In March 2020 four pro-Najaf brigades announced that they were leaving the Hashd Commission to protest their mistreatment by the Iran aligned groups that controlled it. In April however, retired Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi told the media that he had not accepted their move.
On March 18 four
Hashd units aligned with Najaf asked to leave the Hashd Commission and join
the Defense Ministry. That
consisted of the Al Abbas Combat Division, the Imam Ali Brigade, the Ansar
al-Marjaiya Brigade, and the Ali Akbar Brigade. They were objecting to the
appointment of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi aka Abu Fadak
in February to be the new head of the Commission to replace Abu Muhandis
who was killed by the United States. Abu Fadak was chosen by a committee made
up entirely of Hashd with ties to Iran. The Najaf Hashd only learned about the
decision in the media. They have also complained that that they have not been paid fairly nor had all their fighters registered as fighters. Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani had also encouraged them to obtain major positions in the commission,
but they were denied that as well. After being ignored for so long they finally
decided to become independent of the rest of the Hashd.
There was a twist
however in April. First, the four Hashd brigades sent a letter to the formal leader of the Hashd Commission
Falah Fayad saying they would be under the Commander in Chief. They then issued a statement saying their actions had the blessing of the
religious establishment in Najaf. Ansar al-Marjaiya called on other brigades to follow their example and leave the
Commission. Resigned Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi complicated the matter
when his Office of the Commander and Chief said that he had not agreed to the
decision by the Najaf groups. He went on to say that he wanted to keep all the
Hashd united. That leaves the future of these four brigades up in the air. Will
they still be paid? Will the Hashd Commission retaliate against them? More
importantly will more brigades follow their lead and leave the Commission or be
deterred by their treatment? If the former it could lead to a credibility
crisis for the Commission. The pro-Iran units have been able to defer some criticism
of their abuses by claiming the Commission represents a diversity of different
groups. If its base becomes narrower the brigades linked to Tehran may not be
able to use that tactic anymore. It’s title to be the Hashd Commission will
also be in question if it doesn’t represent all of the brigades.
SOURCES
Al Aalem, “The shrine factions withdraw from the popular crowd and
formally join the Ministry of Defense,” 3/18/20
- “Will the defection of the shrine factions take away from the popular
crowd?” 4/24/20
Aldroubi, Mina, “Four brigades split from Iraq’s PMF in sign of internal
rift,” The National, 4/22/20
Asharq Al-Awsat, “Iraq’s Ansar Al-Marjaiya Splits from PMF, Urges Other
to Follow,” 4/25/20
Habib, Mustafa,
“Formerly-Armed Angels? The Controversial Iraqi Militia That Now Prefers Social
Work To Politics,” Niqash, 4/5/18
Knights, Michael and Malik, Hamdi, “The al-Abbas Combat Division Model:
Reducing Iranian Influence in Iraq’s Security Forces,” Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 8/22/17
Malik, Hamdi, “Iran rallies religious leaders to expel US forces from
Iraq,” Al Monitor, 3/4/20
Al Mirbad, “The Commander in Chief: We did not consult the statement
issued by the factions affiliated with the holy shrines yesterday,” 4/24/20
Rudaw, “Brigades withdraw from the popular crowd to protest the
appointment of Abu Fadak and the policy of the axis of resistance,” 3/18/20
Rudolf, Inna, “The Future of the Popular Mobilization Forces after the
Assassination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis,” Iraq in Transition: Competing Actors
and Complicated Politics, April 2020
Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iran and Najaf struggle for control over Hashd
al-Shaabi after Muhandis’s killing,” Middle East Eye, 2/16/20
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