Review Baram, Amatzia, Culture,
History & Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq, 1968-89,
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991
Culture, History & Ideology in the Formation of
Ba’thist Iraq is a very short and concise history of the Baath Party’s move
away from pan-Arabism to a new form of Iraqi nationalism that occurred after it
took power for the second time. The Baath originally pushed a radical and
revolutionary ideology of overthrowing Arab regimes and championed the
Palestinians against Israel. A series of internal and external events however,
changed it to focus upon securing its position within Iraq after the 1968 coup.
University of Haifa’s Dr. Amatzia Baram provides a convincing argument for why
this occurred and how it played out.
Immediately after the Baath came back into power in 1968 it
carried out a dramatic about face in its ideology. Before Iraq was one of the
most radical pan-Arab parties in the region. It advocated for overthrowing
other Arab governments and the destruction of Israel. Several factors
immediately led to a change in this stance however. First, Iraq stationed
one-quarter of its army in Jordan to support the Palestinians which cost an
unsustainable amount of money. Then in 1970 when the Jordanian government moved
against the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Iraq did nothing. Afterward,
Saddam Hussein said that Iraq had to focus upon itself. Second, the party
wanted to resolve the long running Kurdish issue peacefully through
negotiations. The Baath had to provide an accommodating ideology as a result
since pan-Arabism had no appeal to a non-Arab people. Third, the government
started a prolonged and violent struggle with the Shiite religious
establishment. That increased after the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent
Iran-Iraq War. Party leaders felt that Arab nationalism no longer had the
appeal that it previously had and sought something different. Fourth, an
internal power struggle within the Baath led to an anti-Syrian faction led by
Saddam to ascend to the leadership dampening talk about uniting with Arab
neighbors. Last, Baram barely mentions this but the Baath wanted to stay in
power. It took part in the 1963 coup but was quickly ousted by the military.
Now that it returned, it wanted to become permanent. Here Baram provides an
important background for why the party was going to dramatically change its
policies. The Baath was facing a combination of internal and external issues
that led to a re-evaluation of its ideology. If it wasn’t going to champion the
Palestinians or create a unified Arab nation, if it wanted to end the war with
the Kurds, and appeal to the Shiite masses it had to come up with something
new.
The result was a cultural campaign that championed the
uniqueness of Iraq and its rich history. This started with the Education
Ministry, and then a new National Folklore Troupe and the Mosul Spring Festival
that promoted the traditions of different regions of the country. There was a
move to preserve old Iraqi architecture. The Iraqi Fashion House talked about
the different Iraqi attire from the various parts of the nation. There was a
growth in archeology and the founding of various museums. The ruins of Babylon
were rebuilt. Eight of Iraq’s provinces were renamed based upon ancient
history. Ramadi for example became Anbar after an Abbasid Empire capital.
Diwaniya was now Qadisiya after a famous battle where Arabs defeated the
Persians in AD 635. Mosul was transformed into Ninewa after the Assyrians.
Money and stamps used ancient scenes and figures. During the Iran-Iraq War
Saddam was compared to Nebuchadnezzar. There was a precedent for this as well
as during periods of the monarchy and the Qasim government, Iraq’s past was
emphasized too. The point was to tie Iraqis to their history and argue that
they were direct descendants of the people that started civilization. That Iraq
was unique, and that was why it should be a leader in the region. The larger
goal was to provide a cultural campaign that would appeal to Sunnis, Shiites
and Kurds. There was not an emphasis upon being Arab for example, and all
communities could be proud of this rich past. Baram goes through all the
elements of this campaign from the festivals to writers and artists, and there
is a picture section in the middle that highlights some of the sculptures,
architecture and popular art that came out during this period.
Baram continued with his excellent history by pointing out
the difficulties and changes this campaign faced. For one, Pan-Arabism
considered history beginning with the Arab-Islamic period. This switch to
pre-Islamic and pre-Arab times had to be justified. Some tried to overlook
those issues, and just emphasized that Iraqis should be proud of their past.
Others argued that Semitic people originated in Mesopotamia trying to link the
past with the present Arabs. Another point was the attempt to reconcile with
the Kurds failed and war broke out again, only to be crushed in 1975. Then
during the Iran-Iraq War the Kurds joined Iran in the war, and then faced the
Anfal campaign. All together that meant the government wasn’t as interested in
appealing to the Kurds anymore. That didn’t mean the Kurds were ignored, there
just wasn’t the urgency to directly address that community. Similarly, the
government was going after the Shiite clergy while trying to make sure the
wider Shiite population was loyal during the Iran-Iraq War. Finally, there was
the issue of how the Baath could try to unite the country by pushing its
diversity. How to balance the two was never resolved. The Baath policy was
beset by these contradictions. That was especially apparent with the Kurds and
Shiites that faced the political and military force of the state, while on the
cultural and educational level were being courted. It could be argued for the
Shiites at least that this campaign might have worked as the majority fought
and died for the government during the war with Iran.
At just under 150 pages Culture, History & Ideology
in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq packs a lot of information. It is very
readable and Baram covers a lot of territory. The Baath Party went through a
dramatic transformation immediately after it took power and Baram provides
reasons why it went in a new direction, how it carried out this new strategy,
and the challenges it faced. The book does a great job of placing this policy
within the larger context of Iraqi history as well. People always talk about
how the differences in Iraq have been a historical hinderance. Few talk about
this period when the government actually celebrated its different communities,
its traditions, and attempted to create a new history connecting ancient
Mesopotamia with the present. This came with a heavy dose of repression as
well, but this was the first time this happened in a concerted and long running
campaign, and Baram provides a great breakdown of why and how it happened.
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