Murray, Williamson, Woods, Kevin, The Iran-Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History, Cambridge University Press, 2014
The Iran-Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History was the third in the Iraqi Perspectives Project that used captured Baathist documents to try to explain major events in recent Iraqi history. The book portrays the Iran-Iraq War as one between two leaders with expansionist visions who had no idea about military affairs. The result was an eight year bloody war of attrition that ended in a tie. That was only possible because Iraq was able to acquire far more weapons on the international market than the numerically superior Iran that had burned its bridges with most of the world. The Iraqi military also improved at the tactical level and relied upon its armor and artillery against lightly armed Iranian infantry.
The book begins with breaking down Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and their outlook on the war. Saddam believed that invading Iran would not only take care of a revolutionary government which threatened his regime but would rally the Arab world behind him and make him the undisputed Arab leader. Iraqi intelligence told him that Tehran was in turmoil after the revolution and that its forces could easily be defeated. That in turn might lead to Khomeini being overthrown. Khomeini on the other hand wanted to export his revolution starting with Iraq which had a Shiite majority the same sect as the ayatollah. Neither had any idea about war or the military and their countries suffered greatly as a result. Saddam for example when discussing whether to attack Iran only talked about seizing disputed territory along the border and humiliating Tehran. He had absolutely nothing to say about what the strategy or goals of the war were.
When it came to the actual fighting Saddam and Khomeini both looked to zeal and losses as the deciding factors. They saw ideology as the driving force for their troops to victory. Khomeini for example, mistrusted any officer from the Shah era seeing them as counterrevolutionaries. Instead he turned to militias under the control of individual clerics that became the Revolutionary Guard and Basij who were motivated by religion and the revolution. Saddam viewed Bedouin warrior culture as the most important factor for his troops. They each counted casualties as a sign of victory believing that the more soldiers they lost the harder their armies had fought. After losing a significant piece of property in southern Iraq Saddam said it would be seen as a victory by the world because his forces had fought so hard. The result was that neither leader ever spent any time discussing strategy or goals for the war because they didn’t see them as being important. Their countries suffered as a result. It was like a boxing match where both fighters wanted to punch and thought they could take punishment but had no idea how to win.
Murray and Woods point out that the international arms market played a large role in the conflict. Both turned to foreign countries to buy weapons from spending billions of dollars each year. Tehran was at a disadvantage as it seized American hostages during the revolution, talked about spreading its revolution, and being against both the East and the West. It largely came to rely upon Syria, Libya, North Korea and China. The irony was that the Iranian military mostly used American weapons purchased during the Shah’s era while its allies sold it Soviet era equipment. Most of its U.S. weapons were out of service or destroyed by the end. Iraq could not only buy from a far greater number of nations but had far more money to spend thanks to loans from the Gulf States. Towards the end of the war Iraq had a material advantage in tanks, artillery, and planes that allowed it to go on the offensive in the last year of the war which helped convince Khomeini to call for peace.
Finally, Iraq should’ve had an advantage throughout the conflict due to the make-up of its military but failed due to its poor leadership. Iraq’s army was built around tanks and artillery. Its roads and highways were far superior to Iran’s allowing it to quickly move its troops from north to south. Because Khomeini didn’t trust his army his reliance upon the Revolutionary Guard and Basij meant Tehran only had light infantry. It could break through Iraqi lines but could not exploit it because of its lack of mobility. The Revolutionary Guard had no real military training either meaning its offensives were simple matters of infiltration and human wave attacks. The longer battles lasted also meant the Iraqis could mass their greater firepower and inflict huge losses. There was no Iraqi blitzkrieg however because Saddam didn’t understand strategy and promoted officers who were Baathist loyalists rather than competent military men. Iraq relied upon explicit orders given in great detail for simply maneuvers that officers were to carry out to a tee or face execution. Thus during the entire war only small portions of land switched hands because that’s all the armies were capable of.
The Iran-Iraq War was one of the longest in recent history and yet there are few books written about it. Williamson and Woods’ volume is one of the best because it has such in depth insights on the Iraqi side using captured documents. Many times the authors use long quotes from Saddam and his advisors on specific events. It also has some good Iranian sources so it is not a one sided history. It gives both the macro view of the war from the leaders’ positions down to the tactical level with individual battles. It should be one of the first book people pick up to understand the conflict.
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