Review The Gulf War, The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict

Khadduri, Majid, The Gulf War, The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988 

Majid Khadduri wrote several important histories of Iraq from the monarchy to the Baath period. They were known for their insider information as Khadduri was able to interview many of the Iraqi elite over the years. The Gulf War, The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict does not stand up to those earlier works. The book has three main parts to it. The first third is on the history of Iran and Iraq dating back to the Ottoman and Persian period which argues that the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites and the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway contributed to the Iran-Iraq War. The next half of the book is hugely disappointing as it basically gives the Baathist version of the war without any criticism. The last part is on the Arab states that aligned themselves with the two combatants. The repeating of Baathist propaganda undermines the credibility of the book.  

The first section of The Gulf War covers the Sunni-Shiite divide and the Shatt al-Arab waterway and how they set the stage for the Iran-Iraq War. Khadduri starts with the well-known history of how the Shiite sect was created and how it became the religion of the Persian Empire while the Ottomans were Sunni. The dividing line between the two became the area that would become Iraq. Shiites became an early opponent of the Iraqi government which would continue under various regimes. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power he called for the Iranian Revolution to be spread to Iraq and appealed to its Shiites to follow Iran’s example. Relations between Iran and Iraq were also problematic as both laid claim to the Shatt al-Arab that leads to the Persian Gulf. Two treaties were signed over it, one in 1937 and another in 1975 but neither was followed leaving the issue unresolved. Khadduri argues that these were the two main issues which led to the Iran-Iraq War. Many histories of the conflict have pointed towards the waterway as a major cause because Saddam wanted full control of it, although the author doesn’t mention that for reasons which will be explained later. It’s also well known that Khomeini and others in the Iranian leadership wanted to export their revolution throughout the region. Khadduri provides great depth to many of these issues like going into all the details over the various treaties. At the same time this is all very conventional.  

The next part of the book on the Iran-Iraq War itself is completely one-sided. Khadduri writes that Iraq invaded in September 1980 to defend itself against Iranian aggression which started a number of border skirmishes, was blamed for terrorist bombings within Iraq and its call for the Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein. He goes on to say that Iraq was not the aggressor especially after it withdrew its troops from Iranian territory in 1982, and that Iraq’s call for a ceasefire showed that it wanted to end things peacefully. It was therefore Iran’s fault that the war went on for years because it wanted regime change in Baghdad. All of these represent the Baathist version of the war. Captured Iraqi documents for example cover Saddam’s meeting with his advisors when he decided to invade Iran. He didn’t talk about an Iranian threat to the border or his government. Instead he discussed how Tehran was weak and divide in the wake of its revolution and that meant it was the perfect time for Iraq to invade and seize territory in southern Iran and gain full control of the Shatt al-Arab. Rather than a pre-emptive invasion to fend off more Iranian attacks, Saddam was the aggressor who wanted to take advantage of his neighbor. Even before those papers were discovered Iraq was explicit that it had territorial and political aspirations in Iran laying claim to its Khuzistan province which had a large Arab population and hoping for a coup in Tehran to overthrow Khomeini. It’s impossible to call those acts of self-defense. Khadduri also never goes over what was happening on the battlefield in any part of the book, which would explain why Iraq quickly called for a ceasefire in the war. That was because Iraq had no strategy for its invasion and quickly got bogged down. Baghdad therefore called for a ceasefire and international intervention via the United Nations and other bodies to try to save itself because it knew it couldn’t win. It also withdrew from Iranian territory in 1982 because that was going to happen very soon anyway as Tehran had seized the initiative by then and was on the offensive. In an earlier book upon Baathist Iraq Khadduri said that he stood behind the party as the best one to run the country after years of turmoil and coups. In this one he repeats his support by saying that the only way the Iraqi regime was going to survive was that if it backed Saddam in 1979 after President Bakr stepped down. He even expounds some fantasy by saying that the Baath were for parliamentary democracy. It’s also obvious that he only relied upon Iraqi sources for his retelling of the war. This makes The Gulf War completely useless as a history book.  

The Gulf War, The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict was a huge disappointment. Khadduri’s other books on Iraq were highly informative histories. This one starts off with a very conventional explanation of the background to the Iran-Iraq War, and then repeats all of Iraq’s claims about why the war started and how Iran refused to end it. All of the blame is placed upon Tehran without any kind of critique or analysis of Iraq’s side. That was because of the author’s sympathy for the Baath party which he made explicit in this volume and another.