s now up to Ghadban and Obeidi to shake up the
security forces, but the former may actually make the situation worse if his
militia takes over Interior like they did in the past. That’s a major reason
why early on it appears that Abadi’s cabinet will be more of the same rather
than a step forward.
Prime
Minister Abadi’s Full Government
President Fuad Masum, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, Dawa, State of Law
Vice President Osama Nujafi, Mutahidun
Vice President Iyad Allawi, Nationalist Coalition/Wataniya
Prime Minister Haider Abadi, Dawa, State of Law
Deputy Premier Salah al-Mutlaq, al-Arabiya
Deputy Premier Rowsch Nouri Shaways, Kurdistan Democratic
Party
Deputy Premier Bahaa Araji, Sadrist/Ahrar, National Alliance
Agriculture Minister Falah Hassan Zaidan, Mutahidun
Communications Minister Hassan Kadhim Rasheed, Badr
Organization, State of Law
Culture Minister Fryad Rawanduzi, Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan
Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi, Mutahidun
Education Minister Mohammed Iqbal Omar, Iraqi Islamic Party,
Mutahidun
Electricity Minister Qasim Abdi Mohammed Hammadi
al-Fahadawi, Loyalty to Anbar
Environment Minister Qutaiba Jabouri, Iraq Coalition
Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdistan Democratic Party
Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, National Reform Trend,
National Alliance
Health Minister Adilla Hamoud Hussein, State of Law
Higher Education Minister Hussein Shahristani, Independents,
State of Law
Housing Minister Tariq Kinani, Sadrist/Ahrar, National
Alliance
Human Rights Minister Mohammed Bayati, Badr Organization,
State of Law
Industry Minister Nasir Issawi, Sadrist/Ahrar, National
Alliance
Interior Minister Mohammed Salim al-Ghadban, Badr
Organization, State of Law
Justice Minister Haider Zamili, Fadhila, National Alliance
Labor Minister Mohammed Shaia’a Sudani, Dawa, State of Law
Migration Minister Darbaz Mohammed, Change
Minister of State Saman Abdullah, Kurdistan Islamic Group
Municipalities Minister Abdul Karim Younis Aylan, Badr
Organization, State of Law
Oil Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq, National Alliance
Planning Minister Salman Ali Hassan Jumali, Mutahidun
Provinces Minister Ahmed Abdullah, al-Arabiya
Science Minister Faris Youssef Jajou
Sports Minister Abdul Hussein Abdul Ridha Abtan, Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq, National Alliance
Tourism Minister Adel Shirshab, State of Law
Trade Minister Mlass Mohammed Husseini, Nationalist
Coalition/Wataniya
Transportation Minister Bayan Jabr, Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq, National Alliance
Women’s Affairs Minister Bayan Nouri, Kurdistan Islamic
Union
FOOTNOTE
1.
Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 12,” 4/13/11
SOURCES
Kurdish Globe, “Kurdish Ministers swear in as ISIS keeps
slow advancing towards Baghdad,” 10/20/14
Al Masalah, “Who is the new Defense Minister Khaled
al-Obeidi?” 10/18/14
NINA, “Parliament Completes Vote to The Ministerial Cab,”
10/18/14
Osgood, Patrick and Smith, Daniel, “Kurds to join Cabinet
despite deadlock,” Iraq Oil Report, 10/14/14
Sowell, Kirk, “Inside Iraqi Politics No. 12,” 4/13/11
Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane, “New Developments In Iraq’s
Nascent Government,” Institute for the Study of War, 4/1/11
Visser, Reidar, “Additional Ministers Approved for the Iraqi
Cabinet,” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 10/18/14
Whitcomb, Alexander, “Kurds closer to participation in Iraqi
government,” Rudaw, 10/13/14
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